Collins v. Nova Ass'n Mgmt. Partners LLC, No. C20-1206-JCC (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Collins v. Nova Association Management Partners LLC
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
United States District (J.) (unanimous Court)
Collins v. Nova Association Management Partners LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 89619Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Washington,At Seattle.John E. COLLINS, Jr., Plaintiff,v.NOVA ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENTPARTNERS LLC, et al., Defendants.CASE NO. C20-1206-JCC|Signed January 13, 2026Attorneys and Law FirmsChristina Latta Henry, Henry & Degraaff Ps, Seattle, WA, forPlaintiff.Seth E. Chastain, Seattle, WA, Tyler Kerr, Park Chenaur &Associates Inc, Federal Way, WA, for Defendant.Jeffrey T Kestle, Forsberg & Umlauf (Sea), Seattle, WA,Marc Rosenberg, Beresford Booth Pllc, Edmonds, WA, forDefendant.John C. Coughenour, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGEORDER*1 This matter comes before the Court on Rachel R.Burkemper's and Sound Legal Partners, LLC (“SLP”) (the“moving defendants”) renewed motion to dismiss (Dkt. No.51). Having thoroughly considered the briefing and therelevant record, the Court GRANTS the motion in part andDENIES the motion in part as described below for the reasonsexplained herein.I. BACKGROUNDThis case follows a protracted fee dispute and lien foreclosurebetween Plaintiff here, John Collins, Jr. (a condominiumowner), and his homeowners’ association, Villa MarinaAssociation of Apartment Owners (“Villa Marina”). (See Dkt.No. 11 at 6–10.) It involves allegedly inaccurate and inflatedfee ledgers (as prepared by Villa Marina's property manager,Nova Association Management Partners, LLC (“Nova”)),and allegedly misleading collection actions taken by VillaMarina's lawyer, Ms. Burkemper, and her law firm, SLP,culminating in the lien foreclosure. (See id.) Mr. Collins filedsuit here (during the pendency of the foreclosure action)asserting Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) andWashington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) violations(amongst other causes of action) against all the parties notedabove. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 11.) The Court articulated Mr. Collins’specific allegations in a prior order. (See Dkt. No. 40 at 1–3.)It will not repeat that information here.Following a lengthy stay of this case during the pendencyof the foreclosure action, the moving defendants nowseek dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).1 (Dkt. No. 51.)Supporting arguments are as follows: (a) Villa Marina'sstate court foreclosure judgment defeats claims predicatedon inaccurate reporting of amounts owing; (b) the movingdefendants complied with the FDCPA in communicating withMr. Collins; (c) as a matter of law, CPA and/or FDCPA claimscannot be brought against a lawyer for conduct supportingthe foreclosure action; (d) Mr. Collins failed to otherwiseplausibly assert the elements of a CPA claim; (e) Mr. Collinsfailed to adequately plead civil conspiracy; and, finally, (f)the pleaded declaratory and/or injunctive relief claims areinapt. (See Dkt. No. 51 at 6–25.) Mr. Collins, in opposing,challenges both the motion's procedural propriety and itssubstantive arguments. (See generally Dkt. No. 53.)II. DISCUSSIONA. Citations Contained in Plaintiff's Opposition Brief(Dkt. No. 53)*2 As a preliminary matter, the Court took note of the non-existent and inaccurate legal citation incorporated within Mr.Collins’ opposition brief (Dkt. No. 53) (including citationson pages 5, 6, 8–10, 13), as pointed out by the movingdefendants on reply. (See Dkt. No. 54 at 1– 2.) These citationsare troubling but, before going further on this issue, moreinformation is needed. Plaintiff's counsel shall file a noticecontaining a complete list of nonexistent, incorrect, and orinapt legal citations contained in the opposition brief (Dkt.No. 53) with an explanation as to how and/or why each wereincluded in counsel's brief.B. Procedural Issue(s)Turning to the motion to dismiss, which Mr. Collins firstcontends is improperly successive. (See Dkt. No. 53 at 5–6)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2)). Specifically, says Mr. Collins,the motion violates Rule 12(g)(2) and is duplicative of themoving defendants’ previously filed motion to dismiss. (Id.)
