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Crespo v. Tesla, Inc.
, No. 25-cv-80129-MIDDLEBROOKS (S.D. Fla. 2025)
Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Southern District of Florida (S.D. FLA)
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
SOUTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
FLORIDA
Case
No.
25-
cv
-80129-
MIDDLEBROOKS/MATTHEWMAN
LEONARDO
CRESPO
,
Plaintif
f,
v.
TESLA,
INC.
et
al.
,
Defendants
.
__________________________________/
SECOND
ORDER
ON
DISCOVERY
MOTIONS
AND
ON
THE
SUBMISSION
OF
FAKE,
HALLUCINATED
CASES
BY
THE
PRO
SE
PLAINTIFF
LEONARDO
CRESPO
THIS
CAUSE
is
before
the
Court
upon
pro
se
Plaintiff
Leonardo
Crespo’s
(“Plaintiff”)
four
discovery
motions.
Specifically,
Plaintiff’s
(1)
Motion
to
Compel
Further
Responses
to
First
Set
of
Interrogatories
[DE
61],
(2)
Motion
to
Compel
Further
Responses
to
Plaintiff’s
First
Set
of
Request
for
Admissions
[DE
62],
(3)
Motion
to
Compel
Production
of
Documents
Responsive
to
First
Request
for
Production
[DE
63],
and
(4)
Motion
to
Compel
Production
of
Former
Employee’s
Contact
Information
and
for
Reasonable
Expenses
[DE
81].
Defendant
Tesla,
Inc.
(“Defendant”)
filed
responses
[D
Es
71,
72,
73,
84]
and
Plaintiff
filed
replies
[DE
s
78,
79,
80,
87].
Further
,
Defendant
filed
its
Motion
to
Strike
[DE
82]
Plaintiff’s
R
eplies
[DEs
78,
79,
80]
due
to
Plaintiff’s
submission
of
fake
case
citations.
The
Court
issued
an
Order
to
Show
Cause
to
Plaintiff
[DE
83]
and
Plaintiff
filed
a
Response
to
the
Order
to
Show
Cause
and
improperly
included
therein
a
Motion
for
Leave
to
File
Corrected
Reply
Briefs
1
1
The
Court
advises
Plaintiff
that
any
further
motions
shall
be
separately
filed
and
not
contained
within
responses
or
other
filings
under
Local
Rule
7.1.
Plaintiff
is
once
again
instructed
and
ordered
to
read
the
rules
and
comply
with
them
or
face
sanctions.
SW
Jun
30,
2025
WPB
Case
9:25-cv-80129-DMM
Document
88
Entered
on
FLSD
Docket
06/30/2025
Page
1
of
8
2
(“Motion
for
Leave”)
[DE
85].
Plaintiff
then
filed
a
response
to
the
Defendant’s
Motion
to
Strike
[DE
86]
even
though
the
Court
had
not
yet
granted
permission.
The
Motions
are
ripe
for
review.
The
Court
has
carefully
considered
the
Motions
and
is
otherwise
fully
advised
in
the
premises.
I.
PLAINTIFF’S
SUBMISSION
OF
FAKE,
HALLUCINATED
CASE
CITATIONS
To
start,
Defendant
move
s
to
strike
Plaintiff’s
replies
[DEs
78,
79,
80]
because
they
contain
“misleading
representations
of
authority
which
may
have
been
hallucinated
by
artificial
intelligence
(“AI”)[.]”
[DE
82
at
1].
2
Upon
review
of
the
replies
and
the
Motions
to
Compel
Further
Responses,
the
Court
ordered
as
follows:
The
Court
has
reviewed
Defendant
’
s
Motion
to
Strike
[DE
82]
and
has
independently
checked
the
cases
cited
in
Plaintiff's
discovery
motions
and
replies
[DEs
61,
62,
63,
78,
79,
80].
The
Court
has
found
the
following
issues.
First,
Plaintiff
cites
“
Perez
v.
Miami
-
Dade
Cnty.,
297
F.R.D.
620,
625
(S.D.
Fla.
2013)
”
and
“Jacobs
v.
Atrium
Med.
Corp.,
2020
WL
5803503,
at
*2-3
(S.D.
Fla.
Sept.
29,
2020)”
in
his
motions
and
replies
[DEs
61,
63,
78,
79,
80].
These
cases
appear
to
be
nonexistent.
Second,
Plaintiff
cites
Universal
City
Dev.
