Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc (Central District of Cal. (C.D. CAL))

Case details
Full caption
Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Central District of California (C.D. CAL)
Disposition
Motion Granted
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 1 of 18 Present: The Honorable JOHN A. KRONSTADT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE M. LindayaNot ReportedDeputy ClerkCourt Reporter / Recorder Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorneys Present for Defendant(s): Not Present Not Present Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER REPLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY (DKT. 40); DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT. 44) [JS-6: CASE TERMINATED]I. Introduction On September 16, 2025, Meriland Keith Dillard (“Plaintiff”) brought this copyright infringement action against CBS Studios, Inc. (“Defendant”). Dkt. 1. The Complaint advances the following causes of action: (1) Copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq.; (2) Unfair competition, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; (3) Breach of implied contract; (4) Misappropriation of ideas; and (5) Declaratory relief.1 Id. 41–63. Concurrently with the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. 2 (“TRO Motion”), which sought to bar Defendant from broadcasting, distributing, marketing, or otherwise exploiting the television series DMV (the “Accused Television Series”), which was scheduled to air on October 13, 2025, and which allegedly infringes Plaintiff’s work, Department of Labor (the “Screenplay”). On September 29, 2025, an Order issued denying the TRO Motion. Dkt. 31 (“TRO Order”). 1 The Complaint also brings counts for “Injunctive Relief” (Count VI) and “Accounting & Disgorgement” (Count VII). Because those are remedies, not causes of action, neither states a claim for relief. See Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“A request for injunctive relief by itself does not state a cause of action.” (quoting Mbaba v. Indymac Fed. Bank F.S.B., No. 09-CV-1452, 2010 WL 424363, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2010)); Schaffer Fam. Invs., LLC v. Sonnier, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“[A]ccounting is a remedy and not a cause of action.”); Arcell v. Google LLC, No. 22-CV-2499, 2025 WL 210877, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2025) (“Divestiture and disgorgement are equitable remedies, rather than standalone causes of action.”). Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts VI and VII, which are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, i.e., without leave to amend. JS-6Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 1 of 18 Page ID#:748
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 2 of 18 On September 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to as to the TRO Order. Dkt. 34. Plaintiffalso filed with the Ninth Circuit an Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, which was denied by the Ninth Circuit on October 10, 2025. Dkt. 25, No. 25-6180 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025). The TRO Order was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in a memorandum order issued on January 28, 2026. Dkt. 71. There are thus no pending appellate proceedings. On October 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed, in the district court, an Administrative Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. Dkt. 40 (“Motion to Stay”). On October 15, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition to the Motion to Stay. Dkt. 52. On October 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply in support of the Motion to Stay. Dkt. 54. On October 9, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. Dkt. 44 (“Motion to Dismiss”). On October 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 57. On October 29, 2025, Defendant filed a reply in support of the Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 61. In accordance with Local Rule 7-15, it was determined that the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Stay (collectively, “Motions”) could be decided without oral argument, and they were taken under submission.2Dkt. 62. For the reasons stated in this Order, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Motion to Stay is DENIED as moot because there are no pending appellate proceedings. II. Background Because the parties are familiar with the allegations and factual matters relevant to the Motion to Dismiss, and do not dispute the description of the facts and corresponding evidence in the TRO Order, that discussion in the TRO Order is incorporated here by this reference. III. Legal Standards Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that a “pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The pleading must allege facts that, if established, would be sufficient to show that a claim for relief is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint need not include detailed factual allegations but must provide more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 555. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57). 2 Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a surreply, Dkt. 63, which was denied. Dkt. 65. Further, Plaintiff filed an unauthorized supplemental brief, Dkt. 64, which was stricken. Dkt. 66. Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 2 of 18 Page ID#:749
