Cole v. Hobby Town Unlimited, Inc., No. 4:25-cv-04217-SLD-RLH (July 24, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Morgan Cole v. Hobby Town Unlimited, Inc.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
July 24, 2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
Order Sara Darrow (J.) (unanimous Court)
MORGAN COLE, Plaintiff, v. HOBBY TOWN UNLIMITED, INC., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 2138008Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, C.D. Illinois.MORGAN COLE, Plaintiff,v.HOBBY TOWN UNLIMITED,INC., Defendant.Case No. 4:25-cv-04217-SLD-RLH|Filed: 07/24/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsDavid Baldemar Reyes, Equal Access Law Group PLLC,Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff.ORDERSARA DARROW UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff Morgan Cole's motion fordefault judgment, ECF No. 25. For the reasons that follow,the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.Additionally, because several citations in Plaintiff's motionappear to be fabricated or do not support the propositionfor which they are cited, Attorney David Baldemar Reyes,Plaintiff's counsel, is ORDERED to show cause why heshould not be sanctioned.BACKGROUND1I. Factual BackgroundDefendant Hobby Town Unlimited, Inc. is a company sellinga variety of hobby and leisure products both in brick-and-mortar stores and online at Hobbytown.com (“the website”).Defendant accepts online delivery orders through the website.Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind resident ofHenry County, Illinois. He requires screen-reading softwareto read website content. Plaintiff cannot use a computermouse to navigate websites because he cannot see the cursormove across the screen or otherwise complete the requisitevisual activities. Consequently, Plaintiff is limited to using akeyboard to navigate websites.While using his screen reader, Plaintiff visited the website onApril 7, 2025, intending to purchase a LEGO set. Plaintiffalleges that he was unable to purchase the LEGO set becauseof accessibility issues. Specifically, Plaintiff noticed a lackof alternative text embedded beneath images, preventing hisscreen reader from vocalizing a description of the image.Interactive elements on the website were unlabeled, so thescreen reader did not announce their names, leaving Plaintiffunable to understand their purpose. The “skip to content” link,which should allow keyboard users to skip the navigationmenu and move the keyboard focus to the main content,was implemented incorrectly, forcing Plaintiff to tab throughall sub-menu links to navigate. This is merely a sample ofthe issues Plaintiff alleges. As a result of these issues, thewebsite requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction,rendering it essentially impossible for blind users like Plaintiffto purchase a product on the website. Plaintiff alleges that hestill wants to purchase a LEGO set on the website and wouldimmediately visit the website again if the accessibility barrierswere removed.II. Procedural HistoryPlaintiff initiated this action in the Northern District of Illinoison April 15, 2025, naming Amain.com, Inc. as the defendant.See Compl., ECF No. 1. On July 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed theoperative Amended Complaint and substituted Hobby Townas defendant. Plaintiff alleges Defendant's website violatesTitle III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42U.S.C. §§ 12181–89. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56–70, ECF No. 12.On September 23, 2025, Judge Pallmeyer in the NorthernDistrict of Illinois entered Hobby Town's default. See Sep.23, 2025 Min. Entry, ECF No. 17. On October 29, 2025,Plaintiff requested a change of venue to this Court, see Mot.Change Venue, ECF No. 18, which Judge Pallmeyer granted,see Nov. 10, 2025 Min. Entry, ECF No. 21. On January 27,2026, Plaintiff filed the pending motion for default judgment,seeking (1) an injunction which would require Hobby Townto bring the website into compliance with the ADA within180 days and (2) a declaration that the website is in violationof Title III of the ADA. See Mot. Default J. 6. Plaintiffalso requests that the Court reserve jurisdiction to determinereasonable attorney's fees. Id. at 7.2DISCUSSION
MORGAN COLE, Plaintiff, v. HOBBY TOWN UNLIMITED, INC., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2I. Legal Standard*2 A default proceeding is a two-step process. See In re Catt,368 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2004) (“There are two stages ina default proceeding: the establishment of the default, andthe actual entry of a default judgment.”). “When a partyagainst whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought hasfailed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shownby affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party'sdefault” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Whenthe plaintiff's requested relief is not for a sum that is or can bemade certain, Rule 55(b)(2) then requires the party to movethe court for entry of a default judgment. After default isentered, “the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint relatingto liability are taken as true,” Dundee Cement Co. v. HowardPipe & Concrete