Dorsey v. Ponce (Dec. 4, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Dorsey v. Ponce, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Dec. 4, 2025
Disposition
Dismissed
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,ANTHONY SANCHEZ, MARCUS TURNER, and SergeantGABRIEL CAMPOS, Defendants.United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division, EASTERN DIVISION. | December 4, 2025| Slip Copy | 2025 WL 3484962Document Detailsstandard Citation:CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,ANTHONY SANCHEZ, MARCUS TURNER, & Sergeant GABRIELCAMPOS, Defendants., No. 1:25 C 01212, 2025 WL 3484962 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 4, 2025)All Citations:Slip Copy, 2025 WL 3484962Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:IllinoisDelivery DetailsDate:December 8, 2025 at 8:48 AMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineAttorneys and LawFirms (p.1)MEMORANDUMOPINION ANDORDER (p.1)All Citations (p.9)
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3484962Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court,N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division,EASTERN DIVISION.CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff,v.Officers CARLOS PONCE,ANTHONY SANCHEZ,MARCUS TURNER, and SergeantGABRIEL CAMPOS, Defendants.No. 1:25 C 01212|Filed: 12/04/2025Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion ofcitation references that are incorrect or do not actuallyexist. These invalid citations appeared in the originalcourt opinion and have been preserved as written sincethey are part of the official record. Any links to theseinvalid citations have been removed.Attorneys and Law FirmsCordarro T. Dorsey, Calumet City, IL, Pro Se.Jahnee Hughes, Pro Hac Vice, Jordan F. Yurchich,Raoul Vertick Mowatt, City of Chicago Department ofLaw, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERREBECCA R. PALLMEYER United States DistrictJudge*1 On the evening of February 23, 2023, PlaintiffCordarro Dorsey was pulled over by officers ofthe Chicago Police Department (“CPD”). After herefused officers’ orders to exit the vehicle, Dorsey wasdetained and handcuffed, and his vehicle was searched.Dorsey admits that he was driving without a frontlicense plate, but asserts that the officers’ decisionto pull him over, and their conduct during the stop,violated the U.S. Constitution and Illinois state law.He brings this pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,et seq., and state tort law, seeking monetary damages,attorney's fees, and an injunction ordering “[p]olicyreforms.” (Second Am. Compl. [19] at 6.) The Cityhas moved to dismiss Dorsey's Amended Complaint infull, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).1As explained below, this motion is granted in part anddenied in part.BACKGROUNDI. Factual BackgroundThe allegations in Dorsey's Second AmendedComplaint [19],2 are presumed true at the pleadingstage. Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753, 756–57 (7thCir. 2023). Dorsey alleges that on the evening ofFebruary 23, 2023, he was driving his vehicle with anunnamed passenger when he was pulled over by CPDOfficers Carlos Ponce and Anthony Sanchez. (SecondAm. Compl. [19] 5.) Officer Ponce approachedDorsey's vehicle, and informed him that he was beingpulled over because his windows were illegally tintedand because his vehicle had no front license plate.(Id.) Dorsey responded that his “car did not haveillegal tints,” and noted that the Secretary of Statehad informed him that he “would be fine” so longas his license plate was visible through the frontwindshield. (Id.) Ponce responded that the front platemust be physically bracketed onto the car. (Id.) Hethen ordered Dorsey out of the vehicle. (Id.) Dorseyrefused, noting that he was a “valid driver” with “validcredentials.” (Id.) He then requested that he “wouldlike a sergeant be present.”3 (Id.) Ponce unlocked thevehicle's driver-side door himself, and continued toorder Dorsey to exit the vehicle, warning that Dorseywas “going to jail when the Sergeant arrives.” (Id.)*2 Soon after, Officer Turner, another CPD officer,pulled up in his squad car. He “aggressively” parkedhis vehicle in front of Dorsey's car, blocking him in.(Id.) Officer Turner approached Dorsey's vehicle andinsisted that he exit the vehicle, but Dorsey refused,and requested that he “not be touched or forced ... untila sergeant is present.” (Id.) Despite this, Ponce reachedinside of the vehicle and unfastened Dorsey's seatbelt.In response, Dorsey told the officers “I am not refusing,but I am in fear for my life due to [the officers’]
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2aggression.” (Id.) Officer Sanchez then approached thevehicle's passenger side, and began “harassing” thepassenger in an effort to “coerce” Dorsey to exit thevehicle (Dorsey does not describe the nature of thealleged harassment). (Id.) Dorsey continued reiteratingthat he did not consent to a search, and urged that ifthe officers believed “a traffic infraction truly had beencommitted, [they should instead] write a ticket and [i]twill be disputed later.” (Id. (internal quotation marksomitted).)Some twenty minutes after Dorsey had been pulledover, Sergeant Campos arrived at the scene. Thesubsequent events are somewhat unclear: Dorseyalleges that upon his arrival, Campos also orderedhim out of the vehicle, and that the officers then“forcibly removed” him from the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 5,9.) Once he was out of the car, the officers placedDorsey in handcuffs, and “forcibly removed” his cellphone from his hand, while Dorsey was recording theofficers’ conduct. (Id.) Officer Ponce then proceededto search the vehicle “with no actual probable causeor warrant.” (Id.) This search was “purportedly fora license plate” (Pl. Opp. [25] at 2), but Dorseyclaims that Ponce in actuality conducted “a fishingexpedition” (id.), and “went as far as ripping my carpetand flooring from under my center console.” (SecondAm. Compl. [19] 5.) He asserts the search of his carlasted for approximately twenty additional minutes,suggesting that the entire stop took roughly fortyminutes. (Id.)The complaint does not reveal what happened next—whether Dorsey was placed under arrest or permittedto leave.II. Procedural BackgroundOn October 19, 2023, Mr. Dorsey sued the City ofChicago and many individual CPD officers, allegingthat four separate encounters with the police violated42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois state tort law. See Compl.