Eric v. Mitchel II v. Stellantis Financial Servs. (Sept. 18, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Eric V. Mitchel II v. Stellantis Financial Services
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Sept. 18, 2025
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Roderick C. Young (J.) (unanimous Court)
ERIC V. MITCHEL II, Plaintiff, v. STELLANTIS FINANCIAL..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2676569Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D. Virginia.ERIC V. MITCHEL II, Plaintiff,v.STELLANTIS FINANCIALSERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:24CV882 (RCY)|Filed 09/18/2025MEMORANDUM OPINIONRoderick C. Young United States District Judge*1 Pro se Plaintiff Eric V. Mitchel II (“Plaintiff” or “Mr.Mitchel”) brings this unlawful repossession action againstDefendants Stellantis Financial Services, Inc. (“Stellantis”),Richard Epps, P.C. (“Epps”), and Phil Rubin,1 Esq.(“Rubin,” collectively “Defendants”). This case is before theCourt on Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss pursuant toFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ECF No. 8. TheCourt dispenses with oral argument because the materialsbefore it adequately present the facts and legal contentions,and argument would not aid the decisional process. E.D. Va.Loc. Civ. R. 7(J). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants'Joint Motion to Dismiss will be granted.I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2Prior to August 2023, Plaintiff purchased a 2022 ToyotaTundra, with financing provided by Defendant Stellantis.See Compl. ¶¶ 4, 14; Compl. Ex. B at 44–45, ECF No.1-2; Compl. Ex. E at 67–68, ECF No. 1. In 2022, Plaintiffreceived a 1099-A,3 Acquisition or Abandonment of SecuredProperty, from Defendant Stellantis, and also received a1099-C,4 Cancellation of Debt, for calendar year 2023 fromDefendant Stellantis. Compl. Ex. E at 67–68. In January2024, Plaintiff reported that he was the victim of fraud, whichinvolved an individual impersonating a tow company. Compl. 14. As a result of this alleged fraudulent incident, Plaintiffinformed Defendant Stellantis that he was experiencingfinancial challenges. Id. 14. Thereafter, Defendant Eppsfiled a civil action in Hopewell Circuit Court, on behalf ofDefendant Stellantis, against Mr. Mitchel for defaulting on hisloan. See Compl. ¶¶ 13–14, 18.*2 On February 26, 2024, and again on June 20, 2024,Mr. Mitchel moved to dismiss Defendant Stellantis's statecourt complaint for improper venue. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. On July19, 2024, the Hopewell Circuit Court denied Mr. Mitchel'smotion and stayed the court proceedings until September 19,2024. Id. ¶¶ 22; Compl. Ex. B at 45. The stay was issuedto allow Mr. Mitchel to choose an arbitration organizationpursuant to the arbitration provision contained within theretail installment contract dated August 18, 2023. Compl.Ex. B at 45. In the event Mr. Mitchel properly commencedarbitration proceedings, the Hopewell Circuit Court wouldextend the stay by 180 days. Id.On September 12, 2024, Mr. Mitchel initiated arbitrationagainst Defendant Stellantis. Compl. Ex. B at 47–53. Later, onOctober 9, 2024, Defendant Stellantis repossessed Plaintiff'svehicle. Compl. 16. The next day on October 10, 2025,Plaintiff sent a negotiable instrument to Defendant Stellantis“to settle the account,” to which Defendants did not respond.Id. 18. That same day Plaintiff filed an EmergencyMotion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with theHopewell Circuit Court to prevent Defendants from sellingMr. Mitchel's vehicle. Id. 24–25. It does not appear that theHopewell Circuit Court ruled on the matter or held a hearing,however, on November 1, 2024, the Hopewell Circuit Courtgranted Defendant Stellantis's Motion for Entry of Nonsuit,dismissing Defendant Stellantis's case against Mr. Mitchel inits entirety. Id. ¶¶ 24– 26; see generally id.Following the dismissal of the Hopewell Circuit Court actionbrought by Defendants against Mr. Mitchel, Mr. Mitchel filedthis instant action.II. PROCEDURAL HISTORYPlaintiff filed his Complaint on November 13, 2024, in theCircuit Court of Prince George County. Not. Removal Ex.A at 4–205 [hereinafter Compl.], ECF No. 1. On December11, 2024, Defendants Stellantis and Rubin removed this caseto federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), based onPlaintiff's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim. Not.Removal 1, ECF No. 1. On December 18, 2024, Defendantsfiled a Joint Motion to Dismiss, Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 8,and Brief in Support thereof. Br. Supp., ECF No. 9. Plaintiff