Prods., Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir.1983), but “a default is not treated as an absolute confessionby the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff's rightto recover,” Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hou. Nat'l Bank, 515F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Danning v. Lavine,572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[F]acts which arenot established by the pleadings of the prevailing party, orclaims which are not well-pleaded, are not binding and cannotsupport the judgment.”). Whether to enter a default judgmentis in the court's discretion. See Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. ofIll., 473 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2007). “A default judgmentmust not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what isdemanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).II. Analysisa. LiabilityThe Court is satisfied that Hobby Town violated TitleIII of the ADA. Title III prevents discrimination againstdisabled individuals by owners, lessors, or operators of publicaccommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To prevail on aTitle III claim, a plaintiff must “show (1) that [he] is disabledwithin the meaning of the ADA, (2) that [the defendant]owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation,and (3) that [he] was discriminated against on the basis of[his] disability.” Walsh v. Dania Inc., 716 F. Supp. 3d 655,658 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (citing Mohammed v. DuPage LegalAssistance Found., 781 F. App'x 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2019)); seealso McCabe v. Tire Web LLC, No. 23-cv-459-pp, 2024 WL4144200, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 11, 2024) (identifying sameelements); Morey v. McDonald's Corp., No. 18 C 1137, 2018WL 11212379, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 26, 2018) (identifyingsame elements).Plaintiff's allegation that he has visual acuity with correctionof less than or equal to 20 x 200 and is therefore legally blind,Am. Compl. 2, suffices to show that he is disabled within themeaning of the ADA because “the term ‘disability’ means ...a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits oneor more major life activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A),and “major life activities include ... seeing,” id. § 12102(2)(A). See McCabe v. Heid Music Co., No. 23-CV-1215-JPS,2024 WL 1174352, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 19, 2024) (“Legalblindness is recognized as a disability under the ADA.”).Hobby Town's website is a place of public accommodation.Although websites are not specifically listed as publicaccommodations within Title III, see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7),Seventh Circuit decisions suggest that an online storefrontwould be viewed as such, see Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins.Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that TitleIII applies to both physical and electronic spaces and that“the owner or operator of a ... Web site ... that is open tothe public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering thefacility and, once in, from using the facility in the same waythat the nondisabled do” (citation omitted)); Morgan v. JointAdmin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001) (declining“to interpret ‘public accommodation’ literally, as denoting aphysical site”),3 and district courts have widely treated thisas considered dictum4 in finding that websites are publicaccommodations, see, e.g., Colon v. HY Supplies, Inc., No.22 CV 5915, 2023 WL 7666740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15,2023) (following Morgan dictum in holding that “a ‘placeof public accommodation’ does not have to be a physicalspace”); Walsh, 716 F. Supp. 3d at 660; Wright v. ThreadExperiment, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-01423-SEB-TAB, 2021 WL243604, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 22, 2021). Given that recentconsidered “dictum provides the best, though not an infallible,guide to what the law is, and it will ordinarily be the duty ofa lower court to be guided by it,” Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1994), the Court elects to follow thisguidance. As such, the website operated by Hobby Town is aplace of public accommodation.*3 Plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of hisdisability by being prevented from fully enjoying the use ofthe website and the goods and services Hobby Town sellsthrough it. Proving that discrimination occurred on the basisof a disability does not require intent. See A.H. v. Ill. HighSch. Ass'n, 881 F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 2018). It is enoughthat a disabled individual be discriminated against “in thefull and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
