Curry v. Capital One Auto Finance, No. 5:25-CV-164-BO-KS (E.D.N.C. 2026)

Case details
Full caption
SHANIERRA CURRY v. CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Eastern District of North Carolina
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
ORDER 16] is in of 1]. 7] OJ. of 23of to Id. Curry v. Capital One Auto Finance Doc. 21 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION No . 5:25-CV-164-BO-KS SHANIERRA CURRY , ) ) Plaintiff , ) ) V . ) ) CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE , ) ) Defendant. ) This cause comes before the Court on defendant ' s motion to dism iss for failure to state a claim . [DE 14]. Plaintiff responded [DE and defendant replied [D E 17]. The Court also considers plaintiffs motion for leave to file her second proposed amended complaint [DE 16]. In this posture , the motions are ripe for resolution. For the following reasons , the motion to dismiss granted and lea v e to amend is denied. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Shanierra Curry filed a complaint Wake County Small Claims Court against defendant Capital One Auto Finance , alleging violations the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Capital One removed the action to this Court. [DE Plaintiff moved to remand [DE but withdrew her motion to remand and moved to amend her complaint [DE 1 In its order July , 2025 [DE 13] , the Court denied plaintiffs first motion to amend the complaint as futile , also noting that it sought to assert new claims based on fictitious provisions the North Carolina Identity Theft Protection Act (ITPA) , and concluding that plaintiff likely used artificial intelligence draft her first proposed amended complaint. That order cautioned plaintiff that the Court will not tolerate " computer generated morass that only ser v es to waste court t ime and resources ." Dockets.Justia.com
v. of of of of 1-1id. Id. 14]of of in of v. id.v. ."' v. (quoting Thornock Corp . The Presiding Bishop The Church Jesu s Christ Latter-Day Saints, No. 3: 25-CV-56 , 2025 WL 1900314 , at *4 (E.D. Va. July 9, 2025) (unpublished)). Plaintiff's original complaint alleges that she " noticed unauthorized inquiries on her credit report and contacted the credit reporting agency, which directed her to Capital One Auto Finance. " [DE , 17] . De spite plaintiff's repeated r eq uests , at 118-12, defendant Capital One " refused to remove the inquiries " from her file. at 114. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. [DE . Plaintiff responded with a renewed motion for leave to amend her complaint [DE 16] , attaching a second proposed amended complaint [DE 16-1]. Plaintiff's second motion to amend the complaint also contained fictitious citations. DISCUSSION A 1 2(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the complaint ' s legal and factual sufficiency. See Fed. R . Civ . P . 1 2(b)(6) . The focus is on the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules, not the proof needed to succeed on a claim . " Federal Rule Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief , order to give the defendant fair notice w hat the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests ." Bell At l . Corp. Twombly, 550 U .S . 544 , 555 (2007) ( cleaned up). This standard does not require detailed factual allegations , , but it " demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. " Nadendla WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299 , 305 (4t h Cir. 2022) ( citation omitted). " To surv i ve a motion to dismiss , a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter , accepted as true , to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on it s face Ashcroft Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662 , 678 (2009) (quoting Tw ombl y, 550 U.S. at 570). For a claim to be plausible, its factual content must permit the court to " draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. " Id . 2
of 15 §§ 1681 1-1 of 231681 of 15 §§ )(1)of F. n. affd v. of .... to of see,~' of [vF. of .... F. F. ...of to F. of 13p. 5] is to 16]to R. P. to of of Plaintiffs original complaint asserts five separate breach duty claims under U.S.C. s-2(b )(l)(A)-(E). [DE ] . In its order July , 2025 [DE 13], the Court explained , Section s-2(b) imposes certain duties on " furnishers information. " U.S.C. 1681 s-2(b . " The FCRA uses the term 'furnishers information' but does not define it. " Ross v . Washington Mut. Bank, 566 Supp . 2d 468, 475 l (E .D . N.C. 2008) , sub nom. Ross F.D.I.C. , 625 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2010). Courts interpret " furnishers information include various types creditors , such as banks and other lenders , that provide credit information about their customers to other entities that issue consumer reports about the customers' credit worthiness ." Id. ; DiMezza v . First USA Bank, Inc. , 103 F . Supp . 2d 1296 , 1299 (D.N.M. 2000). Section [1681s]-2(b) does not impose duties on businesses that merely make credit inquiries, so-called " users credit reports ." Glanton . DirecTV, LLC], 172 Supp . 3d [890 , ] 897 . Curry fails to plausibly allege that Capital One acted as a furnisher information . Curry merely alleges that Capital One accessed her credit report This allegation does not suffice. See ,~ ' Ross , 566 Supp. 2d at 475 n.l ; DiMezza , 103 Supp . 