ERIC V. MITCHEL II, Plaintiff, v. STELLANTIS FINANCIAL..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2filed his opposition to said motion on December 27, 2024,Resp. Opp'n, ECF No. 11, and Defendants filed their Replyon January 2, 2025. Reply, ECF No. 13.III. STANDARD OF REVIEW“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiencyof a complaint.” Megaro v. McCollum, 66 F.4th 151, 157(4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin,980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)). Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 8 only requires that a complaint set forth “ ‘a shortand plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader isentitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair noticeof what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ”Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The plaintiff'swell-pleaded factual allegations are assumed to be true, andthe complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to theplaintiff. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180(4th Cir. 2009) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)).*3 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “acomplaint must contain sufficient factual matter, acceptedas true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on itsface.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the courtto draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liablefor the misconduct alleged.” Id. (emphasis added) (citingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Notably here, a pro se complaintis “to be liberally construed”6 and, “however inartfullypleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formalpleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Butliberal construction does not mean overlooking the pleadingrequirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,”Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020),nor does it require the Court to discern the unexpressed intentof a plaintiff or take on “the improper role of an advocateseeking out the strongest arguments and most successfulstrategy for a party,” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). So, a pro se complaint “mustnevertheless set forth enough facts to state a claim.” Erwin v.FedEx Freight, Inc., 2023 WL 5959422, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept.13, 2023). “Labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitationof the elements,” and “naked assertions” without factualenhancement are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678.IV. DISCUSSIONPlaintiff brings the following nine claims predicated on thealleged wrongful repossession of Plaintiff's vehicle. Compl.¶¶ 43–79. Of the claims brought by Plaintiff, only oneclaim is based on federal law. See id. Plaintiff brings claimsagainst Defendants for wrongful repossession and violationof arbitration stay (Count I), breach of contract and arbitrationagreement (Count II), negligence and bad faith by DefendantEpps (Count III), violation of Virginia's Consumer ProtectionAct (“VCPA,” Count IV), improper action on charged-offaccount (Count V), intentional infliction of emotional distress(Count VI), failure to provide adequate notice of repossession(Count VII), violation of the Fair Debt Collection PracticesAct (“FDCPA,” Count VIII), and repeated violations ofconsumer protection laws (Count IX). Id.*4 In support of the instant Motion to Dismiss, Defendantslargely argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim undermany of the aforementioned counts because DefendantStellantis lawfully repossessed Plaintiff's vehicle afterPlaintiff defaulted. See Br. Supp. 7–17. Defendants alsohighlight that aside from Count III, there are no specificallegations brought against Defendant Epps, and that thereare no specific allegations brought against Defendant Rubinat all. Id. at 3 n.3; see generally Compl. Plaintiff disagreesand generally argues that Defendants unlawfully repossessedhis vehicle, in violation of the arbitration stay resulting in theaforementioned violations. See Resp. Opp'n 14–17.The Court will begin its analysis with the sole federalclaim raised by Plaintiff, Defendants' alleged violation of theFDCPA (Count VIII). Should the Court find that Plaintiff failsto state a federal claim, the Court will then determine whetherto exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining statelaw claims.A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the FederalDebt Collection Practices Act Against DefendantsDefendants argue that Defendant Stellantis did not violate theFDCPA because it had a present right to dispossess Plaintiffof his vehicle because Plaintiff was in default. Br. Supp. 16.The purpose of the FDCPA is to curtail “the abusive,deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debtcollectors. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a). To recover under the FDCPA,