Partners,
Ltd.
v.
Ride
&
Show,
230
F.R.D.
688,
695
(M.D.
Fla.
2005)
for
stating
the
following
quote:
“
is
tantamount
to
no
objection
at
all.”
[DE
78
at
2].
No
such
quote
exists
in
that
case.
Therefore,
Plaintiff
shall
SHOW
CAUSE
by
June
23,
2025,
in
writing,
as
to
(1)
where
he
obtained
these
case
citations
and
quotes
from;
(2)
if
these
cases
and
quotes
exist;
and
(3)
if
Plaintiff
used
artificia
l
intelligence
to
generate
his
discovery
motions
and
replies,
why
he
should
not
be
sanctioned,
including
the
imposition
of
atto
rney's
fees
and
costs
and
having
his
discovery
motions
denied.
The
Court
will
issue
a
further
ruling
upon
receipt
of
Plaintiff's
response.
[DE
83].
In
his
response
to
the
Court’s
Order
to
Show
Cause,
Plaintiff
claims
a
“flawed
workflow
process
[.]”
[DE
85
at
2].
He
does
take
responsibility
for
his
error
and
admits
to
using
artificial
intelligence
(“AI”)
to
write
these
filings.
Id.
Plaintiff
also
apologizes
to
the
Court
for
wasting
its
time
,
but
seemingly
has
not
apologized
to
Defendant’s
counsel
for
wasting
their
time
.
Id.
at
2
–3.
Plaintiff’s
submission
of
false
case
citations
is
a
serious
matter.
In
considering
sanctions,
the
Court
2
The
Court’s
review
finds
that
Plaintiff
also
filed
fake
case
citations
in
multiple
motions
[DEs
61
,
63
].
Case
9:25-cv-80129-DMM
Document
88
Entered
on
FLSD
Docket
06/30/2025
Page
2
of
8
3
has
considered
all
appropriate
factors
including
that
Plaintiff
is
proceeding
pro
se
.
“[T]
he
Court
has
inherent
authority
to
sanction
the
misuse
of
AI
when
it
affects
the
Court
’s
docket,
case
disposition,
and
ruling
.
”
Versant
Funding
LLC
v.
Teras
Breakbulk
Ocean
Navigation
Enterprises,
LLC
,
No.
17-
CV
-
81140,
2025
WL
1440351,
at
*3
(S.D.
Fla.
May
20,
2025)
(Matthewman,
J.).
The
Court
also
recognizes
that
pro
se
pleadings
are
construed
liberally,
but
“
this
leniency
does
not
give
a
court
license
to
serve
as
de
facto
counsel
for
a
party,
or
to
rewrite
an
otherwise
deficient
pleading
in
order
to
sustain
an
action.”
Campbell
v.
Air
Jamaica
Ltd.
,
760
F.3d
1165,
1168–69
(11th
Cir.
2014)
(citation
omitted).
The
Court
notes
Plaintiff’s
candor
and
acceptance
of
responsibility.
However,
the
Court
also
notes
that
Plaintiff
has
filed
numerous
discovery
motions
in
this
case,
many
of
which
are
without
any
real
arguable
merit.
The
fact
that
Plaintiff
include
d
fake
case
citations
in
certain
motions
and
replies
only
makes
matters
worse
for
Plaintiff
,
and
it
is
quite
frustrating
and
wasteful
to
the
Court
and
opposing
counsel
.
Taking
all
relevant
factors
into
account
and
the
fact
that
Plaintiff
is
pro
se
,
the
Court
will
only
impose
the
sanctions
of
(
1)
requiring
Plaintiff
to
forthwith
apologize
in
writing
to
Defendant’s
counsel
for
the
submission
of
fake,
hallucinated
cases;
and
(
2)
requiring
Plaintiff
to
pay
Defendant
for
its
reasonable
attorneys’
fees
incurred
in
researching
the
fake
citations
and
filing
the
M
otion
to
S
trike
[DE
82]
.
The
Court
notes
that
had
Plaintiff
engaged
in
a
lack
of
candor
regarding
the
fake
citations,
the
sanctions
considered
in
this
case
would
be
much
more
serious
.
Cf.
O’Brien
v.
Flick
,
No.
24
-
61529-
CIV,
2025
WL
242924,
at
*7
(S.D.
Fla.
Jan.
10,
2025)
(Damian,
J.)
(sanctioning
a
pro
se
plaintiff
for
citing
nonexistent
authority
wh
en
the
plaintiff
did
not
have
candor
with
the
Court).