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 3 of 18 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. It is appropriate to grant such a motion only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support one. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). Under this standard, a complaint “must be dismissed when a plaintiff’s allegations fail to set forth a set of facts that, if true, would entitle the complainant to relief.” Parents for Priv. v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2020). In assessing whether a plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim, courts accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and construe all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. However, courts “are not required to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Id. “Taken together, Iqbal and Twombly require well-pleaded facts, not legal conclusions, that ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’ The plausibility of a pleading thus derives from its well-pleaded factual allegations.” Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “In evaluating whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, [courts] rely on ‘judicial experience and common sense’ to determine whether the factual allegations, which are assumed to be true, ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Therefore, courts “need not accept as true factual allegations that are not plausible on their face.” Blantz v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., Div. of Corr. Health Care Servs., 727 F.3d 917, 922 (9th Cir. 2013). Further, “[c]onclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences are . . . insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court “may . . . consider certain materials” outside of the pleadings, including “documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice . . . without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). If a motion to dismiss is granted, the court should “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Although this policy is to be applied “with extreme liberality,” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990)), allowing leave to amend is inappropriate in circumstances where an amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1990). IV. Analysis A. Copyright Claim (Count I) 1. Legal Standards To establish direct copyright infringement, Plaintiffs must establish: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). A valid copyright registration creates a rebuttable presumption of ownership. See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 488–89 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of a copyright.”). Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 3 of 18 Page ID#:750
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 4 of 18 “The second prong of the infringement analysis contains two separate components: ‘copying’ and ‘unlawful appropriation.’” Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018)). They are also referred to as factual copying and legal copying, respectively. “Although these requirements are too often referred to in shorthand lingo as the need to prove ‘substantial similarity,’ they are distinct concepts.” Id. “In the absence of direct evidence of copying, . . . the plaintiff ‘can attempt to prove it circumstantially by showing that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work and that the two works share similarities probative of copying.’” Id. (quoting Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117). A showing of both access and probative similarity are required to prove factual copying through circumstantial evidence. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.2d at 481. “Where there is no direct evidence of access, circumstantial evidence can be used to prove access either by (1) establishing a chain of events linking the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s access, or (2) showing that the plaintiff’s work has been widely disseminated.” Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Ent. Inc., 581 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2009). “On the other hand, the hallmark of ‘unlawful appropriation’ is that the works share substantial similarities.” Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1064. Such substantial similarity, also known as legal copying, is evaluated under a two-part test. Id. First, the “extrinsic” test “compares the objective similarities of specific expressive elements in the two works.” Id. Second, the “intrinsic” test looks “for similarity of expression from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable observer, with no expert assistance.” Id. (quoting Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2008)). 2. Application The TRO Order, whose analysis is incorporated by this reference, concluded that Plaintiff failed to show even a serious question as to the merits of his copyright claim. Dkt. 31 at 5–8. Specifically, Plaintiff’s copyright claim failed as a matter of law because the facts and evidence proffered failed to show that Defendant engaged in factual or legal copying. Id. In connection with the Motion to Dismiss and the prior TRO Order, the parties have submitted extrinsic evidence outside of the pleadings. As discussed in the TRO Order, Dkt. 31 at 6, Defendant has submitted the declaration of Dana Klein, the creator of the Accused Television Series, who has declared that, prior to this litigation, she had “not heard of Plaintiff or his Screenplay, and [had] never read Plaintiff’s Screenplay.” Dkt. 21-2 6. Klein also declared that the Accused Television Series is actually based on the short story, Chicken-Flavored and Lemon-Scented, by award-winning author Katherine Heiny (the “Heiny Story”). Id. 3. