teaching of Rorick and the other cases cited, we hold that the statute is not one within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 2281 and that a three-judge panel is not required to pass on its constitutionality.
The district court, however, in our opinion, misapplied the abstention doctrine. In this connection the court stated:
Although it could be argued that a substantial federal constitutional question exists here, the requirement of federal court equity jurisdiction is missing because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their state court remedies. Moreover no irreparable harm would result from such a course in that the November (1971) General Election is now in the past, and some five months remain before the May (1972) Primary. Whenever such a situation exists, a federal court should invoke the “abstention doctrine” and abstain from passing on the State statute until the State courts have done so.
Abstention is a judicially created doctrine that emerged in Railway Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1940). In that case the Supreme Court held that a federal court in certain narrowly defined “special circumstances” should abstain from exercising equity jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of a state statute. The doctrine was expanded in Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 3 L.Ed.2d 1152 (1962), in which the Court was faced with a challenge to a Virginia scheme of regulation of organizations which advocated racial integration or segregation, including expenditure of funds for racial litigation. The Court hefd abstention proper since a limiting construction could be placed on the state statutes by state courts which would avoid deciding constitutional questions. The Court stated:
The present case, in our view, is one which calls for the application of this [abstention] principle, since we are unable to agree that the terms of these three statutes leave no reasonable room for a construction by the Virginia courts which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem. 360 U.S. at 177, 79 S.Ct. at 1030.
The foundation of the doctrine of abstention rests on several policy considerations. The first of these is the avoidance of a premature constitutional decision by a possible narrowing construction of the state law by a state court. Lake Carriers’ Association v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 32 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965); Cf. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 255, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967) (Harlan, J„ concurring). A second policy reason underpinning the principle is the avoidance of needless conflict in the federal-state relationship. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943). A third consideration is the desirability of avoiding the necessity of a federal court making tentative decisions on issues of state law. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 90 S.Ct. 788, 25 L.Ed.2d 68 (1970); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9 (1943). A fourth basic reason justifying abstention is the avoidance of unnecessary interference with state functions or regulatory schemes. Lake Carriers’ Association v. MacMullan, supra; Younger v. Harris, supra.
The Supreme Court, however, has made clear that abstention is subject