HARRY DONOVAN, George Callahan, Charles Lewis, M. M. Lee, Joseph Ward, W. H. Ashley, R. L. Taylor, I. Ganthier, I. Vaughn, et al., Petitioners, v.

PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY.

(See S. C. Reporter’s ed. 279-305.)

Note. — On use of carrier’s premises hy cab¬ men, hackmen, etc. — see notes to Cole v. Row-

199 U. So

Donovan t. Pennsylvania Co.

railway station and grounds. — A rail¬ way company which has made an arrange¬ ment with a transfer company to furnish at its passenger station all the vehicles nec¬ essary for the accommodation of the passen¬ gers arriving there on its trains or on the trains of other railroad companies using the station may legally exclude from the station and depot grounds all other hackmen or cab¬ men seeking entrance for the purpose of so¬ liciting for themselves the custom or pat¬ ronage of passengers.

witli passengers entering or leaving railway station. — Licensed hackmen or cabmen, when not forbidden by valid munici¬ pal regulations, may, within reasonable limits, use the public sidewalk in front of, adjacent to, or about the main entrance to a railway passenger station in prosecuting their call¬ ing, but are not entitled to congregate upon such sidewalk so as to interfere with the ingress and egress of passengers and em¬ ployees.

— contlnnons injury. — The inadequacy of any remedy at law justifies injunctive relief against the constant, unlawful attempt of hackmen and cabmen to enter a railway pas¬ senger station and depot grounds to solicit patronage, and their use of the sidewalk in front of the station so as to interfere unduly with the ingress and egress of passengers.

[No. 5.)

Argued January 6, 1905. Decided Novem¬ ber 27, 1905.

ON WRIT of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to review a decree which af¬ firmed a decree of the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Northern Divi¬ sion, enjoining cabmen from entering a rail¬ way station and grounds to solicit custom, and from congregating upon the sidewalk in front of the station so as to interfere with the ingress and egress of passengers and employees. Affirmed.

See same case below, 60 C. C. A. 168, 124 Fed. 1016. On first appeal, 61 L. R. A. 140, 57 C. C. A. 362, 120 Fed. 215.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Richard J. Cooney and James R. Word, for petitioners:

No corporation or individual can acquire an exclusive right to the use of city streets for merely private purposes, and ordinances governing such use must be reasonable, not oppressive, or such as will create a monop¬ oly or grant special privileges, or are in their nature class legislation, and must not be against public policy. They must oper¬ ate impartially and they cannot discrimi-

en, 13 L.R.A. 848 ; and Donovan v. Pennsyl¬ vania Co. 57 C. C. A. 367.

On the jurisdiction of equity where remedy at law exists— see notes to Meldrum v. Mel- 199 U. S. U. S., Book 50.

nate between the same class, but must be uniform and apply to all alike.

Trotter v. Chicago, 33 Ill. App. 206, 136 Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359; Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Garfity, 115 Ill. 155, 3 N. E. 448; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405; Chi¬ cago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90, 92 Am. Dec. 200; Kinmundy v. Mahan, 72 Ill. 462; East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 50 111. 28; Danville v. Noone, 103 Ill. App. 290.

The occupations of hackmen, expressmen, and hotel runners are under the immediate control and supervision of the city of Chi¬ cago, and it is exclusively within its power to regulate and control these occupations.

Lindsay v. Anniston , 104 Ala. 257, 27 L.R.A. 436, 53 Am. St. Rep. 44, 16 So. 545.

The use of the street with the consent and acquiescence of the municipal authorities cannot be enjoined at the suit of an abut¬ ting property owner.

Doane v. Lake Street Elev. R. Co. 165 Ill. 510, 36 L.R.A. 97, 56 Am. St. Rep. 265, 46 N. E. 520 ; Murphy v. Chicago, 29 Ill. 279, 81 Am. Dec. 307; Stetson v. Chicago & E. R. Co. 75 Ill. 74; Patterson v. Chicago,

D. & V. R. Co. 75 Ill. 588; Chicago, B. &

Q. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 79 Ill. 269; Peoria & R. I. R. Co. v. Schertx 3 84 Ill. 135; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Heiss, 141 Ill. 35, 33 Am. St. Rep. 273, 31 N. E. 138; Corcoran v. Chicago, M. & N. R. Co. 149 Ill. 291, 37 N.

E. 68; White v. Metropolitan West Side Elev. R. Co. 154 Ill. 620, 39 N. E. 270; Pittsburgh, C. C. c6 St. L. R. Co. v. Backus , 154 U. S. 421, 38 L. ed. 1031, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1114; Truesdale v. Peoria Grape Sugar Co. 101 Ill. 561; Dunning v. Aurora, 40 Ill. 481 ; Bliss v. Kennedy, 43 Ill. 67 : Cook County v. Great Western R. Co. 119 Ill. 218, 10 N. E. 564; Tibbetts v. West cC- South Town Street It. Co. 54 111. App. 180; Chicago v. Union Bldg. Asso. 102 Ill. 380, 40 Am. Rep. 598; Clark v. Donaldson, 104 Ill. 639; Union Coal Co. v. La Salle, 136 Ill. 119, 12 L.R.A. 326, 26 N. E. 506; Hesing v. Scott, 107 Ill. 600; Miller v. Webster, 94 Iowa, 162, 62 N. W. 648; General Electric

R. Co. v. Chicago City R. Co. 66 Ill. App. 362; Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181 Ill. 289, 53 L.R.A. 223, 54 N. E. S25.

The respondent, in coming into the state of Illinois seeking to do business here, owes obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the state and the ordinances of the city of Chicago enacted in pursuance thereof, and is answerable, according to the laws of the state of Illinois and the ordinances of the city of Chicago, for acts of nonfeasance or of misfeasance committed in such city.

drum, 11 L. R. A. 65; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Central Stock Yards & Transit Co. 6 L. R. A. 855 ; and Tyler v. Savage, 36 L. ed. U. S. 83.

13

193

Supreme Court of the United States.

Oct. Term,

St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. 102, 37 L. ed. 384, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Or¬ leans, 164 U. S. 481, 41 L. ed. 523, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161; Chicago, M. d St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 137, 42 L. ed. 692, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289.

To permit the respondent to exercise the power and privilege, and enjoy an immunity, denied to other common carriers, would be beyond the power of the general assembly.

Noel v. People, 187 Ill. 594, 52 L.R.A. 287, 79 Am. St. Rep. 238, 58 N. E. 616; Horwich v. Walkcr-Gordon Laboratory Co. 205 Ill. 497, 98 Am. St. Rep. 254, 68 N. E.

The title to the sidewalks, and the fee of the streets and control thereof, at the entrance to and abutting the Union Pas¬ senger Station of the Pennsylvania Com¬ pany, are vested exclusively in the city of Chicago for public use.

Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181 Ill. 296, 53 L.R.A. 223, 54 N. E. 825; Barnes v. District of Columbia , 91 U. S. 547, 23 L. ed. 442.

The respondent devotes its property to a use in which the public has an interest. It, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and subjects its property to be controlled by such regulations as may be prescribed by law by the legislative author¬ ities of the state, and the city of Chicago, to whom are delegated by the state the power and authority to enact and enforce such regulations.

Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. ( Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 84, 46 L. ed. 99, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Brass v. North Da¬ kota, 153 U. S. 400, 38 L. ed. 760, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 670, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 531, 36 L. ed. 251, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Willeubprg, 117 Ill. 209, 57 Am. Rep. 862, 7 N. E. 698.

The Pennsylvania Company could not law¬ fully, under the Constitution and laws of the state of Illinois, exclude from its Union Passenger Station in said city cabmen and carriage men duly licensed as such by the city of Chicago, and prohibit them from soliciting custom for their vehicles in said passenger station, such places being public highways and free to all persons, and, by contract, bestow the privilege upon the Parmelee Transfer Company, denied by it to petitioners, and thereby institute a par¬ tial hack service of its owii, and discrimin¬ ate against them, and build up a monopoly in the business, and directly or indirectly derive a profit from the maintenance of such monopoly.

104

Kalamazoo Hack d Bus Co. v. Sootsma, 84 Mich. 194, 10 L.R.A. 819, 22 Am. St. Rep. 693, 47 N. W. 667 ; Montana Union R. Co. v. Langlois, 9 Mont. 419, 8 L.R.A. 753, 18 Am. St. Rep. 745, 24 Pac. L09; McConnell v. Pedigo, 92 Ky. 465, 18 S. W. 15; India, i- apolis Union R. Co. x. Dohn, 153 Ind. 10, 45 L.R.A. 427, 74 Am. St. Rep. 274, ’ 53 1ST. E. 937; Cravens v. Rodgers, 101 Mo. 247, 14 S. W. 106; Lindsay v. Anniston, 104 Ala. 257, 27 L.R.A. 436, 53 Am. St. Rep. 44, 16 So. 545.

A court of equity is not open to the liti¬ gant whose acts are violations of law and opposed to public policy and the organic statute law of the state, and who seeks its sanction and aid to enforce a contract ultra vires, and maintain a monopoly. It will not grant such relief under such circum¬ stances.

McConnell v. Pedigo, Montana Union R. Co. v. Langlois, Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Dohn, Cravens v. Rodgers, and Kalama¬ zoo Hack & Bus Co. v. Sootsma, supra.

The relation of carrier and passenger is not involved in this ease, nor is it exercised upon this record; but the exercise of police power, and the authority to prevent and regulate monopolies, and regulate sidewalks and traffic on the same, are ‘involved, — at¬ tributes of state sovereignty which belong exclusively to the state and its political subdivisions and agents.

United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 11, 39 L. ed. 328, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249 ; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 547, 23 L. ed. 442; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 63, 21 L. ed. 404; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, 9 L. ed. 662.

If respondent is so injured that it has a right to complain, it has an adequate remedy at law, which precludes relief in equity.

Richards v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 124 Ill. 516, 16 N. E. 909; Chicago, M. d St. P. R. Co. v. Darke, 148 III. 226, 35 N. E. 750; Lake Erie d W. R. Co. v. Scott, 132 Ill. 429, 8 L.R.A. 330, 24 N. E. 78; Chicago d A. R. Co. v. Robbins, 159 Ill. 598, 43 N. E. 332; Galt v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 157 Ill. 125, 41 N. E. 643; Rigney v. Chicago, 102 Ill. 64 ; Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Ayres, 106 Ill. 511; Pittsburg, Ft. W. d C. R. Co. v. Reich, 101 Ill. 157; Chicago, R. I. d P. R. Co. v. Stein, 75 Ill. 41; Ottawa Gaslight d Coke Co. v. Graham, 28 Ill. 73, 81 Am. Dec. 263; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Grabill, 50 Ill. 242.

Where the relief prayed for, if granted, would be of great injury to the petitioners, and not of a corresponding benefit to the respondent, an injunction will be denied.

Pratt v. New York C. d H. R. R. Co. 90 Hun, 83, 35 N. Y. Supp. 577 ; Gray v. Man-

199 TJ. S*

Donovan v. Pennsylvania Oo.

hattan R. Co. 128 N. Y. 509, 28 N. E. 498; Harlan d H. Co. v. Paschall, 5 Del. Ch. 435; Fobes v. Rome , W. d 0. R. Co. 121 N. Y. 505, 8 L.R.A. 453, 24 N. E. 919; Jackson¬ ville, T. d K. IF. R. Co. v. Adams, 28 Fla. 656, 14 L.R.A. 533, 10 So. 465; Amerman v. Deane, 132 N. Y. 355, 28 Am. St. Rep. 584, 30 N. E. 741; Interstate Commerce Com¬ mission v. Cincinnati , N. 0. d T. P. R. Co. 6 Inters. Com. Rep. 131, 64 Fed. 981 ; Wason v. Sanborn, 45 N. H. 171; High, Inj. 596.

The outside facilities at a depot must he equal ; there can he no privileges shown there.

Codbout v. St. Paul Union Depot Co. 79 Minn. 188, 47 L.R.A. 532, 81 N. W. 835.

A railroad company or depot cannot make arbitrary rules discriminating as to who may occupy cab stands, and as to who shall solicit passengers therefrom.

Ray, Pass. Carr. §§ 1 1 3' — 1 15; 1 Fetter, Carr. Pass. § 245, p. 638 ; 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 505; Montana Union R. Co. v. Langlois, 9 Mont. 419, 8 L.R.A. 753, and note, 18 Am. St. Rep. 745, 24 Pac. 209; Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209; Cravens v. Rodgers, 101 Mo. 247, 14 S. W. 106; Kalamazoo Hack d- Bus Co. v. Sootsma, 84 Mich. 194, 10 L.R.A. 819, 22 Am. St. Rep. 693, 47 N. W. 667 ; Mar¬ riott v. London d S. TP. R. Co. 1 C. B. N. S. 499 ; Palmer v. London, B. d S. C. R. Co. L. R. 6 C. P. 194; Cambios v. Philadelphia d R. R. Co. 9 Phila. 411, Fed. Cas No. 2,331; New England Exp. Co. v. Maine C. R. Co. 57 Me. 188, 2 Am. Rep. 31 ; Summitt v. State, 8 Lea, 413, 41 Am. Rep. 637 ; State y. Reed, 76 Miss. 211, 43 L.R.A. 134, 71 Am. St. Rep. 528, 24 So. 308 ; Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Dohn, 153 Ind. 10, 45 L.R.A. 427 , 74 Am. St. Rep. 274, 53 N. E. 937; Lucas v. Herbert, 148 Ind. 64, 37 L.R.A. 376, 47 N. E. 146; Cole v. Rowen, 88 Mich. 219, 13 L.R.A. 848, 50 N. W. 138; McCon¬ nell v. Pedigo, 92 Ky. 465, 18 S. W. 15; Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181 Ill. 289, 53 L.R.A. 223, 54 N. E. 825; Lindsay v. Anniston, 104 Ala. 257, 27 L.R.A; 436, 53 Am. St. Rep. 44, 16 So. 545; Indian River S. B. Co. v. East Coast Transp. Co. 28 Fla. 387, 29 Am. St. Rep. 258, 10 So. 480.