The
parties
shall
comply
with
the
attorneys’
fee
briefing
schedule
as
described
below.
Case
9:25-cv-80129-DMM
Document
88
Entered
on
FLSD
Docket
06/30/2025
Page
3
of
8
4
II.
MOTIONS
TO
COMPEL
FURTHER
RESPONSES
The
Court
has
reviewed
Plaintiff’s
Motions
to
Compel
Further
Responses
[DEs
61,
62,
63],
Plaintiff’s
discovery
requests,
and
Defendant’s
responses.
Ultimately,
in
addition
to
the
fake
case
citations
contained
in
certain
of
Plaintiff’s
motions
and
replies
,
Plaintiff
’
s
discovery
requests
do
not
comply
with
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
26(b)(1).
This
case
is
quite
simple
and
concerns
only
one
issue
—whether
Plaintiff
validly
revoked
acceptance
of
his
2024
Tesla
Model
X
under
section
672.608,
Florida
Statutes.
To
prove
his
claim
Plaintiff
must
show
that
his
Tesla
is
“nonconforming,
and
that
the
nonconformity
substantially
impair
[s]
the
[Tesla’s]
value.
Additionally,
[Plaintiff
must]
demonstrate
that
[Defendant]
had
the
opportunity
to
cure
the
defects,
but
failed
to
do
so
seasonably,
and
that
[Plaintiff]
revoked
[his]
acceptance
within
a
reasonable
ti
me.
”
Gulfwind
S.,
Inc.
v.
Jones
,
775
So.
2d
311,
312
(Fla.
2d
DCA
2000)
(internal
citation
and
quotation
marks
omitted).
Plaintiff’s
discovery
requests
go
far
beyond
Rule
26(b)(1)
.
First,
Plaintiff
seeks
the
Court
to
compel
Defendant
to
“provide
complete
and
non-
evasive
answers
to
Plaintiff’s
First
Set
of
Interrogatories.”
[DE
61
at
1].
Defendant
argues
that
Plaintiff’s
interrogatory
requests
are
overbroad
and
are
designed
with
an
“i
ntent
to
harass”
Defendant.
[DE
71
at
3].
The
Court
agrees
with
Defendant.
For
example,
Plaintiff’s
Interrogatory
Number
15
states
“[
i
]
dentify
the
specific
security
measures
in
place
for
the
stora
ge
l
ot
where
the
Vehicl
e
was
kept
between
July
13,
2024,
and
August
13,
2024,
and
identify
the
person
(
s)
responsible
for
overseeing
vehicle
security
in
that
area
during
that
period.”
[DE
61
-
2
at
11].
This
request
is
overbroad,
disproportional
to
the
needs
of
the
case,
and
seeks
to
identi
fy
irrelevant
information
and
persons.
Next,
Plaintiff
moves
to
compel
Defendant
“to
provide
proper
and
unambiguous
admissions
or
denials
to
Plaintiff’s
First
Set
of
Requests
for
Admission.”
[DE
62
at
1].
In
response,
Case
9:25-cv-80129-DMM
Document
88
Entered
on
FLSD
Docket
06/30/2025
Page
4
of
8
5
Defendant
asserts
that
“Plaintiff’s
Motion
is
centered
on
his
desire
for
additional
response
that
conform
with
his
specific
form
and
content.
”
[DE
73
at
3].
The
Court
cannot
compel
Defendant
to
change
its
responses
to
Plaintiff’s
First
Set
of
Requests
for
Admission
simply
because
Plaintiff
does
not
like
the
answers.
If
Defendant
has
a
good
faith
basis
for
denying
an
admission,
the
Court
will
not
compel
Defenda
nt
to
change
its
response.
The
parties
may
dispute
factual
issues,
but
those
determinations
are
to
be
made
at
summary
judgment
or
trial.
Lastly,
Plaintiff
requests
the
Court
to
compel
Defendant
“to
produce
documents
and
provide
complete,
non-
evasive
responses
to
Plaintiff’s
First
Request
for
Production
of
Documents[.]”
[DE
63
at
1].
In
response,
Defendant
states
that
it
has
produced
documents
to
Plaintiff,
but
Plaintiff’s
additional
requests
are
“unnecessary,
wasteful,
and
harassing.”
[DE
72
at
4].
The
Court
agrees
that
Plaintiff
seeks
unnecessary
information.
