culty, when his attention was called to their importance, in fixing the place of the disturbance and ripples to be removed, or in determining what was the substantial pitch needed to equalize the speeds of the stock and wire at that place. The immediate and successful use of the. pitch for this purpose by the owners of the then fastest machines and by the whole trade is convincing proof that one versed in paper making could find in Eibel’s specifications all he needed to know, to avail himself of the invention. Expressions quite as indefinite as “ high ” and “ substantial ” in describing an invention or discovery in patent specifications and claims have been recognized by this Court as sufficient. In Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, the claim sustained was for “ the manufacturing of fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temperature and pressure.” See also Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788, 794; Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 620, 629; Lawther v. Hamilton, 124 U. S. 1, 9; Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U. S. 403, 436; Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin, 245 U. S. 198, 205.
It is contended on behalf of the defendant that whether Barrett and Horne perceived the advantage of speeding up the stock to an equality with the wire, yet the necessary effect of their devices was to achieve that result and therefore their machine anticipated Eibel. In the first place we find no evidence that any pitch of the wire, used before Eibel, had brought about such a result as that sought by him, and in the second place if it had done so under unusual conditions, accidental results, not intended and not appreciated, do not constitute anticipation. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, 711; Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. Cowles Electric Co., 55 Fed. 301, 307; Andrews c. Carman, 13 Blatchf. 307, 323.
It is next objected that the alleged invention covers only a matter of degree in pitch which can not be the subject of a patent. The prior art showed the application