Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-177-H (2026)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
James Wesley Hendrix (J.) (unanimous Court)
Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 81679Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Abilene Division.Rene GARIBAY-ROBLEDO, Petitioner,v.Kristi NOEM, et al., Respondents.No. 1:25-CV-177-H|Signed January 9, 2026Attorneys and Law FirmsJohn Michael Bray, The Law Office of John M. Bray PLLC,Dallas, TX, for Petitioner.Ann Cruce-Haag-Doj, DOJ-United States Attorney's Office,Lubbock, TX, for Respondents.ORDERJAMES WESLEY HENDRIX, UNITED STATESDISTRICT JUDGE*1 Rene Garibay-Robledo has lived in the United Statesillegally for over 30 years. In early 2025, he was arrested forpossessing a firearm as an illegal alien and later placed inimmigration detention pending removal. He has not receiveda bond hearing because of the Board of Immigration Appeals'decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216(BIA 2025), which held that “applicants for admission” mustbe detained without bond under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) of theINA. He now petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus,alleging that his detention without bond violates the INA, theDue Process Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act.Dkt. No. 20.But his argument fails on multiple levels. First, it flatlycontradicts the statute's plain language. As an “[a]n alienpresent in the United States who has not been admitted,”he is an “applicant for admission” subject to Section1225's mandatory-detention provision. Second, the historyof legislative changes confirms this result. Previously, alienswho entered illegally without inspection received more rightsthan aliens who entered lawfully. By defining “applicantfor admission” to include all aliens who have not beenadmitted and mandating detention for this category, Congresseliminated the prior incentives to enter illegally. Finally,common sense supports this conclusion. The law, in Garibay-Robledo's reading, would mandate detention for aliens wholawfully apply for admission, are caught at or near the border,or seek admission after entering illegally—while aliens whoare able to enter illegally and remain undetected for yearsare entitled to potential release after being caught. TheINA, unsurprisingly, does not bestow heightened proceduralprotections to illegal aliens based on their stealth andimpenitence.As an “applicant for admission,” Garibay-Robledo must bedetained without bond under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Hisdue process claim—whether substantive or procedural—fails,too. Finally, he lacks entitlement to his requested relief underthe APA. Accordingly, the corrected petition (Dkt. No. 20) isdenied.1. BackgroundIn 1994, Garibay-Robledo illegally crossed into the UnitedStates near Laredo, Texas. Dkt. No. 12 at 8. Nearly thirty yearslater, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)detained Garibay-Robledo without bond after he was indictedfor possessing a firearm in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).1 Dkt. No. 20 38. He also has a prior felony theftconviction from 2000. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2. Garibay-Robledowas soon placed into removal proceedings with a Notice toAppear. Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 29–30. The NTA charged him withremovability as an alien “present in the United States withoutbeing admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United Statesat any time or place other than as designated by the AttorneyGeneral.” Dkt. No. 12 at 8; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).*2 While detained, Garibay-Robledo challenged ICE'scustody determination—including its decision that he must bedetained without bond—before an immigration judge. Dkt.No. 20 2. The IJ found that he lacked jurisdiction to considerGaribay-Robledo's bond request. Id. This denial was based onthe Board of Immigration Appeals' recent opinion in Matterof Yajure Hurtado, holding that aliens present in the UnitedStates without admission must be detained without bondunder Section 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA for the duration oftheir removal proceedings. 29 I. & N. Dec. at 220. Garibay-Robledo did not appeal. Dkt. No. 11 at 7–8.Instead, Garibay-Robledo filed a petition for a writ of habeascorpus. Dkt. No. 1. After the Court repeatedly noted that
Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2the petition's arguments relied on a non-existent Fifth Circuitcase, Dkt. Nos. 5; 9; 14, Garibay-Robledo moved for leaveto file a corrected petition, Dkt. Nos. 16; 16-1. The Courtgranted the motion. Dkt. No. 17 at 1. The corrected petitionstates three claims for relief. First, Garibay-Robledo allegesthat his detention without bond violates the INA. Dkt. No.20 ¶¶ 23–33. In Garibay-Robledo's view, the proper statutoryauthority for his detention is Section 1226(a), which permitsIJs to release aliens on bond while their removal is pending.Id. 32. Second, Garibay-Robledo contends that his detentionwithout bond violates his due process rights. Id. ¶¶ 34–41.Finally, Garibay-Robledo alleges that his detention withoutbond violates the APA. Id. ¶¶ 42–48.The Court ordered the respondents to show cause whyGaribay-Robledo's petition should not be granted. Dkt. No. 6;see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The respondents timely answered (Dkt.Nos. 11; 12), and Garibay-Robledo replied (Dkt. No. 13).2Currently, Garibay-Robledo is detained at the BluebonnetDetention Center. Dkt. No. 20 1.2. Legal Standard“[A]bsent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remainsavailable to every individual detained within the UnitedStates.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525, 124 S.Ct.2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 9,cl. 2). With 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Congress authorized federalcourts to resolve habeas petitions, including in immigration-detention cases. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88,121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). Habeas exists solelyto “grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody.”Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935–36 (5th Cir. 1976).Thus, for the writ to issue, the petitioner must be “in custodyin violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of theUnited States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see Orellana v. Kyle,65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995). A court considering a habeaspetition must “determine the facts, and dispose of the matteras law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.3. AnalysisAs noted above, Garibay-Robledo raises three claims in hishabeas petition—one involving Sections 1225 and 1226 ofthe INA, one based on the Fifth Amendment's Due ProcessClause, and another based on the APA. Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 23–48.His arguments in support of the first two claims are similarto those the Court has rejected in recent cases.3 Even so, theCourt considers the arguments raised in Garibay-Robledo'sbriefing to address whether bond-less detention of alienspresent in the United States without admission violates theINA, the Constitution, or the APA. On each count, the answeris no.A. Garibay-Robledo's detention claim does not presentan exhaustion problem.*3 Typically, a “person seeking habeas relief must firstexhaust available administrative remedies.” Hinojosa v.Horn, 896 F.3d 305, 314 (5th Cir. 2018). The respondents urgethat Garibay-Robledo's detention claim must be dismissedfor failure to exhaust. Dtk. No. 11 at 7–8. But theexhaustion requirement in this context is likely prudential,not jurisdictional. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiringexhaustion only for a “final order of removal”). That said,it would be “an exercise in futility” for Garibay-Robledo toappeal to the BIA. Garner v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 221 F.3d822, 825 (5th Cir. 2000). The BIA issued Yajure Hurtadoon September 5, 2025. Given the recency, there is littleprospect that the BIA would reconsider Yajure Hurtado here.Thus, Garibay-Robledo's habeas petition does not present anexhaustion problem. See id.B. The INA authorizes Garibay-Robledo's detentionwithout bond.Garibay-Robledo's claim under the INA involves theinterplay between two related statutes. First is Section1225(b)(2)(A), the INA's mandatory-detention provision.That statute sets out detention requirements for “applicant[s]for admission” to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Specifically, “in the case of an alien who is anapplicant for admission, if the examining immigration officerdetermines that an alien seeking admission is not clearlyand beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shallbe detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of thistitle.” Id. No one disputes that, subject to certain narrowexceptions,4 Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “mandate[s] detention ofapplicants for admission until certain [removal] proceedingshave concluded.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297,138 S.Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018). Nothing in Section1225 “says anything whatsoever about bond hearings.” Id.Section 1226(a), on the other hand, permits discretionarydetention. “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, analien may be arrested and detained pending a decision onwhether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8U.S.C. § 1226(a). Instead of detention, the Attorney General“may” release the alien on bond, “[e]xcept as provided in
Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3subsection (c).” Id. § 1226(a), (2)(A)–(B). Section 1226(c)in turn requires the Attorney General to “take into custodyany alien” who is inadmissible or removable for involvementin certain criminal offenses. Id. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(E); seeJennings, 583 U.S. at 303, 138 S.Ct. 830. If Section 1226(c)does not apply, and if an alien is released on bond pendingremoval, the Attorney General may still re-detain him “at anytime.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b).The respondents only justify Garibay-Robledo's detentionunder Section 1225(b)(2)(A). See Dkt. No. 11 at 9.The question, then, is whether Garibay-Robledo—whosurreptitiously crossed the border without inspection and hasresided illegally in the United States for decades—is an“applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). If so, he“shall be detained” without bond. Id. If not, he is entitled—atthe very least—to a bond hearing under Section 1226(a).i. As an “applicant for admission,” Garibay-Robledois subject to mandatory detention without bond underSection 1225(b)(2)(A).*4 As always, the Court “begins with the statutory text, andends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd.,LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158L.Ed.2d 338 (2004). Here, the text is as unambiguous as canbe. Section 1225 broadly defines “applicant for admission”as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not beenadmitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §1225(a)(1). Garibay-Robledo is an “alien.” He is “presentin the United States.” And he “has not been admitted”because he did not “lawful[ly] ent[er] [the country] afterinspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Id.§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (defining “admission” and “admitted”). Asan “applicant for admission” who “is not clearly and beyonda doubt entitled to be admitted,” Garibay-Robledo “shall bedetained” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). He is not entitled toa bond hearing.Garibay-Robledo resists this straightforward conclusion. Ashe sees it, Section 1225(b)(2) applies only to “ ‘applicantsfor admission’ who are encountered at or near the border,or in the context of initial inspection and processing.” Dkt.No. 21 at 12. It does not, in his view, govern those aliens“already present in the United States and placed in removalproceedings.” Id. at 11. Why? Because when it comes to“applicant[s] for admission,” the statute requires detention“if the examining immigration officer determines that analien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubtentitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasisadded). As the argument goes, aliens who have resided in theUnited States for years after entering illegally are not “seekingadmission” and thus are not subject to mandatory detention.This argument suffers from several flaws. First, it ignoresthe plain text of the statute. Section 1225 expressly defines“applicant for admission.” That definition covers “[a]n alienpresent in the United States who has not been admitted or whoarrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (emphasisadded). The word “or” is key. As the Supreme Court hasoften said, “ ‘or’ is ‘almost always disjunctive.’ ” EncinoMotorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 87, 138 S.Ct. 1134,200 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018) (quoting United States v. Woods, 571U.S. 31, 45, 134 S.Ct. 557, 187 L.Ed.2d 472 (2013)). Nothingin Section 1225(b)(2)(A) suggests otherwise. Therefore, theterm “applicant[s] for admission” does not just cover arrivingaliens; it also covers aliens who, like Garibay-Robledo, arepresent in the United States—for decades even—withoutadmission.This interpretation tracks how other courts understand theterm. In Jennings, the Supreme Court explained that, “[u]nder[Section 1225], an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’is treated as ‘an applicant for admission.’ ” 583 U.S. at287, 138 S.Ct. 830 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). Andthe BIA—with its considerable expertise in immigration law—recognizes that Congress' “unconventional” definition of“applicant for admission” includes “not just those who areexpressly seeking permission to enter, but also those who arepresent in this country without having formally requested orreceived such permission.”5 Matter of Lemus-Losa, 25 I. &N. Dec. 734, 743 (BIA 2012). At any rate, “[w]hen a statuteincludes an explicit definition, [the Court] must follow thatdefinition.” Digit. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. 149,160, 138 S.Ct. 767, 200 L.Ed.2d 15 (2018) (quoting Burgess v.United States, 553 U.S. 124, 130, 128 S.Ct. 1572, 170 L.Ed.2d478 (2008)).*5 Moreover, Garibay-Robledo hair-splitting emphasis onthe phrase “seeking admission” elevates form over substance.As the Court previously explained, “[t]here is no materialdisjunction—by the terms of the statute or the Englishlanguage—between the concept of ‘applying’ for somethingand ‘seeking’ something.” Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, ––– F.Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, No. 1:25-CV-177, 2025 WL 3264482,at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2025) (order on reconsideration).
Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4An “applicant” is “[s]omeone who requests something.”Applicant, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Thus, an“applicant for admission,” in ordinary English usage, is onewho requests (or seeks) admission into the United States.See Apply (for), Merriam-Webster Thesaurus (noting that to“seek” is a synonym of to “apply” for) (last visited December17, 2025).6 It is unclear how an alien can apply for admissionwithout seeking it.Other parts of Section 1225 illustrate the point. Section1225(a)(3) provides that “[a]ll aliens ... [w]ho are applicantsfor admission or otherwise seeking admission ... shall beinspected.” (emphasis added); see also Shi v. Lyons, –––F. Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, No. 1:25-CV-274, 2025 WL3637288, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2025) (explaining thatSection 1225(a)(3)'s “use of ‘otherwise’ renders ‘applicantsfor admission’ a subset of ‘seeking admission’—i.e., theformer represents one example of the latter”). And Subsection1225(a)(5) states that “[a]n applicant for admission maybe required to state under oath any information soughtby an immigration officer regarding the purposes andintentions of the applicant in seeking admission to theUnited States.” (emphasis added). The logical import of thisphrasing is that an “applicant for admission” is also “seekingadmission” under the statute. “Insofar as the term ‘applicantfor admission’ is more passive than ‘seeking admission,’this is inherent in the nature of agent nouns and theircorresponding gerunds.” Garibay-Robledo, ––– F.Supp.3d at––––, 2025 WL 3264482, at *5. As such, Section 1225 cannotbe read to limit its application to aliens “encountered at ornear the border.” Dkt. No. 21 at 12.In fact, if Congress wanted to limit Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to arriving aliens, it could have done so. Neighboringprovisions in Section 1225 expressly refer to “arrivingalien[s].” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(2) (“arriving alienwho is a stowaway is not eligible to apply for admissionor to be admitted”), 1225(d)(2) (addressing “authority toorder detention and delivery of arriving aliens” coming to theUnited States via vessel or aircraft). Yet Congress did not use“arriving alien” in Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Generally, whenCongress “uses certain language in one part of the statute anddifferent language in another, the [C]ourt assumes differentmeanings were intended.’ ” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542U.S. 692, 711 n.9, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004)(quotation omitted). So the fact that Congress did not refer to“arriving aliens” in Section 1225(b)(2)(A), but did so in otherparts of the statute, suggests that the mandatory-detentionprovision is not limited to aliens arriving at the border.In sum, the Court agrees with the respondents that Garibay-Robledo is subject to mandatory detention under Section1225(b)(2)(A). True, Garibay-Robledo is not an arrivingalien. But the statutory text is unambiguous: “[A]n alienpresent in the United States who has not been admitted” isalso an “applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Andif an “applicant for admission” is “not clearly and beyond adoubt entitled to be admitted,” he “shall be detained” pendinghis removal proceedings. Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). When a statuteis this clear, it must be applied according to its terms. Carcieriv. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387, 129 S.Ct. 1058, 172 L.Ed.2d791 (2009).ii. The statutory history of the INA confirms the Court'sreading of the mandatory-detention provision.*6 “Statutory history, ‘the record of enacted changesCongress made to the relevant statutory text over time,’can also provide helpful context” for statutory interpretation.United States v. Moore, 71 F.4th 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2023)(quoting BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 586 U.S. 310, 329, 139S.Ct. 893, 203 L.Ed.2d 160 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)(emphasis omitted)). Here, the statutory history of the INAconfirms what the plain text already makes clear: aliens whoillegally entered the United States and are later apprehendedin the interior are “applicant[s] for admission” who must bedetained pending removal under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).In 1996, Congress added the broad definition of “applicant foradmission” to the INA in the Illegal Immigration Reform andImmigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Pub. L. No. 104-208,110 Stat. 3009. “Prior to the [IIRIRA], the INA assessedstatus on the basis of ‘entry’ as opposed to ‘admission.’” Martinez v. Att'y Gen., 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (3d Cir.2012) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994)). Under thisso-called entry doctrine, aliens who snuck into the UnitedStates without inspection were entitled to the procedural andsubstantive protections afforded in deportation proceedings.Id. Yet aliens who presented themselves to immigrationofficials for inspection—say, at a port of entry—were subjectto “more summary exclusion proceedings.” Id. (quotationomitted). This distinction—where aliens who followed therules and presented for inspection were worse off than thosewho broke the law—created “a perverse incentive to enter atan unlawful rather than a lawful location.” Dep't of HomelandSec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140, 140 S.Ct. 1959, 207L.Ed.2d 427 (2020).
Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5IIRIRA did away with this anomaly. Congress replaced theentry doctrine with a criterion based on admission, which itdefined as “lawful entry ... after inspection and authorization.”8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). Congress alsoadded Section 1225(a)(1)—the definition of “applicant foradmission”—and mandated detention for all such applicantswhile their removal proceedings play out. See 8 U.S.C.§ 1225(b)(2)(A). By defining “applicant for admission” toinclude all aliens who have not been admitted, Congressthus eliminated the previous incentives to enter the countryillegally.Garibay-Robledo's interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A)marks a return to those bygone days. On his view, aliens whobypass inspection and settle down in the interior have moreprocedural protections than aliens who present themselves forinspection at the border. See Dkt. No. 21 at 11–12. But that, ofcourse, is “the precise situation that Congress intended to doaway with by enacting” IIRIRA. United States v. Gambino-Ruiz, 91 F.4th 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2024). Thus, the INA'sstatutory history supports the view that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires detention without bond for all applicants foradmission—including those who entered the country illegallyand have resided here for years.iii. Garibay-Robledo's counterarguments are notpersuasive.Garibay-Robledo lodges several additional arguments againstapplying Section 1225(b)(2)(A). None have merit. Garibay-Robledo first points to past practice, noting that—until thisyear—aliens who entered the country illegally and werelater placed in standard removal proceedings received bondhearings under Section 1226(a), unless their criminal historymade them ineligible. Dkt. No. 20 21. Indeed, afterIIRIRA, the Executive Office of Immigration Review issuedan interim rule explaining that aliens present in the UnitedStates without admission are typically eligible for bond. SeeInspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention andRemoval of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; AsylumProcedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). Thatpractice continued for several decades.*7 Then, in July 2025, the U.S. Department of HomelandSecurity distributed an internal policy (which was laterleaked) titled “Interim Guidance Regarding DetentionAuthority for Applicants for Admission.” See MaldonadoVazquez v. Feeley, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, –––– & n.2, No.2:25-CV-1542, 2025 WL 2676082, at *5 & n.2 (D. Nev.Sept. 17, 2025) (describing the leaked DHS policy andnoting that the government did not contest its authenticity).The policy advised that DHS, in coordination with theU.S. Department of Justice, “revisited its legal position”and concluded that Section 1225, not Section 1226, “is theapplicable immigration detention authority for all applicantsfor admission.” ICE Memo: Interim Guidance RegardingDetention Authority for Applications for Admission, AILADoc. No. 25071607, Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass'n (July 8,2025).7 Thus, DHS maintained the position—which the BIAlater adopted in Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 220—that all aliens who entered the country without admission areineligible for bond.8 According to Garibay-Robledo, this newpolicy is “in direct contravention of the plain language of” theINA. Dkt. No. 20 22.On close review, this background hurts Garibay-Robledomore than it helps. The post-IIRIRA interim rule states that“[d]espite being applicants for admission, aliens who arepresent without having been admitted or paroled ... will beeligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 62 Fed. Reg.at 10323 (emphasis added). “The effect of this change,” therule goes on to explain, “is that inadmissible aliens, except forarriving aliens, have available to them bond redeterminationhearings before an immigration judge, while arriving aliensdo not.” Id. The clear implication of this language is that,despite possessing statutory authority to deny bond to allnon-admitted aliens, the government previously declined toexercise the full extent of its authority under the INA.When the current Trump Administration took office, itwas free to reconsider the government's position. As theBIA explained in Yajure Hurtado, neither “DHS or itspredecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service,previously rais[ed] the current [detention] issue” before theBIA. 29 I. & N. Dec. at 225 n.6. Therefore, while “for yearsImmigration Judges have conducted bond hearings for alienswho entered the United States without inspection,” id., thatpast practice was not required by binding case law. No doubt,“the longstanding practice of the government ... can informa court's determination of what the law is.” Loper Bright,603 U.S. at 386, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (citation modified). “But a‘long-established practice’ does not justify a rule that deniesstatutory text its fairest reading.” Armstrong v. ExceptionalChild Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 329, 135 S.Ct. 1378, 191L.Ed.2d 471 (2015). Here, the government's past practice
Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6of affording bond hearings to non-admitted aliens cannotovercome the text's clear command.Next, Garibay-Robledo suggests that the respondents'interpretation of Section 1225 cannot be squared with Section1226. See Dkt. Nos. 20 30; 21 at 11–13. Other courtsand petitioners have labeled this a superfluity argument. See,e.g., Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1151–52 (D. Minn. 2025); Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec.at 221–22. To understand the point, some background ishelpful. Recall that Section 1226(c) provides exceptions to thediscretionary-detention rule. It specifically requires detentionof aliens who are inadmissible or removable for involvementin certain criminal offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(E);see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, 138 S.Ct. 830. Earlier thisyear, Congress amended Section 1226(c) with the LakenRiley Act. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Underthe LRA, the Attorney General must detain any alien who(1) is inadmissible for having entered the country withoutadmission or parole, and (2) is charged with or convictedof specific violent or property-based criminal offenses. 8U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). The argument goes like this:The LRA requires detention without bond for a subset ofnon-admitted aliens present in the United States—that is,those responsible for certain crimes. Therefore, it cannot bethat Section 1225(b)(2)(A)—enacted nearly 30 years beforethe LRA—already mandates detention for all such aliens.Otherwise, the LRA's more specific provisions would besuperfluous.9*8 For at least three reasons, the Court is unconvinced.First, as Judge Charles Eskridge recently explained, “priorAdministrations for decades applied [Section] 1226(a) toindividuals like” Garibay-Robledo. Cabanas v. Bondi, No.4:25-CV-4830, 2025 WL 3171331, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Nov.13, 2025). Therefore, “at the time of enactment, the LakenRiley Act did have [real] effect, given that it requiredmandatory detention for criminal, inadmissible aliens whohad not been subject to it ... by longstanding practice of priorAdministrations.” Id. (emphasis in original). So, the LRA wasnot meaningless—it narrowed the discretion afforded to anyAdministration exercising detention authority under Section1226.Second, “it is perfectly possible to interpret the provisions”as taking “a ‘belt and suspenders approach’ to legislation.”Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-168, 2025 WL 3131942,at *4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025) (Divine, J.) (quoting Atl.Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U.S. 1, 14 n.5, 140 S.Ct.1335, 206 L.Ed.2d 516 (2020)). Section 1226(c) regulateswhen the Attorney General must take aliens into custody. Id.Its detention mandate kicks in “when the alien is released,without regard to whether the alien is released on parole,supervised release, or probation, and without regard towhether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again forthe same offense.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). Section 1225, onthe other hand, does not include a timeline. Mejia Olalde,2025 WL 3131942, at *4. It only says that the alien “shall bedetained.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). It is entirely reasonable,then, to interpret the LRA as providing a temporal gloss onthe Executive's detention authority. See Duke v. Univ. of Tex.at El Paso, 663 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting thatcourts should “avoid[ ]” interpretations “which render parts ofa statute inoperative or superfluous”). On that understanding,the LRA adds something that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) lacks.Lastly, any superfluity, standing alone, is not enough to departfrom the clear statutory text. The Supreme Court “has oftenrecognized [that] ‘[s]ometimes the better overall reading of[a] statute contains some redundancy.’ ” Barton v. Barr, 590U.S. 222, 239, 140 S.Ct. 1442, 206 L.Ed.2d 682 (2020)(quoting Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334,346, 139 S.Ct. 873, 203 L.Ed.2d 180 (2019)). More to thepoint, “[r]edundancy in one portion of a statute is not a licenseto rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contraryto its text.” Id. Indeed, the canons of statutory constructionshould only “be used to resolve remaining ambiguity,” notto inject it where it does not exist. Moore, 71 F.4th at 395.Because the statutory text is clear, the Court must apply it aswritten.Two final points. First, Garibay-Robledo notes that manydistrict courts across the country have rejected therespondents' position. See Dkt. No. 20 27. That does not,however, make them right. This case turns on the statutorytext—not on the opinions of other district courts, no matterhow informative they may be. Even so, Garibay-Robledo'ssurvey of district court authority is not as monolithic as it mayseem. Many courts—including several in the Fifth Circuit—have concluded that petitioners like Garibay-Robledo arenot entitled to a bond hearing.10 Until a higher authorityresolves this issue for good, the Court concludes that the INAauthorizes mandatory detention for all non-admitted aliensunder Section 1225(b)(2)(A).*9 Second, Garibay-Robledo continues to claim that anindividualized bond hearing is mandated by binding FifthCircuit precedent. Compare Dkt. No. 1 34 (claiming that
Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7the respondents' failure to provide a bond hearing violatesbinding “Fifth Circuit precedent”), with Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 24,33 (claiming the same in the corrected petition). Garibay-Robledo's counsel, John M. Bray, has since clarified that thenon-existent Fifth Circuit case supporting this contention inthe original petition was obtained from a Facebook comment.Dkt. No. 15-1 at 1 2. Because the corrected petition simplyrestates the previous claim without any supporting citation,however, it is unclear what (if any) Fifth Circuit case couldsubstantiate this contention. Accordingly, Bray is once againreminded of his obligations under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 11. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1172(5th Cir. 1988) (finding citations to “nonexistent rules of law”sanctionable under Rule 11); Gauthier v. Goodyear Tire &Rubber Co., No. 1:23-CV-281, 2024 WL 4882651, at *2–3(E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2024) (same).C. The Due Process Clause does not require thegovernment to give Garibay-Robledo a bond hearing.Next is Garibay-Robledo's claim that the government's refusalto provide a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clauseof the Fifth Amendment. Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 34–41. Garibay-Robledo devotes only a few sentences to this claim, arguingthat he “fundamental liberty interest” in being free fromimprisonment, and that his detention without “access to abond hearing strips [him] of the individualized determinationrequired by due process.” Id. ¶¶ 36–37. He does not clarifywhether his challenge is based on substantive or proceduraldue process. But either way, he is not entitled to relief.Start with substantive due process. That doctrine protects“only ‘those fundamental rights and liberties which are,objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history andtradition.’ ” Dep't of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 910, 144S.Ct. 1812, 219 L.Ed.2d 507 (2024) (quoting Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138L.Ed.2d 772 (1997)). While still recognizing due-processrights for aliens present in the United States, see, e.g.,Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673, 145 S.Ct. 1003, 221L.Ed.2d 529 (2025), the Supreme Court has long affirmedthe constitutionality of executive immigration procedures.The “through line of history,” the Supreme Court recentlyexplained, is “recognition of the Government's sovereignauthority to set the terms governing the admission andexclusion of noncitizens.” Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 911–12, 144S.Ct. 1812. To that end, “Congress regularly makes rules thatwould be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Mathews v.Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976).The principle is no less true for immigration detention. Infact, the Supreme Court has endorsed the constitutionalityof detaining aliens without bond during the pendency ofremoval proceedings. In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Courtacknowledged that “the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens todue process of law in deportation proceedings.” 538 U.S.510, 523, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003) (quotingReno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123L.Ed.2d 1 (1993)). But it clarified that “detention duringdeportation proceedings” is nevertheless a “constitutionallyvalid aspect of the deportation process.” Id. Indeed, “whenthe Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due ProcessClause does not require it to employ the least burdensomemeans to accomplish its goal.” Id. at 528, 123 S.Ct. 1708.It follows that “the Government may constitutionally detaindeportable aliens during the limited period necessary for theirremoval proceedings.” Id. at 526, 123 S.Ct. 1708. Against thatbackdrop, the notion that substantive due process requires abond hearing is untenable.A procedural due process claim fares no better. As an“applicant for admission,” Garibay-Robledo has “only thoserights regarding admission that Congress has provided bystatute.” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140, 140 S.Ct. 1959;see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32, 103 S.Ct. 321,74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982) (“This Court has long held that analien seeking initial admission to the United States requestsa privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding hisapplication, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is asovereign prerogative.”). With Section 1225, Congress setthe procedural rights afforded to aliens who are present inthe United States without admission. “Read most naturally,”Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “mandate[s] detention of applicantsfor admission until certain proceedings have concluded.”Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297, 138 S.Ct. 830. No part of thestatute “says anything whatsoever about bond hearings.”Id. Accordingly, Garibay-Robledo is not entitled to a bondhearing as a matter of procedural due process.D. Garibay-Robledo is not entitled to relief under theAPA.*10 Finally, Garibay-Robledo argues that the respondents'failure to provide him with an individualized custodyredetermination hearing “constitutes unlawful agency actionunder the APA.” Dkt. No. 20 48. The theory of hisAPA claim, however, is unclear. In one paragraph, hecomplains of the “BIA's reversal of decades of establishedlaw” without adequate explanation. Id. 46; cf. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (requiring the reviewing court to “hold unlawful
Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8and set aside” agency actions found to be “arbitrary” and“capricious”). But in the subsequent paragraph, he complainsof the IJ's refusal to exercise jurisdiction, “treating [him] assubject to mandatory detention” under Section 1225(b). Id. 47; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (requiring the reviewing court to“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonablydelayed”).But no matter: the real trouble arises when Garibay-Robledoasks the Court to “grant habeas relief to remedy the violation.”Id. 48. Section 704 of the APA states, in no uncertain terms,that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and finalagency action for which there is no other adequate remedyin a court are subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704(emphasis added). Because Garibay-Robledo requests habeasrelief as the remedy for his APA claim, he unwittingly admitsthat there is, in fact, an adequate remedy outside of the APA.Moreover, the Supreme Court recently held that “where analien detainee's claims ‘necessarily imply the invalidity oftheir confinement’ these claims must be brought in habeas.”P.B., 2025 WL 3632752, at *9 (O'Connor, C.J.) (quotingTrump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672, 145 S.Ct. 1003, 221L.Ed.2d 529 (2025)); cf. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (same, in § 1983context). The APA thus does not provide for judicial reviewof his claim.4. ConclusionIn short, Garibay-Robledo, as an “applicant for admission,” isproperly detained without bond under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).Nothing about the INA, the Due Process Clause, or the APArequires a contrary conclusion. Thus, the corrected petitionfor a writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. No. 20) is denied.So ordered on January 9, 2026.All Citations--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2026 WL 81679Footnotes1According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, law enforcement executed a search warrant on Garibay-Robledo's residence and seized four firearms, 6.8 grams of cocaine, and approximately 450 rounds of mixed caliberammunition. See No. 5:25-CR-177, Dkt. No. 3 at 3–4 (W.D. Tex.); see also id. Dkt. No. 19 (unsealed indictment). Theindictment was later dismissed. Id. Dkt. No. 38.2Garibay-Robledo moved to file a corrected reply brief, Dkt. Nos. 16; 21, after the Court noted that it contained a fabricatedquotation, Dkt. No. 14 at 2–3. The Court granted the motion. Dkt. No. 17 at 1.3See Montelongo Zuniga v. Lyons, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, No. 1:25-CV-221, 2025 WL 3755126 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2025);Gomez Hernandez v. Lyons, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, No. 1:25-CV-216, 2026 WL 31775 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2026); CalderonLopez v. Lyons, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, No. 1:25-CV-226, 2026 WL 44683 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2026).4The Secretary of Homeland Security may temporarily parole into the United States “any alien applying for admission”on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); seeBiden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 806, 142 S.Ct. 2528, 213 L.Ed.2d 956 (2022). But once the purposes of the parole havebeen served, the alien must immediately be returned to custody, and his case “shall continue to be dealt with in the samemanner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).5Of course, the Court does not reflexively defer to the BIA's interpretation of Section 1225. See Loper Bright Enters. v.Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412–13, 144 S.Ct. 2244, 219 L.Ed.2d 832 (2024). But given the BIA's specialized knowledgeof the INA, the Court may consider its “power to persuade.” Id. at 402, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)).6https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/apply% 20(for) [https://perma.cc/7FNU-M7C9].7https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission[https://perma.cc/5GKM-JYGX].8On December 18, 2025, the Central District of California purported to vacate the DHS policy under the AdministrativeProcedure Act. Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-1873, 2025 WL 3678485, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025).
Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9But as this Court explained in Calderon Lopez v. Lyons, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, No. 1:25-CV-226, 2025 WL 3683918(N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025), that purported relief violated the INA. Id. at –––– – ––––, 2025 WL 3264482 at *10–11. Evenassuming the DHS policy is now vacated, the Central District “declined to set aside [the] broader, independent decision”in Yajure Hurtado. Id. at ––––, 2025 WL 3264482 at *1.9Although Garibay-Robledo does not explicitly raise this argument in his petition, he previously presented it in theattachments to his motion for reconsideration of his application for a TRO. See Dkt. No. 8-1 at 18, 34; see also Dkt. No.9 at 7–9 (order denying motion for reconsideration).In his reply brief, Garibay-Robledo pursues a different and, candidly, even less compelling line of argument: that hisplacement into Section 240 removal proceedings necessitates the application of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 1225 isinapplicable, he argues, because it applies to “expedited removal or other border-based processes.” Dkt. No. 21 at 17. Butthe Court does not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Gillaspy v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 278F. App'x 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (“It is the practice of ... the district courts to refuse to consider arguments raised for thefirst time in reply briefs.”). Further, the Court need not repeat its analysis as to why Section 1225 is not limited to “border-based” applications, see supra, § 3.B.i–ii. As to Garibay-Robledo's point regarding expedited removal, it is sufficient tonote that he is not detained pursuant to the statutory provisions requiring expedited removal proceedings. E.g., 8 U.S.C.§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Rather, he is detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A), which explicitly applies to “proceeding[s]under [S]ection 1229a”—that is, Section 240 of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Court thus finds Garibay-Robledo'sargument that detention under Section 1226 inexorably follows from the initiation of Section 240 removal proceedingsto be foreclosed by the plain text of the INA.10See, e.g., Cabanas, 2025 WL 3171331, at *4; Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *2; P.B. v. Bergami, No. 3:25-CV-2978,2025 WL 3632752, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2025); Rodriguez v. Noem, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, No. 9:25-CV-320,2025 WL 3639440, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2025); Sandoval v. Acuna, 6:25-CV-1467, 2025 WL 3048926, at *5 (W.D.La. Oct. 31, 2025); Vargas Lopez v. Trump, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, No. 8:25-CV-526, 2025 WL 2780351, at *2 (D.Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); Chavez v. Noem, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, –––– – ––––, No. 3:25-CV-2325, 2025 WL 2730228, at*4–5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025). See also supra, note 4 (citing cases from this Court).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access