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration from Jane Roe,3who is purportedly a “script consultant and industry consultant.” Dkt. 58-4. According to Roe’s declaration, Roe has assisted Plaintiff since 3 In the Motion to Seal, Plaintiff argues that the names of these persons should be redacted from the public record to protect the privacy interests of nonparties Roe and Doe. Dkt. 58. Because the privacy of nonparties is a compelling reason to seal this material, the Motion to Seal is GRANTED. See, e.g., Cat Coven LLC v. Shein Fashion Grp., Inc., 19-cv-07967, 2019 WL 10856813, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2019) (collecting cases). This portion of the Order may be subject to reconsideration, in whole or in part at any time, if on the application of any party or other interested person it is shown that the interest of the public in access to this information outweighs the need to protect privacy. Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 4 of 18 Page ID#:751
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 5 of 18 February 2008 in distributing his creative works to producers. Id. 1. Roe declares that she communicated with John Doe, an industry professional, in January 2021, February 2021, and September 2024 regarding Plaintiff’s scripts. Id. 2. Roe further declares that Doe has implied that he “maintains professional relationships with Kapital Entertainment,” which was the production company for the Accused Television Series. Id. Plaintiff also submitted what is purportedly an email chain between Roe and Doe.4Dkt. 58-3. This email chain does not reference Plaintiff’s works in general or the Screenplay. Id. Unlike the circumstances and procedures that applied to the consideration of TRO Motion, the parties’ evidentiary submissions cannot be considered as part of the consideration of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). When “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The Court declines to convert the Motion to Dismiss into one for summary judgment. Accordingly, the evidence submitted by the parties will not be considered, but the well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint will be deemed true, and all inferences will be drawn in the light most favorable to Plaintiff in reviewing the Motion to Dismiss, as required by Rule 12(b)(6).5Applying these standards, the Complaint fails to state a claim for copyright infringement for the same reasons as those set forth in the TRO Order. 4 Plaintiff did not submit copies of the emails themselves, but appears to have copied the alleged contents of the emails, and then pasted them into a separate document. 5 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, Plaintiff has requested judicial notice of the following: (1) the broadcasted pilot episode of the Accused Television Series; (2) Plaintiff’s copyright registration; and (3) the Heiny Story. Dkt. 57 at 25. A court “may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Further, the doctrine of incorporation by reference allows courts to consider extrinsic “documents in situations where the complaint necessarily relies upon a document or the contents of the document are alleged in a complaint, the document’s authenticity is not in question and there are no disputed issues as to the document's relevance.” Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). Defendant does not contest the authenticity of any of these documents. Because the first two documents are significant to assessing the Motion to Dismiss, and are relied upon by the Complaint, the material in them is considered in resolving the Motion to Dismiss. The Heiny Story, however, is not relevant to the Motion to Dismiss, because all extrinsic evidence, including Defendant’s evidence regarding the Heiny Story, will not be considered in determining the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations. Therefore, neither Defendant’s evidence concerning the Heiny Story, nor the Heiny Story itself, is considered. Finally, the documents attached to the Complaint will be considered because they were incorporated by reference into the Complaint. Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 5 of 18 Page ID#:752
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 7 of 18 Plaintiff responds that the Accused Television Series copiesa “unique four-step comedic sequence” from the Screenplay, which constitutes the misappropriation of protectible expression. Dkt. 57 at 23. This sequence, according to Plaintiff, involves: “(1) A manager’s directive; (2) An employee’s illogical, literal-minded refusal; (3) The authority’s absurd acquiescence; (4) A stalled workflow as the punchline.” Id. at 10.9 The Court has conducted an independent review of the Screenplay, the July 2024 script for the Accused Television Series, Dkt. 1 at 46–83, and the broadcasted pilot for the Accused Television Series, which is now publicly available.10See YouTube, DMV | Series Premiere (S1, E1) | Full Episode | CBS, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KzxHE5BgGqE&t (Oct. 14, 2025). Based on this review, once again, it has been determined that the Works have not been shown to be substantially similar. In arguing that the Works are substantially similar, Plaintiff first refers to five lines of dialogue in the Screenplay: DAVIDSON: Charlise, can you get this line moving? CHARLISE: I don’t have a pencil or pen. DAVIDSON: What’s a pencil and pen got to do with this line? CHARLISE: The only way I can move this line is to draw it. These people move too slow. DAVISON: Well, use your eraser. Dkt. 24 at 2–3. These lines, according to Plaintiff, involve an order from a superior, the subordinate’s absurd and non-sequitur interpretation of the order, and the superior’s ultimate embrace of the absurd interpretation. Id. / / / / / / / / / 9 Plaintiff does not describe which sequences in the Screenplay embody the “four-step” sequences, and does not point to any specific sequences in the Accused Television Series that are substantially similar. Plaintiff has an obligation to identify with specificity the aspects of the works that were copied, but he has failed to do so in opposing the Motion to Dismiss. See TVB Holdings USA Inc. v. Enom Inc., No. 13-cv-624, 2014 WL 12581778, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2014). However, because in Plaintiff’s previous filings he argued that there are substantial similarities involving a “three-beat” comedic structure, those purported similarities are analyzed. Dkt. 24. 