Dixon v. MultiCare Health Sys. (1) (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Ryan Adam Dixon v. MultiCare Health System (1)
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
United States (J.) (unanimous Court)
RYAN ADAM DIXON, Plaintiff, v. MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 607769Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Washington.RYAN ADAM DIXON, Plaintiff,v.MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM, a Washingtonnon-profit corporation, in its capacity as a planadministrator; MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM401(k) PLAN; MUTLICARE HEALTH SYSTEM403(b) EMPLOYEE SAVINGS PLAN, Defendants.CASE NO. CV25-5414|03/04/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsRyan Adam Dixon, Puyallup, WA, Pro Se.Karin D. Jones, Timothy J. O'Connell, Stoel Rives LLP,Seattle, WA, for Defendants.ORDER*1 THIS MATTER is before the Court on defendantsMultiCare Health System, MultiCare Health System 401(k)Plan, and MultiCare Health System 403(b) Employee SavingsPlan's (collectively, “MultiCare”) motion to dismiss, Dkt15; pro se plaintiff Ryan Dixon's motion to compel plandocuments, Dkt. 19; Dixon's motion for an extension of time,Dkt. 26; and MultiCare's motion for a status or schedulingconference, Dkt. 33.Dixon alleges that MultiCare's administrative errors at thetime of his hiring prevented him from opting out of hisautomatic enrollment in MultiCare's 401(k) Plan. He assertsclaims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Actof 1974 (“ERISA”), Washington state law, RCW 49.52.070for willful withholding of wages, and retaliation. He seeksreimbursement of all wages deferred to his 401(k) accountwhile he was unable to modify his contribution setting, as wellas double damages and attorney's fees.MultiCare seeks dismissal, contending that Dixon failed toexhaust MultiCare's administrative review procedures, andthat the 401(k) Plan requires Dixon to arbitrate his claims.1MultiCare also argues that his Washington state law wagewithholding claim is preempted by ERISA, and that he failsto allege a specific retaliatory act.I. BACKGROUNDIn December 2023, Dixon was hired as a registerednurse at MultiCare Good Samaritan Hospital in Puyallup,Washington. Dkt. 17 at 4. At Dixon's onboarding, anincorrect Social Security Number was input into his electronicemployment records.2 Second Am. Compl. (“2AC”), Dkt.13-1 at 1. MultiCare used the inaccurate SSN and Dixon'snickname, “Rome” Dixon, (rather than his legal name, RyanDixon) to open Dixon's 401(k) retirement account. Id.Dixon was automatically enrolled in MultiCare's 401(k)Plan. Dkt. 15 at 2; see Dkt. 17-1 at 27. Under the Plan,3% of an employee's pre-tax compensation is deductedfrom each paycheck and contributed to the employee's401(k) account. Dkt. 17-1 at 27. The Plan also includes adiscretionary employer match. Id. Employees receive noticeof the automatic enrollment and may opt out during thePlan's 60-day opt-out period. Id. Changes to enrollment orcontribution amounts can be adjusted at any time and applyprospectively. Id. Unlike some 401(k) plans, the MultiCarePlan does not allow for fund withdrawal within 90 days of thefirst automatic enrollment deduction. Id.*2 The Plan provides detailed procedures for resolvingdisputes. It requires that “any claim, dispute, or breach arisingout of or in any way related to the plan” be resolved througharbitration in Tacoma, Washington. Dkt. 16 at 109. However,as a prerequisite to arbitration, employees must first exhaustall internal review procedures. The Plan requires employeesto file claims with MultiCare's Retirement Committee. Id.at 12, 66. If the Committee denies the claim, an employeemay appeal that decision. Id. at 66. Only after the Committeeupholds its original decision may the claim be resolvedthrough arbitration. Id.On April 12, 2024, MultiCare automatically deferred $769.92of Dixon's pre-tax wages into his 401(k) account. 2AC, Dkt.