[1] in Dorsey v. City of Chicago, 23 C 15149. Eachof these four encounters was a “separate occurrence[ ]involving different Chicago police officers,” and theincidents were otherwise “discrete and separate” fromone another. See Dorsey v. City of Chicago, 23 C15149, 2025 WL 327425, at *6–*7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28,2025). Accordingly, on January 28, 2025, the courtfound that the claims had been misjoined, and directedthat Dorsey's claims be severed and docketed as fourseparate cases. Id. at *1, *6. This is one of the resultingcases. Defendants have moved to dismiss the SecondAmended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and the matter has been fully briefed.LEGAL STANDARDA motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges thecourt's subject matter jurisdiction. “[S]ubject matterjurisdiction is a fundamental limitation on the powerof a federal court to act.” Del Vecchio v. Conseco,Inc., 230 F.3d 974, 980 (7th Cir. 2000). If a federalcourt “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The plaintiff bears the burdenof demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction by apreponderance of the evidence. Lee v. City of Chicago,330 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003). At this stage inthe litigation, the court accepts as true all well-pleadedfactual allegations and draws all reasonable inferencesin favor of the plaintiff. Ctr. for Dermatology & SkinCancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir.2014).Likewise, a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency ofthe complaint, not its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police of Chi. Lodge No.7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). To survive, acomplaint “must allege ‘enough facts to state a claim torelief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Fosnight v. Jones,41 F.4th 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bell Atl.Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claimhas facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factualcontent that allows the court to draw the reasonableinference that the defendant is liable for the misconductalleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009)).*3 Pro se complaints like Dorsey's are construedliberally. Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 903 (7thCir. 2022). Nonetheless, even pro se pleadings mustgo beyond mere labels and conclusions and “raise aright to relief above the speculative level” to survivea motion to dismiss. Brockett v. Effingham Cnty., Ill.,116 F.4th 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Twombly,550 U.S. at 555). The court need not “imagine every
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3possible argument” in Dorsey's favor simply becausehe is pro se. Harris v. United States, 13 F.4th 623, 629(7th Cir. 2021).DISCUSSIONDorsey's Second Amended Complaint is somewhatdifficult to decipher. Contrary to Rule 8(d)(1)’sdirection that “[e]ach allegation must be simple,concise, and direct,” Dorsey's factual allegationsappear in two lengthy paragraphs. The complaint isotherwise replete with passing reference to dozensof legal principles, and includes numerous citationsto court cases, some of which do not stand for theproposition for which they are cited or do not exist atall.4 The court assumes that Dorsey intends to bring theclaims that he lists in the sections entitled “CommonLaw Claims” and “Claims for Relief” at the end ofthe document. That list includes claims under theFourth Amendment, the First Amendment, and failureto intervene claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts1–3); a civil rights conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1985 (Count 4); and state tort law claims (includingtrespass to chattels, assault, battery, and intentionalinfliction of emotional distress) (Count 5). Dorseyseeks damages, and requests an injunction ordering“[p]olicy reforms.” (Second Am. Compl. [19] at 6.)Defendants have moved to dismiss all counts. Withrespect to injunctive relief, they argue that Dorseylacks standing; with respect to other remedies, theycontend that Dorsey has not put forward sufficientfactual matter to support a plausible claim forrelief. The court notes that Defendants do notspecifically address each of the numerous claimsthat Dorsey purports to make. This oversight isnot unreasonable, given that Dorsey's pleadings arelengthy and fragmented. And Defendants’ failure toaddress any particular claim may not result in thatclaim surviving this motion, as the court is freeto dismiss claims sua sponte when the allegationsare legally insufficient. See Ledford v. Sullivan, 105F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Sua sponte 12(b)(6)dismissals are permitted, provided that a sufficientbasis for the court's action is evident from the plaintiff'spleading.” (citation omitted)). This is appropriatewhere, like here, a plaintiff makes passing reference tomany legal principles that are clearly not supported bythe pleaded facts.I. Standing*4 The court begins with standing. Article III“confines” federal jurisdiction “to ‘Cases’ and‘Controversies.’ ” FDA v. All. For Hippocratic Med.,602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024). For there to be a “Case” ora “Controversy,” each plaintiff in federal court mustdemonstrate standing—a “personal stake” in the caseand its outcome. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594U.S. 413, 423 (2021). The “irreducible constitutionalminimum” of standing is composed of three elements:(1) an injury in fact, (2) caused by the defendant, (3)that would likely be redressed by judicial action. Lujanv. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “As theparty invoking federal jurisdiction,” Mr. Dorsey bearsthe burden of establishing standing. In re RecalledAbbott Infant Formula Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.4th525, 528 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Silha v. ACT, Inc., 808F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015)).Dorsey's standing to pursue damages is not indoubt; Defendants contest only his standing to pursueinjunctive relief.5 To seek such relief, Mr. Dorsey mustdemonstrate “a substantial risk of future injury that istraceable to the Government defendants and likely tobe redressed by an injunction against them.” Murphyv. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 69 (2024). His injury neednot be “literally certain,” but “it must be ‘certainlyimpending.’ ” Scholl v. Ill. State Police, 776 F. Supp.3d 701, 709 (N.D. Ill. 2025) (citing Clapper v. AmnestyInt'l, USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410, 414 n.5 (2013)). Asthe Supreme Court explained in City of Los Angelesv. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (the sole case citedby Dorsey on this point6), a “federal court may notentertain a claim by any or all citizens who no morethan assert that certain practices of law enforcementofficers are unconstitutional.” Id. at 111. To establishstanding to seek injunctive relief, therefore, Dorseymust do more than simply point to past mistreatment tohim personally; he must show “a sufficient likelihoodthat he will again be wronged in a similar way.” Id.Dorsey has not done so. He has made no factualallegations that suggest he is at imminent risk offuture harm. He offers only the conclusory statementthat “Plaintiff and others risk repeated violations by
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4defendants employed by the City,” but under Lyons,the mere risk of future harm is not sufficient for ArticleIII standing.7 Dorsey's requests for injunctive relief aretherefore dismissed for lack of standing.II. Federal Law ClaimsA. Fourth Amendment*5 The court now turns to the merits of Dorsey'sclaims. The Second Amended Complaint expresslyenumerates four alleged violations of the FourthAmendment: (1) unlawful seizure, (2) excessive force,(3) prolonged detention, and (4) unlawful search. Thecourt construes Dorsey's pleading as bringing thesefour claims under § 1983, and considers each in turn.1. Unlawful SeizureDorsey's core allegation is that the officers lackeda sufficient basis for the traffic stop, making it anunlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. “‘[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonablewhere the police have probable cause to believe that atraffic violation has occurred.’ ” United States v. Lewis,920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Whren v.United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). Probablecause exists “when the facts and circumstances ... aresufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing thesuspect had committed or was committing an offense.”Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 433 (7thCir. 1993) (cleaned up).Dorsey's claims on this theory are undercut by hisown allegations. In the Second Amended Complaint,Dorsey acknowledges that he was pulled over becausehe was, in fact, driving without a license plate affixedto the front of his vehicle. Because Illinois law requiresthat a license plate be affixed to the “frontmost” partof the vehicle, see 625 ILCS 5/3-413(a), Dorsey'sviolation of that law gave the police probable cause toinitiate a traffic stop. See United States v. Smith, 107 F.App'x 651, 653 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that failure toaffix a license plate to a car constitutes probable causethat can justify a traffic stop). Dorsey thus cannot statea claim of unlawful seizure.In response, Dorsey argues that he was not violatingIllinois traffic laws, because his license platewas visible through the front windshield, andthe windshield could be “reasonably interpretedas the ‘frontmost part’ under the statute's plainlanguage.” (Opp'n [25] at 1.) This is unpersuasive. Thestatute's plain language instructs that “[r]egistrationplates issued for a motor vehicle ... shall be attachedthereto, one in the frontmost and one in the rearmost.”625 ILCS 5/3–413(a). Contrary to Dorsey's assertions,placing the license plate in the windshield is not“attaching” it to the car. Several federal and stateauthorities have so held. For example, in Harris v.Melchor, No. 24-2468, 2025 WL 972467 (7th Cir.Apr. 1, 2025), the plaintiff made the same argumentDorsey raises here—he was pulled over for drivingwithout a front license plate, and contended in anaction under § 1983 that the stop was unlawfulbecause his license plate was visible through thefront windshield. Affirming summary judgment forthe defendant officers, the Seventh Circuit observedthat Illinois state law clearly “prohibits a driver