10Defendant has previously argued that the proper comparison in a copyright infringement action is the “final version of a work, presented to the public,” rather than a draft of a work. Dkt. 21 at 14 n.2 (citing Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, 987 F. Supp. 1222, 1227 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 1997)). Although the July 2024 script and the broadcasted pilot do have slight differences, they are immaterial to the determinations made in this Order because both the July 2024 script and the broadcasted pilot have not been shown to be substantially similar to the Screenplay. Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 7 of 18 Page ID#:754
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 8 of 18 The dialoguePlaintiff citesfrom the Accused Television Series, however, does not involve the same themes or structure: VIC: Rotation ignores our individual strengths! AJ: That’s the system! AJ drops a file onto Vic’s desk: “You’ve got one on deck.” . . . BARBARA: Ooo, AJ, your trash’s almost full. JOCELYN: (tattle-tale) He waits til it gets to the top. AJ: And then I empty it. That’s how garbage works. BARBARA: (picking up can) On regular days, maybe . . . This dialogue is structurally different from the dialogue cited in the Screenplay. Thus, this dialogue does not involve an order from a superior, nor any absurd or non-sequitur interpretations. Next, Plaintiff refers to a scene in the Screenplay in which a government employee encounters a job seeker: THOR hands Charlise his paper. CHARLISE (reading, incredulous): Are you kidding? You came here for a job or a meth lab? THOR: No, really. I can do the work. CHARLISE: You can’t do the work if you’re high. Are you crazy? Id. at 4. That scene, which involved a government employee’s incredulous response to a job seeker who is high on methamphetamine, is dissimilar from the scene in the Accused Television Series to which Plaintiff draws a comparison: BRENT hands AJ an expired passport. AJ: This isn’t valid ID. I can’t process you without current identification. Brent: It’s still me. You can see that. Just let it go. AJ: I can’t let it go. Rules are rules. Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 8 of 18 Page ID#:755
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 9 of 18 Finally, Plaintiff appeals to a purported similarity in scenes where government employees in the Works failed to resolve an issue. Id. at 5. However, in the Screenplay, it is the government employee who fails to resolve the issue and walks away from the situation. By contrast, in the Accused Television, it is the customer receiving services who “stomps off” in frustration. Id. This comparison shows that the Works are not similar in fact, or similar with respect to protected expression. Short jokes, like those identified in the Screenplay, receive only thin copyright protection because they are “constrained by the limited number of variations” given the nature of the expression. Kaseberg v. Conaco, LLC, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1245 (S.D. Cal. 2017). Accordingly, the particular comedic sequencing and dialogue in the Screenplay cited by Plaintiff merits only “thin protection,” which requires a showing of “virtual identity” for infringement. Id. Given the substantial differences between the dialogue of the Works, as noted above, the Accused Television Series is not “virtually identical” to the Screenplay.11 There is no showing of infringement under these circumstances. Moreover, to the extent that the comedic rhythm in the Works is similar, that reflects the kind of conventional deadpan, sarcastic humor that is common to the genre of situational comedies. “The mere fact that a theme is comedic or ironic is not protectable.” Shame on You Prods., Inc. v. Banks, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 690 F. App’x 519 (9th Cir. 2017). Although both Works involve sarcastic humor that plays on bureaucratic absurdity, such similarities are not actionable in copyright law under the doctrine of scènes à faire, which filters out any similarities that flow naturally from the setting, premise, or genre of a work. Id. at 1151 (disregarding similarities that flowed from a “basic premise” of the works, including “[g]etting drunk, spending a ‘one-nighter’ with someone you just met, waking up disoriented the next morning at the individual’s house or apartment, and putting on the clothes worn the night before”). Because the Works both involve the same, central premise -- a situational comedy set in a public-facing government office -- the comedic similarities in the Works does not constitute the misappropriation of protectible expression. The kind of similarity identified by Plaintiff -- involving a “specific rhythm of setup, absurd twist, illogical escalation, and thematic payoff,” Dkt. 57 at 12 -- can be identified in countless creative works involving the workplace. See, e.g., Dkt. 