ERIC V. MITCHEL II, Plaintiff, v. STELLANTIS FINANCIAL..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [ ]he has been the object ofcollection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) that thedefendant is a debt collector, as defined under the FDCPA,and (3) that the defendant has engaged in a prohibited actor omission.” Shelton v. Marshall, 724 F. Supp. 3d 532, 541(W.D. Va. 2024) (quoting Wynne v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 124 F. Supp.3d 734, 741 (E.D. Va. 2015)). The FDCPA provides a non-exhaustive list of acts that violate the statute. See 15 U.S.C.§ 1692f.In particular, a debt collector may not “[t]ak[e] or threaten[ ]to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession ordisablement of property if there is no present right topossession of the property claimed as collateral throughan enforceable security interest.” Id. § 1692f(6)(A). Putdifferently, “a repossession without judicial process violates§ 1692f(6)(A) unless the property is collateral under anenforceable security interest and the repossessor has a‘present right to possession’ of the property.” Richards v.PAR, Inc., 954 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2020). Whether a debtcollector has a “present right to possession” is a matter of statelaw. Id. at 966; see also Shue v. JMAC Distrib., LLC, 745 F.Supp. 3d 3, 6 (D. Mass. 2024) (noting that “[r]epossessionrights are governed by the relevant state's property andcontract law” because the FDCPA does not define what itmeans to have a “present right to possession” (first quotingNeathery v. Lucky 13 Recovery Inc., 2023 WL 7924149, at*3 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2023); and then Richards, 954 F.3d at968)).Defendants argue that while the FDCPA prohibits deceptiveor unfair practices, as outlined in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f,Defendant Stellantis's actions do not constitute deceptive oran unfair practice. Br. Supp. 16. Defendants argue that theFDCPA does not prohibit dispossession when creditors havea present right to repossess the vehicle, which DefendantStellantis did under Va Code Ann. § 8.9A-609. Id. at 16–17; Reply 5–6, 13. Defendants rebuff Plaintiff's contentionthat the stay in state court prevented Defendant Stellantisfrom repossessing Plaintiff's vehicle because § 8.9A-609explicitly allows repossession of secured collateral, after adefault, through judicial or non-judicial processes. Reply 5,13. Defendants also disclaim Plaintiff's negotiable instrument,and in doing so assert that it had no impact on DefendantStellantis's ability to repossess Plaintiff's vehicle under §8.9A-609. See Br. Supp. 17 n.13.*5 Plaintiff disagrees with Defendants' contention thatthey had a present right to possess Plaintiff's vehicle inlight of the stay in state court. Resp. Opp'n 16. Plaintiffargues that Defendant Stellantis's repossession in “defianceof an arbitration stay and statutory notice requirements7 isinherently unlawful.” Id. at 17.Neither party disputes the first two elements of a FDCPAclaim. See generally Br. Supp.; Resp. Opp'n; Reply. Thebriefing of both parties reflects their mutual understandingthat Mr. Mitchel has been the object of collection activity(namely, repossession) arising from debt he took on to financethe purchase of a vehicle. See id. Defendant Stellantis, whichextended financing services to Mr. Mitchel, has acted as adebt collector in its efforts to recoup collateral upon Mr.Mitchel's default. Br. Supp. at 2; Resp. Opp'n at 10 (allegingDefendants' violation of industry standards for fair debtcollection practices).Although Plaintiff does not explicitly state that he defaulted,his Complaint—even when construed in the light mostfavorable to him—demonstrates that he was in default at thetime his vehicle was repossessed based on Plaintiff's ownassertion that his account was “charged-off.” See Compl. ¶¶14, 17; see Cashion, 720 F.3d at 179 (“The IRS ... treats theForm 1099–C as a means for satisfying a reporting obligationand not as an instrument effectuating a discharge of debtor preventing a creditor from seeking payment on a debt.”);Grayson v. Westwood Buildings L.P., 859 S.E.2d 651, 678(Va. 2021) (“A ‘charge-off’ associated with a Form 1099-Cis merely an accounting entry that does not affect the legalobligation to pay the debt or evidence an intent to dischargethe debt.” (quoting 4 William D. Hawkland et al., UniformCommercial Code Series § 3-604:1 n.1 (2020)); Nicholasv. Synchrony Bank, 2023 WL 2474216, at *2 n.4 (W.D.Va. Mar. 13, 2023) (same)). Therefore, the only remainingissue is whether Defendants engaged in a “prohibited act oromission,” that is whether Defendants had a present right topossess the vehicle. See Shelton, 724 F. Supp. 3d at 541. In thismatter, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff failedto state a FDCPA claim because Defendants did not engagein a prohibited act when they seized Plaintiff's vehicle.The Court will first examine whether Defendant Stellantis'actions constituted a “prohibited act or omission” underVirginia State law. Should the Court find that DefendantStellantis had a present right to repossess the vehicle, itwill then assess whether that present right to possession isvoided by concurrent judicial proceedings. Lastly, the Courtwill determine whether Plaintiff's “negotiable instrument”affected Defendant Stellantis' rights.
