Gharavi v. Google LLC, No. 25-mc-80164-WHO (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Nima GHARAVI v. GOOGLE LLC
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
William H. Orrick (J.) (unanimous Court)
Gharavi v. Google LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 82256Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. California.Nima GHARAVI, Petitioner,v.GOOGLE LLC, Respondent.Case No. 25-mc-80164-WHO|Signed January 12, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsNima Gharavi, Chicago, IL, Pro Se.Elise Sabrina Edlin, Torryn Taylor Rodgers, Perkins CoieLLP, San Francisco, CA, Todd M. Hinnen, Perkins Coie LLP,Seattle, WA, for Respondent.ORDER RE MOTIONS TO COMPEL ANDSTRIKE AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONSRe: Dkt. Nos. 3, 9, 10, 14, 17, 19,21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 32, 34William H. Orrick, United States District Judge*1 Before the Court are numerous discovery-related motionsfiled by petitioner Nima Gharavi (“Gharavi”) and respondentGoogle, LLC (“Google”), including a motion to compel, amotion for sanctions and a motion to strike from Gharavi, anda motion to strike from Google. Each of the motions relateto Google's alleged noncompliance with a subpoena issuedby this Court under Section 512(h) of the Digital MilleniumCopyright Act (the “DMCA”).Gharavi's motion to compel violates several standing ordersshared by both me and Magistrate Judge Ryu. This mattersbecause we both designed our discovery dispute protocol torequire the parties to discuss each other's positions and, if atan impasse, succinctly present their argument to the court ina joint letter of no more than five pages. This protocol savestime and money, often resolves the dispute before bringing itto court, and allows an expeditious response from the Court ifthe letter is ultimately sent. And no matter whether the partiesthink it's a worthwhile protocol, it is required by Court order.Accordingly, Google's motion to strike is GRANTED, andGharavi's motion to compel is DENIED. Gharavi must raisehis concerns as established by my standing orders.Gharavi's motion for sanctions against Perkins Coie attorneyTorryn T. Rodgers (“Rodgers”) is similarly DENIED. WhileRodgers incorrectly identified Gharavi as a defendant in acriminal case in Wisconsin, this error was neither reckless nordone in bad faith, and Rodgers quickly rectified the issue. AndGharavi's motion to strike portions of Rodgers's testimony isDENIED, as her testimony reasonably constitutes issues offact, rather than conclusions of law.BACKGROUNDOn June 25, 2025, Gharavi served a DMCA subpoenaon Google, seeking “basic subscriber information foreight YouTube accounts engaged in alleged copyrightinfringement.” Motion to Compel Compliance withSubpoena (“Compel Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 3] at 2. Googleproduced information identifying the YouTube subscriberscorresponding to the eight accounts on July 18, 2025, twodays past its deadline under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure45. See Non-Party Google LLC's Motion to Strike (“GoogleStrike Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 9] at 2. The parties continued tocorrespond for two weeks, and Google produced additionalsubscriber information for each account. Id. On August 4,2025, Gharavi requested more information from Google,including “AdSense ID(s), physical mailing address(es),linked YouTube channels, and MCN affiliation information”from the accounts. See id. (citing Compel Mot. Ex. A(Declaration of Nima Gharavi (“Gharavi Decl.”)). Googleraised objections to this request on August 5, 2025. SeeOpposition to Respondent's Motion to Strike (“Google StrikeOppo.”) [Dkt. No. 10] at 2.On August 12, 2025, counsel for Google contacted Gharavito request a meet and confer to discuss the applicabilityof DMCA Section 512(h) to his information requests. Id.The parties met and conferred on August 15 and August22, reaching an impasse at both meetings. See id. During