Messrs. Frank J. Loesch, Edgar A. Bancroft, and Charles F. Loesch for re¬ spondent :

Cabmen and expressmen have no right to rater a railroad station for the purpose of soliciting patronage there without the con¬ sent of the railroad company. The stations, like the railroads, are impressed with a public use, and are open to all having con¬ tractual relations with the company or its passengers; but this does not embrace the right to carry on any private business in any station or train without the consent 199 U. S.

of the company. It may grant an exclusive license to one person to solicit custom of in¬ coming passengers in its station, and ex¬ clude all others from the like privilege.

Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221, Fed. Cas. No. 7,258; Com. v. Power, 7 Met. 596, 41 Am. Dec. 465; Barker v. Midland R. Co. 18 C. B. 46; Marriott v. London d S. W. R. Co. 1 C. B. N. S. 499; Beadell v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 2 C. B. N. S. 509 ; Painter v. London, B. d S. C. R. Co. 2 C. B. N. S. 702; The D. R. Martin, 11 Blatchf. 234, Fed. Cas. No. 1,030; Barney v. Oyster Bay d H. S. B. Co. 67 N. Y. 301, 23 Am. Rep. il5; Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 791, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542, 628; Old Colony R. Co.. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35, 9 Am. St. Rep. 661, 17 N. E. 89; Com. v. Carey, 147 Mass. 40, note, 17 N. E. 97 ; Fluker v. Georgia R. d Bkg. Co. 81 Ga. 461, 2 L.R.A. 843, 12 Am. St. Rep. 328, 8 S. E. 529 ; Griswold v. Webb, 16 R. I. 649, 7 L.R.A. 302, 19 Atl. 143; Chicago, St. L. d N. 0. R. Co. v. Pullman Southern Car Co. 139 U. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 97, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490; Smith v. New York, L. E. d W. R. Co. 149 Pa. 249, 24 Atl. 304; New York C. d H. R. R. Co. v. Flynn, 74 Hun, 124, 26 N. Y. Supp. 859; New York C. d H. R. R. Co. v. Sheeley, 57 N. Y. S. R. 766, 27 N. Y. Supp. 185; Brown v. New York C. d H. R. R. Co. 75 Hun, 355, 27 N. Y. Supp. 69, Affirmed in 151 N. Y. 674, 46 N. E. 1145; Summitt v. State, 8 Lea. 413, 41 Am. Rep. 637; Lucas v. Herbert 148 Ind. 64, 37 L.R.A. 376, 47 N. E. 146 New York, N. H. d H. R. Co. v. Scovil 71 Conn. 136, 42 L.R.A. 157, 71 Am. S. Rep. 159, 41 Atl. 246; Snyder v. U'nio'. Depot Co. 19 Ohio C. C. 368; Kates v. At lanta Baggage d Cab Co. 107 Ga. 636, 46 L.R.A. 431, 34 S. E. 372; Godbout v. St. Paul Union Depot Co. 79 Minn. 188, 47 L.R.A. 532, 81 N. W. 835; New York C. d H. R. R. Co. v. Warren, 31 Misc. 571, 64 N. Y. Supp. 781; Boston d A. It. Co. v. Brown, 177 Mass. 65, 52 L.R.A. 418, 58 N. E. 189; Boston d M. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230, 83 Am. St. Rep. 275, 58 N. E. 689; New York, N. H. d H. R. Co. v. Bork, 23 R. I. 218, 49 Atl. 905; St. Louis Drayage Co. v. Louisville d N. R. Co. 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 137, 65 Fed. 39; Donovan v. Pennsyl¬ vania Co. 61 L.R.A. 140, 57 C. C. A. 362, 120 Fed. 215; Hedding v. Gallagher. 72 N. H. 377, 64 L.R.A. 811, 57 Atl. 225.

Respondent has the legal right to free and unobstructed entrance to its passenger station from Canal street. Such right is a property right; and the obstruction of such entrance by the petitioners gathering there in large numbers to ply their vocations is a private nuisance. The allegations of respondent’s bill are fully sustained by the proof.

195

Oct. Teem,

the United States.

280, 281 Supbeme Coubt of

Benjamin v. Storr, L. R. 9 C. P. 400; Lyon v. Fishmongers Co. L. R. 1. App. Cas. 662; Fritz v. Hobson, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 542; Jaques v. National Exhibit Co. 15 Abb. N. C. 250; Halloclc v. Scheyer, 33 Hun, 111; Flynn v. Taylor, 53 Hun, 167, 6 N. Y. Supp. 96, 127 N. Y. 596, 14 L.R.A. 556, 28 N. E. 418; Callanan v. Oilman , 107 N. Y. 360, 1 Am. St. Rep. 831, 14 N. E. 264; Cohen v. Neio York , 113 N. Y. 532, 4 L.R.A. 406, 10 Am. St. Rep. 506, 21 N. E. 700; Carter v. Chicago, 57 Ill. 283; Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 557, 24 L.R.A. 406, 41 Am. St. Rep. 311, 37 N. E. 850; Newell v. Sass, 142 Ill. 104, 31 N. E. 176; Hart v. Buckner, 5 C. C. A. 1, 2 U. S. App. 488, 54 Fed. 925 ; McDonald v. Newark , 42 N. J. Eq. 136, 7 Atl. 855; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 587, note, 656a; 1 Lewis, Em. Dom. 2d ed. pp. 170-196; Mc- Quaid v. Portland d V. R. Co. 18 Or. 237, 22 Pac. 899; 1 Am. & Eng. Ene. Law, 2d ed. pp. 225, 238; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 2d ed. p. 761 ; Branahan v. Cincinnati Hotel Co. 39 Ohio St. 333, 48 Am. Rep. 457 ; Lahr y. Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. 104 N. Y. 268, 10 N. E. 528; Hedding v. Gallagher, 72 N. H. 377, 64 L.R.A. 811, 57 Atl. 225.

Injunction is the only adequate remedy in the case at bar.

1 Spelling, Inj. & Extr. Rem. 2d ed. §§ 338, 340; 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 225; 2 Lewis, Em. Dom. 2d ed. § 638; 1 High, Inj. §§ 816, 820; Hilliard, Inj. 2d ed. § 328; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 661; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 2d ed. § 709; Penn¬ sylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181 Ill. 289, 53 L.R.A/223, 54 N. E. 825; Carter v. Chicago, 57 Ill. 283; Edwards v. Haeger, 180 Ill. 99, 54 N. E. 176; Lowery v. Pekin, 186 Ill. 387, 51 L.R.A. 301, 57 N. E. 1062; Chicago Gen¬ eral R. Co. v. Chicago, B. d Q. R. Co. 181 Ill. 605, 54 N. E. 1026; London d N. W. R. Co. v. Lancashire d Y. R. Co. L. R. 4 Eq.

174; New York C. d H. R. R. Co. v. Flynn,

74 Hun, 124, 26 N. Y. Supp. 859 ; Brown v. New York C. d H. R. R. Co. 75 Hun, 355, 27 N. Y. Supp. 69; New York C. d H. R. R.

Co. v. Sheeley, 57 N. Y. S. R. 76'6, 27 N. Y.