Collins v. Nova Association Management Partners LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2This argument fails to appreciate the import of the Court'sdisposition of that motion, which was to deny it withoutprejudice. (See Dkt. No. 40 at 7.) The Court intended thisto work as a complete reboot, i.e., as if the motion neverhappened.2 This is why the Court reset the Rule 12(a) andRule 26 deadlines when it lifted the stay here. (See Dkt. No.50.) Thus, the present motion does not violate Rule 12(g)(2)nor is it impermissibly successive. Mr. Collins’ proceduralattack is without merit.C. Substantive Argument(s)With the preliminary issues resolved, the Court now addressesMr. Collins’ substantive challenges to the 12(b)(6) motion.(See Dkt. No. 53 at 6–18.)1. Legal Standard – Adequacy of a ClaimPursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), acomplaint fails to state a claim if it lacks either a cognizablelegal theory or sufficient factual allegations to support thatclaim. Zixiang v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013).Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint mustcontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘statea claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In assessing such amotion, the Court may consider (along with the complaint)those documents duly incorporated into the complaint byreference, see Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir.2006), and/or matters of judicial notice, such as public recordsand court documents, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Evid. 201. Here, thatincludes records of the state court lien foreclosure proceeding.(Dkt. Nos. 49, 52.)2. Import of State Court Judgment – In GeneralThe moving defendants contend that, because the state courtissued judgment in Villa Marina's favor based on the sameledger that Mr. Collins contends was not accurate,3 claimspredicated on this inaccuracy are precluded and cannot beplausibly alleged. (See Dkt. No. 51 at 5–6, 54 at 4–5.) Tofind otherwise would violate full faith and credit and theRooker-Feldman4 doctrine. (Id.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738;Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982);Hachamovitch v. DeBuono, 159 F.3d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 1998);Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 199(4th Cir. 1997); Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981,983 (8th Cir. 1995)). The Court agrees—to a point.*3 To the extent the moving defendants’ communicationsand their court filings relied on the same or an equivalentledger to what Villa Marina received judgment on, suchclaims fail as a matter of law, as preemption would indeedapply. See Roberts v. WMC Secured Assets Corp., 2010 WL11623551, slip op. at 8 (D. Or. 2010) (citing Kremer, 456 U.S.at 466; Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003)). Noris it lost on the Court that Mr. Collins’ complaint precededVilla Marina's judgment on the foreclosure action. It stands toreason, then, that the complaint does not clearly distinguishbetween the ledgers balance(s) ostensibly ratified by the statecourt and those which were not. (See generallyDkt. No. 11.)Thus, at least at present, claims predicated on an inaccurateledger are too unclear to be adequately pleaded.Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES all claims whollysupported by allegations of misleading and/or deceptiveaccounting, whether they be FDCPA, CPA, or other claims.But it will provide Mr. Collins with leave to amend, to allowhim to clarify which balances the state court ratified andwhich it did not.3. FDCPA Violations (Count III)Of course, inaccurate and/or misleading ledger balances arenot the only alleged violation here. (See generally Dkt.No. 11.) The moving defendants served as Nova and VillaMarina's debt collector (in addition to serving as their legalrepresentative). (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 11 at 3–4.) Thus, theywere subject to all aspects of the FDCPA (at least whenserving in this role),5 see Brown v. Transworld Sys. Inc.,646 F. Supp. 3d 1328, 1340 (W.D. Wash. 2022). See 15U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p. The moving defendants contend thattheir actions complied with the FDCPA in all respects. Thus,they move to dismiss all alleged FDCPA violations as eitherinadequately pleaded or because they fail as a matter of law.(See Dkt. No. 51 at 6–11.) The Court addresses each, in turn,below.i. Debt Validation (15 U.S.C. § 1692g)Amongst the FDCPA's requirements is that a debt collectorfirst notify the debtor of the amount of the debt, thecreditor's identity, and the debtor's right to dispute and obtainverification of the debt within 30 days of receiving the notice.See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). In addition, the debt collectorcannot do or say anything during the subsequent 30-day
