Gjovik v. Apple Inc., No. 23-cv-04597-EMC (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Ashley M. GJOVIK v. APPLE INC
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Gjovik v. Apple Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 1447380Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. California.Ashley M. GJOVIK, Plaintiff,v.APPLE INC., Defendant.Case No. 23-cv-04597-EMC|Signed May 19, 2025Attorneys and Law FirmsAshley M. Gjovik, Sacramento, CA, Pro Se.Kathryn Grzenczyk Mantoan, Orrick, Herrington & SutcliffeLLP, San Francisco, CA, Jessica Perry, Melinda S. Riechert,Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Menlo Park, CA, KateElsa Juvinall, Husch Blackwell LLP, Los Angeles, CA, RyanBooms, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Washington, DC,for Defendant.ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYINGIN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKEAND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONFOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENTDocket Nos. 192-93EDWARD M. CHEN, United States District Judge*1 Pending before the Court are two motions filed by Ms.Gjovik: (1) a motion to strike and (2) a motion for a moredefinite statement. Ms. Gjovik differentiates between thetwo motions as follows: the motion to strike is targeted atApple's affirmative defenses whereas the motion for a moredefinite statement is directed to “Apple's evasive denials” inits answer. Docket No. 205 (Reply at 8); see also Docket No.193 (Mot. at 1) (referring to “key denials that are evasive,vague, or implausible under the circumstances”). Havingconsidered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions,the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part themotion to strike and DENIES the motion for a more definitestatement. The hearing on the motions is hereby VACATED.I. DISCUSSIONA. Motion for More Definite StatementFederal Rule of Civil Procedure governs a motion for a moredefinite statement. It provides as follows:A party may move for a more definitestatement of a pleading to which aresponsive pleading is allowed butwhich is so vague or ambiguous thatthe party cannot reasonably prepare aresponse. The motion must be madebefore filing a responsive pleading andmust point out the defects complainedof and the details desired. If the courtorders a more definite statement andthe order is not obeyed within 14 daysafter notice of the order or withinthe time the court sets, the court maystrike the pleading or issue any otherappropriate order.Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).Ms. Gjovik's motion for a more definite statement is deniedfor several reasons. First, the rule is inapplicable. Rule12(e) provides for the remedy of a more definite statementwhen the litigant making the motion is required to file a“responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Here, Applefiled only an answer, and not any counterclaims. Thus, Ms.Gjovik is not required to file a responsive pleading. SeeThigpen v. Anderson, No. 1:24-cv-00214-KWR-SCY, 2024WL 4527748 at *5, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190346 at *14(D.N.M. Oct. 18, 2024) (“A party may only move for a moredefinite statement where responsive pleadings are allowed.As discussed above, Defendant's Answer does not raisecounterclaims.”).Second, much of the relief sought by Ms. Gjovik is not a moredefinite statement but rather the striking of denials made byApple.Third, the Court agrees with Apple that much of the Rule12(e) motion is directed at trying to resolve merits issues priorto discovery. It is inapposite to the current situation.