61 at 10 n.4 (identifying an 1853 short story that embodies the sequence for which Plaintiff asserts copyright protection). Plaintiff has correctly identified that individually unprotectible elements of a work may be protectible as a sequence or pattern of expression. Dkt. 57 at 10 (citing Metcalf v. Bochno, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, the comedic beats identified in the Works here are, itself, generic structural elements of any situational comedy placed in a government office. See Shame on You Prods., 120 F. 11Plaintiff attempts to analogize to the Abbott and Costello’s Who’s on First comedic routine, arguing that the structure of the Screenplay’s dialogue resembles the protectible structure of the Who’s on First routine. Dkt. 57 at 20–21. This argument lacks merit because the structure of a joke is only entitled to thin protection, which requires verbatim copying to make out a case for infringement. Indeed, reviewing an allegation of infringement of the Abbott and Costello routine, the Second Circuit found infringement plausible only where the routine was copied “at some length, almost verbatim” and without any “alter[ation] . . . at all.” TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2016). Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 9 of 18 Page ID#:756
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 10 of 18 Supp. 3d at1151–54(similarities in generic plot sequence does not constitute infringement). In Metcalf,by contrast, the patterns of expression in the works were “striking[ly] similar” in non-generic ways: The similarities between the relevant works are striking: Both the Metcalf and Bochco works are set in overburdened county hospitals in inner-city Los Angeles with mostly black staffs. Both deal with issues of poverty, race relations and urban blight. The works’ main characters are both young, good-looking, muscular black surgeons who grew up in the neighborhood where the hospital is located. Both surgeons struggle to choose between the financial benefits of private practice and the emotional rewards of working in the inner city. Both are romantically involved with young professional women when they arrive at the hospital, but develop strong attractions to hospital administrators. Both new relationships flourish and culminate in a kiss, but are later strained when the administrator observes a display of physical intimacy between the main character and his original love interest. Both administrators are in their thirties, were once married but are now single, without children and devoted to their careers and to the hospital. In both works, the hospital’s bid for reaccreditation is vehemently opposed by a Hispanic politician. Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1073–74. Although these similarities were not protectible “individually,” the Ninth Circuit held that the “presence of so many generic similarities and the common patterns in which they ar[o]se” -- the “totality of the similarities” -- went beyond the “necessities of the theme” and genre, and thus, gave rise to a triable issue as to infringement of protectible expression. Id. at 1074 (emphasis added). In contrast, Plaintiff has merely pointed to “randomly scattered” similarities that lack any “concrete pattern” in common, which is not sufficient to show legal copying. See Flynn v. Surnow, No. 02-CV-9058, 2003 WL 23411877, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2003) (distinguishing Metcalf on that ground); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811–12 (9th Cir. 2003) (limiting the reach of Metcalf based on the principle that “a combination of unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright protection only if those elements are numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes an original work of authorship”). Plaintiff does not argue that the Works are substantially similar in any other respects. Indeed, the Works are dissimilar in their mood and theme for the reasons stated by CBS Studios. Dkt. 44 at 20–21. Other than common plot elements arising out of their setting, e.g., scenes involving government employees providing services to members of the public, which are scènes à faire, the Works’ plots and sequencing also are not similar in any respect. Id. at 20, 22. Further, there is no substantial similarity in the dialogue of the Works. Id. at 21. Nor do the characters in the Works share any protectible traits. Id.; see also Silas v. Home Box Off., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“[C]ourts require a very high degree of similarity between characters.”), aff’d, 713 F. App’x 626 (9th Cir. 2018). For these reasons, the Complaint fails plausibly to allege legal copying. c) Leave to Amend It is determined that granting leave to amend would be futile and prejudicial to Defendant under these circumstances. See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 593 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2014) (permitting Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 10 of 18 Page ID#:757