MORGAN COLE, Plaintiff, v. HOBBY TOWN UNLIMITED, INC., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place ofpublic accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). District courtshave found that barriers for blind individuals in navigating awebsite are sufficient to constitute discrimination in the fullenjoyment of goods and services. See Walsh, 716 F. Supp.3d at 661 (finding that stating specific barriers and how theyimpeded use of a website to purchase furniture was sufficientto allege discrimination); Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *3(finding that the plaintiff sufficiently pled a violation of TitleIII where the website was inaccessible to blind individuals);Heid, 2024 WL 1174352, at *4–5 (finding that a digitalprogram's incompatibility with screen-reading software wassufficient to satisfy the discrimination element). Plaintiffhas alleged that accessibility issues prevented him fromnavigating the website to make a purchase as a nondisabledperson could, including an inability to make a purchaseon the website independently. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35–36.Consequently, if he wished to make a purchase, Plaintiff wasrequired to go to a brick-and-mortar store. Id. 37. This isa discriminatory barrier to Plaintiff's full use and enjoymentof a public accommodation. Cf. Walsh, 716 F. Supp. 3d at661 (“It is of no consequence that [the plaintiff] could havecalled or emailed [the defendant] to complete [the plaintiff's]purchase.”).b. ReliefIn Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, he requests (1)declaratory relief, (2) injunctive relief, and (3) that theCourt reserve jurisdiction to determine attorney's fees. Mot.Default J. 6–7. The Court can easily dispose of the firstand third requests. Plaintiff may file a request for attorney'sfees after entry of judgment pursuant to Civil Local Rule54.1. Attorney's fees are available under the ADA, see 42U.S.C. § 12205, though due to the Court's concerns aboutinaccurate citations and potential AI use, such a request maybe denied, see infra Section II(c). And declaratory relief isinappropriate here. The purpose of declaratory judgment isto “settle the disputed legal relationships and afford relieffrom ... uncertainty.” See NUCOR Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilasde Occidente, S.A. de C.V., 28 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 1994).Where, as here, the disputes are being resolved in the instantlawsuit, declaratory relief is inappropriate. See Field v. Hous.Auth. of Cook Cnty., No. 17-cv-02044, 2018 WL 3831513,at *10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2018) (denying declaratory reliefwhere it “would do nothing to clarify the legal relationsbetween the parties for any future litigation because [theplaintiff] [was] already pursuing [the] claims ... in the instantlawsuit”).Injunctive relief is the only remedy available under TitleIII itself. See Scherr v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069,1075 (7th Cir. 2013). However, injunctive relief does notautomatically issue upon a violation because, “although adefault judgment establishes liability, it does not answerwhether any particular remedy is appropriate.” e360 Insightv. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 2007).Injunctive relief may be awarded at the default judgmentstage, see Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *4 (“[I]njunctions[are] commonly issue[d] as part of default judgments.”),although the “judgment must not differ in kind from, orexceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings,” Fed.R. Civ. P. 54(c). To receive a permanent injunction, a plaintiffmust demonstrate(1) that [he] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) thatremedies available at law, such as monetary damages,are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiffand defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) thatthe public interest would not be disserved by a permanentinjunction.eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391(2006).5 Courts must conduct a balancing exercise evenwhen injunctive relief is the only relief authorized by statute.LAJIM, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 917 F.3d 933, 944 (7th Cir.2019).*4 Here, Plaintiff qualifies for injunctive relief. AcceptingPlaintiff's factual allegations as true, the first two elementsare satisfied. Plaintiff was unable to use the website to makea purchase, and this deprivation of Hobby Town's servicesconstitutes irreparable harm. Am. Compl. 10; see Heid,2024 WL 1174352, at *7 (holding that an inability to accessbusiness offerings on a digital platform was an irreparableharm); Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *4–5 (granting apermanent injunction where website was inaccessible toindividuals with vision impairments); LAJIM, 917 F.3d at945 (finding that where an environmental statute authorizesonly injunctive relief, “[t]he proven harm is, by definition,irreparable absent an injunction”). Because injunctive reliefis the only kind of relief available under Title III of the ADA,the second element is satisfied as well—absent an injunction,there will be no remedies available at all to Plaintiff. See Heid,2024 WL 1174352, at *7;