Gjovik v. Apple Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Fourth, “Rule 12(e) motions are ordinarily restricted tosituations where a pleading suffers from unintelligibilityrather than want of detail.” Media.net Adver. FZ-LLC v.NetSeer, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2016)(internal quotation marks omitted). That is not the situationhere.Ms. Gjovik suggests that, at the very least, Apple should notbe allowed to state in its answer “no response is required” withrespect to allegations related to dismissed claims. Here, theCourt is not without some sympathy for Ms. Gjovik's position.For example, although the Court dismissed Ms. Gjovik'senvironmental safety claims, it recognized that allegationsrelated to those claims could potentially be relevant toher retaliation claims. See Docket No. 204 (Order at 3)(noting that, “[a]lthough Ms. Gjovik will not have to provethat Apple actually violated an environmental safety lawfor [a] retaliation claim, she will still have to show thatshe reasonably believed there was such a violation” and,“[t]ypically, a reasonable belief has a factual basis of somekind”). Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the Court seeslittle value in having the parties bicker over which allegationsin the fifth amended complaint are still relevant to theretaliation claims and, if so, to what extent. More important,it can fairly be inferred from Apple's answer that it denieshaving engaged in any environmental safety violations.See, e.g., 5AC 229 (with respect to § 1102.5 retaliationclaim, alleging that “Apple discharged and discriminatedagainst Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff's disclosure ofinformation about Apple's unlawful acts and omissions”);Ans. 229 (responding that, “[a]s to paragraph 229 of theFifth Amended Complaint, Apple denies the allegations”).The Court, therefore, denies Ms. Gjovik any relief withrespect to her Rule 12(e) motion.B. Motion to Strike*2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a“court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defenseor any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalousmatter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The bulk of Ms. Gjovik's motionto strike is directed to Apple's affirmative defenses.1. No. 1In the first affirmative defense, Apple claims a “fail[ure]to state facts sufficient to constitute a cognizable claim forrelief.” Ms. Gjovik argues the defense should be strickenbecause it is not an affirmative defense. See Zivokovic v. S.Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2022) (statingthat “[a] defense which demonstrates that plaintiff has not metits burden of proof is not an affirmative defense”) (emphasisadded). She also notes that the Court has already made rulingson several 12(b)(6) motions, allowing at least some causes ofaction to proceed.The Court grants the motion to strike. See Izett v. Crown AssetMgmt., LLC, No. 18-cv-05224-EMC, 2018 WL 6592442 at*2, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211459 at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Dec.14, 2018) (granting motion to strike defenses that were not“true” affirmative defenses, including failure to state a claimfor relief). As a practical matter, however, the ruling hasno real impact on the case because Apple is not precludedfrom asserting failure to state a claim for relief as a “regular”defense. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) (providing that“[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be grantedmay 3 be raised: (A) in any pleading allowed or ordered underRule 7(a); (B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or (C) at trial”).To the extent the Court has already rejected arguments thatMs. Gjovik failed to state a claim for relief for any cause ofaction, Apple may not relitigate the issue absent leave of theCourt.2. Nos. 6 and 7The sixth affirmative defense is “failure to exercisereasonable care and diligence to mitigate any damagesallegedly accruing to [Ms. Gjovik].” The seventh affirmativedefense is somewhat related: “Apple is entitled to an offsetfor any monies Plaintiff received from any source afterPlaintiff ceased to be employed by Apple under the doctrineprohibiting double recovery set forth by Witt v. Jackson,57 Cal. 2d 57, 17 Cal.Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641 (1961),and its progeny.” Ms. Gjovik's primary challenge to theaffirmative defenses is that Apple has not provided a factualbasis in support. See Izett, 2018 WL 6592442, at *1, 2018U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211459, at *2 (stating that “courts in thisDistrict, including this Court, have ‘consistently’ ” appliedthe Twombly and Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses”; “ ‘adefense need not include extensive factual allegations in orderto give fair notice, [but] bare statements reciting mere legalconclusions may not be sufficient’ ”).*3 The Court grants the motion to strike. To be sure, basedon her briefs alone, Ms. Gjovik clearly understands whyApple is asserting the defenses – e.g., Apple is suggestingthat Ms. Gjovik should have mitigated damages by seekingalternative employment and, if she did find alternativeemployment, that income should offset any damages, if