2d at 1299 . Curry appears to misunderstand the credit reporting system. For example , Curry faults Capital One for failing to remove allegedly erroneous credit inquiries from her credit report . Yet, the FCRA "does not permit users credit reports remove credit inquiries from consumers ' credit reports. " Glanton , 172 Supp. 3d at 897 . Thus , Curry fails to plausibly allege an FCRA breach duty claim. [DE , (referring to the first proposed amended complaint, denying le ave to amend as futile) (citations to proposed amended complaint omitted) . For the same reasons as articulated in that order , plaintiff fails to state a claim , and defendant ' s motion to dismiss the complaint granted. The Court also addresses plaintiffs motion for leave file a second amended complaint. By the time plaintiff filed her motion [DE , she had already been warned that the Court would not tolerate fabricated citations . Leave amend a complaint should be freely gi v en when justice so requires. Fed . Civ. l 5(a). Leave amend should only be denied where there is bad faith on the part the moving party , the amended would be futile , or granting leave would prejudice the non-moving party. See Johnson v . Orow e at Food s Co ., 785 F. 2d 503 , 509 (4th Cir. 1986). Here , plaintiffs inclusion more fabricated citations in the proposed amended complaint constitutes bad faith . 3
if Nat. Inc.471 of of of of of 15 of 23of of 135] of 13of 15 The motion for leave to amend is also denied because amendment would be futile. " Futility is apparent the proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim under the applicable rules and accompanying standards[.]" Katyle v . Penn Gaming , , 637 F.3d 462 , (4th Cir. 2011). An amendment is therefore futile where the plaintiff fails to state a facially plausible claim , meaning that the facts pled " allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. Courts should be liberal in their construction pro s e complaints , but they should not go beyond deciphering the meaning words written in the complaint to attempt to discern the unexpressed intent the plaintiff. Lab e r v . Harve y, 438 F. 3d 404 , 413 (4th Cir. 2006) . In her proposed second amended complaint , plaintiff asserts the same claims as in her original complaint , plus a violation the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA) and a violation U.S .C . § 1681b(f) for obtaining improper access to her credit report. The Court's order July , 2025 [DE 13] addressed all these claims in the context plaintiffs fir s t proposed amended complaint. The claims common to the original complaint fail because section 1681 s-2(b) " does not impose duties on businesses that merely make credit inquiries" [DE , p . and the second proposed complaint fails to plausibly allege that defendant acted as a furnisher any information with respect to plaintiff , only as a " user " who made a credit inquiry . Similarly , the UDTPA claim fails because , as the Court already determined , the FCRA " preempts state-law claims that merely restate FCRA claims. " [DE , p. 6]. The remaining claim in the second proposed amended complaint fails because defendant had grounds to reasonably believe it accessed plaintiffs credit report for a proper purpose. To state a FCRA claim for improper acquisition a credit report under U .S. C. § 1681b(f) , a plaintiff must allege " (i) there was a consumer report; (ii) the defendants used or obtained it , (iii) the 4
1: in ,r,r 16If of complaint-even ~day of defendants did so without a permissible statutory purpose , and (iv) the defendants acted with the specified culpable mental state. " King v . Equable Ascent Fin. , LLC , No. 12-CV-443 , 2013 WL 2474377, at *2 (M.D.N.C . June 10, 2013) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs second proposed amended complaint alleges she submitted an identity theft report an effort to remove the credit checks , indicating an imposter may have initiated the credit check . [DE 16-1, , 27 , 38]. so, defendant would have reasonably believed it accessed plaintiff's credit report with a permissible purpose. " Courts have reached the conclusion that there is no violation Section 1681 b when a creditor obtains a credit report due to an imposter's application for credit even though the identity theft victim did not make the application. " Glanton v . DirecTV, LLC , 172 F . Supp . 3d 890 , 896 (D.S.C. 2016) (collecting cases) . Plaintiff provides no plausible alternative motivation for defendant to access her credit report. S ee King , 2013 WL 2474377 , at *3. The proposed construed in the plaintiff's favor - indicates the defendant had grounds to reasonably believe it was accessing her credit report for a permissible purpose. The second proposed amended complaint therefore fails to state a claim and leave to amend is denied as futile. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons , defendant ' s motion to dismiss [DE 14] is GRANTED . Plaintiff's second motion for leave to amend the complaint [DE 16] is DENIED. Plaintiffs motion to strike plaintiff's reply [DE 19] is DENIED as MOOT . The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case . SO ORDERED , this March 2026. STATES 5
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