fromdisplaying the license plate in the front windshieldof the car.” Id. at *4. And in People v. Parker, 354Ill. App.3d 40, 820 N.E.2d 1016 (1st Dist. 2004),where defendant challenged his weapons convictionas the product of an unlawful search of his vehicle,the Illinois Appellate Court rejected the argument thata license plate violation did not constitute probablecause for officers to stop his car. See id. at 46-47, 820N.E.2d at 1024 (“[T]he Illinois Vehicle Code require[s]that license plates be in a clearly visible position.A license plate displayed inside the front windshieldof a minivan, is not in a clearly visible position.”);see also Mordi v. Zeigler, No. 3:11-CV-00193-NJR,2020 WL 2425796, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 12, 2020)(granting summary judgment in a § 1983 challengeto a traffic stop; “[d]isplaying a required plate on thewindshield of a vehicle is against the law and thusgave [the officer] probable cause to stop [the plaintiff's]vehicle.”).*6 Dorsey also claims that he consulted with theIllinois Secretary of State, who confirmed the validityof his interpretation of the statute. (Second Am.Compl. [19] 5.) The Secretary's alleged (apparentlyinaccurate) statement is not relevant here; by Dorsey'sown admission, the officers had probable cause to stophim. His unlawful seizure claim is dismissed.
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.52. Excessive ForceDorsey next alleges that by “forcibly remov[ing]Plaintiff from the vehicle without justification,” theofficers used excessive force in violation of the FourthAmendment. (Id. 9.) Fourth Amendment claimsof excessive force are analyzed under the “objectivereasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The Graham inquiry requires“careful balancing of the nature and quality ofthe intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendmentinterests against the countervailing governmentalinterests,” such as officer safety. Id. at 396 (quotingTennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)) (quotationsomitted). A court must weigh the totality of thecircumstances, “including facts and events leading upto” the use of force, “the severity of the crime” atissue, whether the suspect poses an “immediate threatto the safety of the officers or others, and whether heis actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrestby flight.” Id.; see also Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73,76, 80 (2025).Defendants argue that the “alleged conduct could notamount to excessive force.” (Reply [28] at 6.) Thecourt agrees. Dorsey alleges two incidents of physicalcontact—(1) that the officers forced him to exit hisvehicle, and (2) subsequently placed him in handcuffs—but his allegations do not support an inferencethat either of these acts was improper. Both allegedinstances of force appeared to be justified, as bothoccurred only after he ignored officers’ repeated andlawful instructions to exit the vehicle; officers “may asa matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stoppedcar to exit his vehicle.” Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.408, 410 (1997). Dorsey does not allege anything aboutthe nature of the force used, the extent of the conduct,or any injuries that resulted. In short, there is no basishere for a plausible inference that the officers’ conductwas objectively unreasonable. The mere allegation thatforce occurred, and that said force was “excessive,”does not, without more, state a plausible claim. SeeIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (a plaintiff must put forwardmore than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).3. Unlawful SearchDorsey also targets the search itself, claiming thatOfficer Ponce violated § 1983 by searching his vehiclewithout probable cause. “To state a claim under theFourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a searchor seizure occurred and that the search or seizurewas unreasonable.” Hess, 72 F.4th at 761. A searchoccurs “when the government violates a subjectiveexpectation of privacy that society recognizes asreasonable.” United States v. Scott, 731 F.3d 659, 663(7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). Warrants are typically required forsearches, but under the automobile exception, “officersmay search an automobile without having obtained awarrant so long as they have probable cause to do so.”Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 592 (2018). Andprobable cause exists whenever, “given the totalityof the circumstances, there is a fair probability thatcontraband or evidence of a crime will be found in” thevehicle. United States v. Eymann, 962 F.3d 273, 286(7th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marksomitted).*7 On this point, Dorsey appears to have allegedsufficient factual matter to survive the motion todismiss. From his factual narrative, it is reasonableto infer that the officers lacked a reasonable basis tobelieve that there was contraband or evidence in thevehicle, as the alleged basis for stopping Dorsey wasa missing license plate and illegally tinted windows.Defendants do not meaningfully contest this point;while they argue that the traffic stop was lawful, theymake no argument as to the search during the stop.8It could well be the case that the officers are entitledto qualified immunity,9 as the City seems to believe,or that the evidence will indicate that the officers hada sound legal basis for the stop. But at this stage ofthe litigation, looking only at the facts on the face ofthe Second Amended Complaint, the court declines todismiss Dorsey's unlawful search claim.4. Prolonged DetentionFinally, Dorsey claims that his stop was unlawfullyprolonged in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6traffic stop is unlawfully prolonged if it lasts “longerthan is necessary” to address the infraction at issue;“[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tiedto the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should havebeen—completed.