RYAN ADAM DIXON, Plaintiff, v. MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.213-1 at 3. One month later, Dixon notified MultiCare thathe could not access the employee portal to stop his 401(k)contributions because his account was set up with an incorrectname and SSN. Id. at 3.; see Dkt. 16 at 143–151. On June2, 2024, Dixon provided MultiCare with his correct SSN.Dkt. 17-1 at 28. MultiCare updated his account, and Dixonwas able to stop further contributions. Id. Between April 12,2024, and June 7, 2024, MultiCare automatically deferred$1,317.25 to Dixon's 401(k) account. 2AC, Dkt. 13-1 at 3.On April 28, 2025, Dixon requested a refund fromMultiCare's Retirement Committee for what he later allegeswere “involuntary retirement contributions during financialhardship.” Dkt. 17 at 9. While that request was pending,Dixon sued.3 Dkt. 1. He subsequently filed First and SecondAmended Complaints. Dkts. 11, 13-1. He asserts ERISAclaims for (1) recovery of “benefits due,” and (2) breach offiduciary duty; a Washington state law claim under RCW49.52 for willful wage withholding; and ERISA and state lawclaims for retaliation. 2AC, Dkt. 13-1 at 4–5.On May 30, 2025, the Retirement Committee denied Dixon'srequest for a refund of his 401(k) retirement contributions.Id. at 1. Dixon appealed, arguing that the denial was inerror and requesting that MultiCare provide him with certaindocuments, including the complete claim file, workday auditlog, call logs, plan documents, service agreements, anddocuments describing the policies and procedures for claimdistribution. Id.; Dkt. 17-1 at 2. On July 2, 2025, MultiCareemailed Dixon the Plan documents, the Trust Agreement, andthe Annual Report. Dkt. 17-1 at 20. MultiCare refused toprovide the remaining requested documents, explaining thatthey were either not required under ERISA or did not exist.Id. at 21.MultiCare's motion to dismiss argues that Dixon failed toexhaust4 the Plan's internal review procedures and is requiredto arbitrate his ERISA claims. Dkt. 15 at 6, 7. It asks theCourt to accept the parties’ briefing on arbitration and decidethe issue without requiring a separate motion to compelarbitration. Id. at 8 n.9. The parties agree that if arbitrationis compelled, the ERISA claims must be stayed and notdismissed. Dkt. 17 at 17; Dkt. 18 at 8 n.9.MultiCare further contends that Dixon's state law wagewithholding claim is preempted by ERISA and should bedismissed. It also argues that Dixon's retaliation claims failbecause he alleges only prospective relief “should an adverseaction materialize” sometime in the future. Dkt. 15 at 10(citing to 2AC, Dkt. 13-1 at 6).*3 Dixon responds that the Plan's arbitration clause isunenforceable because it eliminates substantive ERISArights. Dkt. 17 at 10. Alternatively, he asserts that MultiCarewaived any right to arbitrate by filing its motion to dismissand producing documents. Id. at 17. He further contendsthat his state law wage withholding claim is not preemptedbecause it is unrelated to the Plan. Id. at 13. He also arguesthat MultiCare retaliated against him by sending email blaststo multiple employees and delaying his job transfer request.Id. at 15.On August 1, 2025, the Retirement Committee denied Dixon'sappeal, stating that “the Plan does not provide for the refundof contributions made when a participant is automaticallyenrolled in the Plan.” Dkt. 17-1 at 26.On August 31, 2025, Dixon moved to compel productionof all requested documents and the complete administrativerecord. Dkt. 19. In response, MultiCare argues that Dixon'smotion is procedurally deficient, and that Dixon failed toconfer in good faith. It asserts that it has produced everythingERISA requires. It also requested that the Court admonishDixon and warn him that his repeated willful violation of thefederal rules will warrant monetary sanctions in the future.The issues are discussed in turn.II. DISCUSSIONA. Rule 12(b)(6) Legal StandardDismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theoryor the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizablelegal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696,699 (9th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff's complaint must allege factsto state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim has “facialplausibility” when the party seeking relief “pleads factualcontent that allows the court to draw the reasonable inferencethat the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.Although courts must accept as true the complaint's well-pled facts, conclusory allegations of law and unwarrantedinferences will not defeat an otherwise proper Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cnty., 487F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007); Sprewell v. Golden State