Gjovik v. Apple Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3awarded.1 While Apple suggests that this satisfies therequirement of fair notice, it should still provide someconcrete allegations along the lines of the above to supportthe defenses. See id.To be clear, however, Apple's allegations need not beextensive. Thus, e.g., Ms. Gjovik's suggestion that Applemust provide specifics such as an “actual job” that she turneddown is not correct. Docket No. 192 (Mot. at 8). The Courtalso notes that Apple will have some leeway when conductingdiscovery into the defenses because the information relevantto the defenses is, in large part, within the possession, custody,or control of Ms. Gjovik. Accordingly, the motion to strike isgranted, but Apple has leave to amend.3. No. 8In the eighth affirmative defense, Apple asserts: “Plaintiff'srecovery is barred in whole or in part by her own uncleanhands and by the doctrines of unclean hands, in pari delictoand/or after-acquired evidence, or in the alternative, thesedoctrines cut off or reduce her alleged damages.” Ms. Gjovik'sprimary argument is that Apple has failed to provide a factualbasis for the defense.The Court grants the motion to strike, but with leave to amend.Similar to above, Ms. Gjovik is likely aware of the factualpredicate for the defenses – i.e., Apple's position is that shewas terminated because she disclosed, without authorization,confidential information and then failed to participate inApple's investigation of the matter. Nevertheless, Appleshould still provide some concrete allegations along the linesof the above to support the defense, particularly because thisinformation is, at least in part, within its possession, custody,or control. See Izett, 2018 WL 6592442, at *1, 2018 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 211459, at *2.4. No. 12In the twelfth affirmative defense, Apple states that“Plaintiff's claims are barred in whole or in part by theapplicable statutes of limitation, including Cal. Civ. Proc.Code §§ 335.1, 338(a), and 340(a).” According to Ms. Gjovik,the defense should be stricken because Apple has failed toplead a factual basis to support the defense. She also arguesthat none of the specific statutes cited by Apple are applicablein her case.The Court denies the motion to strike. Given that Ms. Gjovikworked for Apple from 2015 to 2021, see 5AC 12, and thesprawling nature of Ms. Gjovik's operative complaint, see,e.g., 5AC 60 et seq. (alleging harassment by managers inthe department Ms. Gjovik worked in from 2015 to 2017), itis fair for Apple to assert the defense to ensure that conductoutside of the relevant limitations periods is not actionable.Also, as Apple points out, (1) § 335.1 applies to the claim forwrongful termination in violation of public policy, see Prue v.Brady Co./San Diego, Inc., 242 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1382, 196Cal.Rptr.3d 68 (2015); (2) § 338(a) applies to, inter alia, the §1102.5 claim, see Rabara v. Heartland Empl. Servs., LLC, No.17-CV-03770-LHK, 2019 WL 1877351, at *23, 2019 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 71170, at *77 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2019)2; and(3) § 340(a) applies to the extent a civil penalty is sought.5. No. 15*4 In the fifteenth affirmative defense, Apple asserts thatthis Courtlacks jurisdiction over any claim byPlaintiff for alleged mental, emotionaland/or physical distress on the groundsthat such claims are subject to theexclusive provisions of the CaliforniaWorkers’ Compensation laws. SeeCal. Labor Code § 3600, et seq.Alternatively, Apple alleges that itmay be entitled to a setoff for anyamounts paid to Plaintiff pursuant tothe California Workers’ CompensationAct.Ms. Gjovik's main contention is that the defense islegally invalid because “the exclusivity doctrine of workers’compensation does not apply to claims brought underCalifornia's whistleblower statutes, such as Labor Code §1102.5.” Docket No. 192 (Mot. at 14).The motion to strike is granted. Apple has suggested thatworkers’ compensation exclusivity applies because Ms.Gjovik has asserted not just statutory claims but also acommon law claim for wrongful termination in violation ofpublic policy. But courts have held that a claim for wrongfultermination (as opposed to, e.g., intentional infliction ofemotional distress) is not subject to workers’ compensationexclusivity. See Klip v. Marine Spill Response Corp., No.C-11-06496 EDL, 2011 WL 7268192 at *3, 2012 U.S.