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575U.S. 348, 354 (2015). The notion that the traffic stopat issue here was longer than necessary is doubtful.Dorsey himself alleges that it lasted approximatelyforty minutes, with much of that time spent awaitingthe arrival of the sergeant at Dorsey's own request.Dorsey's request for a sergeant and his refusal toobey officers’ orders to exit the vehicle appear to bethe primary reason for any delay. Cady v. Sheahan,467 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2006) (“When delayis attributable to the evasive actions of a suspect, thepolice do not exceed the permissible duration of aninvestigatory stop.”).Dorsey does, however, allege that Officer Ponce“abandoned the stop's purported purpose—issuinga citation—to forcibly remove Plaintiff from hisvehicle, search it without consent, and inflict propertydamage.” (Opp'n [25] at 1.) This allegedly impropersearch could potentially have unlawfully prolonged thestop. As the Supreme Court explained in Rodriguez,the “officer's mission” in a traffic stop includesactions such as “determining whether there areoutstanding warrants against the driver, and inspectingthe automobile's registration and proof of insurance.”575 U.S. at 355. The search of Dorsey's vehicle,in contrast, could have been “a measure aimed atdetecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,”that lacked a “close connection to roadway safety.” Seeid. at 355–56 (cleaned up). Dorsey's allegation that hisvehicle was unlawfully searched during this traffic stopwithout probable cause supports a plausible inferencethat the police “detour[ed] from the mission of thestop” and thus prolonged it. Cf. United States v. Avilia,106 F.4th 684, 695 (7th Cir. 2024) (upholding denial ofsuppression motion; defendant was subject to a trafficstop, and officers recovered a weapon from his personin a frisk six minutes after he was removed from thecar).* * * * **8 The motion to dismiss is denied with respect toMr. Dorsey's prolonged detention and unlawful searchclaims. Dorsey's other Fourth Amendment claims aredismissed.B. First AmendmentTo state a claim of retaliation under the FirstAmendment, Dorsey must show (1) that he engagedin constitutionally protected speech; (2) that but forthe protected speech, the officers would not have takenthe same action against him; and (3) that he suffereda deprivation that would likely deter First Amendmentactivity by similarly situated individuals in the future.See Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Nieves v.Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 399 (2019) (clarifying that aplaintiff must establish but-for causation to succeed ona retaliatory arrest claim). Causation can be shown viaeither direct or circumstantial evidence. FKFJ, Inc. v.Vill. of Worth, 11 F.4th 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2021)Dorsey's theory of this claim has evolved over time. Inthe operative complaint, Dorsey alleged that officersviolated the First Amendment by seizing his phone inretaliation for his recording. (Second Amended Compl.[19] at 6.) But as Defendants point out, this claim,too, is undermined by Dorsey's own allegations. (Mot.[22] at 7.) Dorsey alleges that the officers removedthe phone from his hand only after they had moved todetain him and place him in handcuffs, meaning thatthe phone was seized to effectuate his detention. Nofactual allegations would support an inference that thetraffic stop or arrest was motivated by retaliation. SeeE.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007) (a complaint must “actuallysuggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief”).10 Atmost, Dorsey alleges a temporal connection—that hewas detained following his recording of the officers—but timing alone, in this context, is not enough tostate a claim. See FKFJ, 11 F.4th at 586. Otherwise,every suspect who is detained in an interaction wherethey are recording the police would have a cognizableFirst Amendment claim, which is clearly not thelaw. Additional factual allegations were needed, andDorsey did not make them.In his brief in opposition, Dorsey raises a new theory:he now asserts that the officers’ “escalation” of the stop(which he characterizes as “unlawful seizure, physicalforce, [and] vehicle damage”) was in response to his
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7verbal statement that “I do not consent to searches”and his informing the officers that he intended “tochallenge the stop in court.” (Opp. [25] at 2.) Thismakes little sense. For one, the seizure could not havebeen in response to his verbal assertion of rights, asthe traffic stop is the seizure at issue, and the stopwas initiated prior to any communications betweenDorsey and the officers.11 But more importantly,Dorsey alleges no facts suggesting that the officers’use of physical force or damage of the vehiclewas motivated by these statements. At most, heoffers only the conjectural allegation that the officers’actions “violated the Plaintiffs (1st Amendment)rights” (Second Am. Compl. [19] 27), but thisis insufficient to state a claim of First Amendmentretaliation.12 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–57(rejecting a pleading that only offers “labels andconclusions” without additional factual matter).