Supp. 185; New York C. d H. R. R. Co. v. Warren, 31 Misc. 571, 64 N. Y. Supp. 781; Bnyder v. Union Depot Co. 19 Ohio C. C. 368; New York, N. H. d H. R. Co. v. Sco- vill, 71 Conn. 136, 42 L.R.A. 157, 71 Am. St. Rep. 159, 41 Atl. 246; Boston d M. R. Co. Y. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230, 83 Am. St. Rep. 275, 58 N. E. 189; Goodson v. Rich¬ ardson, L. R. 9 Ch. 221; Seattle Gas d Electric Co. v. Citizens’ Light d P. Co. 123 Fed. 588.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opin¬ ion of the court :

This suit involves some questions as to the relative rights of the parties in the use

196

of a railroad passenger station and depot grounds, and in the use of the public side¬ walk and street adjacent to such station and grounds. «

The facts out of which the controversy has arisen are clearly established, and may thus be summarized?

By a lease executed in 1871 the Pennsyl¬ vania Company, a corporation of Pennsyl¬ vania, engaged in transporting passengers and freight by railroad, acquired the pos¬ session and control of the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne, & Chicago Railway and all its roll¬ ing stock and property, — the latter railway extending from Pittsburg to a passenger station at or near the corner of Canal and Adams streets, in Chicago.

In 1880 the lessee company erected on the leased premises a hew passenger house, now known as the Union Passenger Station, which ever since has been and is now occu¬ pied and used by it and its tenants, the Chicago & Alton Railway Company, the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway Company, the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St.

Paul Railway Company, and the Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago, & St. Louis Railway Company. The companies just named occu¬ py and use that station under a perpetual lease by which the Pennsylvania Company, as between it and its tenants, has charge of the station, with authority to control and manage all trains therein as well as all watchmen and employees in the business there transacted.

*This passenger station is the only termi-

nus in Chicago of each of those lines of rail¬ way, and through that station alone can the several companies using it conduct an ex¬ change of passengers and baggage and the transportation and handling of the United States mail and express parcels.

The extent of the business done at that station is indicated by the statement that the Chicago & Alton Railway Company con¬ trols and operates in the transaction of what is commonly called interstate business over 1,000 miles of railway; the Chicago, Bur¬ lington, & Quincy Railway Company, over 7,000 miles; the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St.

Paul Railway Company, over 6,000 miles; the Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago, & St.

Louis Railway Company, over 1,400 miles; and the Pennsylvania Company, over 1,000 miles.

At this station the average number of passengers arriving and departing is over 30,000 each day; the average number of par¬ cels of baggage daily received and delivered is over 2,200, and the average number of tons of United States mail daily received and delivered is over 250. Passenger trains to the number of 250 arrive and depart each day. This statement does not include the

199 U. S.

1»05.

Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co.

281-284

large number of express parcels daily han¬ dled at the station.

All tickets of interstate passengers arriv¬ ing and departing from this station, known as through tickets, have attached to each a check or coupon for conveyance through Chicago to the station of the connecting line of railroad designated on such tickets, and not running into or out of the passenger depot of the Pennsylvania Company. The latter company and the other companies named have contracts for the use of a line of omnibuses or conveyances for the per¬ formance of the services called for by such coupons or checks, and those omnibuses or conveyances form the only regular connect¬ ing lines of transportation between the Pennsylvania Company’s station and the stations of other railways in Chicago.

tion there are five other railway stations in Chicago.

The main entrance to and exits from the Pennsylvania Company’s station for passen¬ gers, for employees, and for the public us¬ ing the station, is on Canal street, about 100 feet north of Adams street. Substantially all passengers, whether arriving or depart¬ ing, pass through that entrance, which is at the head of a flight of stairs leading down to and up from the station platform upon which trains arrive and depart.

The present suit was instituted by the Pennsylvania Company against the defend¬ ant Donovan and others, citizens of Illinois, for the purpose of protecting that company in the enjoyment of certain alleged rights and privileges in respect of its passenger station and depot grounds in Chicago. The plaintiff alleged that those rights had been violated by the defendants, and, unless en¬ joined from so doing, they would continue to violate them, to its great damage.

After referring to its efforts for many years to protect incoming and outgoing pas¬ sengers from extortion and annoyance -prac¬ tised by local haekmen, expressmen, and ho¬ tel runners congregating about its station, and noisily soliciting the patronage of pas¬ sengers, the plaintiff, besides stating the above facts, alleged that it was compelled, in 1894, to institute a partial hack service of its own; and, for the purpose of protect¬ ing the rights of passengers, it made, on the 31st day of December, 1894, an arrangement, or contract, with one Eighme for the pur¬ pose of furnishing sufficient carriage and cab service to passengers arriving at its station, and gave to him for a carriage stand a small piece of ground, about 32 feet wide and about 10 feet long, in the northwest corner of its passenger station, at the cor¬ ner of Madison street, near its power house, requiring him to keep at all times clean ve- 199 U. S.

hides, carriages, and cabs with uniformed, honest, and competent drivers, who would be satisfactory to the company; to make charges for the use of such carriages and cabs only in accordance with the ordinances of the city of Chicago; that Eighme *had

been allowed to place an agent inside the company’s station to notify passengers that suitable cabs and carriages could be obtained from such agent; that, by means of such ar¬ rangement, the company made full provi¬ sion for the wants of incoming passengers desiring cabs or carriages for transportation from its station to any part of Chicago.

The arrangement or agreement with Eighme was terminated by the company on the 31st day of January, a. d. 1902, and a similar arrangement was made with the Parmelee Transfer Company, which thereafter suc¬ ceeded Eighme in the same business, and now carried it on in the same manner.

The plaintiff charged a conspiracy and confederation among the defendants — hack drivers and members of the Chicago Hack, Coup4, & Cab Drivers’ Union — to injure its business and property rights, alleging that they daily gathered in numbers from eight to twenty men at a time, in rows and groups, upon the sidewalk in front of its main en¬ trance, entered the company’s station at its main entrance by twos and threes at a time, without plaintiff’s consent and against its ex¬ press objections, and in loud and boisterous voices and manner solicited incoming passen¬ gers and baggage for their vehicles; that de¬ fendants, by their numbers and noisy calls, harassed and annoyed passengers, sometimes forcibly laying hold of them when leaving the station in order to secure their patron¬ age, to the annoyance and confusion of pas¬ sengers, and to the injury and damage of the plaintiffs; that the number of the de¬ fendants, upon the arrival of each train at the entrance and within the station, solic¬ iting businesses, had become so great that by their boisterous actions and obstruction of the sidewalk and the interior of plaintiff’s station, without its consent, they had in large part deprived plaintiff of its lawful property righ.ts in the street frontage, and of the free and full use of its station and property, and thereby created and continued a private nuisance damaging to the plain¬ tiff’s property, depriving it of the full, law¬ ful, beneficial use of its station and street frontage, and of the main entrance there¬ to, and had prevented *and now daily pre-

vented it from securing to passengers a free and uninterrupted passage from and to its station and to arriving and departing trains; and that by such acts of the defend¬ ants great and substantial damages were in¬ flicted upon plaintiff’s property, different in kind and degree from that suffered by the

197

Oct. Teem,

284-286 292 Supreme Court of the United States.

general public, incapable of computation, and which could not be compensated at law.

It was further averred in the bill that the defendants asserted the right — and acted up¬ on that claim and assertion — to enter the station of the plaintiff at all times, in such numbers as suited their purposes, to remain there and occupy such portions of the sta¬ tion as they saw fit in soliciting the custom of incoming passengers, regardless of the consent or the regulations of the plaintiff, or the use to which its property is lawfully devoted, and to the prejudice of its duties and business as a common carrier, and by their actions largely deprived the plaintiff of the control of its property, to its irrepa¬ rable loss and damage.