Collins v. Nova Association Management Partners LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3validation period to “overshadow” or contradict this notice ofthe debtor's rights. § 1692g(b).6*4 The moving defendants’ initial communication (Dkt. No.11-3) contained multiple payment deadlines—some of themsooner than the 30-day validation period. (See Dkt. No. 11at 26.) The moving defendants argue that this is entirelyappropriate, based on out-of-circuit authority. (Dkt. No. 51at 7–8) (citing, e.g., Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padric,Cobb, Nichols & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir.2000)). But the cited cases are inapposite. Miller, for example,holds that debt collectors can avoid claims that they failedto state “the amount” of a debt if they explain that the summight fluctuate daily; it says nothing about listing multipledue dates. 214 F.3d at 876. The plain implication of themultiple dates is that debtor would be better off paying earlierthan later. Regardless, the Court need not decide whetherthis would confuse the least sophisticated debtor becausedismissal is improper for another reason.The moving defendants also say there was no overshadowingbecause “the only express demand for payment [in the initialcommunication] is a due date of November 12, 2019, a dateafter the 30-day validation period.” (Dkt. No. 51 at 8.) But thisargument fails under Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell,845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017). There, the Ninth Circuit held thata notice demanding payment within 35 days of the date of thenotice violated § 1692g(b) because the validation period runsfrom receipt of the letter, not sending; by the time of receipt,there might be less than 30 days left. Id. at 991. “Moreover,even if the debtor received the letter promptly,” the debtorwould probably have to mail the payment before the 30th dayof the dispute period for it to arrive on time. Id. Here, theinitial communication correctly specifies 30 days from receiptversus the date of the letter itself. (Dkt. No. 11-3 at 2.) But italso demands payment “no later than November 12, 2019.”(Id. at 3.) That is the same as demanding payment within 34days from October 9, 2019, the date of the communication.This letter thus violates § 1692g(b) by demanding paymentearlier than Mashiri permits.Mr. Collins also alleges that the moving defendants violated§ 1692g by recording a lien prior to the expiration of the 30-day period. (See Dkt. No. 11 at 27.) However, “[c]ollectionactivities and communications that do not otherwise violatethis subchapter may continue during the 30-day period”unless the consumer disputes the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).In other words, it was permissible to seek a lien before Mr.Collins disputed the debt as long as it would not confusethe least sophisticated debtor as to their statutory disputerights. See Shimek v. Weismann, Nowak, Curry & Wilco,P.C., 374 F.3d 1011, (11th Cir. 2004) (“A debt collector'scontemporaneous filing of a lien...and the sending of adunning letter to a consumer prior to the consumer requestingverification of that debt does not violate the FDCPA.”).And Mr. Collins alleges nothing suggesting that it would.The Court thus DISMISSES FDCPA claims based on thispreviously recorded lien, but not the overshadowing-basedclaims.ii. False or Misleading Representations (15 U.S.C. § 1692e)The FDCPA also forbids misrepresenting “the character,amount, or legal status” of the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).This is a strict liability statute, so a plaintiff need not establishscienter. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2006). “A debt collection letter isdeceptive where it can reasonably be read to have two or moredifferent meanings, one of which is inaccurate.” Gonzales v.Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011).The moving defendants again cite Miller to argue thatMr. Collins fails to state a claim based on an allegedmisrepresentation of the amount of his debt included in theirinitial communication. (Dkt. No. 51 at 9.) While there isnothing inherently misleading about listing amounts due ondifferent dates to show how a debt will increase, the letterdid it in a way that creates confusion about how the amountswere calculated and whether they were accurate. It says, forexample, that the amounts due on October 16 and November1, 2019, “includ[e] $229.15 final payment processing.” (Dkt.No. 11-3 at 3.) But it does not say whether the amount dueon November 19, 2019, also includes that fee. Since VillaMarina owners never authorized this fee, (Dkt. No. 11 at 13),this is material information. The letter also lists two differentamounts owing as of October 9, 2019: $7,321.47 in the textof the letter, and $7,092.32 in the attached lien notice. (Dkt.No. 11-3 at 3–4.) These inconsistent, confusing, and possiblymisleading figures are sufficient to support the notion that theletter plausibly violates § 1692e(2)(A).iii. Harassment or Abuse (§ 1692d) and Unfair Practices (§1692f)*5 Finally, the FDCPA forbids “any conduct the naturalconsequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse anyperson in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15U.S.C. § 1692d Similarly, it prohibits using “unfair orunconscionable means...to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. §