For
example,
Plaintiff
requests
“[a]ll
documents
Relating
To
communications
betwee
n
You
and
TD
Auto
Finance
concerning
the
Vehicle
or
Plaintiff’s
loan”
and
“
[a]ll
documents
Relating
To
the
storage,
security,
and
preservation
of
the
Vehicle
while
on
Your
premises[.]”
[DE
63
-
2
at
8].
Simply,
Plaintiff
seeks
vast
amounts
of
irrelevant
information
including
Defendant’s
training
procedures,
internal
policies,
identification
of
immaterial
employees,
loan
communications
with
a
non
-
party,
and
general
consumer
complaints.
All
this
informatio
n
is
trivial
to
Plaintiff’s
pending
claim
and
any
defens
es
raised
and
is
outside
the
scope
of
Rule
26(b)(1).
It
appears
to
the
Court
that
Plaintiff
is,
in
certain
respects,
attempting
to
overload
Defendant
with
unnecessary
and
improper
discovery
requests.
Just
as
with
Plaintiff’s
submission
of
fake
case
citations,
Plaintiff’s
overbroad,
vague,
irrelevant
and
disproportionate
discovery
requests
are
not
well
taken
by
the
Court.
While
Plaintiff
is
pro
se
,
he
still
must
follow
the
rules
and
orders
of
this
Court.
Case
9:25-cv-80129-DMM
Document
88
Entered
on
FLSD
Docket
06/30/2025
Page
5
of
8
6
Therefore,
Plaintiff’s
Motions
to
Compel
Further
Responses
[DEs
61,
62,
63]
are
DENIED
.
However,
for
a
number
of
reasons,
the
Court
will
not
award
cost
shifting
fees
and
costs
against
Plaintiff
under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
37(a)(5)(B)
for
the
expenses
incurred
by
Defendant
due
to
these
Motions.
There
has
been
an
uncooperative
back
and
forth
between
Plaintiff
and
Defendant’s
counsel
in
this
case
and
this
has
led
to
repeated
and
unnecessary
discovery
disputes.
The
Court
orders
the
parties
to
cooperat
e
in
discovery
and
conclude
the
discovery
process
in
a
timely
manner.
And,
the
Court
will
carefully
consider
sanctions
and/or
cost
shifting
if
appropriate
on
any
future
discovery
motions.
III.
MOTION
TO
COMPEL
CONTACT
INFORMATION
Lastly,
Plaintiff
seeks
to
compel
Defendant
to
provide
the
last
know
n
residential
address
of
William
Hoadley,
Defendant’s
former
employee.
[DE
81].
Plaintiff’s
Motion
to
Compel
Production
of
Former
Employee’s
Contact
Information
and
for
Reasonable
Expenses
is
frivolous.
At
a
prior
court
hearing,
Plaintiff
stated
he
no
longer
desired
to
take
the
deposition
of
Mr.
Hoadley.
And,
when
the
parties
filed
their
Joint
Discovery
Plan
[DE
64],
Plaintiff
did
not
include
Mr.
Hoadley
as
a
witness
he
wished
to
depose.
Plaintiff’s
Motion
is
wholly
unnecessary
and
a
waste
of
the
parties’
an
d
this
Court’s
time.
Defendant
states
that
it
is
not
producing
Mr.
Hoadley
as
a
witness,
ha
s
been
unable
to
locate
his
last
known
address
after
a
reasonable
search,
and
ha
s
provided
Plaintiff
with
Mr.
Hoadley’s
available
contact
information.
[DE
84].
Mr.
Hoadley
also
objects
to
Defendant
disclosing
his
address
due
to
privacy
concerns.
[DE
84
at
2].
Defendant
has
provided
contact
information
for
Mr.
Hoadley
despite
the
fact
that
Plaintiff
has
stated
he
does
not
intend
to
depose
Mr.
Hoadley.
Defendant,
in
its
initial
disclosures,
must
provide
“the
name
and,
if
known
,
the
address
…
of
each
individual
likely
to
have
discoverable
information[.]”
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
26(a)(1)(A)(i)
Case
9:25-cv-80129-DMM
Document
88
Entered
on
FLSD
Docket
06/30/2025
Page
6
of
8
7
(emphasis
added).
However,
Defendant
did
not
identify
Mr.
Hoadley
in
its
initial
disclosures
as
a
person
likely
to
have
discoverable
information.
[DE
84
-
1].