Alleging that its rights could not be ef¬ fectively protected except by the decree of a court of equity, the plaintiff prayed that the defendants be perpetually enjoined from “entering the station” of the plaintiff “for the purpose of soliciting the custom of in¬ coming passengers for cabs, carriages, ex¬ press wagons, or hotels, respectively ; and that the occupation of the sidewalk and street abutting the main entrance of your orator’s said station by said defendants for the purpose of soliciting custom of passen¬ gers for their said cabs, carriages, express wagons, and hotels be decreed to be a nui¬ sance to your orator, and damaging to its property ; and that said defendants and each of them, and all persons acting in concert with them, whose names are unknown to your orator, may be perpetually enjoined from congregating singly or in larger num¬ bers upon the said sidewalk at the main or any other entrance of your orator’s said sta¬ tion for the purpose of plying their respec¬ tive vocations as hackmen, cabmen, express¬ men, or hotel runners, and from interfering with or soliciting the custom of any of the

passengers *upon the sidewalk adjoining said station at any main or other entrance to said station ; and that your orator may have such other and further relief in the premises as the nature of its case may require, and to your honors shall seem meet.”

The defendants filed an answer, putting in issue the material allegations of the bill, and insisting upon their legal right to have their vehicles in the public street in front of the company’s station, and to go upon the plaintiff’s depot grounds or into its station, as well as to stand upon the sidewalk in front of the main entrance to the station, for the purpose of soliciting the business of incoming or outgoing passengers.

A motion for an injunction against the defendants was heard upon the pleadings and upon affidavits filed by the respective parties. The circuit court granted a pro lim inary injunction to the effect that the de- 198

fendants and all persons claiming to act under their authority, direction, or control, or to whom notice of the court’s order or injunction should come,, refrain “from enter¬ ing the passenger station of complainant at the corner of Adams and Canal streets, in the city of Chicago, to solicit custom of the incoming passengers for cabs, carriages, ex¬ press wagons, or hotels, and do absolutely desist and refrain from congregating upon the sidewalk in front of, adjacent to, or about such entrances to said passenger sta¬ tion, and from soliciting the custom of pas¬ sengers for cabs, carriages, express wagons, or hotels until the further order of the court in the premises.”

The defendants appealed from that order, and it was affirmed in the circuit court of appeals, except the last clause thereof, which was modified by restraining the de¬ fendants “from congregating upon the side¬ walk in front of, adjacent to, or about the entrances of appellee’s [cdmpany’s] passen¬ ger station . . . and from there solicit¬

ing the custom of passengers, so as to inter¬ fere with the ingress and egress of passen¬ gers and employees.” 61 L. R. A. 140, 57 C. C. A. 362, 120 Fed. 215. Subsequently, a final decree was passed in the circuit court in conformity with the above order of tne circuit court of appeals. *That decree,

upon appeal by the defendants, was affirmed in the latter court, and the case is now be¬ fore this court upon writ of certiorari, sued out by the defendants.

As this case is before us on writ of certi¬ orari, we can dispose of all questions arising on the record.

Upon the pleadings two principal in¬ quiries arise: First, whether the Pennsyl¬ vania Company, having made an arrange¬ ment with the Parmelee Transfer Company to furnish, at its passenger station, from time to time, all vehicles necessary for the accommodation of passengers arriving there on its trains or on the trains of other rail¬ road companies, may legally exclude from its depot grounds or passenger station all hack- men or expressmen coming to either for the 'purpose only of soliciting for themselves the custom or patronage of passengers. Second, whether, in virtue of its ownership of the passenger station and depot grounds in ques¬ tion, the railroad company is entitled, in prosecuting its business, to any greater privileges in respect of the use of the side¬ walk and street in front of the main en¬ trance to such station than belonged to the defendants in the prosecution of their business.

Much has been said in argument as to the functions and duties of railroad com¬ panies. Under the decisions of this court there can be no doubt as to the nature of

199 U. S.

1*05.

Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co.

292-295

those functions or duties. In New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. 344, 382, 12 L. ed. 465, 482, this court held that a corporation engaged, under legisla¬ tive authority, in the transportation of pas¬ sengers and freight over navigable waters, was “in the exercise of a sort of public office, and has public duties to perform.” In Olcott v. Fond du Lac County, 16 Wall. 678, 694, 695, 21 L. ed. 382, 388, it was adjudged that a railroad, whether con- structed by a private corporation or by in-

dividuals under the autnority of a ‘legisla¬ tive grant, or by the state itself, was a pub¬ lic highway, and that the function per¬ formed by the corporation was that of the state, and the uses to which its property was devoted were of a public nature. In Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall. 83, 91, 22 L. ed. 100, 104, it was said that the con¬ struction or maintenance of a public high¬ way was “for the promotion of a public use.” So in Pine Grove Twp. v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, 676, 22 L. ed. 227, 233, which involved the validity of taxation, under legislative authority, to aid in the construc¬ tion of a railroad by a corporation: “Though the corporation was private, its work was public, as much so as if it were to be constructed by the state.” Again, in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co. 135 U. S. 641, 657, 34 L. ed. 295, 302, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 965, 971: “The question is no longer an open one, as to whether a rail¬ road is a public highway, established pri¬ marily for the convenience of the people, and to subserve public ends, and therefore subject to governmental control and regu¬ lation. It is because it is a public high¬ way, and subject to such control, that the corporation by which it is constructed, and by which it is to be maintained, may be permitted, under legislative sanction, to ap¬ propriate private property for the purposes of a right of way, upon making just compen¬ sation to the owner in the mode prescribed by law.” To the same effect are United States v. Trans- Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 332, 41 L. ed. 1007, 1024, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 544, 42 L. ed. 819, 848, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 CJ. S. 285, 301, 43 L. ed. 702, 708, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465. Necessarily, the same principles apply in reference to the use of the company’s station house and depot grounds ; for they are held in the same right as are its road, its locomotives, and other property or appliances employed in the transportation of passengers and freight, and must be devoted primarily to public use to the extent necessary for the public objects intended to be accomplished by the 199 U. S.

construction and maintenance of the rail¬ road as a highway.

It by no means follows, however, that the company may not establish such reasonable rules, in respect of the use of its property, as the public convenience and its interests may suggest, provided only that such rules are consistent with the ‘ends for which the

corporation was created, and not inconsist¬ ent with public regulations legally estab¬ lished for the conduct of its business. Al¬ though its functions are public in their na¬ ture, the company holds the legal title to the property which it has undertaken to employ in the discharge of those functions.