*9 Count 2 is dismissed.C. Failure to InterveneDorsey next claims that “Sergeant Campos and otherofficers failed to stop constitutional violations,” whichconstitutes failure to intervene under § 1983. (SecondAm. Compl. [19] 12.) An officer is liable for failureto intervene if “any constitutional violation has beencommitted by a law enforcement official; and theofficer had a realistic opportunity to intervene toprevent the harm from occurring.” Yang v. Hardin, 37F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994).This claim also must be dismissed. It is not clear, fromDorsey's filings, which “constitutional violations”Dorsey alleges that Campos and the others were ina position to stop—he offers only the threadbareassertion that the officers “failed to stop constitutionalviolations.” (Second Am. Compl. [19] 12.) Assumingthat Dorsey is referring to Ponce's search of the vehicle,the complaint never alleges that the other officers knewthat the search was ongoing, or that it occurred withoutprobable cause. Without allegations that officers werein a position to intervene, the failure to intervene claimcannot proceed.13 See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020) (“A claim for relief maynot proceed merely because some set of facts can beimagined that would entitle a plaintiff to relief.”).D. ConspiracyFinally, Dorsey alleges that Defendants conspired todeprive him of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C.§ 1985. A claim of conspiracy under § 1985 requiresa showing of “(1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) apurpose of depriving a person or class of persons ofequal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtheranceof a conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or propertyor a deprivation of a right or privilege granted to U.S.citizens.” Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 665 (7thCir. 2002). To meet this standard, Dorsey must show“the conspirators have an agreement to inflict injury orharm upon him.” Hernandez v. Joliet Police Dep't, 197F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1999). This can be “inferredfrom circumstantial evidence,” but only in cases wherea reasonable jury could “conclude that a meeting ofthe minds had occurred and that the parties had anunderstanding to achieve the conspiracy's objectives.”Id. at 263.Dorsey does not allege the existence of a conspiracy orprovide any basis from which a reasonable mind couldinfer that Defendant officers agreed to a violation ofhis rights. The conspiracy claim is dismissed.III. State Law ClaimsThe court next turns to Dorsey's four Illinois state lawtort claims: battery, assault, intentional infliction ofemotional distress (“IIED”), and trespass to chattels.14(Second Am. Compl. [19] at 5.) Defendants havemoved to dismiss each of these claims, arguingthat Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient and thatDefendants are immune from liability for these tortsunder state law.*10 Defendants raised their immunity defense forthe first time in their reply brief, so the court declinesto dismiss the claims on this basis, but notes that theargument appears to have traction. Under the IllinoisTort Immunity Act, a “public employee is not liable forhis act or omission in the execution or enforcement ofany law unless such act or omission constitutes willfuland wanton conduct.” See 745 ILCS 10/2-202. Thestatute defines willful and wanton conduct as “a courseof action which shows an actual or deliberate intentionto cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows anutter indifference to or conscious disregard for thesafety of others or their property.” 745 ILCS 10/1-210.
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Dorsey does not allege that any of the officers’ actionswere willful or wanton. In his Second AmendedComplaint, Dorsey alleges that he was pulled over fora license plate violation and ordered out of the vehicle;that he refused to comply; and that once he was out ofthe vehicle, he was temporarily handcuffed while hiscar was searched. It is unlikely that a reasonable jurycould find that this conduct constitutes an “actual ordeliberate intention to cause harm.” See id. That theofficers allegedly laughed at Dorsey or prolonged hisdetention in the cold is unlikely to constitute willful orwanton conduct.Immunity aside, Dorsey's allegations do not stateclaims for battery, assault, or IIED under Illinoislaw. The court begins with battery: in its simplestterms, the common law tort of battery in Illinois is“the unauthorized touching of the person of another.”Wilson v. City of Chicago, 758 F.3d 875, 879 (7thCir. 2014) (quoting Curtis v. Jaskey, 326 Ill. App.3d 90, 93, 759 N.E.2d 962, 964 (2d Dist. 2001)).To state a claim of battery, Dorsey must show thatthe officers “ ‘intended to cause a harmful contact,that harmful contact resulted and that the plaintiffdid not consent.’ ” Wagner v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff'sOff., 453 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1102 (N.D. Ill. 2020)(quoting Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 319 F. Supp.2d 883, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2004)). He makes no suchshowing. Mr. Dorsey appears to base his battery claimon the officers’ “unfastening [of his] seatbelt against[his] will or consent.” (Second Am. Compl. [19] 38.) But this does not rise to the level of battery,as the unfastening of a seatbelt in this context isnot harmful nor offensive. Cf. Schroeder v. LufthansaGerman Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 622–23 (7th Cir. 1989)(affirming summary judgment on battery claim againstdefendant airline whose staff took plaintiff by thearm and fastened her seatbelt; this was not harmfulcontact). Aside from this, the only physical contactalleged by Dorsey is the officers’ removal of him fromhis vehicle, their handcuffing of him, and