Gharavi v. Google LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2their August 22 meeting, Gharavi indicated that he wouldbe declining magistrate jurisdiction, as the case had beenassigned to Magistrate Judge Ryu in the Oakland Districtof the Northern District. Id. Counsel for Google did notobject. See id. The parties also discussed whether Googlewould accept service of any filing Gharavi would make inconnection with the matter. See Google Strike Mot. at 2.After the August 22 meeting, the parties did not communicateuntil October 2, 2025, when Gharavi filed his Motion toCompel. See Compel Mot. His motion was twenty-six pagesand included over 100 pages of various exhibits. See id.;Google Strike Mot. at 3. That same day, Gharavi declinedjurisdiction by a magistrate judge. See id. at 2; Consent orDeclination to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction [Dkt. No. 5].*2 What followed next could only be described as acacophony of motion filings. On October 13, 2025, Googlefiled a motion to strike Gharavi's motion to compel, claimingthat the motion violated the standing orders of Judge Ryuand was made in bad faith. See Google Strike Mot. at 1. ByOctober 15, 2025, the case had been reassigned to me. SeeDkt. No. 13. The parties then continued to brief the motions tostrike and compel over the course of the following week. SeeRespondent Google LLC's Opposition to Motion to Compel(“Compel Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 17]; Reply in Support of Motionto Compel Compliance (“Compel Repl.”) [Dkt. No. 21]; Non-Party Google LLC's Reply in Support of its Motion to Strike(“Google Strike Repl.”) [Dkt. No. 22].In Google's motion to strike reply, Rodgers submitted adeclaration that indicated that on October 29, 2025, she“directed legal research staff at [her] firm to identify casesin which Mr. Gharavi appears to have represented himselfpro se.” See Declaration of Torryn Rodgers in Support ofGoogle LLC's Reply (“Rodgers Strike Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 22-1]at 2. Rodgers declared that on “information and belief,based on a review of Bloomberg Law's search results, itappears Mr. Gharavi ha[d] represented himself pro se infifteen separate cases, nine of which were in the NorthernDistrict of California.” Id. Rodgers then listed the names ofthe cases, including “County of Racine vs. Nima Gharavi, No.2018TR008316 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr 23, 2018 (sic).” Id. WhileBloomberg indicated Gharavi was a party to the County ofRacine case, this ended up being untrue; as a result, Gharavifiled a motion for compensatory sanctions against Rodgers,arguing that she acted recklessly and in bad faith in includingthis case in her declaration under penalty of perjury. SeeMotion for Sanction Against Attorney Torryn T. Rodgers ofPerkins Coie LLP (“Sanctions Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 23] at 1.Google filed an opposition on November 13, 2025, see Non-Party Google LLC's Opposition to Nima Gharavi's Motionfor Sanctions (“Sanctions Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 25], and Gharavireplied on November 28, 2025. See Reply in Support ofMotion for Sanctions (“Sanctions Repl.”) [Dkt. No. 26].In support of its opposition to Gharavi's motion for sanctions,Google submitted an additional declaration from Rodgersclarifying her conduct when performing the Bloombergsearch. See Declaration of Torryn Rodgers in Support ofGoogle's Opposition to Mr. Gharavi's Motion for Sanctions(“Rodgers Sanctions Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 25-1]. Rodgersindicated that she “reasonably relied on Bloomberg's searchresults, which appear to have been incorrect.” Id. at 6.She asserted that “[t]his error was inadvertent, as a resultof Bloomberg's reporting, and not made in bad faith.” Id.Gharavi took issue with these declarations, finding them tobe legal conclusions rather than fact, and filed a motion tostrike Paragraph 6 from the Rodgers Sanctions Declaration.See Motion to Strike Paragraph 6 of the Declaration of TorrynRodgers (“Gharavi Strike Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 27]. Googlefiled its opposition on December 9, 2025, see Non-PartyGoogle LLC's Opposition to Movant's Motion to Strike(“Gharavi Strike Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 32], and Gharavi repliedon December 12, 2025. See Reply in Support of Motion toStrike (“Gharavi Strike Repl.”) [Dkt. No. 34].LEGAL STANDARDMotion to CompelSection 512(h) of the DMCA sets forth the procedures ofissuance of a subpoena to an internet “service provider [to]expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner or personauthorized by the copyright owner the information requiredby the subpoena, notwithstanding any other provision of lawand regardless of whether the service provider responds to thenotification.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(5). This framework requiresdisclose of all “information sufficient to identify the allegedinfringer.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(3). Section 512(h)(6) indicatesthat “the remedies for noncompliance with the subpoena,shall be governed to the greatest extent practicable by thoseprovisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governingthe issuance, service, and enforcement of a subpoena ducestecum.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(6). “Rule 45 in particular governsthe enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum and provides fora motion to compel and for a motion to quash, as well asremedies available for both types of motions.” CognospherePte. Ltd. v. X Corp., No. 23-mc-80294-PHK, 2024 WL
