Dodds v. Bridges, No. 25-7021 (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Thomas Carl Dodds, Jr. v. Carrie Bridges
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Panel
Carson (Circuit Judge); Baldock (Circuit Judge); Kelly (Circuit Judge)
THOMAS CARL DODDS, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 380194Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.THOMAS CARL DODDS, JR., Petitioner - Appellant,v.CARRIE BRIDGES, Respondent - Appellee.No. 25-7021|February 11, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.(D.C. No. 6:20-CV-00470-RAW-DES) (E.D. Okla.)Before CARSON, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.ORDER AND JUDGMENT*Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge*1 Thomas Carl Dodds, Jr., an Oklahoma state prisonerappearing pro se, appeals the district court's denial of his 28U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus application. This court grantedDodds a certificate of appealability (COA) concerningwhether the sentencing court violated his due process rightsby relying on two prior convictions that had been vacatedand expunged. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291,we affirm. We also warn Dodds about what appears to be hismisuse of generative artificial intelligence in researching anddrafting his opening brief.I. BACKGROUNDIn 2017, Dodds entered blind pleas of nolo contendereto five counts in two Oklahoma state court cases: seconddegree rape, lewd molestation, soliciting sexual conductor communication with a minor by use of technology,contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and procure/produce/distribute/possess juvenile pornography after formerconviction of two or more felonies. At the sentencing hearing,the judge heard testimony that in 1993, when Dodds was stilla juvenile, he was convicted of lewd molestation and second-degree burglary, but the sentences for those convictions werevacated in post-conviction proceedings because Dodds hadnot been properly certified as an adult before he pleadednolo contendere. The convictions were also expunged. Theseconvictions and the vacatur of the sentences were also listedin a presentence investigation report.After the testimony, the judge confirmed with counsel for bothparties that those convictions had been vacated and expunged.The judge then recounted three of Dodds's other prior felonyconvictions and observed that Dodds had “a long history ofcriminal behavior. The 1993 lewd molestation, you know, youcan take that one way or the other. Mr. Dodds entered a guiltyplea to it, but it was later vacated. So, that kind of cuts bothways as to what to make of it.” R. vol. I at 364:2–5. Thejudge then expressed his concern with the “multiple countsof ... predatory sexual behavior towards children” in the twocases for which he was imposing sentence, describing it as“something that society can't tolerate.” Id. at 364:7–9. Thejudge characterized this as “the most legitimate reason forincarcerating somebody, so that they don't do further damageto people in society.” Id. at 394:10–12. The judge sentencedDodds to various sentences on the five counts, totaling 40years in prison with 10 years suspended.After sentencing, Dodds moved to withdraw his pleas inboth cases. Although Dodds advanced several grounds forwithdrawing his pleas, we focus only on the basis relevant tothis appeal—that the sentencing court had improperly reliedon the 1993 convictions. The sentencing judge held a hearingand denied Dodds's motion. The judge explained that eventhough the 1993 juvenile convictions had been vacated andexpunged, the judge was entitled to consider a “very widerang[e]” of information when determining sentence. Id. at371:1. The judge continued: “But even so, I think the recordreflects that I gave very little consideration to” the “1993 lewdmolestation.” Id. at 371:2–3. Quoting from the sentencingtranscript, the judge observed that at sentencing, he hademphasized the offense conduct in the cases before him andthe need to protect society from predatory sexual behaviortoward children. Finally, the judge added that “almost allconsideration and sentencing in this case was due to what[Dodds] was charged with, what he pled no contest to, and hismultiple prior felonies.” Id. at 371:17–20.
