Estate of Downing v. Brown, No. 25-14133 (11th Cir. May 20, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
ESTATE OF ERNEST DOWNING, SR. v. DWAYNE BROWN
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
11th Circuit
Decided
May 20, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Brasher (Circuit Judge); Abudu (Circuit Judge); Anderson (Circuit Judge)
Opinion
Per curiam
NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-14133 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ ESTATE OF ERNEST DOWNING, SR., Plaintiff, RAQUEL DOWNING, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus DWAYNE BROWN, Driver, Defendant-Appellee, DAVITA, INC., et al., Defendants. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cv-02909-WMR ____________________ Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. USCA11 Case: 25-14133 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 05/20/2026 Page: 1 of 8
2 Opinion of the Court 25-14133 PER CURIAM: Raquel Downing, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of her complaint for lack of standing. She argues that the district court abused its discretion when it took judicial notice of documents from outside the record without giv-ing her prior notice or an opportunity to respond before dismissing her complaint. After careful review, we affirm. I. Downing filed a complaint in federal district court on behalf of the estate of her father, Ernest Downing, naming several of his caregivers and medical providers as defendants. The complaint al-leged causes of action under Georgia state law, including wrongful death, negligence, vicarious liability, and corporate negligence. In an Order to Show Cause, the district court noted that, to bring a wrongful death claim under Georgia law, the action must be brought by “[t]he surviving spouse or, if there is no surviving spouse, a child or children.” Doc. 12 at 1 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 51-4-2(a)). And to bring a personal injury claim on behalf of a vic-tim under Georgia tort law, the action must be brought by the “personal representative of the deceased plaintiff.” Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 9-2-41). To assure itself that Downing had standing to bring the claims, the district court ordered her “to show cause that she has been appointed as the administrator or executor of” her fa-ther’s estate. Id. at 2. USCA11 Case: 25-14133 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 05/20/2026 Page: 2 of 8
25-14133 Opinion of the Court 3 Downing responded to the Order, arguing that she has standing to pursue a wrongful death claim under section 51-4-2 be-cause “[t]here is no lawful surviving spouse.” Doc. 14 at 1. She claimed that her father’s marriage to Angela Braithewaite-Bussey was invalid and that the probate court’s validation of the marriage “deprive[d] [her] of her rights as a legal heir.” Id. at 3. She further requested that the district court refer the matter to the Department of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of State, and various federal and state law enforcement agencies for investigation. Downing did not con-tend that she was the administrator or executor of her father’s es-tate, but she did state that, on account of the facts discussed above, she “has fully explained the circumstances that prevented her ap-pointment as Administrator under [section] 9-2-41.” Id. at 5. Ac-cordingly, she requested “that the Court accept [her] Response as sufficient and allow [the] matter to proceed on its merits.” Id. The district court dismissed Downing’s complaint sua sponte for lack of standing. It reasoned that Downing could not bring the claims under Georgia law because her father had a surviving spouse (precluding Downing from bringing the wrongful death claim under section 51-4-2(a)) and Downing was not the executor of her father’s estate (precluding her from bringing the tort claims under section 9-2-41). To reach this conclusion, the district judge took judicial notice of two exhibits from a related case filed by Downing (over which the district judge presided), and he attached those exhibits to his order. The two exhibits included a copy of Mr. Downing’s and Mrs. Brathwaite-Bussey’s marriage certificate and license, and a copy of the Probate Court of Fulton County’s order USCA11 Case: 25-14133 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 05/20/2026 Page: 3 of 8
4 Opinion of the Court 25-14133 recognizing Brathwaite-Bussey as Mr. Downing’s surviving spouse and appointing Luanne Bonnie as the temporary administrator of his estate. Downing appealed. II. We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of standing de novo. Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006)). We review “a district court’s decision to take judicial notice of a fact for abuse of discretion.” Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Lodge v. Kondaur Cap. Corp., 750 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2014)). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States ex rel. Sedona Part-ners LLC v. Able Moving & Storage Inc., 146 F.4th 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). III. Downing contends that the district court’s dismissal of her complaint for lack of standing improperly relied on extra-record materials and violated her due process rights. For the following rea-sons, we reject these claims. First, Downing’s argument is supported almost exclusively by fabricated legal authorities. Throughout her appellate brief, USCA11 Case: 25-14133 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 05/20/2026 Page: 4 of 8
