Dallas v. Lyotard, No. 05-24-01449-CV (District of Tex. (D. TEX) June 12, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Texas at Dallas v. NADIA LYOTARD AND MITCHELL SADLER
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
District of Texas (D. TEX)
Decided
June 12, 2026
Disposition
Reversed
Affirm in part; Reverse in part and Opinion Filed June 12, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-01449-CV SHADDAI HARRIS, Appellant V. NADIA LYOTARD AND MITCHELL SADLER, Appellee On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-06395 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Goldstein, Barbare, and Lee Opinion by Justice Lee Appellant Shaddai Harris appeals from a judgment following a jury trial which, in relevant part, awarded (1) appellee Nadia Lyotard a take-nothing judgment against Harris and (2) awarded Lyotard damages against Harris for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). We reverse the judgment awarding Lyotard damages for IIED. Finding no merit in the balance of appellant’s issues, we otherwise affirm the judgment of the court.
–2– I. The Briefing In Texas, an individual who is a party to civil litigation has the right to represent himself at trial and on appeal. TEX. R. CIV. P. 7; Ex parte Shaffer, 649 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. 1983) (orig. proceeding). The right of self-representation carries with it the responsibility to adhere to our rules of evidence and procedure, including our appellate rules of procedure if the party chooses to represent himself on appeal. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Strange v. Continental Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). Courts regularly caution pro se litigants that they will not be treated differently than a party who is represented by a licensed attorney. See Mansfield, 573 S.W.2d at 184–85; See also In re N.E.B. at 212. Our appellate rules have specific requirements for briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38. These rules require appellants to state concisely the complaint they may have, provide understandable, succinct, and clear argument for why their complaint has merit in fact and in law, and cite and apply law that is applicable to the complaint being made along with record references that are appropriate. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f), (h), and (i). Only when we are provided with proper briefing may we discharge our responsibility to review the appeal and make a decision that disposes of the appeal. Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.).
–3– Existing legal authority applicable to the facts and the questions we are called on to answer must be accurately cited. References to legal authority that have nothing to do with the issue to be decided are contrary to the requirement of rule 38.1(i). See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). References to sweeping statements of general law are rarely appropriate. If we are not provided with existing legal authority that can be applied to the facts of the case, the brief fails. When deciding whether an appellant's brief is deficient, we do not adhere to any rigid rule about the form of a brief. Pro se litigants may not be versed in the form of briefing favored by seasoned appellate practitioners. However, we are not responsible for identifying possible trial court error, for searching the record for facts that may be favorable to a party’s position, or for doing legal research that might support a party’s contention. See Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 895. “Were we to do so, even for a pro se litigant untrained in law, we would be abandoning our role as judges and become an advocate for that party.” Id. We do, however, examine briefs for compliance with prescribed briefing rules, including specifically, in this case, rule 38.1. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. And we examine every brief closely. If we can conclude a brief complies with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, we submit the appeal for review and decision on the merits. If we cannot, we may dismiss the appeal as we are authorized to do. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. On appeal, appellant has proceeded pro se, though she was represented by counsel at trial. Appellees are represented by counsel.
–4– Appellant initially filed a brief raising sixteen appellate issues.1 The brief contained at least four hallucinated citations and at least twenty citations which do not stand for the proposition or holding for which they are presented. After appellees filed their brief, appellant filed a reply brief with at least two hallucinated citations and at least ten citations which do not stand for the proposition or holding for which they are presented. Appellees, meanwhile, filed a brief challenging appellant’s initial brief, noting at least one hallucination and multiple instances of appellant misrepresenting the holdings of cited cases. Appellees’ brief itself was lacking; the brief contained exactly one citation to the record, and that citation was to the entirety of the trial court record (“see generally Clerk’s Record and Reporter’s Record”). Notably, appellees’ brief made no effort to refute appellant’s arguments about the portion of the judgment awarding appellee Lyotard damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The brief cited no case law concerning the cause of action and did not cite any portion of the record supporting the award of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Upon assignment of the appeal to this panel, we concluded appellant’s briefing needed to be stricken, so we filed an order striking the briefing and ordering appellant to file an amended brief. Appellant did so. Appellant’s redrawn brief 1 Two of appellant’s original issues directly attacked the legal and factual bases of the intentional infliction of emotional distress award.