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 11 of 18 dismissal with prejudice where amendment would be futile); Thakur v. Cofiroute USA, LLC, No. 19-CV-2233, 2021 WL 304389, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2021) (denying leave to amend where it “would unduly prolong resolution of this protracted litigation, and it would unduly prejudice Defendants by forcing them to continue to defend against meritless claims”), aff’d, No. 21-55364, 2022 WL 1115874 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2022) First, as to circumstantial proof of factual copying, Plaintiff cannot adduce any facts or circumstances that are necessary to allege a viable theory of access based on a non-speculative chain of events. In the Complaint, Plaintiff has alleged only that two industry professionals affiliated with CBS Studios were sent the Screenplay in 2014. From this, Plaintiff infers that CBS Studios had access to the Screenplay and copied it. That inference has already been rejected because Plaintiff has failed to allege “any plausible nexus” between these “industry professionals” and the Accused Television Series. Dkt. 31 at 6. The new evidence submitted by Plaintiff further confirms that granting leave to amend would be futile. Roe’s declaration does not reference the Screenplay; the emails between Roe and Doe do not mention any of Plaintiff’s works, much less the Screenplay at issue here. Rather, Roe declares only that Dillard’s “creative material” and “some scripts” authored by Plaintiff were disseminated to Doe. Dkt. 58-4 ¶¶ 2, 4. Roe’s vague reference to certain of Plaintiff’s works does not establish that she disseminated the Screenplay at issue. Moreover, because Roe expressly did not declare that she disseminated the Screenplay to Doe, which is a key fact that Plaintiff must establish to prove access, it is unreasonable to infer that she did so. See Esparza v. Kohl’s, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 3d 934, 939 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (“It is also improper for the court to assume ‘the plaintiff can prove facts that he or she has not alleged.’” (cleaned up) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983))). Moreover, even if it were established that Roe sent the Screenplay to Doe, Plaintiff cannot draw a plausible connection between Doe and Defendant. Roe’s declaration includes a hearsay statement that Doe has “indicated that he maintains professional relationships with Kapital Entertainment,” which is the production company that worked with Defendant on the Accused Television Series. However, Plaintiff has not proffered any evidence as to the nature and the extent of Doe’s alleged relationship with Kapital Entertainment. An inference of access requires “more than a mere allegation that someone known to the defendant possessed the work in question.” Herzog v. Castle Rock Ent., 193 F.3d 1241, 1252 (11th Cir. 1999 (quoting Palmieri v. Estefan, No. 91-CV- 3098, 1995 WL 331719, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1995)); Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 583 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting claim of access based upon a “tortious [sic] chain of hypothetical transmittals”). That the Screenplay was sent to one individual with an indeterminate “professional relationship[]” with a nonparty production company does not constitute a “sufficiently strong” nexus between Doe and Defendant required to “raise a reasonable possibility of access by” Defendant. Meta-Film Assocs., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 1984). More substantial theories of access that are considerably stronger than Plaintiff’s have been dismissed with prejudice on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Washington v. ViacomCBS, Inc., No. 20-CV-435, 2021 WL 2640105, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-55668, 2023 WL 2658749 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2023) (dismissing complaint with prejudice because the following theories of access were unduly speculative: “(1) Defendant’s predecessor company, CBS, had a ‘first look’ deal with Imagine Impact, to which Plaintiff submitted her Works for its consideration; (2) Dan Lerner, who is the credited director of Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 11 of 18 Page ID#:758
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 14 of 18 these, as well as litigating another motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s fundamentally flawed allegations. For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Count I, which is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, i.e., without leave to amend. B. Copyright Preemption (Counts II and IV) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim (Count II), and idea misappropriation claim (Count IV), are preempted by Section 301 of the Copyright Act. Dkt. 44 at 21. Defendant contends that, because these claims are merely a “restate[ment]” of Plaintiff’s copyright claim, both are preempted. Dkt. 44 at 21–23. 1. Legal Standards The Ninth Circuit has established a two-part test to determine whether a state law claim is preempted by the Copyright Act. First, it must be determined “whether the ‘subject matter’ of the state law claim falls within the subject matter of copyright as described in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.” Laws v. Sony Music Ent., Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006). Section 102 of the Copyright Act affords copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” including “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102. Second, if the claim does fall within the subject matter of copyright, it must be determined “whether the rights asserted under state law are equivalent to the rights contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106, which articulates the exclusive rights of copyright holders.” Laws, 448 F.3d at 1137-38. The exclusive rights provided in Section 106 include the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies[,]” “to prepare derivate works[,]” “to distribute copies . . . to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,” and “to display the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106. “To survive preemption, the state cause of action must protect rights which are qualitatively different from the copyright rights. The state claim must have an extra element which changes the nature of the action.” Laws, 448 F.3d at 1143 (quoting Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)). 