ERIC V. MITCHEL II, Plaintiff, v. STELLANTIS FINANCIAL..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.41. Under Virginia State Law a “Present Right toPossession” Includes The Right To Repossess CollateralSo Long As Reposession Proceeds Without A Breach ofthe Peace*6 “Under the Uniform Commercial Code of Virginia,upon default a secured party may ‘take possession of thecollateral ... if it proceeds without breach of the peace.’ ” VivosAcquisitions, LLC v. Health Care Res. Network, LLC, 2022WL 995389, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2022) (quoting Va. CodeAnn. § 8.9A-609); Va. Code Ann. § 8.9A-609 (“After default,a secured party ... may take possession of the collateral; and ....A secured party may [take possession of the collateral] ...pursuant to judicial process; or ... without judicial process, ifit proceeds without breach of the peace.”); Goard v. CrownAuto, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 915, 920 (W.D. Va. 2016) (“[T]heVirginia Code ... clearly states that self-help repossession canonly proceed ‘without judicial process, if it proceeds withoutbreach of the peace.’ ” (first citing Va. Code Ann. § 8.9A-609;and then Universal Credit Co. v. Taylor, 180 S.E. 277 (Va.1935)).There is a general consensus among district courts, includingVirginia district courts, that a breach of the peace involves“force, violence, threats or fraud to obtain control” overproperty. Mahdavi v. NextGear Capital, Inc., 2015 WL1526538, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2015) (citing Wallace v.Chrysler Credit Corp., 743 F. Supp. 1228, 1232–33 (W.D.Va. 1990) (noting that “no Virginia cases precisely delineat[e]these rules ... [but] [t]he right to possession of chattels maybe exercised without recourse to the courts, provided this canbe done peaceably”)); see also Shue, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 7–8 (comparing cases involving oral objections, which do notconstitute a breach of the peace, with vehicles being towedwhile plaintiff is in the vehicle, which does constitute a breachof the peace); McCarthy v. First Credit Res., Inc., 702 F. Supp.3d 366, 369 (W.D. Pa. 2023) (“Although their findings vary,courts consistently look to the following factors to determineif there was a breach of the peace: the use of law enforcement;violence or threats of violence; trespass; verbal confrontation;and disturbance to third parties.” (quoting Rivera v. DealerFunding, LLC, 178 F. Supp. 3d 272, 279 (E.D. Pa. 2016)).A breach of the peace refers to conduct at or near thetime of the seizure of property. Wallace, 743 F. Supp. at1233. “[A]lmost all jurisdictions [have held] that the useof stealth in a self-help repossession is not a breach ofthe peace.” Id. Virginia is one such jurisdiction. See Pressv. Purks, 1997 WL 823549, at *1–2 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1997)(creditor's repossession of horse, without debtor's knowledge,from farm where debtor boarded the horse was proper and“without breach of the peace”). Likewise, courts have heldthat repossession of “movable collateral” from a public placeor from property owned by a third party cannot constitutea breach of the peace because the “debtor's real propertyinterest is not invaded.” Wallace, 743 F. Supp. at 1233 (citingEugene Mikolajczyk, Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code—A Modern Definition for anAncient Restriction, 82 Dick. L. Rev. 351, 362 (1997-1998)).As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not sufficiently allegeda FDCPA claim because Plaintiff has not disputed thatDefendants were authorized to dispossess Plaintiff of hisvehicle based on his default. Plaintiff also alleges no factsthat Defendants breached the peace when seizing Plaintiff'svehicle. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16; see generally Compl. Plaintiffmerely states that Defendants repossessed his vehicle but doesnot suggest that Defendants used “force, violence, threats orfraud to obtain control” at the time they seized the vehicle.Mahdavi, 2015 WL 1526538, at *4; see Wallace, 743 F. Supp.at 1233 (noting a breach of the peace refers to conduct at ornear the time the property was seized). Indeed, it is not clear,even viewing in the light more favorable to him, that Plaintiffeven possessed the vehicle at the time Defendants repossessedthe vehicle. See Compl. 