And, as incident to ownership, it may use the property for the purposes of making profit for itself; such use, however, being always subject to the condition that the property must be devoted primarily to pub¬ lic objects, without discrimination among passengers and shippers, and not be so man¬ aged as to defeat these objects. It is re¬ quired, under all circumstances, to do what may be reasonably necessary and suitable for the accommodation of passengers and shippers. But it is under no obligation to refrain from using its property to the best advantage of the public and of itself. It is not bound to so use its property that others, having no business with it, may make profit to themselves. Its property is to be deemed, in every legal sense, private property as be¬ tween it and those of the general public who have no occasion to use it for purposes of transportation. In Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 195 U. S. 540, 49 L. ed. 312, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133, the court con¬ sidered the nature of the interest which a railroad company had in its right of way. It was there said: “A railroad’s right of way has, therefore, the substantiality of the fee, and it is private property even to the public in all else but an interest and' benefit in its uses. It cannot be invaded without guilt of trespass. It cannot be appropriated in whole or part except upon the payment of compensation. In other words, it is en¬ titled to the protection of the Constitution, and in the precise manner in which pro¬ tection is given.” In that case the court referred, with approval, to the observation of the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Hummell, 44 Pa. 375, 84 Am. Dec. 457, to the effect “that a railroad company is a purchaser, in consideration of public accommodation and convenience, of the exclusive possession of the ground paid for to the proprietors of it.” So, in Pittsburgh, *Ft. W. & C. R. Oo.

v. Bingham, 29 Ohio St. 370, 371, 23 Am.

Rep. 751, the supreme court of Ohio said that “for all purposes not connected with the operation of its road, the right of the

199

295-297 Supreme Court of

company to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the corporate property is as perfect and absolute as is that of an owner of real prop¬ erty not burdened with public or private easements or servitudes.”

Applying these principles to the case be¬ fore us, it would seem to be clear that the Pennsylvania Company had the right — if it was not its legal duty — to erect and main¬ tain a passenger station and depot buildings in Chicago for the accommodation of pas¬ sengers and shippers as well as for its own benefit; and that it was its duty to manage that station so as to subserve, primarily, the convenience, comfort, and safety of pas¬ sengers and the wants of shippers. It was therefore its duty to see to it that passen¬ gers were not annoyed, disturbed, or ob¬ structed in the use either of its station house or of the grounds over which such passen¬ gers, whether arriving or departing, would pass. It was to that end — primarily, as we may assume from the record — that the Pennsylvania Company made an arrange¬ ment with a single company to supply all vehicles necessary for passengers. We can¬ not say that that arrangement was either unnecessary, unreasonable, or arbitrary; on the contrary, it is easy to see how, in a great city, and in a constantly crowded railway station, such an arrangement might promote the comfort and convenience of passengers arriving and departing, as well as the effi¬ cient conduct of the company’s business. The record does not show that the arrange¬ ment referred to was inadequate for the ac¬ commodation of passengers. But if inade¬ quate, or if the transfer company was al¬ lowed to charge exorbitant prices, it was for passengers to complain of neglect of duty by the railroad company, and for the con¬ stituted authorities to take steps to compel the company to perform its public functions with due regard to the rights of passengers. The question of any failure of the company to properly care for the convenience of pas-

sengers *was not one that, in any legal as¬ pect, concerned the defendants as licensed hackmen and cabmen. It was not for them to vindicate the rights of passengers. They only sought to use the property of the rail¬ road company to make profit in the prose¬ cution of their particular business. A hack- man, in nowise connected with the railroad company, cannot, of right and against the objections of the company, go upon its grounds or into its station or cars for the purpose simply of soliciting the custom of passengers ; but, of course, a passenger, up¬ on arriving at the station, in whatever ve¬ hicle, is entitled to have such facilities for his entering the company’s depot as may be necessary.

Here the defendants press the suggestion

200

the United States. Oct. Term,

that they are entitled to the same rights aa were accorded by special arrangement to the Parmelee Transfer Company. They in¬ sist, in effect, that, as carriers of passengers, they are entitled to transact their business at any place which, under the authority of law, is devoted primarily to public uses, — certainly, at any place open to another car¬ rier engaged in the same kind of business.

But this contention, when applied to the present case, cannot be sustained. The rail¬ road company was not bound to accord this particular privilege to the defendants simply because it had accorded a like privilege to the Parmelee Transfer Company; for it had no contractual relations with the defendants, and owed them, as hackmen, no duty to aid them in their special calling. The defend¬ ants did not have, or profess to have, any business of their own with the company. In meeting their obligations to the public, what¬ ever the nature of those obligations, the de¬ fendants could use any property owned by them, but they could not, of right, use the property of others against their consent. In maintaining a highway, under the authority of the state, the first and paramount obliga¬ tion of the railroad company was, as we have already said, to consult the comfort and convenience of the public who used that highway. To that end it could use all suit¬ able means that were not forbidden by law.

In its discretion it *could accept the aid or 497} stipulate for the services of others. Bun. after providing fully for the wants of pas¬ sengers and shippers, it did not undertake, expressly or by implication, to so use its property as to benefit those who had no business or connection with it. It is true that by its arrangement with the railroad company the Parmelee company was given an opportunity to control, to a great extent, the business of carrying passengers from the Union Passengers’ Depot to other rail¬ way stations and to hotels or private houses in Chicago. But in a real, substantial, le¬ gal sense, that arrangement cannot be re¬ garded as a monopoly in the odious sense of that word, nor does it involve an improp¬ er use by the railroad company of its prop¬ erty. That arrangement is to be deemed, not unreasonably, a means devised for the convenience of passengers and of the rail¬ road company, and as involving such use by the company of its property as is con¬ sistent with the proper performance of its public duties and its ownership of the prop¬ erty in question. If the company, by such use of its property, also derived pecuniary profit for itself, that was a matter of no concern to the defendants, and gave them no ground of complaint.

This question is not controlled by any statute of Illinois. Reference has beeu

199 U. S.

Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co.

297-300

made to the Illinois act as amended in 1883, by which it is provided that every railroad in that state shall, “at all junc¬ tions with other railroads, at all depots where said railroad companies stop their trains regularly to receive and discharge passengers in cities and villages, for at least one-half hour before the arrival of, and one-half hour after the arrival of, any passenger train, cause their respective de¬ pots to be open for the reception of passen¬ gers; said depots to be kept well lighted and warmed for the space of time afore¬ said;” also, to the act of 1877, as amended in 1895, by which it is provided, “that all railroads in this state carrying passengers or freight shall, and they are hereby re¬ quired to, build and maintain depots for the comfort of passengers and for the protec¬ tion of shippers of freight, where such

railroad ‘companies are in the practice of receiving and delivering passengers and freight, at all towns and villages having a population of two hundred or more, on the line of their roads and roads leased and operated by them.” Hurd’s Rev. Stat. (Ill.) 1901, pp. 1378, 1385. Clearly, these statutes have nothing to do. with the mat¬ ter before us. They relate only to the com¬ fort and convenience of passengers and shippers of freight, and do not confer or assume to confer any rights on hackmen or cabmen who seek to enter the depot grounds and station of the railroad company merely to solicit business for themselves. It docs not appear that the state has undertaken by any statute to compel the railroad com¬ pany to share the use of its depot grounds and station with hackmen and cabmen seek¬ ing to use them only to solicit custom for themselves. Whether such a statute would be valid, we need not now consider or de¬ termine.

In the Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 24, 29 L. ed. 791, 801, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542, 554, 628, which involved a general inquiry as to the respective rights of railroad and express companies in respect of the use of railroads for the transportation of express parcels, this court said: “So long as the public are served to their reasonable satisfaction, it is a matter of no importance who serves them. The railroad company performs its whole duty to the public at large and to each individual when it affords the public all reasonable express accommodations. If this is done, the railroad company owes no duty to the public as to the particular agencies it shall select for that purpose. The public require the carriage, but the company may choose its own appropriate means of carriage, always provided they are such as to insure reasonable prompt¬ ness and security.”