RYAN ADAM DIXON, Plaintiff, v. MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] plaintiff'sobligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] torelief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and aformulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action willnot do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right torelief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). This requiresa plaintiff to plead “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).When granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a districtcourt should grant leave to amend even if no request to amendthe pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleadingcould not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., 911 F.2d242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). However, when the facts are notin dispute and the sole issue is whether there is liability as amatter of substantive law, courts may deny leave to amend.Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195–96 (9th Cir. 1988).B. The 401(k) Plan documents, Dixon's HR ticket,26 C.F.R. § 1.414(w)-1, and Dixon's internal appealdocuments are incorporated by reference into Dixon'scomplaint.As an initial matter, the Court must determine which materialsit may consider when evaluating MultiCare's motion todismiss. Generally, a court may not consider any materialoutside the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12 motion, or themotion is converted to one for summary judgment (and theopposing party is entitled to respond to the new motion). SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). There are two exceptions to this rule.*4 First, the Court may consider material submitted as partof the complaint, or upon which the complaint necessarilyrelies, if the material's authenticity is not contested. Lee v.City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); seealso United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir.2003) (A document “may be incorporated by reference into acomplaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document orthe document forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim.”). “Oncea document is deemed incorporated by reference, the entiredocument is assumed to be true for purposes of a motion todismiss, and both parties—and the Court—are free to refer toany of its contents.” In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d1046, 1058 n.10 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marksomitted). Second, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, theCourt may take judicial notice of matters of public record. Id.MultiCare asks the Court to incorporate by reference thefollowing documents: Dixon's 401(k) Plan, his HR ticket andrelated email correspondence, and 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(w)-1.Dkt. 15 at 6; see Dkt. 16. Dixon does not oppose the request.Because these documents form the basis of Dixon's claims,MultiCare's request is GRANTED.Although Dixon makes no formal incorporation request, healso submits multiple documents for the Court's considerationin opposing MultiCare's motion. See Dkt. 17-1. The Courtincorporates by reference each document except MultiCare'semail correspondence with Dixon concerning a separateinvestigation, exhibits E and F, because they were notreferenced or relied on in his complaint.C. Dixon's ERISA claims are subject to arbitration.MultiCare argues first that Dixon's claims are subject to thePlan's mandatory arbitration provision.5 Dkt. 15 at 7. Itcontends that the provision is enforceable and that his claimsfall within its scope.Dixon does not dispute that the arbitration provision appliesto his claims. However, he appears to argue that the Plan'sarbitration provision is unenforceable because it eliminatesthe right of claimants to proceed as a class. Dkt. 17 at 10–11. He also argues that MultiCare waived its right to arbitrateby filing its motion to dismiss (which includes the arbitrationargument). Id. at 7.Under the Federal Arbitration Act, valid arbitrationagreements are enforceable. It “permits a party ‘aggrieved bythe alleged...refusal of another to arbitrate’ to petition anyfederal district court for an order compelling arbitration inthe manner provided for in the agreement.” Chiron Corp. v.Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4). A court's role is “limited todetermining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate existsand, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses thedispute at issue.” Id. (citation omitted). If the answer to bothquestions is “yes,” then the agreement must be enforced.Id. The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretionby a district court;” instead it mandates “that district courtsshall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issuesas to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Id.(emphasis in original) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985)).