–5– continues to contain citation issues, though not nearly as pervasive as the original briefing. Appellant’s redrawn brief contains seven appellate issues, all of which are cogently stated and supported by argument, attempting for each to show the law, the application of the facts to the law, and harm. While there remain problems with both parties’ briefs, we have concluded we have sufficient briefing to properly address this appeal. II. Background On October 8, 2021, Harris accompanied her niece to Dr. Lyotard’s dental office to obtain free orthodontic services offered through a charitable partnership. After learning Dr. Lyotard was unavailable to answer her questions about consent forms, Harris was directed to an office occupied by Mitchell Sadler, Lyotard’s husband and business manager. What began as a discussion about the free services escalated into a heated exchange. Harris testified that Dr. Lyotard entered the room, yelled at her, and twice grabbed her left arm as she attempted to leave, later shutting a door on her ankle. She reported left-arm redness and a swollen right ankle, sought medical treatment that day, and was diagnosed with a left-arm contusion and right-foot injury. Dr. Lyotard and other witnesses, however, described Harris as irate and belligerent, stating Harris grabbed and forcefully pushed Dr. Lyotard’s arm. The responding officer’s report noted no visible injuries at the scene. The incident gave
–6– rise to competing allegations of assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. III. The Appellate Issues Harris presents seven issues on appeal: (1) the court erred by failing to conform the final judgment to the jury’s verdict; (2) the court erred in finding Harris liable where there was evidence she acted in self-defense against unlawful restraint; (3) the IIED claim was barred “by the gap-filler doctrine” and the First Amendment; (4) the jury’s $0 award was unjust in light of evidence of physical injury; (5) the court abused its discretion in excluding Harris’s medical records and emergency room photographs; (6) the court abused its discretion in denying Harris’s motion for continuance and motion for new trial; and (7) the cumulative errors require reversal and remand under Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1. IV. ANALYSIS A. The Court’s Judgment and Rejection of Self-Defense Claim Harris alleges the trial court violated its ministerial duty under Rule of Civil Procedure 301 by failing to conform the final judgment to the jury’s finding that Lyotard assaulted Harris. She claims that, because this finding was never set aside by a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or any other lawful mechanism, its omission constitutes reversible error.
–7– Harris further contends the jury’s verdict that she assaulted Lyotard was error because “uncontroverted, objective evidence” established she acted in lawful self-defense against Lyotard’s unlawful restraint. Analysis Judgment Rule of Civil Procedure 301 requires the judgment of the court to conform to the pleadings, the nature of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and be so framed as to give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled either in law or equity. Harris is simply mistaken. The judgment precisely conforms to the verdict. The jury found Lyotard assaulted Harris and awarded $0 in damages. The trial court’s take-nothing judgment reflects this finding. The “fundamental mischaracterization of the record” of which Harris challenges, that the jury’s verdict was in favor of Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Nadia Lyotard and against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Shaddai Harris, is a reflection of the jury’s finding Lyotard was entitled to $10,000.00 for IIED. As no other damages were awarded for any other findings, the judgment is in conformity with the jury’s verdict. Self-Defense Harris did not request an instruction or jury question on self-defense, nor did she object to the omission of self-defense in the charge. A trial court has no duty to sua sponte charge the jury on unrequested defensive issues that may have been raised by the evidence. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 278 (“Failure to submit a definition or
–8– instruction shall not be deemed a ground for reversal of the judgment unless a substantially correct definition or instruction has been requested in writing and tendered by the party complaining of the judgment.”); Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1992). Accordingly, the trial court has not committed error by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. Harris’ first and second issues are overruled. B. Harris’ Allegation of Evidence Exclusion is Waived and The Jury’s Award of $0 Was Not Unjust Harris alleges the trial court abused its discretion by excluding her medical records and photographs under circumstances where any delay in disclosure was attributable to prior counsel, a documented family medical emergency had occurred, and no unfair surprise or prejudice was shown. Additionally, Harris asserts the jury’s $0 damages award for Lyotard’s assault is factually insufficient and manifestly unjust. She contends objective medical evidence conclusively established physical injury and the jury was required to award damages. Applicable Law Briefing Waiver If an appellant’s issue is identified in her brief, then rule 38.1(i) calls for the brief to guide us through the appellant's argument with clear and understandable statements of the contentions being made. Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 896. If we must speculate or guess about what contentions are being made, then the brief fails. Id.
