I. Introduction
This case is an employment discrimination suit brought under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and District of Columbia law, the latter of which entitles the plaintiff to a jury. Plaintiff Guy A. Green, who was a Kinney store manager in Texas, contends that he moved to the Washington, D.C., area with an understanding from Kinney that he would be given one of the first manager’s positions that became available in the Washington, D.C., area. Kinney did not offer him a manager’s spot, however, but employed him as an assistant in a largely black area of suburban Maryland. Mr. Green contends that Kinney’s actions toward him were racially motivated.
Expert testimony is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence if it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed.R. Evid. 702. This standard is “broadly phrased” and is meant to make admissible a wide range of expert opinions on a wide variety of subjects. See id. advisory committee’s notes; Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales Inc., 550 F.Supp. 1220, 1223-24 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 661 (3rd Cir.1983). As broad as the standard is, however, expert testimony should not be admissible when the proposed testimony infringes on one of the decisions that is entrusted solely to the jury — e.g., an examination of the credibility of witnesses — or when it runs counter to conclusions of law, many of which are themselves amalgams of expert opinion crafted by courts and legislatures.
A court should exercise special caution in admitting expert testimony on the issue of evaluating an employer’s motivations in discrimination cases. To deal with the always-difficult problem of determining motivations, the courts have developed precise tests and standards for setting out a pri-ma facie case, validating tests with adverse impact, and making other legal conclusions. These standards cannot be contradicted by an expert who would, for example, find a prima facie of discrimination in an employer’s hiring statistics when, under the legal standard, no prima facie case exists. Nor should a court accept testimony from an expert who would conclude that a promotion test is not discriminatory when, under the proper legal analysis, the test is shown to have an adverse impact and is not validated as job-related. To admit such evidence would be to allow improperly the finder of fact to consider rejecting the policy decisions and evidence standards that have been imposed on discrimination trials by higher courts.
II. Analysis and Conclusions
With these cautionary considerations in mind, the Court considers Kinney’s objections to the testimony of three experts that the plaintiff wishes to call at trial.
A. Paul Katz
The plaintiff seeks to offer expert testimony from Paul Katz, a “compensation consultant” who helps businesses determine the appropriate level of salaries and wages and helps develop examinations and training programs. Mr. Katz would testify about (1) the significance of Kinney’s use of subjective criteria in promoting employees, (2) Mr. Green’s qualifications to be a manager as compared with those hired instead of him, and (3) his statistical analysis of the level of minority representation among Kinney’s managers.
The Court refuses to permit Mr. Katz to testify about the significance of Kinney’s use of subjective criteria in promoting employees. It should be clear to any reasonable person that a subjective promoting process could enable an employer to hide discrimintory intent. Indeed, this kind of argument may be made, based on the evidence, by lawyers in closing argument. The finders of fact do not need expert testimony on this point. Indeed, such testimony may be harmful, in that the finders of fact may be led to believe that subjective hiring is inherently suspect under discrimination law, whereas in fact it is perfectly lawful for employers to use a subjective promotion process.1 See, e.g.,
1
The United States Supreme Court has given mixed signals on whether subjective hiring crite*1124ria are desirable in the effort to combat racial discrimination in employment. In the groundbreaking Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), the Court in essence criticized the use of objective tests and standards for employees, concluding that such tests often are barriers to advancement by blacks. By 1988, however, the Court was critical of subjective factors, concluding implicitly that it is perhaps easier to hide discriminatory intent with a subjective hiring process than it is with an objective process. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988).