Collins v. Nova Association Management Partners LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.41692f. Mr. Collins asserts that the moving defendants violatedthese statutes by obtaining custodial receivership of hisproperty, intercepting rent from his tenants, and refusing toremove the lien so he could sell his condo. (Dkt No. 11 at16–17, 31–32.) Trouble is, this conduct is precisely whatWashington law authorizes in this circumstance. Under RCW64.32.200(2):All sums assessed by theassociation...but unpaid for the shareof the common expenses chargeable toany apartment shall constitute a lienon such apartment ....Such lien...maybe foreclosed by suit by the manageror board of directors ....In any suchforeclosure the apartment owner shallbe required to pay a reasonable rentalfor the apartment, if so provided inthe bylaws, and the plaintiff in suchforeclosures shall be entitled to theappointment of a receiver to collect thesame.Moreover, the state appellate court affirmed the trial court'sappointment of a receiver here. (Dkt. No. 39-1). Thus, themoving defendants’ use of these remedies did not violatethe FDCPA. See, e.g., Zizlsperger v. Maxwell & Morgan PC,565 F. App'x 636 (9th Cir. 2014) (implying that garnishingwages in accordance with a court order does not violate theFDCPA); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (authorizing otherwise-forbidden communications with third parties with “theexpress permission of a court..., or as reasonably necessary toeffectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy.”) Thus, the Courtdismisses FDCPA claims predicated on these allegations, asthey fail as a matter of law.4. Conduct During Foreclosure ProceedingAs previously indicated, see supra Part II.C.2., Mr. Collinsdid not adequately plead any claims based on the movingdefendants’ incorporation of inaccurate ledger balances intocommunications or state court filings. Nor can FDCPAclaims survive if they relate to communications once counselrepresented Mr. Collins. See Guerrero v. RJM AcquisitionsLLC, 499 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir. 2007). This is because“[c]ongress viewed attorneys as intermediaries able to bearthe brunt of overreaching debt collection practices fromwhich debtors and their loved ones should be protected.” Id.7Thus, such claims fail here as a matter oflaw.Finally, the CPA claims associated with the foreclosureproceeding also fail as a matter of law but for its own reason:the judicial action privilege. See Jeckle v. Crotty, 85 P.3d 931,938 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). It applies to acts in support of suchproceedings (amongst other litigation) because this is, by itsvery nature, non-entrepreneurial conduct, i.e., not engaged inpursuit of a “trade or commerce,” i.e., that of a debt collector.See Anglin v. Merchants Credit Corp., 2020 WL 4000966, slipop. at 6 (W.D. Wash. 2020), aff'd, 2022 WL 964216 (9th Cir.2022).*6 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES FDCPA claimsto the extent they are based on the moving defendants’communication with Mr. Collins once represented by counsel,and all CPA claims based on the moving defendants’ conductsupporting the foreclosure proceeding.5. Remaining CPA Claim(s) (Counts V, VI, VIII)Ordinarily, to state a CPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in tradeor commerce, (3) impacting the public interest, (4) aninjury to the plaintiff's business or property, and (5) legalcausation. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. SafecoTitle Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1986). But aper se CPA claim truncates the first three elements—solong as the defendant violated “a statute that contains aspecific legislative declaration of public interest impact.”RCW 19.86.093(2). The FDCPA satisfies this requirement.See Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 204 P.3d 885, 897(Wash. 2009) (holding that violation of a debt collectionregulation constitutes a per se CPA violation). As a result,only damages and causation are at issue here, see Keyes v.Bollinger, 640 P.2d 1077, 1080–81 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982),at least for the remaining adequately pleaded and colorableFDCPA violations: 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (“overshadowing”)and § 1692e (misleading representations). See supra PartsII.C.3.(i)–(ii).Turning to the issue, then, of resulting damages: accordingto the complaint, Mr. Collins’ account was “in a perpetualstate of delinquency” which put him further into debt thanhe otherwise would be. (See Dkt. Nos. 11 at 35.) Of course,the first hurdle to recovery for this damage is the preemption
Collins v. Nova Association Management Partners LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5barrier described above. See supra Part II.C.2. This largelynegates such damages. And to the extent colorable damagesremain, it is not clear from the complaint that the movingdefendants, as opposed to Villa Marina and Nova, were atfault (i.e., were the one to charge Mr. Collins the fees). (SeeDkt. No. 11 at 6–7). Given this lack of clarity. all that reallyremains for the Court to consider are conclusory allegations.Relatedly, Mr. Collins neither explains why nor alleges thatthe moving defendants charged him for anything they did notactually bill to Villa Marina. (See generally id.) Nor does heallege, for example, that the communications prompted himto hire a lawyer or spend money investigating. (See generallyid.) Admittedly, the complaint points to his loss of rentalincome and of the right to use his property or sell it forfull value, and eventual foreclosure. (Id. at 35–36.) But theproximate cause of this was Mr. Collins's unpaid debt (which,again, as described above is largely subject to preemption,see supra Part II.C.2., not anything unlawful that the movingdefendants did).8*7 Given all this, the Court finds that Mr. Collins fails tostate any CPA claim against the moving defendants. Thus, theCourt DISMISSES all CPA claims (not addressed above) asinadequately pleaded. Because a portion of this claim maybe curable through amendment, the Court will provide Mr.Collins leave to do so.6. Civil Conspiracy (Count XI)A civil conspiracy requires (1) two or more people combiningto do something unlawful (or something lawful by unlawfulmeans); and (2) entering an agreement to accomplish theconspiracy. Ferrie v. Woodford Research, LLC, 2020 WL3971343, slip op. at 7 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (citations omitted).