Gjovik v. Apple Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Dist. LEXIS 16026 at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2012) (“The[California Supreme Court] held that where the plaintiffalleged a Tameny public policy claim as part of his claim ofIIED, only the underlying public policy claim may proceedand workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy for theaccompanying IIED. A public policy violation as defined inTameny ... allows plaintiffs to proceed on public policy claimswhile remedies based on accompanying IIED claims remainexclusive to workers’ compensation law.”).As for Apple's alternative position – i.e., any workers’compensation could still be used as a set-off to damages,if awarded – the Court agrees with Ms. Gjovik that someconcrete allegations are needed. For example, is Apple awareof any workers’ compensation awarded to Ms. Gjovik duringthe time she was employed with Apple?The motion to strike is therefore granted, but with leaveto amend (i.e., to the extent Apple asserts that workers’compensation may be used as a set-off).6. No. 5The fifth affirmative defense is that “Plaintiff consented tocertain of the conduct that she now claims was wrongful.”3Ms. Gjovik argues that the defense should be stricken becauseApple has failed to allege supporting facts for the defense.The motion to strike is denied. In its answer, Apple allegedthat Mr. Gjovik signed a consent with respect to use of theGobbler application. See Ans. 218. Though this allegationwas not made directly in conjunction with the fifth affirmativedefense per se, the allegation still establishes a factual basisfor the defense.7. Nos. 4, 11, 14In the following affirmative defenses, Apple asserts asfollows:• No. 4: “Plaintiff was an at-will employee with noentitlement to continued employment pursuant to LaborCode section 2922.”*5 • No. 9: “[A]ssuming arguendo that discriminatory orretaliatory reasons had been a motivating factor in anyemployment decision toward Plaintiff (which they werenot), Apple would have made the same decisions towardPlaintiff in any case for legitimate, non-discriminatoryand/or nonretaliatory business reasons.”• No. 10: “[A]ny alleged action that [Apple] took withrespect to Plaintiff was privileged and justified andprotected by the doctrine of business necessity.”• No. 11: “[Apple] at all times acted without malice, ingood faith, and with reasonable grounds for believing itsactions did not violate the law.”• No. 14: “[Apple] was fully justified, and exercisedreasonable care, prudence, skill and business judgmentwith respect to Plaintiff, and any decisions with respectto Plaintiff were made without regard to Plaintiff'salleged disability, national origin, age or other protectedbasis.”Ms. Gjovik moves to strike the defenses as legally untenableand/or factually unsupported.The motion to strike is granted, but with leave to amend. TheCourt does not agree that the defenses are legally untenable.As Apple explains in its opposition, it is simply contendingthat it did not act unlawfully and that it had a legitimate basisto terminate Ms. Gjovik. The Court strikes the defenses onlybecause Apple has not provided concrete facts to support thedefenses. In its opposition, Apple already indicates what thosefacts will be (i.e., it terminated Ms. Gjovik for disclosing,without authorization, confidential information and for notparticipating in Apple's investigation into the matter), butthose facts should still be articulated in the pleading.To the extent Ms. Gjovik suggests that all or some of thedefenses are not “true” affirmative defenses, that is unclear.Context may inform whether the defenses are affirmativedefenses or instead are defenses related to elements that Ms.Gjovik has the burden of proving as part of her prima faciecase. Thus, the Court does not strike on that basis.8. Nos. 2-3Affirmative Defenses Nos. 2 and 3 relate to causation. Appleasserts that “no conduct by or attributable to it was the causein fact or legal cause of the damages, if any, suffered byPlaintiff,” and “[s]hould it be determined that Plaintiff wasdamaged, then said damages were proximately caused byPlaintiff's own conduct.” In her motion, Ms. Gjovik arguesthat the defenses should be stricken because Apple has failedto provide a factual basis for the defense.The Court grants the motion to strike, but with leave to amend.Admittedly, Ms. Gjovik is aware of Apple's position that she
