Deak v. Schuitema, No. 1:26-cv-1610 (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Jonathan David Deak v. Mike Schuitema, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Maloney (Justice)
JONATHAN DAVID DEAK, Plaintiff, v. MIKE SCHUITEMA, ET AL., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1753635Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D.Michigan, Southern Division.JONATHAN DAVID DEAK, Plaintiff,v.MIKE SCHUITEMA, ET AL., Defendants.No. 1:26-cv-1610|06/18/2026Editor's Note: This document contains discussion ofunverified citations, likely generated by AI tools used by aparty or counsel. These citations are not attributable to theCourt. The unverified citations have been preserved as part ofthe official record, but links are unavailable.Paul L. Maloney, United States District JudgeOPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT ANDRECOMMENDATION*1 This matter comes before the Court on MagistrateJudge Green's Report and Recommendation (R&R), (ECFNo. 8), in which he recommended that Plaintiff's complaintbe dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff, proceedingin forma pauperis in this case, objected to the R&R. (ECF No.9). Plaintiff suggests that the “core question” in this case iswhether “the State of Michigan [may] criminally prosecute”him “for failing to comply with a civil child support orderthat was entered without the appointment of counsel.” (ECFNo. 2). The answer to that question, based on binding legalauthority, is straightforwardly yes, and Plaintiff's contraryconclusion relies on misrepresentations of the few cases hecites. The R&R will thus be adopted, and Plaintiff's complaintwill be dismissed.I.After being served with a report and recommendation issuedby a magistrate judge, a party has fourteen days to file writtenobjections to the proposed findings and recommendations.28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A districtcourt judge reviews de novo the portions of the R&R towhich objections have been filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Only those objections that are specificare entitled to a de novo review under the statute. Mira v.Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).An “objection does not oblige the district court to ignorethe report and recommendation.” Fharmacy Recs. v. Nassar,465 F. App'x 448, 456 (6th Cir. 2012). Our Local Rulesrequire any party objecting to a report and recommendationto “specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings,recommendations or report to which objections are made andthe basis for such objections.” W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b);see also Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)(holding that “objections disput[ing] the correctness of themagistrate's recommendation but fail[ing] to specify thefindings...believed [to be] in error” are too general).In cases where the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis,courts must dismiss the case if they determine that theplaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may begranted. U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). To state a claim, “a complaintmust contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true” toplausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefrequested. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Facts“merely consistent with” the defendant's liability suggestonly possibility, not plausibility, and thus fail this test. Id. Inassessing whether the complaint contains sufficient factualmatter, courts need only accept factual allegations as true andnot legal conclusions or unwarranted inferences. Kottmayerv. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006).II.Plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing Defendants, a localprosecutor and Michigan's Attorney General, from enforcinga criminal statute against him. The statute in question allowscriminal charges “[i]f the court orders an individual to paysupport for the individual's former or current spouse, or fora child of the individual, and the individual does not pay thesupport in the amount or at the time stated in the order.” Mich.Comp. Laws § 750.165. Plaintiff alleges that an order to paychild support was entered against him in civil proceedings.During those proceedings, he requested the appointment ofcounsel, and that request was denied. He alleges that he isin arrears on his child support payments and argues thatany criminal prosecution of him for failure to pay would beconstitutionally defective because he was denied appointedcounsel in the civil proceeding.
JONATHAN DAVID DEAK, Plaintiff, v. MIKE SCHUITEMA, ET AL., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2*2 Before discussing the R&R and Plaintiff's objections,some legal background is in order. In Michigan, childsupport orders emerge from adversarial civil proceedingsin which defendants have “the opportunity to voice anyobjections,” direct appeal is available, and “there are amplestatutory provisions under which a party can seek to have[a] judgment revised to take into consideration changingfinancial circumstances.” People v. Adams, 683 N.W.2d 729,735 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). In these civil proceedings, noperson can be jailed or imprisoned—the Court determines afinancial obligation. But if a child support order is enteredin those proceedings and the person does not pay, thegovernment may prosecute the person, and to convict, it mustprove beyond a reasonable doubt “that (1) the defendantwas required by a divorce order to support a child, (2) thedefendant appeared in or received notice of the action inwhich the order was issued, and (3) the defendant failed topay the required support at the time ordered or in the amountordered.” People v. Iannucci, 887 N.W.2d 817, 818-19 (Mich.Ct. App. 2016). The civil proceeding in which the childsupport order is entered and the criminal proceedings forfailure to pay are separate proceedings in separate courts withdifferent parties. See People v. Likine, 823 N.W.2d 50, 73(Mich. 2012). “Neither the support order nor evidence ofa defendant's failure to pay introduced in the family courtproceedings, singly or together, establishes proof beyonda reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of felonynonsupport.” Id. “[D]ifferent procedural safeguards exist infamily court proceedings than in the criminal proceedings”in a felony nonsupport case, and in the criminal case,the defendant maintains “the full panoply of constitutionalprotections that inhere in any criminal prosecution, whichare simply inapplicable in civil family court proceedings,”including the right to counsel and present defenses which maynot be relevant in a civil case. Id.Indigent defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counselin criminal cases. