Dallas v. Rockwall Rental Properties, No. 05-25-00536-CV (District of Tex. (D. TEX) Apr. 15, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Texas at Dallas v. ROCKWALL RENTAL PROPERTIES
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
District of Texas (D. TEX)
Decided
Apr. 15, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Affirm and Opinion Filed April 15, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-25-00536-CV FODAY S. FOFANAH AND HAWA FOFANAH, Appellant V. ROCKWALL RENTAL PROPERTIES, Appellee On Appeal from the 422nd Judicial District Court Kaufman County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 118630-422 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Garcia, Jackson, and Lee Opinion by Justice Lee Appellants Foday and Hawa Fofanah appeal a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Rockwall Rental Properties awarding possession of a property in Kaufman County, monetary damages, and attorney fees. Appellants’ briefing is a disaster, as explained in detail in this opinion. Appellants’ opening brief cites seven appellate opinions in support of the four1 1 The argument section of appellants’ opening brief attempts to argue four issues, but the Issues Presented section states there are seven. Appellants’ reply brief suggests an eighth issue. We conclude appellants are presenting the four issues argued in their opening brief.
–2– appellate issues they raise. None of the seven cited authorities support the propositions for which they are offered. After appellee filed its brief, cogently and logically demonstrating the lack of merit in appellants’ appellate argument and showing that the case citations briefed by appellants do not stand for the claimed propositions of law, appellants filed a reply brief. The reply brief attempted to add an appellate issue, and it included fifteen opinion citations. Of those, one is a purported opinion from this court for which the citation is incorrect and which we were unable to locate after extensive research. It appears to be hallucinated. Four of the opinions cited in the reply brief do not stand for the asserted propositions. The remaining cases cited are for generic legal propositions, such as the standards for granting summary judgment. Considering the merits, we find no error and affirm the judgment. BACKGROUND On January 14, 2020, appellants executed a promissory note in favor of appellee, secured by a deed of trust against their property in Kaufman County. Appellants made one payment on the note and then defaulted. Appellee authorized foreclosure, accelerated the maturity date, sent the required notice of acceleration, sent the notice of foreclosure sale and appointment of substitute trustee, and posted the required notice of foreclosure sale. On May 7, 2024, appellee purchased the property at the public foreclosure sale.
–3– Appellants filed suit against appellee asserting claims for trespass to try title, wrongful foreclosure, usury, misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Appellee answered, counterclaimed for declaratory relief and for attorney fees, and moved for traditional summary judgment, asserting that foreclosure was properly conducted and appellants’ claims failed as a matter of law. Appellants did not reply to the motion for summary judgment. Concurrent with this litigation, appellee filed a forcible detainer action. After the justice court ruled in appellee’s favor, appellants appealed to the county court and alleged the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the instant action was pending and would determine title. The county court also ruled for appellee, and on appeal we affirmed, holding that the justice and county courts had forcible detainer jurisdiction. See Fofanah v. Rockwall Rental Prop., LP, No. 05-24-01265-CV, 2025 WL 3129510, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 7, 2025, pet. dism’d.) (mem. op.). We specifically found that appellants’ allegations fell short of specific evidence of a genuine title dispute that was intertwined with the issue of immediate possession. See id. at *4. Dissatisfied with having now lost at three levels of the Texas judicial system, appellants sought review by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. In this action, the trial court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment, declared the foreclosure proper, awarded possession of the property to appellee, and entered judgment for appellee in the amount of $34,667.02, consisting of $29,679.71
–4– in ad valorem taxes paid by appellee on behalf of appellants, $4,905.00 in attorney’s fees, and $82.31 in costs. Appellants filed a Motion to Reinstate2 and an Expedited Motion to Reconsider, Vacate, and Set Aside the order denying the Motion to Reinstate, both of which were denied. This appeal ensued. APPELLANT’S BRIEFING Issues Raised In their opening brief’s “Issues Presented” section, appellants claim there are seven appellate issues. However, appellants’ argument addresses only four issues, and even those are worded differently than in their Issues Presented section. These four issues argued by appellants, restated by us for clarity, are: 1. Was proper notice of default and an opportunity to cure provided; 2. Is a foreclosure invalid where a payoff statement is not provided; 3. Was the payoff balance usurious; 4. Was the grant of appellee’s summary judgment improper because there were genuine disputes of material fact. The three issues, for which appellants failed to provide any argument, are waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; see also In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 212 (Tex. 2 That was the title of appellant’s post-judgment motion, with appellants seeking reinstatement of a dismissed case. Appellants apparently confused a final judgment with a dismissal for want of prosecution.
