struction as any other written instrument. 2 Walker on Patents, Deller’s Ed., §§ 245 and 240. But in addition to the general rules of construction applicable to all written instruments, the courts over the years have formulated a great number of minor rules or canons of construction applicable to patents only. id. ch. XI. Possibly the courts, as non-expert tribunals, felt inadequate to definitely and finally decide the question of the meaning of such a highly technical document as a patent, many of which are extremely difficult if not impossible to understand by one not versed in the arts to which they appertain, and hoped by formulating these minor rules to provide definite guides to meaning for themselves and others to follow in the future. If this was the hope it seems to us that it has not been realized but that on the contrary these numerous overlapping and sometimes conflicting canons of construction and the exceptions thereto shed only an illusion of light upon, and so only add confusion to, the exceedingly difficult question of the meaning of a patent.
To illustrate: A patent covering what is called a pioneer invention, that is, one covering a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as to mark a long step forward in the progress of the art to which it appertains, is to be construed liberally but one which covers a device which marks only a minor step forward in a crowded art is to be narrowly construed. Then there is another rule to the effect that a patent covering an invention or discovery of great utility which has enjoyed practical success is to be liberally construed, while a mere paper patent, that is, one covering something which has never gone into practical commercial use, is to be narrowly construed. Considered separately these rules do not seem unreasonable, — they may even be helpful in some cases, — but considered together they breed confusion because we are aware of no rule indicating the proper attitude for a court to take when called upon to construe a pioneer patent which for some reason or another, maybe because of lack of funds or lack of aggressiveness, or possibly even sheer obstinacy on the part of the patentee, has remained a paper one. Another illustration is found in the case at bar. As we have already stated the defendant here, citing cases, relies upon the rule that words in the introductory clause of a claim import no structural elements into it, so that, it says, the words “in the field” merely specify the type of machine in which the elements actually claimed work as improvement over the prior art. In answer to this argument the plaintiff, although it admits that “In some cases the introductory clause of a claim is a mere title and is not a limitation”, says that there are other cases, and it claims that the case at bar is one of them, in which an introductory clause in a claim “cannot be ignored and is a limitation”, so that, it says, Claim 15 here in suit, although it specifically claims only the inner shield, must be limited by construction to claim that shield only when used in conjunction with an outer one. It cites cases in which introductory clauses have been held to have such a limiting effect. Neither party, however, cites any case, and we have found none, in which any indication is given as to how a rational choice is to be made between these divergent lines of authority. Of course we are at liberty to choose between them without stating any reasons for our choice, but this is not a candid and straightforward technique of decision.
It seems to us that what we have said indicates how unsatisfactory it is to solve the problem of the meaning of a patent by resorting to minor canons of construction which, instead of providing reasons for a result provide only pegs upon which a result already reached in some other way may conveniently be hung. In consequence we prefer to decide the question of the meaning of a patent, not by heavy reliance upon subsidiary canons of construction, but rather by resorting to broad general principles applicable to the construction of all similar written instruments.
The courts have said (for authorities see 2 Walker on Patents, Deller’s Ed., §§ 240, 245) that letters patent are contracts. This seems to us too broad a statement. If patents are contracts at all, surely they are contracts of a peculiar sort. 'But the fact remains that patents, like contracts, are bilateral instruments, and this common feature makes the rules for the construction of contracts applicable to them. Thus as we see it our problem is to determine first what a patentee intended to claim as his invention or discovery and second upon what invention or discovery the patent office intended to grant a temporary monopoly. To make this determination we turn to the words of the patent, viewing them as objectively as we would view the words of any ordinary contract.