MORGAN COLE, Plaintiff, v. HOBBY TOWN UNLIMITED, INC., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4The remaining two elements are also satisfied. The balanceof hardships weighs in favor of granting Plaintiff a permanentinjunction, given that the hardships suffered by Hobby Townin the present case (costs incurred by updating its website)would be relatively minor. Requiring defendants to maketheir websites accessible to disabled individuals is a smallburden, see Wright, 2021 WL 243604, at *4 (“[W]e discernno hardship, beyond incurring certain costs necessary to bring[the website] into compliance with the ADA, that will besuffered by [the d]efendant.”), and is outweighed by theharm a plaintiff suffers when unable to patronize businessesthrough their online platforms, see Heid, 2024 WL 1174352,at *7 (holding that “the hardship of being unable to access[the defendant's] Digital Platform and ... inability to patronizethe [the d]efendant business to the same degree as thoseindividuals not falling within the protection of the ADA”outweighs any burden placed on the business). And the publicinterest would not be disserved by a permanent injunctionbecause “the public has a strong interest in eliminatingdiscrimination and in enforcing the ADA.” See Wright, 2021WL 243604, at *4 (quotation marks omitted); PGA Tour, Inc.v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001) (“Congress enacted theADA in 1990 to remedy widespread discrimination againstdisabled individuals.”).Even though the elements for injunctive relief have been met,“the Court must assure itself that the injunctive relief soughtis appropriately tailored to address the violation.” Heid, 2024WL 1174352, at *8; see also Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v.Scheidler, 396 F.3d 807, 817 (7th Cir. 2005) (referencing“the rule requiring courts to tailor injunctive relief to thescope of the violation found”). The Court is satisfied thatPlaintiff's proposed order for injunctive relief is tailored tothe scope of the ADA violation. The specific injunctive reliefrequested relates to discrete instances of discriminatory webdesign, and Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that theseelements of the website's design operate specifically as abarrier to blind individuals because of either incompatibilitywith screen readers or keyboard-only navigation. CompareMot. Default J. 6, with Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 35. The proposedinjunctive relief relates specifically to those instances wherethe website's design “interfere[s] with a plaintiff's abilityto enjoy a public accommodation in a manner akin to thatwhich nondisabled individuals enjoy,” Walsh, 716 F. Supp.3d at 661, and where an “individual with a disability is ...denied services... or otherwise treated differently,” 42 U.S.C.§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). In other words, the proposed injunctiverelief applies specifically to instances in which Title III ofthe ADA was violated under the facts of this case, so theinjunction will not “depart[ ] from the traditional equitableprinciple that injunctions should prohibit no more than theviolation established in the litigation or similar conductreasonably related to the violation.” E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone,Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 841 (7th Cir. 2013). Because the elementsfor injunctive relief have been met and the relief soughtis appropriately tailored to address the Title III violations,injunctive relief is warranted here. Cf. Kennedy v. KabirPramukh Macomb Hosp. LLC, No. 1:20-cv-01134-SLD-JEH,2021 WL 4494273, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Becauseinjunctive relief must be specific, it is imperative that [thep]laintiff be clear about what information she believes thewebsites were lacking in order for the Court to address thepossibility of injunctive relief.” (citation omitted)).c. Order to Show Cause*5 In reviewing Plaintiff's motion, the Court has uncoverednumerous citations that appear to be fabricated or do notsupport the propositions for which they are cited. Plaintiff'sfirst citations in paragraphs eighteen and nineteen could notbe located on either Lexis or Westlaw.6 Mot. Default J. 4.Further, Plaintiff's citations in paragraphs seventeen, twenty-five, and twenty-six do not support the propositions for whichthey are cited. In paragraph seventeen, id., Plaintiff citesLiebhart v. SPX Corp., 998 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2021), assupport for the four factors that courts apply in permanentinjunctive relief cases. However, the four factors recitedin Plaintiff's Motion are not the four factors that Liebhartprovides. Compare id. at 779, with Mot. Default J. 4. Inparagraph twenty-five, Plaintiff cites Goodman v. IllinoisDepartment of Financial and Professional Regulation, 430F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that “TitleIII of the ADA does not provide compensatory or punitivedamages.” Mot. Default J. 5–6. Although it is true thatcompensatory and punitive damages are unavailable underthe ADA, see Heid, 2024 WL 1174352, at *7, Goodmanmakes no mention of the ADA—it discusses a FirstAmendment challenge to the Illinois Medical Practice Act.430 F.3d at 434. In paragraph twenty-six, Plaintiff cites SierraClub v. Franklin County Power of Illinois, LLC, 546 F.3d918 (7th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that “the requiredfixes ... are modest in cost relative to the harms avoided.” Mot.Default J. 6. Sierra Club has nothing to do with websites, theADA, or the costs associated with altering a website; rather,it is about an environmental organization seeking injunctiverelief to prohibit the construction of a coal power plant. 546F.3d at 922.
