on up here,” indicating that he was, in fact, experiencing some difficulty with the other prisoners, although he apparently declined to elaborate further on the nature of the difficulty.4
In light of McCrary’s admitted suspicion on March 2, 1995 that “something was going on between [Montgomery] and the other men on the block” and his conclusion that Montgomery was suicidal enough to be placed under close observation, we must conclude that McCrary subjectively perceived the risk of serious harm to Montgomery on March 3, 1995, including the fact that Montgomery’s mental state was affected by the other inmates’ dislike for him. McCrary cannot escape a finding of his subjective knowledge of risk just because he “declined to confirm inferences of risk,” namely that Montgomery felt threatened by other prisoners, “that he strongly suspected to exist.” Fanner, 511 U.S. at 843 n. 8, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
(3) Evidence demonstrating that McCrary disregarded the risk of serious harm
Even though, on the facts alleged, McCrary perceived a substantial risk of serious harm to Montgomery on the morning of March 3, 1995, McCrary may still prevail if he “responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970. In other words, if McCrary was not “failing to treat” Montgomery, or “doing less than [his] training indicated was necessary,” Williams, 186 F.3d at 692, when he reevaluated Montgomery on March 3, 1995, then he cannot be said to have consciously disregarded the risk of serious harm.
Comstock asserts, and McCrary admitted in his deposition testimony, that, when making the decision to send Montgomery back to his cell, McCrary did not (1) review the battery of psychological tests administered to Montgomery on February 27, 1995, J.A. at 81; (2) review Montgomery’s medical records or institutional file, and therefore did not read Howell’s progress note indicating that Montgomery had been labeled a snitch, J.A. at 85; (3) speak to the resident officer who had referred Montgomery for a psychological consultation, J.A. at 86; (4) speak with the prison guards who daily observed Montgomery, J.A. at 87; (5) check the log book entries kept by the RGC control center or Top 6 where Montgomery was housed, J.A. at 92, which noted that Montgomery told a prison guard that “they are going to kill him,” J.A. at 105, and that he did not want yard time and did not want to shower, J.A. at 106; or (6) speak with other two psychologists who had met with Montgomery previously, J.A. at 90. Plaintiff also claims that McCrary did not ensure that the Outpatient Mental Health Team conducted an evaluation of Montgomery, as McCrary had ordered only the day before.
Comstock further alleges that McCrary’s conduct violated the Department of Corrections policy directive regarding suicide prevention in several ways: (1) he failed to review the custody staff referral form CHX-212 or, alternatively, speak with the custody officers who referred Montgomery for evaluation; (2) he failed to follow form CHJ-180, an evaluation of suicide risk prisoners, and to review Montgomery’s institutional file and health record; and (3) he failed to complete a written health record when removing Montgomery from close observation. J.A.
4
McCrary recognized that Montgomery may have been reluctant to explain to him the situation with the other inmates on March 2, 1995, because the inmates in adjacent cells could overhear their conversation. J.A. at 97 (McCrary Dep.).