Gharavi v. Google LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.34227594, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2024) (Kang, M.J.) (citingFed. R. Civ. P. 45).*3 District courts maintain “broad discretion and authorityto manage discovery.” Id. (citing U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011)).“The Court's discretion extends to crafting discovery ordersthat may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested,particularly with regard to subpoenas.” Id. (citing Fed. R.Civ. P. 45(d)(3); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598(1998)). A recipient of a DMCA subpoena “may object tothe subpoena on the basis that issuing the subpoena: (1)would require disclose of material protected by the FirstAmendment; and (2) would conflict with the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure.” Id. (citing In re DMCA § 512(h) Subpoenato Twitter, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 3d 868, 876–77 (N.D. Cal.2022)).Motion for SanctionsGharavi seeks sanctions under the Court's inherent authorityto impose sanctions, rather than under Rule 11 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure. “A court may impose sanctionsunder its inherent powers ‘when a party has acted in badfaith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’ ”In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig.(“In re Facebook”), 655 F. Supp. 3d 899, 924 (N.D. Cal.2023) (Chhabria, J.) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991) (internal citations omitted)). “Beforeimposing sanctions, the court must find that the conduct‘constituted or was tantamount to bad faith.’ ” Id. at 924–25(quoting Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997)). “That standard may be met when aparty misrepresents the law or the facts to the court,” or “whena party acts for an improper purpose—even if the act consistsof making a truthful statement or a non-frivolous argumentor objection.” Id. (quoting Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992(9th Cir. 2001)).“To protect against abuse and to ensure parties receivedue process, individuals subject to sanction are affordedprocedural protections, the nature of which varies dependingupon the violation, and the type and magnitude of thesanction.” F.J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev.,Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuithas distinguished between issuing punitive and compensatorysanctions. See In re Facebook, 655 F. Supp. 3d at 925. Whilethe Ninth Circuit “has not addressed the burden of proofrequired for compensatory sanctions ... a finding of bad faithby clear and convincing evidence is sufficient.” Id. (citingLahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 606 F.3d1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010). The amount of compensatorysanctions “is limited to fees and costs ‘incurred solely becauseof the misconduct’ at issue, meaning ‘fees that party wouldnot have incurred but for the bad faith.’ ” Id. (quotingGoodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101,104 (2017)). District courts maintain “broad discretion” incalculating such sanctions. See id.Motion to StrikeFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) allows the Courtto strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or anyredundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). “The function of a 12(f) motion to strikeis to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arisefrom litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issuesprior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and alteration omitted).Motions to strike, however, “are generally disfavored bycourts because the motions may be used as delaying tacticsand because of the strong policy favoring resolution on themerits.” Barnes v. AT & T Pension Ben. Plan-NonbargainedProgram, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010)(citation omitted). Such motions should only be granted if“the matter