14 (noting that Plaintiff had filed apolice report regarding an individual impersonating a towingcompany).2. Defendant Stellantis Was Not Prohibited FromRepossessing Plaintiff's Vehicle Despite Ongoing JudicialProceedings*7 Defendants argue that there was nothing to stopDefendant Stellantis from pursuing a judicial and nonjudicialremedy simultaneously. Br. Supp. 5, 13.Indeed, there is nothing preventing Defendants from pursuingrepossession pursuant to judicial process (i.e. via a lawsuit)or without judicial process (i.e. repossessing the vehicle usingself-help methods), see Phillips v. Ball & Hunt Enters., 933F. Supp. 1290, 1299 (W.D. Va. 1996) (“Courts that haveconsidered this issue overwhelmingly agree that a securedparty may pursue more than one remedy.”) (collecting cases),or pursuing those remedies simultaneously. See GlamorganCoal Corp. v. Bowen, 742 F. Supp. 308, 310–11 (W.D. Va.1990) (finding it appropriate for the creditor to pursue both amoney judgment and possession of property to satisfy debtor'sdebt, in part, because the creditor did not abuse their statutory
ERIC V. MITCHEL II, Plaintiff, v. STELLANTIS FINANCIAL..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5rights or harass the debtor); Vital Basics, Inc. v. Vertrue Inc.,515 F. Supp. 2d 170, 172–73 (D. Me. 2007).Although Defendants previously brought an action againstPlaintiff in state court exercising their right to take possessionpursuant to judicial process, see Va. Code Ann. § 8.9A-609,that did not prevent them from repossessing the vehiclewithout judicial process, so long as Defendants did notbreach the peace. Moreover, the Court has found no law, norhas Plaintiff offered any, to suggest that the state-imposedstay applied to the Defendants' ability to repossess thevehicle outside of the state judicial proceedings.8 Defendantsdismissed the state court proceedings against Plaintiff afterthey repossessed the vehicle, therefore there is no evidencethat Defendants harassed Plaintiff or abused their statutoryrights. See Compl. 19; Glamorgan Coal Corp., 742 F. Supp.at 310–11.3. Plaintiff's “Negotiable Instrument” is No SuchInstrument As A Matter of Law And Does Not InvalidateDefendant Stellantis's Right to RepossessionLastly, the “negotiable instrument,”9 Compl. Ex. C 54–55, ECF No. 1, provided by Plaintiff to Defendants doesnot qualify as such an instrument as a matter of law.A negotiable instrument is “an unconditional promise ororder to pay a fixed amount of money.” Va Code Ann.§ 8.3A-104(a) (emphasis added). A promise is a “writtenundertaking signed by the person undertaking to pay.” Va.Code Ann. § 8.3A-103(9) (emphasis added); see Daily v.White, 520 F. Supp. 3d 835, 846 (W.D. Va. 2021); see alsoVa. Code Ann. § 8.3A-401 (“A person is not liable on aninstrument unless (i) the person signed the instrument, or (ii)the person is represented by an agent or representative whosigned the instrument”). Here, the “negotiable instrument” isnot signed by Plaintiff, nor a representative. Therefore, anyquestion that Plaintiff's “negotiable instrument” invalidatedthe Defendants' right to repossess Plaintiff's vehicle failsbecause the document provided by Plaintiff is not a negotiableinstrument as a matter of law.B. The Court Will Decline to Exercise SupplementalJurisdiction Over Remaining State Law Claims (CountsI, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, and IX)*8 The Court now addresses the remainder of Plaintiff'sallegations against Defendants, for which Plaintiff cites nofederal basis. Thus, the Court construes them as state lawclaims.Federal district courts have supplemental jurisdiction overstate law claims when those claims “form part of the samecase or controversy” as a federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).Supplemental jurisdiction is not automatic, and district courtsmay decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over statelaw claims if the court has dismissed all claims overwhich it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).Supplemental jurisdiction is a discretionary doctrine anddistrict courts “enjoy a wide latitude in determining whetheror not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federalclaims have been extinguished.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). However, both the Fourth Circuitand the Supreme Court favor dismissing state law claims ifthe federal claims are extinguished prior to trial. United MineWorkers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“[I]fthe federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though notinsubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims shouldbe dismissed as well.”); Banks v. Gore, 738 F. App'x 766, 773(4th Cir. 2018) (“Generally, when a district court dismisses allfederal claims in the early stages of litigation, it should declineto exercise jurisdiction over any remaining pendent state lawclaims by dismissing those claims without prejudice.” (firstciting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; and then citing Carnigie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988))).When determining whether to exercise its discretion to retainjurisdiction, a court considers “convenience and fairnessto the parties, the existence of any underlying issuesof federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicialeconomy.” Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110. However, “whenall federal claims are dismissed early in the litigation, thejustifications behind pendent jurisdiction—‘considerations ofjudicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants’—aretypically absent” and weigh against exercising supplementaljurisdiction. Alexandria Resident Council, Inc. v. AlexandriaRedevelopment & Hous. Auth., 11 F. App'x 283, 287 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726).At this juncture, Plaintiff's singular federal claim hasbeen extinguished prior to trial, and the remaining claimsrely entirely upon Virginia state law. Therefore, theaforementioned factors uniformly favor dismissal. Theremaining counts do not directly involve federal policy andare entirely state law claims. Therefore, allowing a Virginiastate court to address state law matters “would best servejudicial economy.” Thornton v. Piedmont Reg'l Jail Auth.,2025 WL 888417, at *12 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2025). Moreover,this Court has not decided any disputed state law claims or
ERIC V. MITCHEL II, Plaintiff, v. STELLANTIS FINANCIAL..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6issued a scheduling order in this case. Given that FourthCircuit precedent “evince[s] a strong preference that statelaw issues be left to state courts in the absence of diversityor federal question jurisdiction,” the Court will declineto exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss theremaining counts without prejudice. Arrington v. City ofRaleigh, 369 F. App'x 420, 423–24 (4th Cir. 2010); Thornton,2025 WL 888417, at *12; Johnson v. Exeter Fin. LLC, 2024WL 4336615, at *4–5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2024).V. CONCLUSION*9 For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiff fails to statea federal claim under the FDCPA against Defendants. Thus,the Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as toCount VIII, with prejudice. Further, the Court will exercise itsdiscretion to dismiss the remaining state law claims, CountsI, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, and IX, without prejudice.An appropriate Order will accompany this MemorandumOpinion.Richmond, VirginiaAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2676569Footnotes1Defendants point out in their Joint Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff's Complaint misspellsMr. Rubin's name as “Ruben.” Br. Supp. 1 n.1, ECF No. 9. As Mr. Rubin's legal name is “Rubin” and not“Ruben,” the Court will employ the correct spelling throughout.2When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, theCourt “accept[s] as true the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations and views all facts and draws all reasonableinferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4thCir. 2009). Such a standard, however, does not require accepting any unreasonable inferences or a plaintiff'slegal conclusions. Id. Additionally, a court may consider any documents attached to the complaint. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011). Applying these standards,the Court construes the facts in the Complaint, including any attached documents, as follows.At the motion to dismiss stage, a court may consider the face of the complaint, documents attached to thecomplaint, documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are integral to the complaint and are authentic,and matters of public record subject to judicial notice. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180(4th Cir. 2009).3“Form 1099–A is filed when a creditor who ‘lends money secured by property’ acquires an interest in thesecurity ‘in full or partial satisfaction’ of the debt, or the creditor ‘has reason to know’ that the security ‘hasbeen abandoned.’ ” David v. Summit Community Bank, 2015 WL 12516770, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 15, 2015)(citing 26 U.S.C. § 6050J(a)).4“The IRS ... treats the Form 1099–C as a means for satisfying a reporting obligation and not as an instrumenteffectuating a discharge of debt or preventing a creditor from seeking payment on a debt.” F.D.I.C. v. Cashion,720 F.3d 169, 179 (4th Cir. 2013).5Plaintiff's original Complaint, along with service materials, are collectively filed at ECF No. 1–2. For ease ofreference, the Court provides pincites for appropriate document locations within this omnibus filing. For this