RYAN ADAM DIXON, Plaintiff, v. MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4However, courts may invalidate an arbitration agreement thatprevents the “effective vindication” of a federal statutoryright. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228,235 (2013). When this exception applies, a plan's arbitrationprovision is unenforceable. Id. The effective vindicationexception is intended to prevent the “prospective waiverof a party's right to pursue statutory remedies.” (quotingMitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc.,473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)).*5 Dixon argues that the arbitration provision isunenforceable because it “eliminates plan-wide relief.” 2AC,Dkt. 13-1 at 4 (citing Smith v. Bd. of Directors of Triad Mfg.,Inc, 13 F.4th 613 (7th Cir. 2021)). He argues that discoverymay “reveal systemic recordkeeping failures affecting otherparticipants, preserving potential class or plan-wide claimsunder [ERISA].” Dkt. 17 at 11. This position has beensquarely rejected. In Italian Colors, the Supreme Court heldthat a class action arbitration waiver “merely limits arbitrationto the two contracting parties;” it does not eliminate theirright to pursue statutory remedies. Id. at 236. The Courtemphasizes that an individual suit is adequate to assure“effective vindication” of a federal right. Id.Furthermore, a pro se litigant cannot litigate claims that arenot personal to him. Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79(9th Cir. 1962). Dixon may therefore represent only himself.He cannot represent a class of similarly situated people or asDixon suggests, “preserve” his ability to later add class-wideclaims. See Dkt. 17 at 11.Dixon makes no other argument, and notably, the Plan'sarbitration provision does not limit Dixon's right to pursueERISA remedies, but rather preserves them:[T]he arbitration provision and ClassAction Waiver shall not limit aclaimant's right to seek relief thatmay be awarded under ERISA,so long as such relief is soughtthrough an individual arbitrationproceeding, and not through a classor collective action....if any portionof the arbitration provision or ClassAction Waiver is found to prohibita claimant from obtaining any reliefunder ERISA that the claimant wouldbe able to obtain on an individual basis,the arbitration provision and ClassAction Waiver shall not be deemedvoid; rather, the Arbitrator shall havethe authority to award such relief.Dkt. 16 at 109-10; cf. Smith, 13 F.4th at 620–22 (concludingthat the arbitration clause was unenforceable because iteliminated plaintiff's ERISA remedy of fiduciary removal.).Dixon fails to make a cognizable argument as to why thearbitration provision is unenforceable.Dixon next argues that MultiCare waived any right to arbitrateby filing its motion to dismiss and producing documents. Dkt.17 at 17. MultiCare contends that Dixon has not shown thatit acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate.6 Dkt. 18 at7. It explains that it filed its motion to dismiss in response toDixon's premature filing of this action before exhausting thePlan's internal review and arbitration procedures. Accordingto MultiCare, the motion to dismiss expressly states its intentto arbitrate, preserving that right. MultiCare further maintainsthat it produced documents as required by statute. Id. at 8.When considering whether MultiCare took actionsinconsistent with its right to arbitration, the Court mustconsider the “ ‘totality of the parties’ actions.’ ” Armstrong, 59F.4th at 1015 (quoting Hill v. Xerox Bus. Servs., 59 F.4th 457,471 (9th Cir. 2023)). A party generally “acts inconsistentlywith exercising the right to arbitrate when it (1) makes anintentional decision not to move to compel arbitration and (2)actively litigates the merits of a case for a prolonged period oftime in order to take advantage of being in court.” Id. (quotingNewirth ex rel. Newirth v. Aegis Senior Cmtys., LLC, 931 F.3d935, 941 (9th Cir. 2019)).*6 Here, MultiCare argued in its very first motion—themotion to dismiss—that arbitration is required. It did not,as Dixon suggests, extensively litigate the merits and thenattempt to compel arbitration after losing. Instead, MultiCarehas consistently maintained that Dixon's arguments aresubject to mandatory arbitration. MultiCare therefore did notwaive its right to arbitration.Because the Plan's arbitration provision is enforceable, andDixon does not dispute that the arbitration provision governshis ERISA claims, MultiCare's request to compel arbitrationis GRANTED. Dixon's ERISA claims are STAYED pendingarbitration. See Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 478 (2024).