has no logical connection to the controversy atissue and may prejudice one or more of the parties to thesuit.” New York City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Berry, 667 F.Supp. 2d 1121, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2009). “Where the movingparty cannot adequately demonstrate such prejudice, courtsfrequently deny motions to strike even though the offendingmatter literally was within one or more of the categoriesset forth in Rule 12(f).” Id. (citation and quotation marksomitted). “Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to strike lieswithin the sound discretion of the district court.” Cruz v. Bankof New York Mellon, No. 12–00846, 2012 WL 2838957, at*2 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2012) (citing Whittlestone, 618 F.3dat 973).DISCUSSIONI. GOOGLE'S MOTION TO STRIKEA. My Standing Orders Govern this Dispute.*4 As a threshold matter, I must first decide whetherGoogle's Motion to Strike correctly asserts that Gharavi'sMotion to Compel is procedurally deficient. Gharavi filed hisMotion to Compel on October 2, 2025. See Motion to Compel(“Compel Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 3]. At that time, jurisdiction was
Gharavi v. Google LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4with Magistrate Judge Ryu in the Oakland Division of theNorthern District. See id. However, that same day, Gharavideclined consent to have a magistrate judge hear the matter.See Dkt. No. 5. The parties now dispute whether Gharavi'sMotion to Compel is governed by Judge Ryu's standingorders.Google maintains that Judge Ryu's standing orders governthis dispute, as it is “undisputed that Judge Ryu maintainedjurisdiction at least through Mr. Gharavi's filing of the[motion to compel] on October 2, 2025.” Non-Party GoogleLLC's Motion to Strike (“Google Strike Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 9]at 5. Gharavi disagrees, arguing that his decision to declinejurisdiction “required reassignment to a district judge,” andthat “magistrate judges may handle dispositive miscellaneousmatters only with the parties' consent.” Google Strike Oppo.at 3 (citing In re DMCA Subpoena to X Corp., No. 3:23-mc-80294-PHK, 2024 WL 4227594 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18,2024)). In his view, when a party simultaneously files amotion and declines consent before a magistrate judge, thatparty need not comply with the magistrate judge's standingorders, as the case will inevitably be transferred to a districtjudge.Much of the parties' concerns are now moot, as this casehas since been reassigned to me, and my standing ordersgovern this dispute. My standing orders note the followingwith respect to discovery disputes:In the event of a discovery dispute, lead trial counselfor the parties shall meet and confer in person orby videoconference to attempt to resolve their disputeinformally. A mere exchange of letters, e-mails, telephonecalls, or facsimile transmissions does not satisfy therequirement to meet and confer.If, after a good faith effort, the parties have not resolvedtheir dispute, they shall prepare a concise joint statementof five pages or less, stating the nature and status ofall pending disputes and certifying that they have metthe meet-and-confer requirement. Absent an order of thisCourt, parties shall not file affidavits or exhibits other thancopies of the written requests for discovery and the answersor objections thereto.If a joint statement is not possible, each side may submit abrief individual statement of two pages or less. In additionto the certification of compliance with the meet-and-conferrequirement, the individual statement shall include anexplanation of why a joint statement was not possible. Thejoint statement or individual statements shall be e-filed inthe Civil Events category of Motions and Related Filings >Motions-General > Discovery Letter Brief.The Court will advise the parties of the need, if any, formore formal briefing or a hearing, pursuant to Civil LocalRule 7-1(b). The Court may also elect to refer the matter toa magistrate judge or special master. If a magistrate judge isassigned to a case for discovery, that judge shall handle anyfuture discovery disputes in that case and the parties shallcomply with the procedures set by that judge for discovery.J. Orrick Civ. Standing Orders Sec. 4 (“Standing Orders”). Asexplained below, Gharavi's motion to compel fails to satisfyseveral of my standing order requirements.B. Meet and Confer RequirementsMy standing orders require that, in the event of adiscovery dispute, the parties “meet and confer in personor by videoconference to attempt to resolve their disputeinformally.” Id. Only when “after a good faith effort, theparties have not resolved their dispute” should the parties filea discovery dispute. Id. Google argues that Gharavi failed toadhere to Judge Ryu's (and, subsequently my) standing ordersrequiring the parties to meet and confer in good faith. I agree.