Also,
Defendant
declares
that
it
does
not
currently
know
Mr.
Hoadley’s
address
after
a
reasonable
search.
[DE
84
at
1].
Therefore,
Defendant
is
under
no
further
obligation
to
find
the
address
for
Plaintiff.
Further,
the
need
to
depose
Mr.
Hoadley
also
seems
unnecessary.
While
Mr.
Hoadley
is
mentioned
in
the
interrogatories,
his
references
are
limited
to
certain
email
communications
to
Plaintiff
stating
that
Plaintiff’s
revocation
was
not
accepted
and
storage/towing
i
nformation.
See
DE
61
-
2.
Plaintiff
has
those
emails.
See
id.
Also,
the
Court
already
ordered
the
deposition
of
Abner
Pena,
a
current
employee
of
Defendant
who
reviewed
the
facts
of
Plaintiff’s
case.
[DE
58
at
2].
Therefore,
the
Motion
to
Compel
Contact
Information
[DE
81]
is
DENIED
.
Because
this
Motion
[DE
81]
is
denied
and
not
substantially
justified,
the
Court
shall
impose
cost
shifting
against
Plaintiff
pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
37(a)(5)(B)
for
the
time
spent
by
Defendant
in
responding
to
this
unnecessary
motion
which
the
C
ourt
has
denied
in
full.
As
to
the
attorneys’
fee
amount
to
be
paid
by
Plaintiff
to
Defendant
as
ordered
herein,
both
as
to
the
fake
citation
issue
,
discussed
earlier
in
this
order
,
and
the
M
otion
to
C
ompel
C
ontact
I
nformation
,
discussed
immediately
above
,
t
he
parties
shall
confer
in
good
faith
in
an
effort
to
resolve
and
agree
to
the
amount
of
reasonable
attorneys’
fees
to
be
paid
by
Plaintiff
to
Defendant
per
this
Order.
The
Court
expects
that
the
amount
of
fees
w
ould
not
be
great,
and
Defendant
shall
only
insist
on
the
payment
of
reasonable
attorneys’
fees
for
the
time
reasonably
expended
at
a
reasonable
hourly
rate.
If
the
parties
are
able
to
agree
on
this
amount,
then
they
shall
file
a
Joint
Notice
on
or
before
July
7,
2025,
advising
the
Court.
However,
if
they
cannot
agree,
then
Defendant
shall
file
a
memorandum
by
July
8,
2025,
stating
the
amount
of
reasonable
attorneys’
fees
sought,
including
the
hourly
rate,
time
incurred,
description
of
services,
and
the
experience
of
Case
9:25-cv-80129-DMM
Document
88
Entered
on
FLSD
Docket
06/30/2025
Page
7
of
8
8
counsel.
Plaintiff
shall
be
permitted
to
file
a
responsive
memorandum
on
or
before
July
15,
2025,
where
he
can
state
his
objections
and
response
to
the
time,
hourly
rate,
and
amount
of
fees
sought.
The
Court
shall
then
determine
the
amount
of
reasonable
attorneys’
fees
to
be
awarded
against
Plaintiff
and
payable
by
Plaintiff
to
Defendant
,
and
enter
any
further
necessary
orders.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The
Court
has
already
cautioned
Plaintiff
and
Defendant
that
any
discovery
disputes
shall
comply
with
the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure,
the
Local
Rules,
and
the
Order
Setting
Discovery
Procedure.
Any
further
uncooperative,
unnecessary,
and
frivolous
discovery
practice
will
result
in
sanctions
.
Accordingly,
it
is
hereby
ORDERED
as
follows:
1.
Plaintiff’s
Motions
to
Compel
Further
Discovery
[DEs
61,
62,
63]
are
DENIED
.
2.
Plaintiff’s
Motion
to
Compel
Contact
Information
[DE
81]
is
DENIED
.
3.
Defendant’s
Motion
to
Strike
[DE
82]
is
DENIED
AS
MOOT
.
4.
Plaintiff’s
Motion
for
Leave
[DE
85]
is
DENIED
AS
MOOT
.
DONE
AND
ORDERED
in
Chambers
at
West
Palm
Beach,
Palm
Beach
County,
in
the
Southern
District
of
Florida,
this
30th
day
of
June
2025.
WILLIAM
MATTHEWMAN
United
States
Magistrate
Judge
Case
9:25-cv-80129-DMM
Document
88
Entered
on
FLSD
Docket
06/30/2025
Page
8
of
8
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