THOMAS CARL DODDS, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2*2 Dodds appealed the denial of his motion to withdrawhis plea, arguing that he had received ineffective assistanceof counsel in connection with his plea-withdrawal motion.The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) deniedcertiorari.Dodds next filed a pro se application for post-convictionrelief in state district court. Relevant here, he argued thatby basing his sentences in part on convictions that hadbeen vacated on constitutional grounds, the sentencing courtviolated his Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights underUnited States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). In denyingDodds's application, the post-conviction court concluded thatthe sentencing judge did not improperly rely on the 1993convictions because he was aware that those convictions hadbeen vacated and had primarily based the sentence on public-safety concerns. Dodds appealed that ruling to the OCCA,which affirmed.Dodds then filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application forhabeas corpus. Relevant here, Dodds repeated his Tuckerclaim. The district court denied relief and denied a COA.We granted a COA on the Fourteenth Amendment Tuckerclaim, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA toappeal the denial of a § 2254 application), and now resolve it.II. STANDARD OF REVIEW1Our standard of review depends on whether the OCCAadjudicated Dodds's Fourteenth Amendment claim on themerits. See Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir.2011). If it did, then our review would be deferential under§ 2254(d), asking only whether the OCCA's decision was(1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,clearly established Federal law, as determined by the SupremeCourt of the United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasonabledetermination of the facts in light of the evidence presented inthe State court proceeding.” § 2254(d)(1)–(2). If the OCCAdid not adjudicate the claim on the merits, then § 2254(d)would not apply, and we would review “questions of law denovo.” Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).Dodds seeks de novo review. He argues that the OCCA didnot decide his Fourteenth Amendment Tucker claim on themerits because the OCCA did not cite Tucker or refer to anyfederal constitutional standard.2We conclude that the OCCA adjudicated the Tucker claimon the merits. Federal courts typically presume that a statecourt has adjudicated the merits of a federal claim, evenwhere the state court does not mention the federal basis ofthe claim or cite any federal law in support of its ruling.Simpson v. Carpenter, 912 F.3d 542, 583 (10th Cir. 2018).This “presumption may be overcome when there is reasonto think some other explanation for the state court's decisionis more likely.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99–100(2011).*3 In Tucker, the Supreme Court determined that remandto the sentencing court was required because that court hadbased its sentence in part on prior convictions that wereconclusively rendered unconstitutional by the retroactiveapplication of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),decided some ten years after the sentencing at issue in Tucker.See 404 U.S. at 447–48 & n.4.Although the OCCA did not cite Tucker, it did correctlyidentify Dodds's claim as a “Fourteenth Amendmentclaim” involving whether “the sentencing court improperlyconsidered vacated convictions.” R. vol. I at 82–83. Indetermining that the post-conviction court had not “abuse[d]its discretion” in rejecting that claim, the OCCA relied on astate-law presumption—“ ‘when a trial court operates as thetrier of fact,’ ” it considers “ ‘only competent and admissibleevidence ... in reaching [its] decision’ ” Id. at 82 (quotingLong v. Oklahoma, 74 P.3d 105, 107 (Okla. Crim. App.2003)). Reliance on a state-law standard can suffice as anadjudication on the merits of a federal claim if the statestandard “is at least as protective as the federal standard.”Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301 (2013); see alsoEarly v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (holding that a statecourt adjudicated the merits of a federal claim despite relyingsolely on state-law principles where those principles providedgreater protection than federal law).Dodds has not argued that the Long standard is lessprotective than the Tucker standard. Nor do we see howLong was less protective of Dodds's rights than Tucker; bothpreclude consideration of impermissible information. Wetherefore conclude that the OCCA adjudicated the FourteenthAmendment Tucker claim on the merits. Accordingly, wereview the OCCA's decision under § 2254(d)’s deferentialstandard. See Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1166 (stating this standard“demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of thedoubt,” and “prohibits us from substituting our own judgmentfor that of the state court” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
THOMAS CARL DODDS, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3III. DISCUSSIONA. MeritsDodds argues that under Tucker, any consideration atsentencing of prior convictions that have been vacatedon a constitutional ground is a Fourteenth Amendmentdue-process violation even where, as here, the sentencingcourt is aware that the convictions have been vacated asunconstitutional. We do not read Tucker so broadly.The concern driving the remand for resentencing in Tuckerwas that, at federal sentencing in 1953, the judge hadconsidered two of the defendant's prior state convictions,but those convictions were “retroactive[ly]” deemed “whollyunconstitutional under Gideon.”3 Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447& n.4. The Court explained that “the real question” was“whether the sentence in the 1953 federal case might havebeen different if the sentencing judge had known that atleast two of the respondent's previous convictions had beenunconstitutionally obtained.” Id. at 448. The Court concludedthat the sentence had not been “imposed in the informeddiscretion of a trial judge” but was instead “founded at leastin part on misinformation of a constitutional magnitude” and“assumptions concerning [the defendant's] criminal recordwhich were materially untrue.” Id. at 447 (internal quotationmarks omitted). The Court further explained that if thetrial judge had been aware that the two prior convictionswere constitutionally infirm, then “the factual circumstancesof the respondent's background would have appeared in adramatically different light at the sentencing proceeding.” Id.at 448.