2. Application The Complaint alleges that Defendant violated the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., by “misappropriating” his work and “misrepresenting” its origin. Dkt. 1 48. Further, the Complaint alleges that Defendant misappropriated his ideas, including the “unique premise, character types, and comedic motifs” of his work, without authorization. Id. 55. These claims concern Defendant’s use of his literary work, which falls within the “subject matter” of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). Further, the state-law rights that Plaintiff asserts are substantially equivalent to rights protected by the Copyright Act because these claims are based on the unauthorized copying of Plaintiff’s literary work. See Sybersound Recs., Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) (“To the extent the improper business act complained of [under the UCL] is based on copyright infringement, the claim was properly dismissed because it is preempted.”). Plaintiff Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 14 of 18 Page ID#:761
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 16 of 18 law, an amendment would be futile.See, e.g., Reyes v. Premier Home Funding, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Since such claims are preempted, dismissal is with prejudice.”). C. Breach of Implied Contract (Count III) 1. Legal Standards California common law recognizes that an implied-in-fact contract may be created where one party furnishes an idea to another, even absent any express promise to pay. Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 737–39 (1956). “To establish a Desny claim for breach of implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff prepared the work, disclosed the work to the offeree for sale, and did so under circumstances from which it could be concluded that the offeree voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the conditions on which it was tendered and the reasonable value of the work.” Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). 2. Application The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff disclosed the Screenplay to Defendant under “circumstances giving rise to an implied-in-fact contract for compensation if used,” which Defendant breached by exploiting the Screenplay without compensating Plaintiff. Dkt. 1 51. Defendant argues that these allegations fail to state a claim for relief because Plaintiff does not plausibly allege any contractual relationship, even an implied one, between the parties. Dkt. 44 at 24–25. Plaintiff responds that he disseminated the Screenplay “to the industry” with an understanding that he would be paid if the Screenplay were used. Dkt. 21 at 21–22. Defendant’s arguments are persuasive. The Complaint does not plausibly allege that Plaintiff submitted the Screenplay to Defendant, as opposed to two individuals affiliated with Defendant more than ten years ago. Nor does it aver that Plaintiff’s submission was conditioned on Defendant’s obligation to pay Plaintiff and that Defendant received and exploited the Screenplay with the understanding that it had formed an implied agreement with Plaintiff in so doing. See Meta-Film Assocs., 586 F. Supp. 1346 at 1357–58 (observing that “countless unsolicited scripts are submitted to numbers of individuals on studio lots every day,” and, as such, “it is clearly unreasonable to attribute the knowledge of any one individual—especially a non-employee—to every other individual just because they occupy offices on the same studio lot”). Plaintiff’s bare allegation that he submitted the Screenplay to several industry professionals, only two of whom are identified as associated with Defendants, also does not plausibly demonstrate that an implied contractual relationship was formed with Defendant. See, e.g., Alexander v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., No. 17-CV-3123, 2017 WL 5633407, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017) (dismissing theory of “implied contract . . . by mass-mailing of” screenplay because plaintiff failed to allege a reasonable expectation of payment for unsolicited submission of the work and failed to allege that defendants, who never responded to the submission, accepted plaintiff’s implied offer). “Even in cases where the plaintiff alleged a more concrete exchange between the parties, courts have been wary to let an implied contract claim proceed at the motion to dismiss stage.” Id. Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 16 of 18 Page ID#:763
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 17 of 18 For reasons similar to those discussed with respect to Plaintiff’sdeficientcopyright claim, granting leave to amend the Desny claim would be futile under these circumstances and unduly prejudicial to Defendant. Plaintiff’s new evidence suggests that, at most, he had a bilateral expectation of payment from Roe, who promoted certain of Plaintiff’s works on his behalf. There is no evidence, however, that Roe promoted the Screenplay, as opposed to other works not at issue in this action, on his behalf. Moreover, there is no evidence that Plaintiff or Roe has ever dealt with Defendant, either directly or indirectly, with respect to the Screenplay. Indeed, there is no evidence that Defendant even received the Screenplay. Accordingly, Defendant could not have misappropriated it because there was no “bilateral exchange through which an