RYAN ADAM DIXON, Plaintiff, v. MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5D. Dixon's Washington state law wage withholding claimis preempted by ERISA.MultiCare argues that Dixon's RCW 49.52.050 state lawwage withholding claim “falls within the expansive sweepof ERISA's preemption clause.” Dkt. 15 at 9. It argues that“[t]here is no doubt” that the state law relates to an employeebenefit plan because it penalizes employers for collecting “arebate of any part of wages” with no distinction for wages thatare directed to an employee's ERISA retirement plan. Id.Dixon responds that RCW 49.52 is unrelated to the Plan forseveral reasons: (1) the law regulates wage deductions beforethey become plan assets; (2) it does not require interpretationof the Plan's terms; (3) it addresses pure payroll functions;and (4) it was violated before funds “entered” the Plan. Dkt.17 at 13.ERISA § 514(a) broadly preempts “any and all State lawsinsofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employeebenefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added). Alaw “relates to an employee benefit plan if it has either a‘connection with’ or ‘reference to’ such a plan.” Paulsenv. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotingIngersoll–Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990)).In other words, a cause of action is related to an ERISAplan if the existence of the plan is essential for establishingliability. Id.; see also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S.200, 210 (2004) (A state law cause of action is preemptedby ERISA where legal liability exists “only because of [the]administration of ERISA-regulated benefit plans” and “whereno legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or theplan terms is violated.”). Where a state law claim is preemptedby federal law, dismissal may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Cleghorn v. Blue Shield of Cal., 408 F.3d 1222,1225 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of state law causesof action that were preempted by ERISA).Here, any alleged liability under RCW 49.52.050 arises solelyfrom Dixon's automatic enrollment in MultiCare's 401(k)Plan. RCW 49.52.050 imposes penalties on employers whounlawfully “collect or receive” any portion of an employee'swages. MultiCare “collected” Dixon's wages pursuant to theterms of an ERISA governed 401(k) retirement plan. Becausethe challenged conduct concerns wage deferral made underan ERISA employee benefit plan, Dixon's claim falls withinERISA's preemption clause. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).Dixon's RCW 49.52.050 wage withholding claim ispreempted by ERISA. MultiCare's motion to dismiss thisclaim is GRANTED and it is DISMISSED with prejudiceand without leave to amend.E. Dixon's retaliation claims are dismissed for failure tostate a claim.*7 Dixon asserts retaliation claims under both ERISA §510 and RCW 49.48.0907 for “[a]ny adverse action takenbecause Dixon asserted ERISA rights.” 2AC, Dkt. 13-1 at 5.MultiCare correctly contends that this claim must fail becausea party may not assert a claim over actions “that may, ormay not, occur in the future.” Dkt. 15 at 10 (citing Scottv. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 662 (9th Cir.2002)). In his reply, Dixon points to MultiCare's “e-emailblasts to several employees.” However, Dixon did not includethose facts in his second amended complaint, and they do notstate a plausible retaliation claim in any event.8MultiCare's motion to dismiss Dixon's retaliation claims isGRANTED. His retaliation claims are DISMISSED withoutprejudice.F. MultiCare has produced all statutorily requireddocuments.As a separate matter, Dixon alleges in his response toMultiCare's motion to dismiss that he is entitled to statutorypenalties of $110 per day for MultiCare's failure to produceall requested documents. Dkt. 17 at 5 (citing 29 C.F.R. §2575.502c-1). He raised this argument again a month laterin his motion to compel plan documents, Dkt. 19. Dixonargues that without these documents, he cannot identifyspecific fiduciaries, understand the plan's structure, accessevidence of account error, or evaluate insurance coveragefor settlement. Dkt. 19 at 8. He argues that arbitrationwithout these documents is futile. Dkt. 17 at 2 (citing Vaughtv. Scottsdale Healthcare, 546 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2008).However, his reliance on Vaught is misplaced.Vaught reiterates that before filing suit under ERISA § 502,a plaintiff “must avail himself or herself of a plan's owninternal review procedures.” Id. at 626. Vaught does nothold that failing to disclose documents excuses arbitration;in fact, it does not even mention arbitration at all. Moreimportantly, Dixon fails to identify any documents requiredunder ERISA that MultiCare failed to produce. To thecontrary, the evidence he attached in response to MultiCare'smotion to dismiss suggests the MultiCare timely providedhim with the following documents:
RYAN ADAM DIXON, Plaintiff, v. MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.61. The MultiCare Health System 401(k) Plan (as amendedand restated effective July 1, 2017) (the 2017 Restatement)2. Amendments One to Fourteen to the 2017 Restatement3. March 2020 Summary Plan Description for Plan4. Summaries of Material Modifications for the Plan datedJune 2022, December 2022 and April 20245. The Trust Agreement for the Plan effective April 29,20196. Amendment to the Trust Agreement effective October 1,20247. The Annual Report (Form 5500) for the 2023 Plan Yearfiled on October 14, 20248. The Administrative Services Agreement for MultiCareHealth System effective April 29, 2019, with provisionsrelevant to the MultiCare Health System 401(k) Plan.Dkt. 17-1 at 21.Dixon alleges that this is not sufficient, asserting thatERISA also requires MultiCare to produce “(1) Committeeminutes, (2) Fiduciary roster, (3) Fidelity bond policy, (4)Investment Policy Statement, (5) Summary Annual Reports,(6) 404a-5 participant disclosures, (7) 408(b)(2) serviceprovider disclosures, (8) Audit logs, and (9) Committeecharter.” Dkt. 17 at 5. But that is not what the statute requires.See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4).*8 Dixon also argues that MultiCare is required to producethe entire administrative file under 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(2)(iii). However, that regulation is specific to a claim forbenefits. A claim for benefits is defined as “a request for a planbenefit.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(e). Dixon is not requestinga “plan benefit,” but rather a “refund” or a “correctivedistribution” of the wages deferred to his 401(k) account.2AC, Dkt. 13-1 at 1, 6.Lastly, Dixon's motion to compel is procedurally deficient.Despite MultiCare's repeated attempts to meet and conferregarding discovery, Dixon moved to compel without firstserving MultiCare with any discovery requests under Rule34; attending, or even scheduling, a Rule 26(f) conference;or making any good faith attempt to confer with MultiCare.See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37; W.D. Wash. Local Civ. R. 37(a)(1). The requirement to meet and confer is intended to“ensure that parties have an inexpensive and expeditiousopportunity to resolve discovery disputes and that onlygenuine disagreements are brought before the Court.”Nguyen v. Mercer Island Boys Basketball Booster Club,No. 2:24-CV-01990-RSL, 2025 WL 1519134, at *2 (W.D.Wash. May 28, 2025) (denying motion to compel due toinsufficient conferral where plaintiff merely certified that they“repeatedly notified defendant” of discovery deficiency).Dixon asserts that he served a written discovery requestby email, sent a deficiency “cure” email identifying thedocuments still missing, and sent a “final” meet and conferemail “giving a short cure window.” Dkt. 19-1 at 1. However,emails alone are not sufficient. A good faith effort “requires aface-to-face meeting or a telephone conference.” W.D. Wash.Local Civ. R. 37(a)(1); see Gould v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop.Ins. Co., No. 2:22-CV-00820-LK, 2023 WL 3018865, at *6(W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2023) (denying motion to compel wheredefendant had not shown that it met and conferred regardingthe discovery dispute). Dixon failed to meet and confer asrequired.Dixon's request for ERISA penalties relating to withhelddocuments, Dkt. 17 at 5, and his related motion to compel,Dkt. 19, are DENIED.G. Dixon is subject to sanctions for his improper filings.MultiCare requests that the Court subject Dixon to sanctionsfor his repeated improper filings, including citing nonexistentor inapplicable case law, misconstruing applicable law, andgenerally misleading the Court. Dkt. 29 at 10. Rather thanan award of fees, however, MultiCare requests that the Courtadmonish Dixon for his inappropriate conduct and willfulviolation of the federal rules. Id. at 11. Dixon did not directlyrespond to this sanctions request.A pro se litigant is not held to the same standard as alicensed attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521(1972). Regardless of technical deficiencies, a pro se litigant'spleading—his complaint—should be judged only by function,not form. Id. This rule is almost uniformly applied when a prose plaintiff is seeking in forma pauperis status, or defendinga motion to dismiss. But a pro se plaintiff is not immune fromthe rules of civil procedure. Although the Court must construehis complaint liberally, a pro se litigant “must follow the samerules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh,814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other groundsby Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 925–28 (9th Cir.2012). Pro se litigants in the ordinary civil case should not be