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335(1963). This right of an indigent litigant to counsel does notextend to all civil proceedings: an indigent litigant mighthave that right in a civil case “only when, if he loses, hemay be deprived of his physical liberty,” and even then, notin “all such cases.” Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 443(2011). In Turner, the Court held that “the Due Process Clausedoes not automatically require the provision of counsel atcivil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual whois subject to a child support order, even if that individualfaces incarceration.” Id. at 448. The Court held that becausean indigent, unrepresented person was deprived of libertywithout either counsel or adequate procedural safeguards,the proceeding resulting in his incarceration was in violationof the Due Process Clause. See id. at 448-49. In a casewhere the party claiming a right to counsel did not face adeprivation of physical liberty, but rather a termination ofparental rights, the Court found that the Constitution didnot require “the appointment of counsel in every parentaltermination proceeding,” and left decisions about “whetherdue process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigentparents in termination proceedings” to trial courts. Lassiter v.Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).Turning back to this case, Plaintiff argues that in thecivil proceedings where his child support obligations weredetermined—where he never faced the possibility of losinghis physical liberty—he had a right to counsel, and relies onTurner and Lassiter, two cases where the Court held that therewas not a right to counsel. (See ECF No. 2 at PageID.24-27).To the extent that Turner and Lassiter are informative, theyare so for civil contempt proceedings based on failure to paya child support obligation and proceedings where parentalrights could be terminated. This case involves neither. Turneris closer, but the suggested, non-necessary safeguards inTurner would apply in a proceeding where a person could bedeprived of his liberty. See 564 U.S. at 447-48 (suggestingfour safeguards in civil contempt proceedings and explainingthat others might be sufficient). Here, that proceeding is ayet-to-begin criminal one with greater safeguards. Plaintiffwas never proceeding on a firm foundation; no wonder, then,that the Magistrate Judge recommended finding that Plaintifffailed to state a claim. (See ECF No. 8 at PageID.49-52). TheCourt now addresses Plaintiff's objections.Plaintiff's first objection relates to standing. The MagistrateJudge recommended finding that Plaintiff lacked standingbecause the prospect of his prosecution was merelyspeculative. (Id. at PageID.47-48). Plaintiff argues that thereis a history of “past enforcement against the same conduct”establishing that “the threat of enforcement is not chimerical.”Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164(2014) (citation modified). But the history to which Plaintiffalludes is not presented in the complaint. (See ECF No. 1 atPageID.3-5 ¶¶ 10-21). Instead, it is presented for the first timein the objections to the R&R: Plaintiff represents that felonyarrest warrants have issued against him before for failing topay his child support obligations. (ECF No. 9 at PageID.55).They cannot have been “pleaded with sufficient specificity inthe original complaint,” (id. at PageID.56), because they were
JONATHAN DAVID DEAK, Plaintiff, v. MIKE SCHUITEMA, ET AL., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3not referenced at all. Plaintiff argues that he should be grantedleave to amend his complaint rather than having it dismissedon standing grounds. (See id.). Amendments to the complaintmust be made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15,not through objections to an R&R. Even if the Court wereamenable to breaking with normal procedure and allowingamendment to cure the standing issue, amendment would befutile substantively, as discussed below.*3 Plaintiff's second objection contains several distinctclaims, none of which have merit. First, Plaintiff argues thatthe R&R contains references to child custody proceedings,when Plaintiff's argument is about determinations of childsupport. (ECF No. 9 at PageID.57). But the points made in theR&R are that Turner was about what due process required incivil contempt proceedings rather than prior child custody orchild support proceedings, and that Lassiter was about caseswhere parental rights could be terminated. (ECF No. 8 atPageID.50-51). Second, Plaintiff argues that Turner entitledhim to the suggested safeguards in the civil proceedingin which his child support obligations were determined. Itdid not: Turner applied safeguards only because the civilcontempt proceeding resulted in incarceration. Plaintiff neverargues that a potential criminal proceeding would haveinsufficient safeguards nor that he was ordered incarceratedduring the child support proceeding. That the existence of thechild support order is a pertinent fact in a potential subsequentprosecution does not retroactively transform the independentfamily court proceeding into a part of the criminal proceeding.See Likine, 823 N.W.2d at 73. Third, Plaintiff argues thatthe R&R is circular. (ECF No. 9 at PageID.58-59). Thisargument rests on Plaintiff's confusion of the recommendationon