Gjovik v. Apple Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5was terminated because she disclosed, without authorizationconfidential information and failed to participate in theinvestigation of the matter. Nevertheless, Apple should stillprovide some concrete allegations to that effect to support thedefense.9. No. 16The sixteenth affirmative defense is as follows: “Applereserves the right to assert additional defenses in the eventdiscovery indicates it would be appropriate to do so.” Ms.Gjovik argues the Court should strike the defense as it is nota defense at all.The Court grants the motion. “ ‘The mere reservation ofaffirmative defenses is not an affirmative defense.’ ” Izett,2018 WL 6592442, at *2, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211459,at *5. However, if Apple finds, whether through discoveryor otherwise, a basis for additional affirmative defenses, itmay move for leave to amend its answer in accordance withFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. See id.10. No. 13*6 In the thirteenth affirmative defense, Apple states:“[A]ny award of punitive damages in this case wouldviolate the due process, equal protection and excessive finesprovisions of the California and United States Constitutions.”According to Ms. Gjovik, the defense should be strickenbecause it is boilerplate in nature.The motion to strike is denied. To be sure, without knowingwhat punitive damages are awarded (if any), the Courtcannot assess whether the amount is excessive or violates dueprocess (e.g., because of the magnitude compared to the actualdamages). However, the Court shall not strike the defensebecause Ms. Gjovik's prior pleadings have indicated thatshe will be seeking significant punitive damages. See, e.g.,Docket No. 32-2 (SAC ¶¶ 1603-08) (suggesting that punitivedamages should be at least 10 times the compensatory awardand should take into account Apple's market cap of over $3trillion).11. Relief Sought of Dismissal and Attorneys’ FeesIn its prayer for relief, Apple asks, inter alia, for a dismissalof Ms. Gjovik's complaint and an award of attorneys’ fees.Ms. Gjovik asserts that this specific relief should be stricken.The motion to strike is denied. If Apple prevails in this suit,it is entitled to a dismissal even if it has not brought anycounterclaims. As for attorneys’ fees, the issue is prematurebut the Court cannot say at this juncture that a request for feesis improper in light of, e.g., Federal Rule of Civil Procedure11.12. References to No “Preclusive Effect”Apple's answer contains statements that government agencydeterminations do not have preclusive effect. See, e.g., Ans. 8. Ms. Gjovik moves to strike such statements because theyare irrelevant: “Plaintiff never alleged that the government'sactions, such as investigations or enforcement, have anypreclusive effect on the claims at issue here. Instead, Plaintiffhas simply referenced the government's actions in relation tothe reported violations and retaliation.” Docket No. 192 (Mot.at 7).The motion to strike is denied. “The standard for strikingportions of a complaint under Rule 12(f) ‘is strict and ... onlyallegations that are so unrelated to the plaintiffs’ claims as tobe unworthy of any consideration should be stricken.’ ” Sizerv. Bennett, No. 2:17-cv-01591-LPL, 2018 WL 3439533, at*1, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118773, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. July17, 2018). Moreover, although Ms. Gjovik's motion states thatshe does not seek to hold Apple to any agency determination,her reply is not consistent. See Docket No. 206 (Reply at 2,4) (arguing that Apple's answer is, “in some cases, in directcontradiction to agency findings and public settlements” –e.g., “Apple has inserted defenses ... that directly conflict withits admissions and compliance obligations in prior federalagency settlements”).C. RJNIn conjunction with the pending motions, Ms. Gjovik hasfiled a request for judicial notice. Specifically, Ms. Gjovikhas asked the Court to take judicial notice of certain NLRBsettlement proceedings. The request for judicial notice isdenied. As indicated by the above, the settlement proceedingsare largely irrelevant to resolution of the pending motions.Moreover, Ms. Gjovik's request improperly asks the Court todo more than just take judicial notice of any facts. Finally,Ms. Gjovik ignores that the settlement agreement contains anon-admissions clause. See Docket No. 194 (ECF Page 16)(Settlement Agreement) (“By entering into this Agreementthe Charged Party does not admit to any violation of theNational Labor Relations Act.”).