ERIC V. MITCHEL II, Plaintiff, v. STELLANTIS FINANCIAL..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7and other filings, the Court uses the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system, and not any conflictingpagination appearing on the originally filed document(s).6The Court notes that Erickson's liberal-construction requirement for pro se pleadings predates the advent ofartificial intelligence (“AI”) drafting tools, which are being used with increasing prevalence by pro se parties.See Powhatan Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Skinger, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104564, at *19–24 (E.D. Va. June 2, 2025)(collecting cases to illustrate the growing issue and accompanying concerns). Such tools both increase prose litigants' ability to draft voluminous pleadings and increase the odds that such pleadings contain fracturedassertions and “hallucinated” legal propositions, which courts must wade through in construing claims. Id.While its analysis does not ultimately turn on this point, the Court notes that many if not all of Plaintiff's legalcitations are inaccurate, suggesting to the Court that Plaintiff used AI to draft some, if not all, of Plaintiff'spleadings in this case.For example, Plaintiff cites to Smith v. Stellantis Financial Services, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-00512 (E.D. Va.2018), Compl. 29, however, the case number is actually for a § 1983 Bivens action in the case of Miller v.General District Court of the City of Richmond. In fact, every citation listed under Plaintiff's sub-heading “VII.Established Pattern of Unfair Practices by Stellantis” appears to be incorrect or fabricated. Compare Compl. 32 (listing Garcia v. Stellantis Fin. Servs., 4:21-cv-00354 (W.D. Tex. 2021), which yielded no Westlawresults), with Franklin v. Apple Inc., 569 F. Supp. 3d 465 (W.D. Tex. 2021) (the actual W.D. Tex. 2021 casewith case number 4:21-cv-354, which is an antitrust case).The Court respectfully proposes that the time may be near for an exception to the Erickson liberal-constructionrule, where a pro se individual relies on AI to draft pleadings and thus blurs the line between what is a goodfaith pro se assertion of an actionable claim and what is a computer-generated morass that only serves towaste court time and resources.7To the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint by way of briefing to add an additional FDCPA claimbeyond the scope of his Complaint, regarding notice, see Compl. ¶¶ 68–73, he is barred from doing so viabriefing. Hurst v. District of Columbia, 681 F. App'x 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Car Carriers, Inc. v.Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amendedby the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).8Neither case that Plaintiff cites, Russell v. Absolute Collection Services, Inc., 763 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2014)or Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 741 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2014) stand for Plaintiff's assertion—thatrepossession is unlawful when conducted “in defiance of an arbitration stay”—indeed, neither case mentionsarbitration or a judicial stay. Resp. Opp'n 17 n.219Although the parties did not brief the issue, a “negotiable instrument” is defined as:an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other chargesdescribed in the promise or order, if it:(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to doany act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking orpower to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or power to the holderto confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended
ERIC V. MITCHEL II, Plaintiff, v. STELLANTIS FINANCIAL..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8for the advantage or protection of an obligor, (iv) a term that specifies the law that governs the promise ororder, or (v) an undertaking to resolve in a specified forum a dispute concerning the promise or order.Va. Code Ann. § 8.3A-104(a).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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