Foster v. Publishing, No. 2:25-cv-545-RAH-JTA (Oct. 29, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Ronald H. Foster v. Author Success Publishing, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Oct. 29, 2025
Majority
Jerusha T. Adams (J.) (unanimous Court)
RONALD H. FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. AUTHOR SUCCESS..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3022296Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, M.D.Alabama, Northern Division.RONALD H. FOSTER, Plaintiff,v.AUTHOR SUCCESS PUBLISHING,MARK ANDERSON, MICHAELA STONE,EMILY ROSE, ECHO GLOBAL LLC, andKHURRAM Y. KHAN, individually and asorganizer of Echo Global LLC, Defendants.CASE NO. 2:25-cv-545-RAH-JTA|Filed 10/29/2025Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsRonald H. Foster, Troy, AL, Pro Se.Khurram Y. Khan, Philadelphia, PA, Pro Se.MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERJERUSHA T. ADAMS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATEJUDGE*1 Before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Ronald H. Foster'smotions for clarification, reconsideration, and assistance ofcounsel. (Doc. No. 55.) For the reasons stated below, themotions are due to be denied. Further, Plaintiff will berequired to show cause why he should not be found inviolation of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureand why he should not be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 andfor violating this court's orders.I. DISCUSSIONA. Motion for AssistancePlaintiff argues the complexity of this case requires assistanceof counsel. (Doc. No. 55 at 3.) Plaintiff's amended complaintalleges1 Defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme relatedto a publishing contract. (Doc. No. 26.) Specifically, Plaintiffalleges Defendants fraudulently represented they wouldrelease $300,000.00 in publishing royalties they were holdingfor him pursuant to a contract to publish books he authored,but only on condition that he first send sums of $18,199.00and $6,999.00 they claimed he owed for compliance feesand pursuant to fictitious court orders. (Id.) Defendantsallegedly have yet to release the royalties to Plaintiff, despitePlaintiff's payments in compliance with their demands. (Id.)Meanwhile, Defendants allegedly continue to distribute andcollect royalties on Plaintiff's copyrighted works. (Id.)While litigation of Plaintiff's claims may be complex, thiscase is not more complex than most cases litigated bypro se litigants. Plaintiff is not indigent and does not seekcourt-appointed counsel in the traditional sense. Rather, heseeks the court's assistance in “facilitating representation”and “securing representation by facilitating contact withcounsel at [his own] expense.” (Doc. No. 55 at 3–4.) He alsorequests an order “encourag[ing] local counsel to considerrepresentation.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff cites no legal basis forthe judicial assistance he requests in obtaining counsel.Pursuant to its duties to remain impartial, the court will notrecommend attorneys, assist the parties in obtaining privatelegal representation, encourage or discourage counsel fromrepresenting any party, or assist any party in communicatingwith counsel or potential counsel.2 Accordingly, Plaintiff'srequest for assistance in procuring legal counsel is due to bedenied.Plaintiff also seeks the court's assistance in harnessingexecutive branch agencies to pursue criminal investigationsagainst Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff requests referralof this matter for criminal proceedings or, alternatively,“guidance or contact information for the United StatesAttorney's Office, the Department of Justice, or the FederalBureau of Investigation so that his evidence may be reviewedby the proper authorities.” (Doc. No. 55 at 2.) As animpartial, independent branch of government, the court hasno authority to direct executive branch agencies or officialsto investigate crimes or refer matters (other than criminalcontempt of court) to executive agencies for prosecution.Fed. R. Crim. P. 42; Lee v. Smithart, No. 2:23-cv-523-MHT-CSC, 2023 WL 9442571, at *1 n.2 (M.D. Ala. Dec.