*4 In contrast here, the sentencing judge was awarethat Dodds's 1993 lewd molestation conviction had beenvacated and expunged.4 In fact, the judge expressly soughtclarification on the point. Thus, the judge did not, as wasthe case in Tucker, base the sentence on any “assumptionsconcerning his criminal record which were materiallyuntrue,” or “misinformation of a constitutional magnitude.”Id. at 447. Rather, the judge was fully informed of “thefactual circumstances of [Dodds's] background.” Id. at 448.Given these distinctions, we are unpersuaded the OCCA'sdecision was either contrary to or an unreasonable applicationof Tucker. See Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1166 (stating that under §2254(d)(1) “we grant relief only if the state court arrives ata conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Courton a question of law or ... decides a case differently than theCourt has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts”).Even further distinguishing Tucker are the sentencing judge'sexplicit comments that the vacated conviction could be taken“one way or another” and “cuts both ways,” R. vol. I at 364:2–3, 5, together with his observation that proper sentencingconsiderations “are very wide ranging,” id. at 370:25–371:1.So to the extent Dodds argues the state courts unreasonablydetermined the facts by finding the sentencing judge hadnot improperly relied on the vacated convictions, we areunpersuaded. See § 2254(d)(2). Rather, this record reasonablyallowed a conclusion that the sentencing judge consideredonly the alleged conduct (lewd molestation) associatedwith the charged offense, not the conviction itself. Suchconduct falls within the constitutionally permissible scope ofinformation a sentencing court can consider when fashioningan appropriate sentence. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d1447, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he admission of evidenceof unadjudicated offenses at a sentencing proceeding doesnot violate due process.”), overruled on other grounds byDaniels v. United States, 254 F.3d 1180, 1188 n.1 (10thCir. 2001)). Thus, the OCCA's rejection of Dodds's claimdid not contradict or unreasonably apply controlling federallaw. See Tucker, 404 U.S. at 446 (federal sentencing judge“may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largelyunlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider,or the source from which it may come”).Finally, unlike the Supreme Court in Tucker, we harborno doubt that Dodds's sentence would have been the sameeven if the sentencing judge had not given “very littleconsideration” to “[t]he 1993 lewd molestation,” R. vol. I at371:2–5 (internal quotation marks omitted). At sentencing,the judge emphasized his view that “the most legitimatereason for incarcerating somebody,” was to prevent further“predatory, sexual behavior towards children.” Id. at 364:10–11. This again supports the OCCA's rejection of Dodds'sclaim, because it demonstrates the judge imposed a sentencehe thought was necessary to address that overriding purpose,regardless of whether Dodds had been unconstitutionallyconvicted of lewd molestation in 1993.In sum, we conclude that Dodds has not shown that theOCCA's rejection of Dodds's Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim was contrary to or an unreasonable applicationof Tucker or based on an unreasonable determination of thefacts in light of the evidence presented in the state courtproceedings. See § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
THOMAS CARL DODDS, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4B. Opening-brief problemsIn his opening brief, Dodds attempts to persuade this court toreverse by relying heavily on a case he cites as United States v.Farrow, 599 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1979). Dodds states that in thiscase, the “court was unequivocal that due process is violatedwhen a sentence is influenced by convictions known to beunconstitutional, regardless of the judge's awareness.” Aplt.Opening Br. at 7. Dodds also offers a quote purportedly takenfrom this case: “ ‘It is no answer to say that the sentencingjudge was aware that the convictions were constitutionallyinvalid. Tucker teaches that reliance on such convictions—whether knowing or unknowing—violates due process.’Farrow, 599 F.2d at 158.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 7.*5 As the State points out in its response brief, the citationDodds provides for the alleged Farrow case leads to a page inthe middle of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7thCir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). That case involveda nuisance action; it has no relevance to this appeal.The State also points out several other fabricated casecitations in Dodds's brief, and we have uncovered one more.We will specifically address two of these citations. On pagefive of his opening brief, Dodds provides what purports tobe a quotation from a case he identifies as United States v.Matthews, 7 F.3d 1552, 1555 (11th Cir. 1993): “A sentencingjudge's own comments acknowledging that he ‘looked at’or ‘considered’ a prior conviction are sufficient to establishreliance under Tucker.” But the reporter citation Doddsprovides leads to a page in the middle of Post v. City of FortLauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552 (11th Cir. 1993), a civil rights casewith no relevance to this appeal. On page four he cites UnitedStates v. Mateo, 476 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2007), and onpage six he provides a quotation purportedly taken from thisMateo case: “Reliance can be shown by the sentencing court'sexpress remarks referencing the prior conviction.” Dodds'scitations, however, lead to pages in the middle of a bankruptcycase, In re O'Lexa, 476 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2007), and anemployment-discrimination case, Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d180 (3d Cir. 2007). Neither of these cases has any relevanceto this appeal.In his reply brief, Dodds attempts to explain these problems,stating that the cases cited in his opening “brief are realdecisions that reflect the principles for which they werecited,” but “several citations were inaccurate due to errorsintroduced when an outside source prepared the typed brief.”Aplt. Reply Br. at 1. He refers to these misrepresentationsas “transcription errors.” Id. at 2. He claims that the correct“Farrow” citation is Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339(9th Cir. 1978), which is a real case, and that the quotation heattributed to Farrow was an “argument” that “was mistakenlymade a quote.