*5 The good faith requirement has been interpretedby district courts as requiring a “genuine two-waycommunication wherein both parties engage[ ] inmeaningfully dialogue to resolve each specific discoverydispute without judicial intervention.” Shuffle Master, Inc. v.Progressive Games, Inc., 170 F.R.D. 166, 173 (D. Nev. 1996).It is undisputed that the parties met and conferred twice,with the “second and final” meeting occurring on August 22,2025. See Gharavi Decl. 21. At these meetings, the partiesdiscussed Judge Ryu's standing orders as well as service offilings in connection with the matter. Google Strike Mot. at2. On August 25, 2025, Gharavi sent an email to counselfor Google, asking again if they would accept service ofany forthcoming motions. See id. The parties then did notcommunicate until October 2, 2025, when Gharavi filed hismotion to compel. See id. at 6–7.Google maintains that Gharavi's failure to notify Google'sattorneys about his October 2 motion, “combined with [his]repeated refusal to allow Google a reasonable extensionto oppose the Motion (given Google's significant delay inreceiving it due to lack of notice) reveals no attempt to resolvethe outstanding issue in good faith.” Id. at 7; see Gharavi
Gharavi v. Google LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Decl. Ex. A (Gharavi indicating in his August 25 email thathe “will, of course, let [Google] know as soon as [a motion is]filed.”). Gharavi, in response, urges me to liberally construehis filing as a pro se party, and that any “format concerns”could be resolved by “case management alternatives” toavoid “striking a comprehensive brief addressing genuinesubstantive issues about Rule 45 waiver and § 512(k)(1)interpretation.” Google Strike Oppo. at 7.While I agree with Google that certain facts—such asGharavi's inclusion of new arguments that were not discussedat the parties' meet and confers—suggests bad faith on thepart of Gharavi, I do not think such a finding is necessary toresolve this motion. Rather, as described below, the simplefact that the motion to compel exceeds my requirements forsuch discovery disputes is enough for Google's motion tostrike to be granted.C. The Length and Format of the Motion ViolatesStanding Orders.My standing orders also maintain clear requirements for thelength and format for discovery disputes. Specifically, theysay that the parties “shall prepare a concise joint statementof five pages or less, stating the nature and status of allpending disputes and certifying that they have met the meet-and-confer requirement.” If a joint statement is not possible,“each side may submit a brief individual statement of twopages or less ... [and] shall include an explanation of why ajoint statement was not possible.”Gharavi's motion fails to meet either requirement. His motionto compel was not jointly filed with Google. And whilehis individual motion does explain why in his view a jointstatement was not possible, it quite significantly exceeds mytwo-page requirement. Gharavi attempts to counter this factby pointing to Local Rule 7-2(b), which says that all motionsshall be contained in “one filed document not exceeding 25pages in length.” N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-2(b). But, as explainedabove, Gharavi's argument presumes that this rule applies for“motions filed before assignment to the judge who will hearthe matter.” Google Strike Oppo. at 3. I now have jurisdictionover this dispute, and my standing rules govern. Local Rule7-2(b) does not change the fact that Gharavi's motion violatesmy standing rules.Because Gharavi's Motion to Compel exceeds the page limitand formatting requirements for discovery disputes, Google'sMotion to Strike is GRANTED. I encourage the parties tomeet and confer once more to attempt to resolve the disputesmentioned in Gharavi's motion; if this is not possible, then theparties should file a discovery dispute that meets the formatand length requirements as outlined by my standing orders.II. GHARAVI'S MOTIONSA. Motion to Compel*6 As explained above, finding that Gharavi's Motion toCompel is procedurally defective, I decline to address themerits of the