implied contract could be inferred.” Alexander, 2017 WL 5633407, at *11. “Affording Plaintiff the chance to amend his Complaint is likely to raise even more baseless allegations, is unlikely to cure the current deficiencies, and is even more unlikely to render Plaintiff’s Complaint ‘plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting ZL Techs., Inc. v. Gardner, Inc., No. 09-CV-2393, 2009 WL 3706821, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2009). For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Count III, which is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, i.e., without leave to amend. D. Declaratory Relief (Count V) “It is well established that declaratory relief is an equitable remedy,” not a standalone cause of action. See Baker v. Baker, No. 16-CV-8931, 2018 WL 3216509, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2018) (collecting cases), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 860 F. App’x 502 (9th Cir. 2021). “The availability of declaratory judgments, therefore, depends on the presence of an underlying legally-cognizable cause of action.” Kidd v. Am. Reliable Ins. Co., No. 15-CV-1720, 2016 WL 4502459, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016). When the underlying claim is dismissed, the declaratory relief claim must also be dismissed. Vaughan v. Quicken Loans Inc., No. 25-CV-4020, 2025 WL 2104273, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2025). Because each of Plaintiff’s substantive claims fail, the declaratory relief claim also fails to state a plausible claim for relief.17 Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Count V, which is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, i.e., without leave to amend. E. Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments Plaintiff raises several other arguments that are collateral to the issues raised by the Motion to Dismiss. None are persuasive. First, Plaintiff argues that CBS Studios failed to meet and confer in good faith, as required by Local Rule 7-3, because the parties’ conference was “perfunctory” and Defendant’s counsel failed to articulate the basis for its motion. Dkt. 57 at 6. Even taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, this does not provide grounds to deny the Motion to Dismiss because the parties were both on notice of the legal and factual bases for the Motion to Dismiss, which have already been litigated in connection with the TRO Order. The sole case cited by Plaintiff, Singer v. Live Nation Worldwide Inc., is distinguishable. There, 17Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion to Dismiss as to this cause of action, and therefore, he has also abandoned the claim for the reasons set forth in n.17. Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 17 of 18 Page ID#:764
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL Case No.8:25-cv-02091-JAK (KESx) DateMarch16, 2026 Title Meriland Keith Dillard v. CBS Studios, Inc. Page 18 of 18 the conference consisted of an unanswered letter sent three days before the motion was filed. No. 11-CV-427, 2012 WL 123146, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012). Second, Plaintiff argues that CBS Studios should be “judicially estopped” because it falsely claimed that the August 2024 script had been superseded by a later script. Even if that allegation were true -- and Plaintiff proffers no evidence in support of it -- judicial estoppel does not apply because the TRO Order did not depend on whether the August 2024 script had been superseded. Dkt. 31 at 3 n.3; see also Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2001) (“This court has restricted the application of judicial estoppel to cases where the court relied on, or ‘accepted,’ the party’s previous inconsistent position.”). Third, Plaintiff argues that CBS Studios falsely claimed to the Court that the Heiny Story was the source of the Accused Television Series. Dkt. 57 at 10. Plaintiff offers no evidence for this assertion. Moreover, as previously noted, this is immaterial to resolving the Motion to Dismiss because any evidence concerning the Heiny Story has not been considered in this analysis. Finally, Plaintiff argues that CBS Studios has engaged in a “coordinated pattern” of misconduct that warrants denial of the Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 57 at 22. However, Plaintiff offers no evidence or nonconclusory argument in support of this contention. That Plaintiff disagrees with the legal arguments raised by Defendant does not provide a basis to deny the Motion to Dismiss. V. Conclusion For the reasons stated in this Order, the Motion to Stay is DENIED as moot and the Motionto Dismiss is GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, i.e., without leave to amend. After meeting and conferring with Plaintiff to determine if the parties can agree on the form of a proposed judgment consistent with this Order, Defendant’s counsel shall lodge a proposed judgment within 14 days of the issuance of this Order. If the parties have reached an agreement as to its form, the proposed judgment shall include a signature from Plaintiff stating such an agreement. If the parties have not reached an agreement as to form, Defendant’s counsel shall submit Defendant’s form of the proposed judgment, and Plaintiff shall file any objections within seven days thereafter and in conformance with the Local Rules. Based on a review of the materials that are filed, the form of the judgment will be determined, and then filed. IT IS SO ORDERED. : Initials of Preparer LC3 Case 8:25-cv-02091-JAK-KES Document 73 Filed 03/16/26 Page 18 of 18 Page ID#:765
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