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 2–3. He claims the correctcitation for Mateo is United States v. Mateo, 471 F.3d 1162(10th Cir. 2006), which is a real case, and that the citationto Matthews should have been a citation to this newly-identified Mateo case. He adds that the quotation he attributedto Matthews is not a quotation at all but instead his ownargument. He makes similar statements regarding two otherfaulty case citations.We highly doubt the veracity of Dodds's explanation. TheFarrow case he identifies in his reply brief does not standfor the proposition he attributed to it—that even if awarethat a prior conviction has been vacated on constitutionalgrounds, a sentencing judge violates Tucker by relyingon that conviction. Farrow says nothing of the sort butinstead explains that a successful Tucker challenge requires,among other things, a showing of “the sentencing judge'smistaken belief that the prior conviction was valid.” Farrow,580 F.2d at 1345 (emphasis added). As for the newly-identified Mateo case, it did not involve a Tucker challengeat all. The only remotely relevant aspect of Mateo is theconclusion that the federal district court did not err whenit considered uncontested facts included in a presentencereport. See 471 F.3d at 1166–68. That conclusion is consistentwith our disposition of Dodds's Tucker claim. And Dodd'sassertion that the Matthews citation should have been toMateo wholly fails to explain how an entirely fictitiouscitation, accompanied by a purported quotation taken fromthat fictitious case, surfaced in his brief due to the use of an“outside source” to type the brief.*6 Dodds's erroneous citations and quotations appear to befabrications resulting from the use of a generative artificialintelligence (AI) tool, such as ChatGPT. See Wadsworth v.Walmart Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489, 497 (D. Wyo. 2025) (“Itis ... well-known in the legal community that AI resourcesgenerate fake cases.”). Such fabrications are referred to as“AI hallucinations.” See Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff'sDep't, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 157661, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan.21, 2026) (defining “a so-called AI ‘hallucination’ ” as “acircumstance where an AI large language model generatesan output that is fictional, inaccurate, or nonsensical”). Thereis nothing inherently problematic with the use of artificialintelligence to help prepare legal materials, but its carelessuse can waste both judicial resources and the opposing party's
THOMAS CARL DODDS, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5time and money, and it can damage the credibility of the legalsystem. See Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).We can sanction litigants who make such misrepresentations,or dismiss their appeals. See, e.g., Grant v. City of LongBeach, 96 F.4th 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2024) (dismissing appealbecause of fabricated citations); Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610,615–16 (2d Cir. 2024); Fed. R. Civ. P. 38; 10th Cir. R.46.5(B), (C). But we decline to do so in the circumstanceshere. However, we warn Dodds—and all pro se litigants andcounsel appearing before this court—of the responsibility toensure that citations to legal authority are not fabrications butinstead point to real cases that at least arguably stand for thepropositions for which they are cited.IV. CONCLUSIONWe affirm the district court's judgment. We deny Dodds'smotion to appoint counsel. We grant Dodds's motion toproceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees andremind him of his obligation to continue making partialpayments until the filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1) (authorizing courts to excuse only “prepayment offees”).Entered for the CourtAll CitationsNot Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2026 WL 380194Footnotes*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is notbinding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It maybe cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.1Because Dodds represents himself, we construe his filings liberally, but we may not act as his advocate. SeeYang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).2Dodds also argues that de novo review applies because the OCCA unreasonably determined the facts whenit “misstated the timeline of events by suggesting the convictions were vacated after sentencing—an assertionrefuted by the record.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 12. But he provides no supporting record citation, and we areunable to find any such misstatement in the OCCA's decision. Moreover, even if the OCCA made such amisstatement, Dodds has not explained (and we do not see) why it would entitle him to de novo review.3“The Gideon case established an unequivocal rule making it unconstitutional to try a person for a felony ina state court unless he had a lawyer or had validly waived one.” Tucker, 404 U.S. at 449 (internal quotationmarks omitted). As noted, Dodds's 1993 convictions were vacated and expunged not because of a Gideonviolation, as in Tucker, but because Dodds had not been properly certified as an adult. See R. vol. I at 304–05. We will assume, for the sake of argument, that Tucker’s holding (mistaken reliance at sentencing on aprior conviction that was obtained in violation of Gideon violates due process) constitutes clearly-establishedlaw applicable to Dodds's 1993 convictions for § 2254(d)(1) purposes. See Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86,94–95 (2025) (explaining that “[g]eneral legal principles can constitute clearly established law for purposes of[§ 2254(d)(1)] so long as they are holdings of this Court,” and that “certain principles are fundamental enoughthat when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt”); butsee House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1015 (10th Cir. 2008) (instructing “that Supreme Court holdings—the
THOMAS CARL DODDS, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6exclusive touchstone for clearly established federal law—must be construed narrowly and consist only ofsomething akin to on-point holdings”).4There is no indication that the sentencing judge gave any consideration to the vacated 1993 second-degreeburglary conviction.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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