RONALD H. FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. AUTHOR SUCCESS..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.220, 2023) (“Although [the plaintiff] does not specify thetype of investigation he seeks, notably, a court has noauthority to act as a prosecutorial entity and thus is withoutjurisdiction to refer any defendant to a federal agency forcriminal investigation or prosecution.” (citing United Statesv. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000)), report andrecommendation adopted, No. 2:23-cv-523-MHT, 2024 WL329136 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2024); see also Terry v. Desautels,No. 2:24-CV-727-RAH-JTA, 2025 WL 2089310, at *7 &n.23 (M.D. Ala. July 24, 2025) (explaining individuals' lackof judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of othersand collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted,No. 2:24-CV-00727-RAH, 2025 WL 2375145 (M.D. Ala.Aug. 14, 2025). Therefore, the court will not refer thismatter for criminal investigation or prosecution. Nor willthe court provide guidance to Plaintiff regarding the same.Contact information for executive branch agencies is publiclyavailable.B. Motion for Clarification*2 Plaintiff seeks “clarification regarding default procedureunder Rule 55” and “seeks the court's guidance as to whethersimultaneous filings are permissible or whether the [c]ourtprefers sequential submission.” (Doc. No. 55 at 3.) “Thecourt is not [Plaintiff's] attorney and cannot provide legaladvice,” even to pro se litigants. Hammond v. Strickland,No. 1:24-CV-395-ECM-JTA, 2025 WL 1021482, at *2 &n.5 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 27, 2025) (citations omitted), report andrecommendation adopted, No. 1:24-CV-395-ECM, 2025 WL1021475 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2025). Hence, the court will notguide or advise Plaintiff regarding the proper procedures forpursuing default judgment.C. Motion for ReconsiderationPlaintiff expresses frustration with previous orders decliningto consider his evidence and render a decision on the meritsof his claims. (Doc. No. 55 at 1.) All civil lawsuits beforethis court must proceed in accordance with the Federal Rulesof Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the United StatesDistrict Court for the Middle District of Alabama.3 This caseis early in the procedural process. After being served witha summons and a copy of the complaint, Defendants willbe allowed a period of time to file an answer or motion todismiss in accordance with Rule 12 of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure. If the court rules in Plaintiff's favor on anyRule 12 motion to dismiss, or if Defendants answer withoutmoving to dismiss, the court will direct the parties to meetand formulate a proposed schedule for discovery and thedisposition of this case, and the court will enter a schedulingorder. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 & 26(f). The parties are thenentitled to a period of discovery. Following discovery, theparties will be given a deadline to file dispositive motions e.g., motions for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P.56. After the court rules on any such motions, and if any ofPlaintiff's claims remain pending, a pretrial hearing will beheld in advance of a trial. In other words, this case has notyet reached a posture at which the court may consider andresolve claims on the merits. Therefore, the undersigned willnot reconsider its prior orders and recommendations decliningto prematurely address the merits of Plaintiff's claims.Plaintiff requests the court reconsider certain statements in anorder entered September 23, 2025. There, the court pointedout that, in a previous motion, Plaintiff improperly attributeda quote to S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2005) andcited Smyth for a proposition it did not support. In his previousmotion, Plaintiff's exact words were:Plaintiff has already moved for defaultjudgment against ASP, which remainspending. Defendant Khan's “Answer”merely attempts to re-litigate issuesalready established by ASP's defaultand does not deny the core facts.Where a corporate officer sharesidentical interests with the corporateentity and has notice, the EleventhCircuit recognizes that he may bebound by the entity's default. Sec.& Exch. Comm'n v. Smyth, 420 F.3d1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) (holdingthat default judgment against onedefendant may extend to others“where they are similarly situatedand have notice”).*3 (Doc. No. 52 at 4 (emphasis added).)Regarding Plaintiff's reliance on Smyth, the court stated:Smyth does not contain the quotePlaintiff attributes to it. Nor does itotherwise support Plaintiff's assertionthat corporate officer defendants who
RONALD H. FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. AUTHOR SUCCESS..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3have appeared are bound by entryof default against corporate entitydefendants who have not.(Doc. No. 54 at 2–3 n.3.)The court went on to warn Plaintiff of the potentialconsequences of misrepresenting legal authorities to thecourt:Plaintiff is expressly warned sucherrors in a filed document maysubject the filer to Rule 11 sanctions.Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), (c). On thechance such errors are the byproductof using artificial intelligence as a legalresearch and drafting tool, Plaintiffis expressly warned reliance onartificial intelligence is no defense tosanctions. Plaintiff has an independentobligation to verify all citations heuses are valid, ensure the materialshe cites support the propositions forwhich they are cited, and accuratelydescribe the information in the citedmaterial. See id.4(Doc. No. 55 at 2–3 n.3.)Plaintiff now contends he merely “paraphrased Smythincorrectly” in reliance on “a longstanding principle”established by Supreme Court precedent holding “it wouldbe ‘incongruous and illegal’ to permit inconsistent outcomesbetween defaulting and nondefaulting defendants in the sameaction.” (Doc. No. 55 at 2.) The court will not wastetime peeling back and examining all the layers of duplicitycontained in just that one assertion by Plaintiff. It is enoughto point out that (1) falsely attributing a convenient quoteto Smyth is not the same as incorrectly paraphrasing Smythand (2) Smyth has nothing whatsoever to do with inconsistentoutcomes between defaulting and nondefaulting defendants.Therefore, the court will not grant Plaintiff's request toreconsider the portion of its September 23, 2025 Orderdiscussing Plaintiff's flawed citation to Smyth and warninghim not to repeat his misconduct. (Doc. No. 54 at 2–3 at n.3.)Plaintiff now continues his deceptive characterization ofSmyth by falsely attributing another quote to it and doublingdown on using it to support arguments to which it has no realrelevance.5 Specifically, Plaintiff states:The Eleventh Circuit has consistently applied thiscommon-sense rule, reaffirming that while defaultjudgments ordinarily do not bind non-defaultingdefendants, an exception exists “in cases where thedefendants are similarly situated, such that it would beillogical or unfair to require the plaintiff to prove the samecase multiple times.” Smyth, 420 F.3d at 1234; see also GulfCoast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Elecs. Importers, Inc., 740 F.2d1499, 1512 (11th Cir. 1984);6 Farley v. Country Coach,Inc., 403 F. App'x 397, 401 (11th Cir. 2010).7*4 (Doc. No. 55 at 2.)Nowhere does Smyth contain a quote anything like the onePlaintiff attributes to it (specifically, the following quote: “incases where the defendants are similarly situated, such that itwould be illogical or unfair to require the plaintiff to provethe same case multiple times”). Plaintiff's attribution of thatquote to Smyth is no mere failure to properly paraphrase orquote Smyth. It is an outright fabrication. Smyth has nothingto do with inconsistent judgments between defaulting andnondefaulting defendants, exceptions to rules against defaultjudgments binding nondefaulting defendants, attributionof default judgments to similarly-situated defendants, orunfairness to plaintiffs who must prove the same casemultiple times. Hence, there is no credible possibility Plaintiffaccidentally inserted quotation marks around something heintended merely as an accurate paraphrase of a statement inSmyth. Furthermore, the court can find no evidence Plaintiffmistakenly attributed to Smyth a real quote from some othercase.8The court finds Plaintiff violated its September 23, 2025orders (Docs. No. 53, 54) by continuing to provide falsequotes and citations. Further, pursuant to Rule 11(c) of theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure,9 Plaintiff will be ordered toshow cause why he has not violated Rule 11(b) by continuingto provide fabricated quotes and citations to support hisarguments. He shall also be required to show cause why heshould not be sanctioned for violating Rule 11(b) and thiscourt's orders.