RYAN ADAM DIXON, Plaintiff, v. MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record.Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986).*9 Dixon repeatedly cites to nonexistent cases9 and to othercases10 that do not support the proposition for which theywere offered. The Court has no formal rule against the useof generative artificial intelligence to write pleadings andbriefs. However, parties are bound by Rule 11, which requiresparties to certify that their “legal contentions are warrantedby existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing newlaw.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).Dixon's repeated and presumably intentional failure to verifycited authority supports an award of sanctions. If, in thefuture, Dixon repeats this behavior, monetary sanctions maybe awarded.III. ORDERMultiCare's motion to dismiss, Dkt. 15, is DENIED inpart and GRANTED in part. MultiCare's motion to dismissDixon's ERISA claims is DENIED. However, MultiCare'srequest to compel arbitration on those claims is GRANTED.Dixon's ERISA claims are STAYED pending arbitration. Theparties shall file a Joint Status Report within 30 days of thecompletion of any arbitration.Dixon's RCW 49.52.050 wage withholding claim isDISMISSED with prejudice. Dixon's retaliation claim isDISMISSED without prejudice.Dixon's motion to compel production of plan documents, Dkt.19, is DENIED. Dixon's motion for an extension of time,Dkt. 26; and MultiCare's motion for a status or schedulingconference, Dkt. 33, are DENIED as moot.Dated this 4th day of March, 2026.AAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 607769Footnotes1MultiCare alternatively argues in a footnote that Dixon's ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) “benefits due” claim should bedismissed because he cites a law, 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(w)-1(b)(2)(v), and a Plan provision, Plan § 5.12, thatdo not exist. Dkt. 15 at 7 n.7. Dixon responds that these were merely “typographical errors, and corrects thecitations to 26 C.F.R. 1.414(w)-1(c)(2)(i) and Plan §§ 10.2 and 4.1(b). He blames the errors on MultiCare'swithholding of Plan documents. While the Court is skeptical of Dixon's excuse, MultiCare did not respond toDixon's explanation, and it makes no additional argument as to why Dixon's ERISA claim fails on its merits.MultiCare's motion to dismiss on this alternative ground is DENIED.2Dixon claims MultiCare's administrative error violated multiple federal requirements:including verifying identity documents under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A); ensuring tax reporting accuracy under26 U.S.C. § 6051; and maintaining accurate participant records under 29 U.S.C. § 1059. Dkt. 17 at 19. Dixondoes not assert any claims under those laws.3Though he lives in Florida, this is the eighth case pro se plaintiff Dixon has filed in this District in the pastfour years.4MultiCare conceded in its reply that Dixon exhausted his administrative remedies when the RetirementCommittee denied his appeal on August 1, 2025. Dkt. 18 at 3. MultiCare's exhaustion argument is thereforemoot.
RYAN ADAM DIXON, Plaintiff, v. MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.85MultiCare originally raised the arbitration argument in its motion to dismiss before Dixon had fully exhaustedhis internal appeal efforts. Because the appeals process is now complete and the parties have fully briefedthe issue, the Court treats MultiCare's request as a motion to compel arbitration.6MultiCare also argues that the party opposing arbitration “bears a heavy burden of proof” and mustdemonstrate prejudice. Dkt. 18 at 7. However, the Supreme Court in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S.411 (2022), rejected that approach. Although the party asserting waiver still bears the burden of proof, thatburden is not “heavy,” and prejudice is no longer required to establish waiver. Morgan, 596 U.S. at 418.Today, the party asserting waiver must demonstrate (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitrationand (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right. Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, 59 F.4th 1011,1015 (9th Cir. 2023)7RCW 49.48.090 does not create or support a retaliation claim.8Dixon alleges in his first amended complaint that MultiCare has taken adverse actions against him, includingauto rejecting his transfer request and denying him union representation, in retaliation for asserting hisERISA statutory rights. Dkt. 11 at 3–4. However, he did not include those allegations in his operative, secondamended complaint.9The following cases are non-existent: Mazza v. Washoe Cnty., 728 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1984) andShirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., 992 F.3d 1082, 1095 (9th Cir. 2021). Dkt. 17 at 5, 15.10The following are a few of the cases that do not support the proposition for which they are offered: Boundsv. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 823 (1977) and Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1147(9th Cir. 2000).BENJAMIN H. SETTLEUnited States District JudgeEnd of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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