“Mere suspicion or commonality of interest is insufficientto prove a conspiracy.” Id. Rather, a plaintiff must allegefacts from which the Court can “reasonably infer that [thedefendants] entered into an agreement.” Id. Mr. Collins failsto do this. He alleges that each Defendant, including themoving defendants, was involved in events that led to hisforeclosure. (Dkt. No. 11 at 38–39.) But he does not plausiblyallege anything beyond representation or agency, such asmeetings or communications, from which the Court can inferthat they mutually agreed to collect his debts in an unlawfulway.The Court DISMISSES the civil conspiracy claim against themoving defendants as inadequately pleaded.7. Declaratory/Injunctive Relief (Count X)Finally, Mr. Collins seeks a judicial declaration that themoving defendants’ debt collection practices are unlawful.(Dkt. No. 11 at 40.) The Court has never understood whylitigants file declaratory judgment claims repeating claims foraffirmative relief. Mr. Collins, like many others, fails to statea declaratory judgment claim. See, e.g., Kho v. Wells Fargo& Co., 2012 WL 3240041, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. 2012)(“Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief...will be resolvedby other claims for relief and is therefore superfluous andunnecessary.”).The injunctive relief claim is deficient too. A thresholdrequirement for injunctive relief is the likelihood ofirreparable injury if the relief is not granted. See, e.g., IdahoRivers United v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, 156 F.Supp. 3d 1252, 1259 (W.D. Wash. 2015). Mr. Collins cannotdemonstrate this because he cannot allege that the movingdefendants’ conduct is ongoing or that recurring violations ofthe CPA will befall him or anyone else going forward, as theforeclosure action here is complete. (See Dkt. 52 at 4–31.)8. Leave to AmendIf the Court finds that a complaint fails to state a plausibleclaim for relief, it need not provide leave to amend whenit is “clear...that the complaint could not be saved by anyamendment.” Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems,Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004); see Barahona v.Union Pac. R.R. Co., 881 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018)(leave to amend need not be provided when doing so would befutile). As noted above, it is possible that claims predicated oninaccurate and/or misleading accounting might be adequatelypleaded, along with other claims simply suffering from a lackof supporting allegations (rather than those that fail as a matterof law.) Thus, leave to amend is warranted for these claims.An amended complaint pursuant to the leave provided aboveand below, if filed, is due 21 days from the date of this order.This leave has no impact on the preliminary case schedule.(See Dkt. No. 50.)III. CONCLUSION*8 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED thatthe motion to dismiss (Dkt. No.51) is GRANTED in part, as follows:1. Claims against the moving defendants based oninaccurate or misleading ledger(s), see supra Part II.C.2.,
Collins v. Nova Association Management Partners LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6are DISMISSED, with leave to file an amended complaint(solely addressing the deficiency noted herein);2. The FDCPA claim relating to a pre-foreclosure lienrecording, see supra Part II.C.3.(i)., and a court-appointedreceiver, see supra Part II.C.3.(iii)., is DISMISSED;3. The FDCPA and CPA claims based on the movingdefendants’ post-foreclosure conduct, see supra PartII.C.4, are DISMISSED;4. All remaining CPA claims, see supra Part II.C.5, areDISMISSED, with leave to amend (solely addressing thedeficiencies noted herein);5. The civil conspiracy claim, see supra Part II.C.6, isDISMISSED; with leave to amend (solely addressing thedeficiencies noted herein);6. The declaratory and injunctive relief claim(s), see supraPart II.C.7, are DISMISSED; and7. The dismissals above are with prejudice.Finally, Plaintiff's counsel is ORDERED to comply with theCourt's directive above, see supra Part II.A., within 14 daysfrom the date of this order and explain how non-existent andinaccurate citations made their way into her opposition brief.DATED this 13th day of January 2026.AJohn C. CoughenourUNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGEAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 89619Footnotes1By way of review, Mr. Collins filed his complaint(s) in 2020. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 11.) The moving defendants firstmoved to dismiss shortly thereafter. (Dkt. No. 15.) At the time, Villa Marina was pursuing a lien foreclosurefor monies due (along with fees and costs) through a state court action. (See Dkt. No. 52 at 4–31) (docket inVilla Marina Association of Apartment Owners v. Collins, King County Superior Court Case No. 19-2-32346-9SEA).The Court stayed this matter pending resolution of that proceeding, in accordance with Younger v. Harris,401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).