motion until the parties have met and conferredagain to discuss the issues presented.B. Motion for SanctionsGharavi also seeks to impose monetary sanctions on TorrynT. Rodgers (“Rodgers”), counsel for Google, in the amount of$5,625. See Sanctions Mot. at 1. Gharavi believes sanctionsare warranted because Rodgers filed a declaration in supportof Google's Reply in Support of its Motion to Strike, in whichshe asserted that Gharavi “has represented himself pro sein fifteen separate cases.” See Rodgers Strike Decl. at 2.Rodgers then provided a list of cases pulled from BloombergLaw, the last being “County of Racine v. Nima Gharavi, No.2018TR008316 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2018.” Id. Gharavimaintains that he “has never litigated any case in Wisconsin,pro se or otherwise, and has no recollection of ever appearingin a Wisconsin court.” Gharavi Sanctions Decl. at 3. As aresult, Gharavi contends that “Rodgers' false sworn statementwas strategically designed to establish that Mr. Gharavi is anexperienced litigant with extensive pro se litigation history,thereby defeating Mr. Gharavi's procedural arguments andgaining tactical advantage in Google's Motion to Strike.”Sanctions Mot. at 1.In response, Rodgers contends that this was “simple error”made by her firm's legal research team, and that she “believedthat the research tool upon which she relied was accurate.”Sanctions Oppo. at 1–2. Counsel for Google then provideda corrected declaration removing the false citation. Id. at 2.In Google's view, this error was “not material to the pointin support of which the declaration was submitted,” whichwas to show that “Gharavi has engaged in multiple priorproceedings in this Court and elsewhere.” Id.Both parties agree that the standard for sanctions in thiscase is set out in Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989 (9th Cir.2001). In Fink, the Ninth Circuit clarified that courts have theinherent power to issue sanctions when an attorney engagesin “reckless misstatements of law and fact, when coupled
Gharavi v. Google LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6with an improper purpose, such as an attempt to influenceor manipulate proceedings in one case in order to gaintactical advantage in another case.” Id. at 994. In other words,to levy sanctions on an attorney for misconduct under itsinherent authority, a court must find that (1) the attorney actedrecklessly and (2) with an improper purpose.Neither of those factors are met. With respect to recklessness,Gharavi maintains that Rodgers “bore [a] duty” to ensurethat her representations in her declaration were correct, andthat she “failed to discharge” such duties. Sanctions Repl.at 2. He also argues that verification through the WisconsinCircuit Court Portal—a publicly accessible website trackingWisconsin state cases—was “straightforward and readilyavailable,” but Rodgers decided not to use such website. Id.at 3.Gharavi primarily relies on Guangzhou Youlan TechnologyCorporation v. Onbrill World, No. 1:25-cv-11051, slip op.at 3–5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2025) (“Guangzhou Youlan”),to support his motion for sanctions. In Guangzhou Youlan,plaintiffs sought to serve a defendant electronically, ratherthan through traditional means, claiming that the defendant“provided a false name and physical address” in China. Id. at2. The court “expressed concern that the plaintiff was tryingto skip a step by forgoing any attempt at traditional servicein favor of alternative service,” especially after counsel forplaintiff could not provide a “[g]ood faith basis that [theaddress was] false.” Id. The court then issued an order toshow cause why plaintiff's counsel should not be sanctionedunder Rule 11(b). Id. Plaintiff's counsel response indicatedthat he “relied on his paralegal ... and his client for informationabout the defendant's name and address,” as he did not speakChinese. Id. at 3. The court ultimately sanctioned plaintiff'scounsel, finding that he “failed to conduct a reasonableinquiry” into the whereabouts of the defendant, despiteknowing that “the location of the defendants provided byPlaintiff was unknown.” Id. Additionally, plaintiff's counselhad the resources and ability to conduct his own research onthe issue, but instead “simply took the information providedby his client” without second thought. Id. at 5.