their seizinghis cell phone. None of these instances of conduct areharmful or offensive, given that each act was taken toeffectuate his detention, and “an arrest or investigatorystop necessarily carries with it the right to use somedegree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effectit.” See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.His assault claim is similarly flawed. Under Illinoislaw, such a claim requires an “allegation of areasonable apprehension of an imminent battery.”McNeil v. Carter, 318 Ill. App. 3d 939, 944, 742 N.E.2d1277, 1281 (3d Dist. 2001). Dorsey believes that theofficers’ threatened removal of him from his vehiclequalifies as assault, but again, the law allows for anofficer to make a reasonable threat of physical force toachieve compliance with the officer's lawful demand.Dorsey's refusal to exit the vehicle, in this context,privileges the officers’ threatening of force.Finally, the IIED claim is also barred. UnderIllinois law, to state an IIED claim, a plaintiff mustestablish (1) that the conduct was “truly extreme andoutrageous;” (2) that Defendants “intended to inflictsevere emotional distress or knew that there was atleast a high probability that his conduct would havecaused such distress”; and (3) “the conduct in factcaused severe emotional distress.” Sun v. Xu, 99 F.4th1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 2024). Nothing about Dorsey'sallegations suggests that the officers’ actions were“truly extreme and outrageous”; more importantly,Dorsey has not alleged that he suffered any actualemotional distress as a result of the incident.*11 Notably, Dorsey does not have an answer to anyof these arguments raised by Defendants. His briefin opposition focuses solely on arguments relatingto supplemental jurisdiction, not the underlyingchallenges to the merits of his claims. Dorsey's battery,assault, and IIED claims are dismissed.That leaves Dorsey's claim of trespass to chattels.Dorsey bases this claim on the allegation that “OfficerPonce[’s] destruction of my vehicle's interior (rippedcarpet and console)” constitutes trespass to chattelsunder Illinois law. (Second Am. Compl. [19] 37.)Under Illinois law, trespass to chattels by can becommitted by “intentionally (a) dispossessing anotherof the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with achattel in the possession of another.’ Kurowski v. RushSys. for Health, 683 F. Supp. 3d 836, 850 (N.D. Ill.2023). A “harm to the personal property or diminutionof its quality, condition, or value as a result of adefendant's use can result in liability.” Smith v. City ofChicago, 143 F. Supp. 3d 741, 761 (N.D. Ill. 2015)(cleaned up) (citation and internal quotation marksomitted).
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Dorsey appears to have stated a claim of trespass tochattels. He alleges that Officer Ponce, in executingthe search warrant, unnecessarily harmed his vehicle'sinterior. (Second Am. Compl. [19] 37.) Whilehe does not specifically allege that Ponce's actions“intermeddled” with his use of his vehicle, it isa fair inference, given the detailed allegations ofproperty damage that Dorsey does make. Officer Poncemay be entitled to state law immunity (as arguedin Defendants’ reply brief), or may be able to showthat his conduct is otherwise privileged. See, e.g.,Trover v. Oglesby, No. 3:18-CV-1464-DWD, 2024WL 1529799 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2024) (holding barred,under the Immunity Act, plaintiff's claim of trespassto chattels against arresting officers who performed aninventory search of his car). For now, however, thetrespass to chattels claim survives dismissal.CONCLUSIONThe motion to dismiss [22] is granted in part anddenied in part. Defendants are directed, within 21days, to file their answer to Plaintiff's claims underthe Fourth Amendment and his state law trespass tochattels claim. All other claims are dismissed.ENTER:All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3484962Footnotes1Defendants stylize this motion to dismiss as being “pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” (See generally Mot. [22].) Because Defendants challenge Mr. Dorsey's standing to bring some of hisclaims, the court understands this motion as also being brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), which allows formotions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2Shortly after this motion was filed, Dorsey filed a Third Amended Complaint, evidently in an attempt toaddress the deficiencies that Defendants raised in their motion to dismiss. Under Rule 15(a) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may only amend a pleading “once as a matter of course.” See Fed.R. Civ. P. 15(a). Future amendments can only be made “with the opposing party's written consent or thecourt's leave.” See id. Dorsey appears to have received neither. The Third Amended Complaint [31] istherefore stricken. Future amended pleadings will also be stricken unless Mr. Dorsey attests that he soughtand received the written consent of the opposing party, as required by Rule 15.3Dorsey claims that Ponce “deliberately ignored [his] request for a sergeant.” (Second Am. Compl. [19] 5.)It is not clear what he means by this, as he himself has alleged that a CPD sergeant arrived shortly afterhe requested one. (See id.).4The court suspects that many of these cases are the product of an artificial intelligence tool. For example,Dorsey cites to “State v. Slowikowski, Ohio 2003,” “U.S. v. Weaver, 9th Circuit, 2016,” and “Mackey v. Townof Allendale, 2021”—none of which the court was able to locate. While a pro se party is given a fair amountof procedural leeway, even an unrepresented litigant is expected to provide accurate