Gjovik v. Apple Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6D. Use of Artificial Intelligence*7 Finally, the Court addresses Apple's arguments relatedto Ms. Gjovik's use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) andits request for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 11. Ms. Gjovik has admitted to use of AI. See, e.g.,Docket No. 206 (Reply at 10). Apple argues that her use of AIhas been, and continues to be, a problem because she has notconfirmed, and continues not to confirm, the accuracy of theAI-generated information or information otherwise providedby AI. Apple has pointed to a number of examples wherethe information provided is not correct, indicating that Ms.Gjovik has not been verifying the information.4 Ms. Gjovikmaintains that she is exercising oversight, but the examplesprovided by Apple indicate otherwise. Notably, Ms. Gjovikdoes not address the numerous examples provided by Apple.She simply states that she is making a “good faith effort,as time and resources allow, to review, verify, and edit allcontent.” Docket No. 206 (Reply at 10).At this juncture, the Court shall not impose any sanctions.However, it forewarns Ms. Gjovik that (1) she is responsiblefor verifying the accuracy of AI-generated or AI-providedinformation, including but not limited to case citations andcontent, and that (2) failure to do so may lead to sanctions,including but not limited to a finding of contempt and/or theability to proceed pro se. See Kruglyak, ––– F.Supp.3d at––––, 2025 WL 900621, at *3, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56784,at *10 (declining to sanction pro se plaintiff for use of AI but,“going forward,” plaintiff was ordered to “identify any casesthat are the result of legal research preformed with generativeAI” and held “responsible for verifying their accuracy”; alsocautioning plaintiff that failure to do so could lead him to beheld in contempt of court and to lose the ability to proceedpro se).Ms. Gjovik is also advised that the standard applicable toher conduct is Rule 11. Cf. Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610, 616(2d Cir. 2024) (stating that, “[i]f a lawyer chooses to employtechnology in representing a client, the lawyer continues to bebound by the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure11”). See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (“By presenting tothe court a pleading, written motion, or other paper[, ...] anattorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best ofthe person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed afteran inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: ... (2) theclaims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warrantedby existing law ....”). The Court is cognizant that Ms. Gjovikis involved in other proceedings against Apple in differentvenues which could affect the time she has available to workon this case. That fact, however, does not relieve her of herRule 11 obligations before this Court.The Court emphasizes that it is Ms. Gjovik's responsibilityto confirm the accuracy of information before she files anypapers with the Court containing that information; the burdenis not on Apple to identify what information is problematic.That being said, if Apple seeks Rule 11 sanctions in the futurebased on filings made by Ms. Gjovik, then it must complywith the rule's procedures, including the safe harbor. See Fed.R. Civ. P. 11(c).II. CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, Ms. Gjovik's motion for a moredefinite statement is denied, but the motion to strike is grantedin part and denied in part. Apple may file an amended answerconsistent with the Court's rulings above. The amendedanswer shall be filed within two weeks of the date of thisorder.*8 This order disposes of Docket Nos. 192-93.IT IS SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 1447380Footnotes1Apple's decision to assert these defenses was likely informed by statements that Ms. Gjovik has made duringthis litigation – e.g., that she has tried to find employment post-termination from Apple and/or that she isunemployed.
Gjovik v. Apple Inc., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.72In Newton v. Bank of America, No. CV 16-09581-AB (RAOx), 2018 WL 6219946, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS228955 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2018), the district court took note that there a lack of consensus (in both stateand federal court) as to whether a three- or one-year statute of limitations applies for § 1102.5 claims. Thecourt ultimately concluded that there was a three-year statute of limitations where damages were sought,although a one-year statute of limitations would apply if a civil penalty was sought. See id. at *6–7, 2018 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 228955, at *16-17.3Contrary to what Ms. Gjovik asserts, Apple has not included waiver, estoppel, or laches as part of the fifthor any other affirmative defense.4See generally Williams v. Cap. One Bank, N.A., No.: 24-2032 (RC), 2025 WL 843285 at *7, 2025 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 49256 at *20 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2025) (noting that “[c]ourts have recently seen increasing reliance onartificial intelligence in legal proceedings, leading to the use of nonexistent citations in court documents”);Kruglyak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 900621, at *2, 2025 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 56784, at *4 (W.D. Val. Mar. 25, 2025) (stating that AI “platforms sometimes ‘hallucinate,’ meaningthey provide inaccurate responses[;] [i]n the legal research context, these hallucinations can include thegeneration of fictitious case cites and misrepresentations of case summaries or holdings”).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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