standing and the recommendation on the merits and revealsno problems with either.Plaintiff's third objection is that any criminal prosecutionof him would be constitutionally defective because “thecriminal offense is wholly derivative of the civil order,”and he contends the R&R did not address this argumentsufficiently. (Id. at PageID.59). But Plaintiff's argument onthis score rests on his having a right to counsel duringthe civil proceeding, which the R&R did address. Further,Plaintiff's central contention that “the criminal offense iswholly derivative of the civil order” is incorrect. “Neitherthe support order nor evidence of a defendant's failure topay introduced in the family court proceedings, singly ortogether, establishes proof beyond a reasonable doubt that adefendant is guilty of felony nonsupport.” Likine, 823 N.W.2dat 73. Prosecutors in § 700.165 cases must prove beyond areasonable doubt that the child support order exists, that thedefendant was involved in the proceedings or was on notice,and that the defendant failed to pay. Iannucci, 887 N.W.2d at818-19. Further, defendants may defeat a § 700.165 chargeby raising an impossibility defense and presenting evidencethat they could not pay despite reasonable efforts. Likine, 823N.W.2d at 70. And people subject to child support orders mayappeal in their civil proceedings and seek modifications ofthose orders. Adams, 683 N.W.2d at 735. The initial issuanceof a child support order does not make criminal liabilityfor failure to follow it a fait accompli, as Plaintiff suggests.There is no authority suggesting that an independent civilproceeding can ever retroactively become part of a criminalproceeding, and Plaintiff's argument that there is even a robustconnection between the two rests on a misstatement of thelaw. For Turner to apply, the child support proceeding wouldneed to, alone, result in a deprivation of physical liberty. Thatsimply is not the case, so Plaintiff's objection has no merit.Plaintiff's fourth objection is to the conclusion in the R&Rthat any appeal “would be frivolous and not made in goodfaith.” (ECF No. 8 at PageID.52). A claim is frivolous“where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or infact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Asdiscussed above, Plaintiff's legal claims rest on foundationalmisunderstandings of Turner and Lassiter and on inaccuraterepresentations of Michigan law, so they lack any arguablebasis in law. That makes them frivolous, so this objection hasno merit.Plaintiff's fifth and final objection is that he should begranted leave to amend rather than having his complaintdismissed. He cites two authorities for this claim. First,he cites LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir.2013). In LaFountain, the Sixth Circuit overruled a previouscase which required dismissal without leave to amend at thescreening stage, but left district courts with discretion as towhether to grant leave to amend. See id. So courts may stilldeny leave to amend based on, for example, “futility of theamendment.” Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 905 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).The second authority Plaintiff cites is Brown v. Matauszak,415 F. App'x 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2011). Unfortunately, thequote that Plaintiff attributes to Brown is not in that case.1In Brown, the court remanded a case, granting the prose plaintiff leave to amend where his complaint failed tospecially plead the claims he was allegedly prevented frommaking in his denial of access to courts claim; essentially,he failed to recognize that he “must plead a case within
JONATHAN DAVID DEAK, Plaintiff, v. MIKE SCHUITEMA, ET AL., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4a case.” Id. at 612. The court found when dismissal isbased on a pro se plaintiff's “ignorance of special pleadingrequirements,” dismissal without prejudice or leave to amendis appropriate. Id. at 615. Brown does not require courtsto grant leave to amend or dismiss without prejudice if theproposed amendment would be futile. Plaintiff argues that inan amended complaint, he would “plead, with specificity, thetwo prior felony arrest warrants” and “the absence of eachTurner safeguard in the underlying proceeding.” (ECF No. 9at PageID.61). But Plaintiff never had a right to an attorneyor the “Turner safeguards” in the child support proceeding,as discussed above. The amendment would thus be futile, soleave to amend, even if properly requested, would have beendenied, and dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. None ofPlaintiff's objections have merit, so they are overruled.III.*4 Plaintiff's core argument, that he had a right to counsel ina civil proceeding where he could never have been deprivedof his physical liberty, is unsupported by any legal authority.The few cases he does cite do not support the propositions forwhich they are cited, and the premise from which he makeshis arguments rests on a misstatement of Michigan law. TheMagistrate Judge properly recognized this on the face ofPlaintiff's complaint, so the R&R (ECF No. 8) is ADOPTED.Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED. IT IS SOORDERED.Date: June 18, 2026 /s/ Paul L. MaloneyPaul L. MaloneyUnited States District JudgeAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 1753635Footnotes1The full sentence in Plaintiff's objection is: “And ‘where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiffmust be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.’Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App'x 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).” Whether this false quotation is the productof an artificial intelligence “hallucination,” United States v. Farris, 171 F.4th 920, 923 (6th Cir. 2026), is unclear, thoughthe citation omitted parenthetical suggests that Plaintiff intended to submit at least some quoted language from Brownrather than accidentally including quotation marks.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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