25-14133 Opinion of the Court 5 Downing relies on precedents that do not exist. For example, she quotes United States v. Jones, 29 F.4th 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2022), as providing that “[C]ourts must confine themselves to the record de-veloped in the proceeding before them.” Neither that precedent nor the quoted text exists in any of this Court’s precedents in any form. She also provides seemingly fake quotations from real prec-edents. For example, she says our real decision in In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2003), includes the holding that “Due process requires that a party be given notice and an opportunity to respond before a court takes adverse action based on disputed factual matters.” But that precedent addresses service of process and does not include anything like the alleged quotation. Although we give liberal construction to the filings of pro se litigants, “we nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002). We need not consider Downing’s argument to the extent it is based on fictitious authorities. Second, even considering Downing’s arguments, the district court properly reviewed Downing’s standing to bring the lawsuit before analyzing the underlying merits of her claims. Standing pre-sents a threshold question of subject matter jurisdiction and “must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party’s claims.” Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). “[A] federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lack-ing.” Id. (quoting Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 509 (11th Cir. 1999)). The district court fulfilled its duty to assure USCA11 Case: 25-14133 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 05/20/2026 Page: 5 of 8
6 Opinion of the Court 25-14133 itself that it had jurisdiction by conducting its sua sponte standing inquiry, and we affirm its decision to do so. Next, in conducting its standing analysis, the district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of relevant facts. Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence “provides for taking judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dis-pute because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be ques-tioned.” Bryant v. Avado Brand, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). A court may take “notice of another court’s order for the limited purpose of recognizing the judicial act that the order repre-sents or the subject matter of the litigation and related filings.” In re Delta Res., Inc., 54 F.3d 722, 725 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation modi-fied). Here, the district court took judicial notice of facts that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2)—pub-licly available court filings memorializing the “judicial act[s]” of a state court, In re Delta Res., Inc., 54 F.3d at 725. To determine that Downing’s father was married to Brathwaite-Bussey, the district court took judicial notice of an exemplified copy of the couple’s marriage license and certificate. And to conclude that Downing was not the administrator of her father’s estate, the district court referred to the Fulton County Probate Court’s order appointing Luanne Bonnie to that role. These records had already been filed as exhibits in another case pending before the same district judge. USCA11 Case: 25-14133 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 05/20/2026 Page: 6 of 8
25-14133 Opinion of the Court 7 See United States v. Glover, 179 F.3d 1300, 1302 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999) (“a court may take judicial notice of its own records . . . .”). Finally, we reject Downing’s contention that she was denied an adequate opportunity to be heard. Although it is true that “[i]f the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is . . . entitled to be heard,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(e), we conclude that Downing had the chance to do so here. See Turner v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 991 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the opportunity to reopen the case provided sufficient oppor-tunity to be heard). The district court dismissed Downing’s com-plaint without prejudice, and she could have moved to reopen un-der Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (providing that a motion to alter or to amend the judgment may be filed within 28 days after judgment is entered); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (setting forth the grounds upon which a district court may relieve a party from a final judgment, including “mistake” or “inad-vertence”). Because Downing could have challenged the propriety of taking judicial notice by moving to reopen, we conclude that she had the opportunity to be heard under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(e). IV. For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal of Downing’s complaint is AFFIRMED. Separately, although we liberally construe pro se pleadings, pro se litigants are still required to conform to procedural rules, Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Loren, USCA11 Case: 25-14133 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 05/20/2026 Page: 7 of 8
8 Opinion of the Court 25-14133 309 F.3d at 1304), which include the duty of candor to the court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). By filing an appellate brief replete with ficti-tious cases and made-up quotations, we conclude that Downing violated this obligation. Accordingly, we strike those portions of her brief containing fabricated legal authorities as improper. USCA11 Case: 25-14133 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 05/20/2026 Page: 8 of 8
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