ing the subpoena duces tecum issued to appellants. On March 18, 1976, the court directed the defendants to show cause in writing, on or before March 29, 1976, why the FTC’s petition should not be granted. Twice the court extended the March 29 deadline at appellants’ behest — to April 28, 1976, and May 28, 1976, respectively.
Appellants failed to respond to the court’s order, and consequently, on September 1, 1976, the court directed appellants to show cause why a default judgment should not be entered against them. Appellants filed a response to the court’s September 2 order, but the district court found it meritless and entered a default judgment on September 23,1976. On December 7, 1976, the district court denied a motion by appellants for a new trial or an amendment of the court’s earlier judgment.
This appeal presents a single issue: whether or not the district court abused its discretion in entering a default judgment against appellants and in refusing to alter that judgment or grant a new trial.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure commit the entry of a default judgment against a party to the sound discretion of the trial court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2);
Provident Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gorsuch, 323 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950, 84 S.Ct. 966, 11 L.Ed.2d 970 (1964); C. Wright,
Law of Federal Courts § 98, at 439 (1970). Federal district courts possess a similar discretion in ruling on motions to set aside a default judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c);
McGrady v. D’Andrea Elec., Inc., 434 F.2d 1000, 1001 (5th Cir. 1970); C. Wright,
Law of Federal Courts § 98, at 439 (1970), or to grant a new trial, Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a);
Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 312 F.2d 655, 659-60 (8th Cir. 1963).
Although default judgments are not favored by the law, the record does not establish that the district court acted improperly in entering a default judgment or in refusing to set that judgment aside. None of the excuses set forth for this failure appear substantial,2 and the district court’s reasons for its decision are fully justified.3 Accordingly, we affirm.4
2
These reasons were summarized in appellants’ brief at 6, as follows: First, that substantial legal research of a law student being relied on by defendants “has been inexplicably mislaid and has not been found despite diligent efforts being made by the personnel in the law firm of Levy & Craig.” Second, that Packers Brand Meats, Inc., is not presently doing business and has been unable to finance additional legal research. Third, that there are “meritorious defenses” to the petition which will be proven by discovery. Fourth, that John Cuezze has been unavailable to consult with his counsel because of a temporary change of residence from Kansas City, Missouri, to Springfield, Missouri. Fifth, that defendants’ counsel stated that he had not had time to . prepare a response because he had been preparing for an appearance of John Cuezze before a Federal Grand Jury on September 14, 1976.
3
The court succinctly listed its reasons for dismissal:
4
Appellants’ jurisdictional argument relating to the merits — that its activities are wholly intrastate, and if otherwise, that provisions of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 and 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) exempt appellants from FTC jurisdiction — has been largely undercut by our rejection of similar arguments made by a simi*11larly-situated Kansas City meat packer resisting an FTC subpoena in Blue Ribbon Quality Meats v. Federal Trade Commission, 560 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1977).