199 U. S.

In Chicago , St. L. & N. 0. R. Co. v. Pullman Southern Car Co. 139 U. S. 79, 87,

35 L. ed. 97, 100, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490, one of the questions was as to the validity of a contract between a railroad company and the Pullman company, whereby the latter was given the exclusive right for fifteen years to furnish drawing-room and sleeping cars to be used by the former, and where¬ by, also, the railroad company stipulated ‘that during that term it would not con-

tract to give a like privilege to other sleep¬ ing-car companies. That contract was as¬ sailed as one in restraint of trade and as being against public policy. This court said: “The authorities cited in support of this contention have no application to such a contract as the one before us. The de¬ fendant was under a duty arising from the public nature of its employment to furnish for the use of passengers on its lines such accommodations as were reasonably re¬ quired by the existing conditions of passen¬ ger traffic. Its duty as a carrier of passen¬ gers was to make suitable provisions for their comfort and safety. Instead of fur¬ nishing its own drawing-room and sleeping cars, as it might have done, it employed the plaintiff, whose special business was to provide cars of that character, to supply as many as were necessary to meet the re¬ quirements of travel. It thus used the in¬ strumentality of another corporation in or¬ der that it might properly discharge its duty to the public. So long as the defend¬ ant’s lines were supplied with the requisite number of drawing-room and sleeping cars, it was a matter of indifference to the public who owned them. Express Cases, 117 U. S.

1, 29 L. ed. 791, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542, 028.”

The views we have expressed find more or less support in numerous adjudged cases, some of which are cited in the margin. t There are cases to the contrary, but, in our opinion, the better view — the one sus¬ tained by the clear weight of ‘authority and

by sound reason and public policy — is that which we have expressed.

The defendants cite, as supporting their contention, Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181 Ill. 289, 53 L. R. A. 223, 54 N. E. 825. But that case did not involve any question as to the right of licensed cabmen to enter the station house of a railroad company, against its objection, solely for the purpose of soliciting the custom of passengers. What appears in the opinion of the majority, and in the particular cases cited by the learned

fJencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221, Fed, Cas. No. 7,258; The D. R. Martin, 11 Blatchf. 233, Fed. Cas. No. 1,030 ; Com. v. Power, 7 Met. 596, 41 Am. Dec. 465 ; Barney v.. Oyster Bay S. B. Co. 67 N. Y. 301 ; Old Colony R. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35, 9 Am. St. Rep. 661, 17 N. E. 89 : Com.

201

300-302

Supreme Court of tiie United States.

state court, on that point, was, we feel con¬ strained to say, outside of the issues pre¬ sented, and cannot be deemed authoritative upon the question now being considered. The sole issue in that case was as to the validity of certain ordinances of the city of Chicago relating to the use by hackmen of the public street and sidewalk in front of the company’s station, — a question whol¬ ly different from the one relating to the special arrangement between the railroad company and the Parmelee Transfer Com¬ pany. If the question had been before the state court, and it had adjudged that a railroad corporation could not grant to one person or company the exclusive right with¬ in its station to. solicit the custom of pas¬ sengers (the subject not being covered by any valid statute), then it would have been necessary to consider whether the subject was not one of general law, in respect of which the courts of the United States were entitled to exercise their independent judg¬ ment, in light of the settled principles that must always control the determination of the legal rights of parties. No such ques¬ tion is now presented.

The next question to be examined is that which involves the respective rights of the parties in the use of the public street and sidewalk in front of the company’s passen¬ ger station.

We have seen that the original tempo¬ rary restraining order of the circuit court was, in general terms, to the effect that the defendants desist from congregating upon the sidewalk in front of, adjacent to, or about the entrance to the company’s pas¬ senger station, and from soliciting the cus- '301]tom of passengers *for cabs, etc., until the further order of the court; and that this order was so modified in the circuit court of appeals as to restrain only such congre¬ gating by defendants upon the sidewalk as would interfere with the ingress and egress of passengers and employees. We take it that the final decree recognized the right of the defendants in prosecuting their business to congregate, in reasonable numbers, upon the sidewalks in front of, adjacent to, or about the entrance of the company’s sta¬ tion, and from there soliciting the custom of passengers, providing such use of the

v. Carey, 147 Mass. 40, note, 17 N. E. 97 ; State ex rel. Sheets v. Union Depot Co. 71 Ohio St 370, 68 L. R. A. 792, 73 N. E. 633; Norfolk & W. R. Co. y. Old Dominion Baggage Trans- fer Co. 99 Va. Ill, 50 L. R. A. 722, 37 S. E. 784 ; Fluker v. Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. 81 Ga 461, 2 L. R. A. 843, 12 Am. St Rep. 328 8 S. E. 529 ; Griswold v. Webb. 16 R. I. 649 ■ 7 L. R. A. 302, 19 Atl. 143 ; Summitt v. State,

8 Lea, 413, 41 Am. Rep. 637; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Scoviil, 71 Conn. 136, 42 L. R. A. 157, 71 Am. St. Rep. 159, 41 Atl. 246 ;

ooo

Oct. Term,

sidewalks did not obstruct the ingress and egress of passengers and employees.

As the railroad company did not appeal from the final decree of the circuit court, it cannot, upon this appeal, complain of any of its provisions. The defendants did appeal, and they object to the decree relat¬ ing to the use of the sidewalk and street in front of the main entrance to the passenger depot.

That the railroad company, by its agents and employees, are entitled, in prosecuting its business, to use, in all appropriate ways, the sidewalk and street in front of its sta¬ tion and depot grounds, cannot be doubt¬ ed, — that right being appurtenant to the lands upon which its station house and de- pot grounds stand. Passengers may, there¬ fore, in their own right, as well as in right of the company, use the sidewalk in order to gain access to the depot grounds and sta¬ tion, or to reach the public street when leav¬ ing the station.

Referring to the rights of abutting own¬ ers, the supreme court of Illinois, in Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 556, 571, 24 L. R. A.

406, 411, 41 Am. St. Rep. 311, 37 N. E. 850, said: “The dedication of the street by the plat, the sale of lots with reference to it, conveyance of abutting lots, and the pay¬ ment of the money for the conveyances, were elements sufficient to create the right. The right may be regarded in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament. It becomes ap¬ purtenant to the lots. As to the rights se¬ cured, they are plain: to have the street kept open, so that free access may be had to and from lots abutting on the street.”

In the later case of Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181 Ill. 289, 53 L. R. A. 223, 54 N. E. 825, above *cited, that court adjudged

that the title to the streets in Chicago was vested in the city, and “it has the conser¬ vation, control, management, and supervi¬ sion of such trust property, and it is its du¬ ty to defend and protect the title to such trust estatp. The city has no power or au¬ thority to grant the exclusive use of its streets to any private person or for any pri¬ vate purposes ; but must hold and control the possession exclusively for public use, for purposes of travel and the like.” The general doctrine is correctly stated in Dillon on Municipal Corporations: “For example.

r"*tes. I' Alabama Baggage & Cab. Co. 107 Ga.