–9– Importantly, statements of fact must be supported by direct references to the record that are precise in locating the fact asserted. Id. If record references are not made or are inaccurate, misstated, or misleading, the brief fails. Id. And, just as importantly, existing legal authority applicable to the facts and the questions we are called on to answer must be accurately cited. Id. References to legal authority that have nothing to do with the issue to be decided are contrary to the requirement of rule 38.1(i). Id. References to sweeping statements of general law are rarely appropriate. Id. If we are not provided with existing legal authority that can be applied to the facts of the case, the brief fails. Id. Damages Awards In reviewing damage awards, we apply the traditional sufficiency standards of review. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered. United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v. Evans, 668 S.W.3d 627, 640 (Tex. 2023). In conducting our review, we credit evidence that supports the verdict if reasonable jurors could have done so and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not have done so. Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Pena, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014). The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. Id.
–10– In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the entire record, considering both the evidence in favor of and contrary to the challenged finding. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). “The court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the evidence, and can set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). “[W]e employ the same standard of review for an excessive damages complaint as for any factual sufficiency of the evidence complaint.” Casas v. Paradez, 267 S.W.3d 170, 185 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's findings, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and we defer to its credibility determinations. Id. Absent an objection to the jury charge, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the charge as written. Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000). Analysis Evidence Exclusion Harris has failed to adequately brief this issue through a lack of citations to the record where she attempted to admit this evidence and was denied. She provides
–11– only citations to her own testimony and one page of a medical record consisting of a COVID screening. Harris has provided this Court no guidance as to where the trial court made the decision to exclude her evidence. We are not obligated to search the record for evidence supporting her argument. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Damages As an initial matter, Harris argues there was objective, uncontroverted evidence of injury from Lyotard’s assault upon her. She relies on Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176, for the proposition that “a jury’s failure to award damages is reversible” when injury has been proven. Cain is a case involving foundation defects and has no relevance to her issue. She also relies on Golden Eagle, 116 S.W.3d at 761-62, for the assertion that juries “may not ignore objective medical evidence establishing physical injury.” As stated in the applicable law section above, Golden Eagle sets out the standard for a sufficiency review for appellate courts. Harris testified Lyotard grabbed her left arm and shut a door on her right ankle. After waiting for the police for three hours, Harris drove to the police station to file a report. Harris told the officer her left arm had red marks on it and she had taken photographs of the injury. In his report, the officer records that he did not observe any visible marks and Harris never mentioned any injury to her right foot or ankle.
–12– Harris then drove to the emergency room complaining of tenderness in her left arm and right ankle pain. Her doctors took photographs of her injuries and she was diagnosed with: • A left arm contusion; • Right foot contusion; • Crushing injury of right foot; • Right foot and left arm pain. She was given Ibuprofen and told to follow-up with an orthopedist. Harris saw a sports medicine doctor who provided her with pain medication and a referral to a podiatrist. At trial, she noted pain, swelling, not being able to stand or drive for extended periods, and reliance on flat shoes and compression socks. She also recounted sleepless nights, inactivity causing a twenty-pound weight gain, and having to make accommodations for daily life. Harris admitted there was nothing wrong with her left arm at trial. We conclude that a reasonable jury might conclude that Harris suffered no injury. The officer observed no marks indicating injury, and Harris failed to mention to the officer any injury to her foot or ankle. And as noted by Harris’ fifth issue, her medical records and photographs were not in evidence. Considering all of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's findings, and the findings are not against the great weight and preponderance of the
–13– evidence and not manifestly wrong or unjust. See Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). We overrule Harris’ fourth and fifth issue. D. Harris’ Allegation of Abuse of Discretion Regarding a Continuance Denial is Waived Due to Inadequate Briefing Harris contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for continuance and motion for new trial despite her grandmother being terminally ill with only weeks to live. She claims these decisions materially impaired her ability to prepare and present her case. Applicable Law We incorporate, without repeating, the applicable law concerning briefing waiver stated in the preceding section of this opinion. Analysis Harris’s argument to this Court was fully encompassed in two sentences: Appellant requested a continuance due to her grandmother’s terminal illness, with only weeks to live. Despite this documented emergency, the trial court denied the continuance. She provided one record citation to a page which does not exist. Harris cited Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986), for the proposition that “A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a continuance when a party demonstrates a valid excuse, such as a death or terminal illness in the family, that materially impairs the party’s ability to prepare for trial.” Villegas concerns a