MORGAN COLE, Plaintiff, v. HOBBY TOWN UNLIMITED, INC., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5The Court is deeply troubled by these errors. When filingwith a court, an attorney represents that “legal contentionsare warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argumentfor extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or forestablishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). “Adherenceto these rules is crucial to the administration of justice”because “[v]iolations ... result in confusion and timewasted ... tracking[ing] down ... false citations, seek[ing]explanations from counsel, and evaluat[ing] the magnitudeof the violations.” Dec v. Mullin, 171 F.4th 940, 948 (7thCir. 2026). Furthering the Court's concern is the fact thathallucinated cases are a telltale sign of AI usage. AI usageis of special concern to the Court because “[i]t promotescynicism about the legal profession and the American judicialsystem.” Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448(S.D.N.Y. 2023). In addition, “[w]hile the court takes timeto investigate, other cases may be disrupted or deprived ofjudicial attention.” Virgil v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., No.1:25-cv-01641-MPB-MJD, 2026 WL 401066, at *4 (S.D. Ind.Feb. 12, 2026). Finally, and perhaps what should have beenmost troubling to Plaintiff's counsel here, is that, as a result ofAI usage, “client[s] may be deprived of arguments based onauthentic judicial precedents.” Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 448.Notably, this is not the first time that Plaintiff's counsel,Attorney David Reyes, has been responsible for inaccuratecitations. In Hippe v. Retention Brands, LLC, No. 25-CV-596,2026 WL 1802971, at **2–3 (E.D. Wis. June 23, 2026),he was ordered to show cause for inaccurate citations that“[bore] ... AI fingerprints.” (noting that the motion for defaultjudgment filed by Attorney Reyes contained two hallucinatedcases and relied on Goodman and Sierra Club for propositionswholly unsupported by the cases).Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(3), Reyes isordered to explain the source of these inaccuracies, includingany AI usage, and why he should not be subject to sanctionsfrom the Court.CONCLUSIONAccordingly, Plaintiff Morgan Cole's motion for defaultjudgment, ECF No. 25, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIEDIN PART. Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief is DENIED,and his claim for injunctive relief is GRANTED. AttorneyDavid Baldemar Reyes, counsel for Cole, is ORDERED TOSHOW CAUSE why he should not be sanctioned for theinclusion of fabricated and inaccurate citations by August7, 2026. Plaintiff may file a request for attorney's fees nolater than fourteen days after the entry of judgment, pursuantto Civil Local Rule 54.1. The Court will issue a separateinjunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d).*6 Entered this 24th day of July, 2026.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 2138008Footnotes1Unless otherwise noted, the facts related herein are taken from the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 12, and the Courtaccepts the allegations relating to liability as true by virtue of Defendant's default. See Wehrs v. Wells, 688 F.3d 886,892 (7th Cir. 2012).2Plaintiff also sought class action certification; however, in his motion for default judgment, he expressly chooses to nolonger seek class relief. Mot. Default J. 6. Additionally, Plaintiff appears to have abandoned his negligent infliction ofemotional distress claim and his requests for damages for that claim. Compare Am. Compl. 19–20, with Mot. Default J.The Court will treat the claim as abandoned. See Okeke v. Nantomah, No. 25-cv-36-pp, 2025 WL 2494024, at *7 (E.D.Wis. Aug. 29, 2025) (declining to grant damages requested in complaint but not in motion for default judgment); seealso Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding & Equip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Perfunctory and undevelopedarguments are waived....”).3The First Circuit has held that public accommodations under Title III are not limited to physical structures. See CarpartsDistrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New Eng., Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994) (to “limit the application ofTitle III to physical structures which persons must enter to obtain goods and services would run afoul of the purposes of theADA”). The Ninth Circuit has held that Title III of the ADA may extend beyond physical spaces if there is some connectionto an actual physical place. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]omeconnection between the good or service complained of and an actual physical place is required.”); Robles v. Domino's