–5– App.—Dallas 2008) (“When a party fails to adequately brief a complaint, he waives the issue on appeal.”). Appellee replied, focusing on the merits but also noting the briefing and citation deficiencies in appellants’ brief. In their reply brief, appellants claimed an additional issue, arguing that there was insufficient evidence supporting the award of attorney’s fees. This issue was waived for failing to assert it in appellants’ opening brief,3 but we also observe that appellants misstate the contents of the record before the trial court on the issue of attorney’s fees. There was sufficient evidence of attorney’s fees per Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP¸ 578 S.W.3d 469, 498 (Tex. 2019).4 So we overrule the issue to the extent it was raised in the reply brief. Pro Se Briefing In Texas, an individual who is a party to civil litigation has the right to represent himself at trial and on appeal. TEX. R. CIV. P. 7; Ex parte Shaffer, 649 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex.1983) (orig. proceeding). The right of self-representation carries with it the responsibility to adhere to our rules of evidence and procedure, 3 See Dallas Cty. v. Gonzales, 183 S.W.3d 94, 104 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (“The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure do not allow an appellant to include in a reply brief a new issue in response to some matter pointed out in the appellee’s briefs but not raised by the appellant’s original brief.”); see also Humphries v. Advanced Print Media, 339 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“In general, an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief may not be considered.”). 4 “Sufficient evidence includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the services were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such services.”
–6– including our appellate rules of procedure if the party chooses to represent himself on appeal. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Strange v. Continental Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). Courts regularly caution pro se litigants that they will not be treated differently than a party who is represented by a licensed attorney. See Mansfield, 573 S.W.2d at 184–85; See also In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d at 212. Our appellate rules have specific requirements for briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38. These rules require appellants to state concisely the complaint they may have, provide understandable, succinct, and clear argument for why their complaint has merit in fact and in law, and cite and apply law that is applicable to the complaint being made along with record references that are appropriate. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f), (h), and (i). Only when we are provided with proper briefing may we discharge our responsibility to review the appeal and make a decision that disposes of the appeal. Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Existing legal authority applicable to the facts and the questions we are called on to answer must be accurately cited. References to legal authority that have nothing to do with the issue to be decided are contrary to the requirement of rule 38.1(i). See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. References to sweeping statements of general law
–7– are rarely appropriate. If we are not provided with existing legal authority that can be applied to the facts of the case, the brief fails. When deciding whether an appellant's brief is deficient, we do not adhere to any rigid rule about the form of a brief. Pro se litigants may not be versed in the form of briefing favored by seasoned appellate practitioners. However, we are not responsible for identifying possible trial court error, for searching the record for facts that may be favorable to a party’s position, or for doing legal research that might support a party’s contention. See Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 895. “Were we to do so, even for a pro se litigant untrained in law, we would be abandoning our role as judges and become an advocate for that party.” Id. We do, however, examine briefs for compliance with prescribed briefing rules, including specifically, in this case, rule 38.1. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. And we examine every brief closely. If we can conclude a brief complies with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, we submit the appeal for review and decision on the merits. If we cannot, we may dismiss the appeal as we are authorized to do. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. In this case, we conclude appellants have failed to comply with our briefing rules. Citations Deficient in Appellants’ Brief As noted in our opening, appellants provided no accurate substantive case citations. We provide a couple examples.
–8– In their opening brief, appellants cited to Khan v. GBAK Properties, Inc., 371 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) where, according to appellants, “the court reversed summary judgment and held that a lender’s failure to strictly comply with the statutory notice provision prevented lawful foreclosure.” However, the issues and holding of Khan concern the statute of limitations for foreclosure, whether an acceleration of a note was ever abandoned, and evidence of tortious interference. While Khan did reverse a summary judgment, the reversal was due to a statute of limitations issue and not one of notice. Later, appellants cite to this case in stating “the court reversed summary judgment where there was no proof that the borrower had received a statutory opportunity to cure.” Again, this does not appear anywhere in Khan. Appellants provided six other case citations in their opening brief. Each of the six, like the citations to Khan, were for propositions unsupported or not addressed in the actual appellate opinion. At least four cases cited by appellants in their reply brief similarly fail. In addition, in appellant’s reply brief, appellants cited to Jones v. American Real Estate Services, LLC, an opinion allegedly issued by this court, for the proposition that “Texas courts recognize that when a borrower is attempting to reinstate or cure, the lender must provide the correct amount” and “foreclosure [was] reversed where lender failed to provide correct payoff amount or failed to respond to borrower requests.” Despite extensive searches across multiple databases, we
–9– have found no evidence that this case exists. The citation for this opinion provided by appellants leads to a different appellate opinion having nothing to do with the issues presented in this appeal. In other words, the citation is hallucinated. Appellants Fail to Identify Trial Court Error As explained, the citation deficiencies are profound. Overall, appellants failed to adequately brief their issues. An appellant bears the burden of filing a brief that “enable[s] the court to decide the case” by summarizing the pertinent facts with “support[ive]…record references” and by presenting “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations…to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g), (i), 38.9. Appellants failed in this task. Appellants’ briefing thus sends the court on a scavenger hunt to find and piece together the record and the law that they may or may not be referencing and, more often than not, the briefing simply leaves us in a quandary as to what they mean. See Fredonia State Bank v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex. 1994) (forcing the court to “search for evidence itself…has never been considered part of an appellate court’s duties in conducting judicial review.”). Such quandaries are precisely what the briefing rules exist to avoid. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9. We therefore overrule appellants’ four appellate issues and affirm the summary judgment granted appellee.
–10– CONCLUSION We affirm the summary judgment in favor of appellee Rockwall Rental Properties. /Mike Lee/ MIKE LEE JUSTICE
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