–14– denial of a continuance due to an attorney’s withdrawal on the eve of trial; there is no mention of death or terminal illness assuring a grant of continuance. Harris has waived this issue. We overrule her sixth issue. E. Appellees’ IIED Claim Was Inappropriate Where Other Causes of Action Are Available Harris asserts the damages awarded against her are legally barred as intentional infliction of emotional distress is a gap-filler tort unavailable where the gravamen of the complaint is governed by a traditional tort such as assault. Moreover, the conduct relied upon by appellees in asserting IIED – including a Google review, two phone calls, and an email seeking business information – constitutes protected activity and does not remotely approach the “extreme and outrageous” threshold required under Texas law. On this issue, we agree with Harris. Applicable Law To the extent it remains a viable cause of action2, IIED remains nothing more than a “gap-filler” tort never intended to supplant or duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004). The existence of assaultive or defamatory causes of action leaves no gap to fill when the alleged tortious conduct falls within the parameters of 2 See Bacsik v. Britton, No. 05-24-00934-CV, 2025 WL 607396 at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 25, 2025) (Lee, J., concurring).
–15– the assault or defamation torts. IIED remains to address only truly outrageous conduct for which the law provides no remedy and which is “beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. 2005). IIED was never intended as an easier and broader way to allege claims already addressed by our civil and criminal laws, nor was it intended to replace or duplicate existing statutory or common law remedies. See Creditwatch, 157 S.W.3d at 817–18; Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d at 447. Thus, if the gravamen of a plaintiff's complaint is another tort, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim will not lie regardless of whether the plaintiff succeeds on or even makes the alternate claim. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d at 448; see also Creditwatch, 157 S.W.3d at 817 (“As [the plaintiff's] complaints are covered by other statutory remedies, she cannot assert them as intentional infliction claims just because those avenues may now be barred.”); Louis v. Mobil Chem. Co., 254 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2008, pet. filed) (“Where the gravamen of the complaint is really another tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress is unavailable.”); Conley v. Driver, 175 S.W.3d 882, 887 n. 4 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2005, pet. denied) (explaining that intentional infliction of emotional distress tort “cannot be used as an alternative to some other, more conventional tort [that] fits the facts but might be subject to some structural impediment”).
–16– Analysis In Lyotard’s counterclaim, she asserts an IIED claim arising out of Harris grabbing and pushing her with the intent to intimidate, harm, and cause Lyotard emotional distress. The conduct of Harris alleged in this appeal can be addressed by other available tort remedies, including the assault claim alleged by appellees but for which the jury awarded Lyotard zero damages. Further, appellees presented no evidence of conduct that was truly outrageous and beyond all possible bounds of decency. Lyotard’s claim was, in essence, one of assault. As she had, and took advantage of, the ability to seek redress through an assault claim, her IIED claim was barred. Accordingly, the portion of the judgment awarding Lyotard $10,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress is reversed. We render judgment that Lyotard take nothing from Harris on the IIED claim. Harris’ third issue is sustained. F. Cumulative Errors Do Not Require Reversal and Remand Harris proposes that, even if any single error was deemed harmless in isolation, the cumulative effect of alleged errors probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.
–17– Applicable Law To prevail on a cumulative error point, appellant would have to show that, based on the record as a whole, but for the alleged errors, the jury would probably have rendered a verdict favorable to appellant. Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 810 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ). Analysis The only error which we have reversed in Harris’ favor concerns one cause of action – intentional infliction of emotional distress. In light of our disposition of Harris’ other points of error and the lack of argument bolstering Harris’ contention it probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment, we do not find cumulative error present. Harris’ final issue is overruled.
–18– V. Conclusion We reverse the judgment awarding appellee Lyotard $10,000 in damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and render judgment that Lyotard take nothing on that claim. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment. /Mike Lee/ MIKE LEE JUSTICE
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