On appeal, the district court’s interpretation of state law (in this case, the Tennessee Constitution) is likewise governed by the de novo standard. Brainard v. Am. Skandia Life Assur. Corp., 432 F.3d 655, 660 (6th Cir.2005) (citation omitted).
III.
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all of the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle him to relief.
First American Title Co. v. DeVaugh, 480 F.3d 438, 443-44 (6th Cir.2007) (citing
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). “ ‘Although this is a liberal pleading standard, it requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. Rather, the complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.’ ”
Id. at 444 (quoting
S.E. Texas Inns, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 462 F.3d 666, 671-72 (6th Cir.2006).)
IV.
The United States Constitution prohibits states from imposing ex post facto laws. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 10, cl. 1. The Ex Post Facto Clause is implicated where a law punishes retrospectively: “ ‘a law is retrospective if it changes the legal consequences of acts committed before its effective date.’ ”
United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987)). “ ‘[T]he focus of the
ex post facto inquiry,’ ” however, “ ‘is not whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage’ ... but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which the crime is punishable.’ ”
Dyer v. Bowlen, 465 F.3d 280, 289 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting
Calif. Dept. of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995)).
When evaluating an ex post facto claim, our first task is to “ascertain whether the legislature meant to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997).) If the intent of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, “ ‘the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)). Because we “ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent, ... only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,....” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“Whether a statutory scheme is civil or criminal ‘is first of all a question of statutory construction.’ ” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072) (other citation omitted). We consider the statute’s text and its structure to determine the legislative objective. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-93, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). We first ask whether the Tennessee Legislature, in passing the Acts, “indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the