citations to case law.See, e.g., Powhatan Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Skinger, No. 3:24 CV 874, 2025 WL 1559593, at *10 (E.D. Va. June 2,2025) (collecting cases). Dorsey is ordered to include, in all future filings, a traditional reporter or databasecitation for any cases he cites. Dorsey is warned, as well, that fabricated or hallucinated case citations infuture filings will result in sanctions, including an order striking the filing and possible dismissal of the lawsuit.5Dorsey's past encounter with the police, as alleged, constitutes a concrete injury in fact, caused byDefendants, that is redressable by a favorable court decision. He thus has standing to pursue damagesbased on harms that occurred in the past.6Dorsey characterizes this case as holding that an “injunction [is] proper where policy or practice posesongoing risk.” (Opp'n [25] at 2.) In fact, however, in Lyons, the Supreme Court reversed entry of an injunction
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10prohibiting police officers from using “chokeholds.” The Court held that the fact the individual plaintiff hadbeen illegally choked did not establish a real and immediate threat that it would happen again—meaningthat the federal court lacked jurisdiction to enter the injunction. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106 (holding thatthe plaintiff “has failed to demonstrate a case or controversy with the City that would justify the equitablerelief sought”).7Dorsey separately asks the court to acknowledge “Plaintiffs Beneficiary standing, and as Co Trustee oftrust RF 159 212 970 US Private Trust; governed under U.S. Constitution, Common Law, and EquityJurisprudence.” (Id.) This is nonsense—this matter does not involve a trust, and Dorsey does not explainwhat this phrase means. To the extent he intends this to be a claim, it is also dismissed.8Defendants do argue that each of the § 1983 claims must be dismissed because “the plaintiff alleges theofficers ‘failed’ to act under color of law,” negating an essential element of § 1983. (Mot. [22] at 4–5.) Dorsey'sSecond Amended Complaint does so allege, but context makes clear that the allegation was a mistake; andhe has corrected the error in his brief in opposition to this motion. (See generally Opp'n [25].) The courtdeclines to dismiss the complaint on this basis.9Dorsey asks the court to find that Defendants are barred from “claiming qualified immunity or lawfuljustification” under the unclean hands doctrine due to their failure to produce officer body camera footage.(Second Am. Compl. [19] at 5.) This argument is a non-starter. The sole authority he cites is PrecisionInstrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945), a patent law case from the 1940's thathas nothing to do with the circumstances here. The court declines to bar Defendants from asserting anyvalid defenses in this case, which remains at the pleading stage. The court has not set a discovery schedule,nor are any discovery motions before the court.10On this point, Dorsey cites to Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019), which he characterizes as holding that“causal connection exists if adverse action follows protected speech.” (Opp. [25] at 2.) This misstates Nieves.The Nieves court stated that it “is not enough to show that an official acted with a retaliatory motive and thatthe plaintiff was injured—the motive must cause the injury. Specifically, it must be a ‘but-for’ cause, meaningthat the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Id. at398–99. Dorsey makes no allegations supporting an inference of but-for causation.11To the extent that Dorsey intends to argue that the officers initiated the seizure in response to his priorlawsuits, that is not plausible. There is no basis in this complaint for an inference that Defendants (two ofthe more than 10,000 sworn CPD officers) were aware of Dorsey's litigation and chose to retaliate againsthim for this reason.12Dorsey claims that the “complaint alleges a direct nexus between Plaintiff's objections and Defendants’punitive conduct, satisfying notice pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.” (Opp'n [25] at 2.) This is not true. Asthe court explains here, the operative complaint raises an different theory of First Amendment retaliation,one that is premised on his video recording of the officers—not any verbal assertion of rights. (See SecondAm. Compl. [19] 11.)13In support of his failure to intervene claim, Dorsey cites, without analysis, to “Sanchez v. Dart, 2016.” Thiscase does not appear to exist; the court could not find any cases from 2016, in any jurisdiction, with thatcaption. There is a case from 2020, Sanchez v. Dart, No. 1:19-CV-4139, 2020 WL 2085005 (N.D. Ill. Apr.30, 2020), but that case deals with a prisoner who alleges that prison officials failed to adequately protecthim from assaults by other prisoners, and has no obvious application here.14Federal jurisdiction over these claims is proper under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.The court has original jurisdiction over Dorsey's § 1983 and § 1985 claims because they “aris[e] under”federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The state law claims arise out of the same set of underlying facts, sothe court has supplemental jurisdiction over them under § 1367. Defendants ask the court to relinquish
CORDARRO T. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. Officers CARLOS PONCE,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11jurisdiction over the state law claims, but such a request is premature, given that one of Dorsey's § 1983claims has, for now, survived the motion to dismiss.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access