RONALD H. FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. AUTHOR SUCCESS..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4II. CONCLUSION*5 Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:1. Plaintiff's motion for clarification (Doc. No. 55) isDENIED.2. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Doc. No. 55) isDENIED.3. Plaintiff's motion for assistance of counsel (Doc. No. 55)is DENIED.4. On or before November 18, 2025, Plaintiff shall SHOWCAUSE (1) why he has not violated Rule 11(b) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by continuingto provide misleading and fabricated quotes and casecitations and (2) why the court should not sanction himfor violating Rule 11 and the court's September 23, 2025court orders (Docs. No. 53, 54).Failure to comply with this order will result insanctions, which may include monetary sanctions ora recommendation of dismissal of this action with orwithout prejudice. Further use of fabricated or misleadingquotations or citations may result in a recommendation ofdismissal with prejudice.DONE this 29th day of October, 2025.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3022296Footnotes1The court is merely summarizing Plaintiff's detailed allegations. At this stage of litigation, his allegations havenot been proven as a matter of law.2Plaintiff is ADVISED that the court's website provides important information for litigants who are proceedingpro se. Plaintiff should review the section entitled “Representing Yourself in Court” on the court's website(https://www.almd.uscourts.gov). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules for the Middle Districtof Alabama, and forms/instructions are also available.3The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle Districtof Alabama may be found on the court's website at https://www.almd.uscourts.gov/representing-yourself.They may also be found at https://www.almd.uscourts.gov/about/rules-orders-procedures.4Smyth was not the only misleading citation for which the court castigated Plaintiff on September 23, 2025.(See Doc. No. 53 at 1–4, nn. 2, 4, 6 (discussing multiple misleading citations and including a similar warningnot to repeat the errors).)5As of the date of this order, neither default nor default judgment have been entered against any Defendant.6Gulf Coast, 740 F.2d 1499, does not support Plaintiff's underlying argument. In Gulf Coast, the court foundthat, despite serious misconduct by the defaulting defendant, “[i]t would be incongruous and unfair to allow[the plaintiff] to collect a half million dollars from [the defaulting defendant] on a contract that,” at trial againsta nondefaulting codefendant, “a jury found was breached by [the plaintiff].” 740 F.2d at 1512.7The court has been unable to locate the Eleventh Circuit Farley case Plaintiff cites. When the court conductedresearch to determine if the opinion may be a real one issued by some other court in the nation, it found aSixth Circuit case with the same name and an eerily similar citation: Farley v. Country Coach Inc., 403 F.App'x 973 (6th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Farley has nothing to do with defaultjudgments.
RONALD H. FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. AUTHOR SUCCESS..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.58The court notes Plaintiff is a published author and presumably knows how to correctly use quotation marks.Nevertheless, the court investigated to determine whether Plaintiff mistakenly used quotation marks forparaphrased material or mistakenly attributed to Smyth an exact or paraphrased quote from some other case.The quote Plaintiff attributed to Smyth does not appear in any case cited in his motion. Using Westlaw's onlineresearch tools, the court could not even find the quote in any other opinion from any federal or state court inthe nation. The court also unsuccessfully attempted to find a similar (but not exact) quote in an opinion froma state or federal court anywhere in the United States.9Rule 11(c) requires the offending party be allowed “a reasonable opportunity to respond” prior to a finding ofa Rule 11(b) violation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). Rule 11 also provides that, prior to finding a Rule 11 violationon its own motion, “the court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conduct specificallydescribed in the order has not violated Rule 11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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