*7 Guangzhou Youlan is distinguishable on several grounds.In that case, the court was concerned with counsel's failureto research an issue central to the case—how service wouldbe effectuated on a defendant. Here, Rodgers's reference tothe cited cases is to support a matter “not material to thepoint in support of which the declaration was submitted.”Sanctions Oppo. at 2. Additionally, unlike in GuangzhouYoulan, where plaintiff's counsel expressly acknowledged thathe knew the defendant's address was in question, Rodgersrelied on Bloomberg Law, a well-trusted database and legalsearch tool, and had no reason to believe that the informationprovided was false. See Rodgers Sanctions Decl. at 3. ThatRodgers did not utilize a second, outside source to determinethe veracity of the cases does not amount to recklessnessunder either an objective or subjective analysis.I also agree with Rodgers that her conduct was not in badfaith. While Gharavi suggests that Rodgers included the falsecriminal case to “falsely associat[e] him with adversarialcriminal proceedings,” nothing in the record corroborates thisconclusion. See Sanctions Mot. at 6. Even so, this is not a casewhere Rodgers attempted to “gain [a] tactical advantage”—rather, it is rooted in a harmless error that does not impactthe outcome of the parties' motions. See Fink, 239 F.3d at994. Gharavi's allegations of bad faith are premised entirelyon speculation, and I will not impute bad faith on Rodgersabsent evidence of bad faith.Finding that Rodgers' conduct was neither reckless nor inbad faith, Gharavi's motion for compensatory sanctions isDENIED. Gharavi's “claimed hours for sanctions researchand briefing were discretionary litigation choices far beyondwhat would have been necessary to request a simplecorrection or stipulation to strike.” Sanctions Oppo. at 3.C. Motion to StrikeFinally, Gharavi moves to strike Paragraph 6 of Rodgers'Sanctions Declaration as violating Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 56 and the Northern District's Local Rules.Under Local Rule 7-5(b), “[a]n affidavit or declaration maycontain only facts, must conform as much as possible tothe requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), and must avoidconclusions and argument.” Civ. L.R. 7-5(b). Declarations“not in compliance with this rule may be stricken in whole orin part.” Id.Paragraph 6 of Rodgers' declaration states: “I reasonablyrelied on Bloomberg's search results, which appear to havebeen incorrect. This error was inadvertent, as a result ofBloomberg's reporting, and not made in bad faith.” RodgersSanctions Decl. at 6. Gharavi argues that the phrases“[t]his error was inadvertent,” “not made in bad faith,” and“I reasonably relied” are legal conclusions that should bestricken from Rodgers' declaration. See Gharavi Strike Mot.at 2. I disagree. The first two phrases represent testimony byRodgers as to her mental state and subjective understanding
Gharavi v. Google LLC, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7of the facts relating to the Bloomberg search, a subjectof which she is uniquely qualified to testify. And whilethese terms may have legal implications in other contexts,Rodgers' testimony does not attempt to provide the court witha legal conclusion on the motion for sanctions. Nor doesPerkins Coie's “documented linguistic precision” provide abasis for concluding that Rodgers' declaration presented legalconclusions rather than facts. See Gharavi Strike Repl. at 3.What is a closer call is whether the use of the word“reasonably” suggests a legal conclusion as a legalfact. But even if “reasonably” is interpreted as a legalconclusion, I find striking would be inappropriate. “[W]herea paragraph containing an improper legal conclusion isotherwise bookended by admissible statements, as is oftenthe case ... [courts] consider[ ] the admissible factualevidence but disregarded the improper legal conclusions andargumentative statements.” Persian Gulf Inc. v. BP WestCoast Prods. LLC, 632 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1131 (S.D. Cal.2022). Accordingly, Gharavi's motion to strike is DENIED,and I will not infer any reasonability in Rodgers' actions solelybased on the language of Paragraph 6.CONCLUSION*8 A multiplicity of motions has sprung from a simpledispute. The parties should work together and comply withmy standing orders governing discovery disputes. If they senda joint letter, I will address the merits of their arguments.Gharavi's motion to compel, motion to strike, and motionfor sanctions are all DENIED; Google's motion to strike isGRANTED.IT IS SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 82256End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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