MORGAN COLE, Plaintiff, v. HOBBY TOWN UNLIMITED, INC., Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding Title III of the ADA applies where a “website ... facilitate[s] accessto the goods and services of a place of public accommodation—[the defendant's] physical restaurants”); c.f. Lloyd v.Facebook, Inc., No. 23-15318, 2024 WL 3325389, at *1 (9th Cir. July 8, 2024) (the ADA claim fails because Facebookis not a place of public accommodation). Although the Third and Sixth Circuits have declined to extend the meaning ofpublic accommodation beyond physical places, see Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3d Cir. 1998)(declining to extend the meaning of public accommodation to encompass disability benefits); Peoples v. Discover Fin.Servs., 387 F. App'x 179, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2010) (declining to extend the meaning of public accommodation to encompasscommunications between a credit card processing terminal and the defendant); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d1006, 1013–14 (6th Cir. 1997) (declining to extend the meaning of public accommodation to include a benefit plan), districtcourts have distinguished these cases and found that Title III protections can extend to websites, see Gniewkowski v.Lettuce Entertain You Enters., 251 F. Supp. 3d 908, 918–19 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (finding a cognizable Title III claim wherealleged discrimination took place on the defendant's website); Mahoney v. Bittrex, Inc., No. 19-3836, 2020 WL 212010,at **2–3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2020) (holding that websites can be places of public accommodation where there is a nexusbetween a physical place of public accommodation and the services or goods denied); Castillo v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC,286 F. Supp. 3d 870, 881 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (finding a Title III claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss where “[theplaintiff] ha[d] sufficiently alleged a nexus between [the defendant's] website and its brick-and-mortar stores”). The FifthCircuit has declined to extend the meaning of public accommodation beyond physical places, see Magee v. Coca-ColaRefreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 2016) (declining to extend the meaning of public accommodationto encompass vending machines), which district courts have interpreted as meaning that websites cannot be placesof public accommodation and are not covered by Title III, see Strojnik v. Landry's Inc., No. 4:19-CV-01170, 2019 WL7461681, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2019) (“[A]n ADA claim [can] not be based on the alleged deficiencies in a business'website because a website is not a place of public accommodation.” (citing Magee, 833 F.3d at 534–36)); Zaid v. SmartFin. Credit Union, No. H-18-1130, 2019 WL 314732, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2019) (relying on Magee and finding that“[b]ecause a website is not a place of public accommodation under the ADA, [the defendant] cannot be liable for itswebsite's alleged failure to comply with the ADA”).4Considered dictum is “recent dictum that considers all the relevant considerations and adumbrates an unmistakableconclusion.” See Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1994).5In Plaintiff's motion, he cites Liebhart v. SPX Corp., 998 F.3d 772, 779 (7th Cir. 2021), as support for applying a differentfour-factor test for permanent injunctions than the one recited above. Mot. Default J. 4. Liebhart provides the same fourfactors recited above, and in fact includes the exact same quote, Liebhart, 998 F.3d at 779 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 391),so it is unclear where Plaintiff has sourced the test he applies in his motion. The Court will apply the four-factor eBay testand will address this and other legal inaccuracies in its discussion of its order to show cause. See infra Section II(c).6The Court does not include the hallucinated citations or discuss them with more specificity to avoid these nonexistentcitations becoming part of a published record which could be cited in the future.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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