(See Dkt. No. 40 at 1–8.) The Court further denied the outstanding motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 15, 17)without prejudice, pending resolution of the foreclosure action. (See Dkt. No. 40 at 1–8.) That action tookyears to resolve. This is because, following an initial judgment in Villa Marina's favor, the Washington Courtof Appeals remanded the matter for further proceedings. (See Dkt. No. 52 at 4–88.) The case then wentthrough another direct review before, finally, the Washington Supreme Court denied Mr. Collins’ petition fordiscretionary review. (Id.)This Court then lifted the stay and issued an initial scheduling order. (Dkt. Nos. 48, 50.) Shortly thereafter,the moving defendants renewed their motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 51.)2This is not an unusual nor unprecedented approach. See, e.g., Rosenow v. Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL5828010, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (permitting a successive motion to dismiss once stay is lifted);PepperBall Techs., Inc. v. Sec. with Adv. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 11508688, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Cal. 2008)(same); Van Fossen v. Sierra Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 738717, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Cal. 2006)(same); Austin v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1930313, slip op. at 4 (D. Ariz. 2021) (allowing refiling
Collins v. Nova Association Management Partners LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7of motion to include additional cited legal authority). And it falls within the Court's inherent discretion. SeeJohnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992).3Mr. Collins alleges that Villa Marina's ledger contained substantial errors and mysterious charges. (See Dkt.No. 11 at 6–12.) Thus, its incorporation into Ms. Burkemper's and SLP's communications with him and thestate court filings was misleading and/or deceptive (and inherently violative of the FDCPA and CPA). (Id. at12–19; see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 11-3, 11-5, 11- 6.) This, says Mr. Collins, supports all resulting claims relevant tothe instant motion (at least in part). (See Dkt. Nos. 11 at 24–32, 34–40, 53 at 9–18.)4See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 485 (1983).5The court evaluates compliance with the FDCPA by viewing the defendant's conduct from the perspectiveof the “least sophisticated debtor.” See, e.g., Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006). This objective standard protects gullible, shrewd, ignorant, unthinking, andcredulous consumers alike. Id. It applies even if the recipient of a communication is “unusually savvy,”Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011), or did not actually rely on the debtcollector's representation, Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014). Unlikea “reasonable” person, the least sophisticated debtor “is comparatively uninformed and naive about financialmatters and functions as an ‘average consumer in the lowest quartile (or some other substantial bottomfraction) of consumer competence.’ ” Stimpson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 944 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir.2019). Still, this person is not literally “the least intelligent consumer in this nation of [over] 300 million people,”id., and does not adopt “bizarre, idiosyncratic, or peculiar misinterpretations,” Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1062.6Overshadowing or inconsistency occurs where the language in the notice would ‘confuse a least sophisticateddebtor’ as to her validation rights.’ ” Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2017)(quoting Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1997)). Demanding payment before the 30-dayvalidation period expires is one way to violate this rule. Mashiri, 845 F.3d at 991. But the touchstone ofovershadowing is that “the unsophisticated consumer is to be protected against confusion whatever form ittakes.” Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997).7Guerrero’s reasoning—that communications which might confuse an unsophisticated debtor will not deceivethe debtor's lawyer—supports applying the holding even to communications that an attorney presumablyrelays to a client, so long as there is no direct contact with the debtor. See Angel v. Am. Recovery Servs.Inc., 2012 WL 3594371, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (rejecting claim based on voicemail to attorneywhere the plaintiff made “no allegation that ARSI threatened or attempted to contact [her] directly.”); Stoverv. Bishop, White, Marshall & Weibel, P.S., 2011 WL 3421554, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Wash. 2011) (contradictionin attachments to summary judgment motion served on consumer's counsel were not actionable).8As far as the Court can glean, Mr. Collins's only potentially cognizable CPA allegations are that the movingdefendants’ communications forced him to take “time away from his business of property management” andincur expenses “relating to the resistance of unlawful debt collection activities,” separate from defending theforeclosure action. (Dkt. No. 11 at 36.) But without more, these allegations are insufficient because they donot explain how the moving defendants’ non-foreclosure conduct took time away from his business or forcedhim to incur expense.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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