3Vp , ,A' 431’ 34 S- E' 372 •• Godbout

v. St. Paul Union Depot Co. 79 Minn. 188 47

L. R. A. 532, 81 N. W. 835; Boston & A. R. Co. v. Brown, 177 Mass. 65, 52 L. R. A 418 ^„N- E' 189 : Boston & M. R. Co. v. Sullivan’, Ion S?ass' 230’ 83 Am- St. Rep. 275, 58 N. E. 689 ; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v Bork 23 R- I- 218, 49 Atl. 965; St. Louis Drayage Co v Louisville & N. R. Co. 5 Inters. Com. Rep!

Eed' 39 ’ Bedding v. Gallagher, 72 N. H. 3 <7, 64 L. R. A. 811, 57 Atl. 225.

199 U. S.

Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co.

302-304

an abutting owner’s right of access to and from the street, subject only to legitimate public regulation, is as much his property as his right to the soil within his boundary

lines . When he is deprived of such

right of access, or of any other easement connected with the use and enjoyment of his property, other than by the exercise of legitimate public regulation, he is deprived of his property.” Again: “But it was further seen that he had rights not shared by the public at large, special and peculiar to himself, and which arose out of the very relation of his lot to the street in front of it, and that these rights, whether the bare fee of the streets was in the lot owner or in the city, were rights of property, and as such ought to be and were as sacred from legislative invasion as his right to the lot itself.” 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. §§ 5876. 656a. So, in Lewis on Eminent Domain, where the adjudged cases are referred to and examined: “When the owner of a tract of land lays the same out into lots and streets, and sells the lots, the purchasers of such lots acquire, as appurtenant there¬ to, a private right of way and access over the streets. This private right arises with¬ out any express grant, and in the absence of any statute. The law presumes that the parties had in mind the advantages to be derived from the use of the proposed streets, and implies a right to such use as a part of the grant. . . . Therefore, in the case

of such a grant, there arises by operation of law a private right to use the streets in connection with the lots of each proprietor, which is as inviolable as any other right of property. . . . The existence of these

private rights *and easements is, therefore, entirely independent of the mode in which the highwav is established, or of the estate or interest which the public acquires in the soil of the street, whether a fee or less.” Lewis, Em. Dom. 2d ed. §91 f and authori¬ ties cited in notes. See also Newell v. Sass, 142 Ill. 104, 31 N. E. 176.

But the right of the railroad company, as abutting owner, and the rights of pas¬ sengers, are not, in their nature, paramount to the rights of others of the general public to use the sidewalk in question in legiti¬ mate ways and for legitimate purposes. Licensed hackmen and cabmen, unless for¬ bidden by valid local regulations, may, with¬ in reasonable limits, use a public sidewalk in prosecuting their calling, provided such use is not materially obstructive in its nature; that is, of such exclusive character as, in a substantial sense, to prevent others from also using it upon equal terms, for legitimate purposes. Generally speaking, 199 U. S.

public sidewalks and streets are for use by all, upon equal terms, for any purpose con¬ sistent with the object for which such side¬ walks and streets are established; subject, of course, to such valid regulations as may be prescribed by the constituted authorities for the public convenience; this, to the end that, as far as possible, the rights of all may be conserved without undue discrimina¬ tion.

By the Illinois statutes it is provided that the city council in cities may regulate the use of streets and sidewalks, and li¬ cense, tax, and regulate hackmen, omnibus drivers, carters, cabmen, porters, express- men, and all others pursuing like occupa¬ tions, and to prescribe their compensation. Hurd’s Rev. Stat. (111.) 1901, pp. 285, 287.

And by ordinance of the city council of Chicago it is provided that “any licensed hackney, coach, cab, or other vehicles for the conveyance of passengers, may stand, while waiting for employment, at the fol¬ lowing places, and for the period of time hereinafter provided: . . . . Stand No. 4.

The east side of Canal street, occupying 110 feet between Adams and Madison streets, as the superintendent of police shall direct . . . Stand No. 6. *At all rail-

road depots ten minutes previous to the ar¬ rival of all passenger trains.” Rev. Code of Chicago, § 498. The validity of this or¬ dinance has been sustained by the supreme court of Illinois. Pennsylvania Co. v. Chi¬ cago, 181 Ill. 299, 53 L. R. A. 223, 54 N. E.

visions inconsistent with any right secured by the Constitution of the United States, we accept the decision of the state court as authoritative upon this point. When, there¬ fore, licensed hackmen and cabmen, at ap¬ propriate times, placed their vehicles in the public street, next to the sidewalk, in front of the company’s passenger house, they did not violate the regulations estab¬ lished by the city council. Nor, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, did they violate such regulations, when, leaving their vehi¬ cles in the public street, at the appointed places, they stood near by them for a rea¬ sonable time upon the sidewalk, awaiting the coming of passengers from the station house. What they could not legally do— what the final decree properly forbade them to do — was to congregate upon the sidewalk in front of, adjacent to, or about the pas¬ senger house, so as to interfere with the ingress and egress of passengers. Of course, any use of the sidewalk in whatever way that would unnecessarily or unduly obstruct and interfere with passengers in their going

203

304-306

Supreme Court of the United States.

Oct. Term,

or corning would be inconsistent with the rights of such passengers as well as an in¬ fringement of the right of the company, as abutting property owner, to have, by its agents and employees, for the purposes of its business, reasonable access to and from the sidewalk and the public street.

It only remains to inquire as to the com¬ petency of a court of equity to give the railroad company the relief it sought. The defendants insist that equity cannot prop¬ erly interfere. But the inadequacy of a legal remedy in such a case as this one is quite apparent. According to the record the attempt of the defendants, despite the objections of the company, to use its sta¬ tion house and depot grounds for the purpose of meeting passengers and soliciting their patronage, was of constant, daily, almost hourly occurrence. The case was one of a

continuing *trespass, involving injury of a permanent nature. A suit at law could only have determined the particular wrong occurring on a particular occasion, and would not reach other wrongs of like char¬ acter that would occur almost every hour of each day, as passengers arrived at the station of the company. The same state of things existed in reference to such use of the sidewalk in front of the passenger sta¬ tion as unduly interfered with the rights of passengers arriving and departing. Only a court of equity was competent to meet such an unusual emergency, and by a com¬ prehensive decree determine finally and once for all the entire controversy between the parties, • thus avoiding a multiplicity of suits, and conserving the public interests. No remedy at law would be so complete or efficacious as a suit in equity in such a case as this one. Coosaw Min. Co. v. South Car¬ olina, 144 U. S. 550, 36 L. ed. 537, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep, 689; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 517, 42 L. ed. 819, 838, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418. The supreme court of Illinois well said in Chicago General R. Co. v. Chi¬ cago, B. & Q. R. Co. 181 Ill. 605, 611, 54 N. E. 1026: “When irreparable injury is spoken of, it is not meant that the injury is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond the possibility of compensation in damages, but it must be of such constant and fre¬ quent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law.” See also Newell v. Sass, 142 Ill. 104, 115, 116, 31 N. E. 176; Carpenter v. Capital Electric Co. 178 Ill. 29, 36, 43 L. R. A. 645, 69 Am. St. Rep. 286, 52 N. E. 973; Lowery v. Pekin, 186 Ill. 387, 398, 51 L. R. A. 301, 57 N. E. lOOSe,

The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.

204