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Guy v. Afge
(2026)
Case details
Full caption
Joseph Guy v. AFGE
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
1
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United
States
District
Court
Northern
District
of
California
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
NORTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
CALIFORNIA
AMERICAN
FEDERATION
OF
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES,
AFL
-
CIO
(AFGE),
et
al.
,
Plaintiff
s,
v.
DONALD
J.
TRUMP,
et
al.
,
Defendant
s.
JOSEPH
GUY,
Petitioner,
v.
AMERICAN
FEDERATION
OF
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES,
AFL
-
CIO
(AFGE),
Respondent.
Case
No
s.
25-
cv
-03698-
SI
26-
mc
-80146-
SI
ORDER
DENYING
JOSEPH
GUY’
S
MOTION
TO
QUASH
SUBPOENA
AND
FOR
PROTECTIVE
ORDER
Before
the
Court
is
Joseph
Guy’s
Emergency
Motion
to
Quash
Subpoena
and
for
Protective
Order
,
docketed
at
26
-
mc
-80146,
Dkt.
No.
1
(“Mot.”).
On
May
6,
2026,
Guy
filed
an
emergency
motion
to
quash
his
deposition
subpoena
and
for
a
protective
order
in
the
Eastern
District
of
Virginia.
See
Guy
v.
Am.
Fed.
of
Gov’t
Emps.,
AFL
-
CIO
,
ECF
No.
1,
No.
1:26-
mc
-
8
(E.D.
Va.
May
6,
2026).
The
Eastern
District
of
Virginia
transferred
Guy’s
motion
to
the
Northern
District
of
California
.
See
id
.,
ECF
No.
5.
1
For
the
reasons
set
forth
below,
the
Court
DENIES
Guy’s
motion.
1
The
case
was
randomly
assigned
to
a
magistrate
judge
and
then
referred
to
this
Court
for
the
purpose
of
determining
whether
it
was
related
to
this
case.
Dkt.
No.
390.
This
Court
determined
the
cases
were
related
on
May
12,
2026.
Dkt.
No.
391.
Case
3:25-cv-03698-SI
Document
395
Filed
05/13/26
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of
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United
States
District
Court
Northern
District
of
California
BACKGROUND
On
March
3,
2026,
the
Court
ordered
defendants
to
produce
four
categories
of
expedited
discovery,
related
to
plaintiffs’
pending
motion
for
preliminary
injunction
regarding
the
Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency
(FEMA).
Dkt.
No.
321;
see
also
Dkt.
Nos.
328,
336,
339,
351
(further
discovery
orders).
In
light
of
information
that
came
out
through
expedited
discovery
2
,
plaintiffs
served
defendants
with
a
deposition
notice
for
Joseph
Guy
on
April
10,
2026,
while
he
was
employed
by
defendant
Department
of
State
.
Dkt.
No.
350
at
15
&
n.14;
Dkt.
No.
350-
1
(“Eshleman
Decl.”)
¶¶
16
-
17,
Ex.
J.
Plaintiffs’
counsel
declares
that
they
served
revised
deposition
notices
on
April
13,
2026.
Eshleman
Decl.
¶
16.
Guy’s
deposition
was
originally
scheduled
to
take
place
on
April
30,
2026,
pending
Court
authorization.
Id.
,
Ex.
J.
at
1
.
On
April
22,
2026,
the
Court
issued
an
order
authorizing
the
depositions
of
Guy
and
Kara
Voorhies
for
the
week
of
April
27,
2026,
or
the
following
week.
Dkt.
No.
351
at
1
-2.
The
Court
also
ordered
defendants
to
search
the
personal
phones
of
Evans,
Guy,
and
Voorhies
and
produce
all
responsive
communications
related
to
CORE
renewals
or
target
FEMA
staffing
reductions.
Id.
at
2
-4.
On
April
24,
2026,
defendants
informed
plaintiffs
that
Guy’s
last
day
of
federal
employment
would
be
April
30,
2026
,
and
stated
that
“t
o
that
end,
because
Mr.
Guy
will
no
longer
be
a
State
Department
employee
effective
May
1
—and
thus
no
longer
an
employee
of
any
party
to
this
matter
—the
only
means
for
Plaintiffs
to
compel
his
attendance
at
a
deposition
after
April
30
would
be
through
service
of
a
subpoena
under
Rule
45.”
Dkt.
No.
356-
2
at
6-
7.
The
email
further
stated
that
defense
counsel
was
“informed
earlier
today
that
as
of
Thursday,
April
23,
[Mr.
Guy]
was
not
represented
by
counsel.”
Id.
at
7.
The
email
correspondence
indicates
that
o
n
April
27,
2026,
plaintiffs
sent
defense
counsel
another
revised
deposition
notice
for
Mr.
Guy’s
now-
rescheduled
2
Specifically,
Karen
Evans,
FEMA’s
Senior
Official
Performing
the
Duties
of
Administrator
(SOPDA),
testified
at
her
deposition
that
Guy
told
Evans
to
include
an
option
for
a
50%
cut
in
FEMA’s
staffing
plan.
Dkt.
No.
350-1
(“
Eshleman
Decl.
”)
,
Ex.
G
(Evans
Dep.)
at
235:10-25.
Case
3:25-cv-03698-SI
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395
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United
States
District
Court
Northern
District
of
California
May
4
deposition,
along
with
a
Rule
45
subpoena,
as
requested
by
defendants.
Id.
at
5
-
6.
On
April
29,
2026,
defen
se
counsel
stated
that
they
had
not
accepted
service
of
the
Rule
45
subpoena
and
were
not
authorized
to
do
so
on
Guy’s
behalf.
Id.
at
1
-
2.
As
to
the
deposition
notice,
defendants
stated:
“
Were
his
deposition
scheduled
to
occur
during
his
time
as
an
employee
of
a
party-
defendant,
his
attendance
at
that
deposition
would
be
a
matter
properly
considered
and
(if
necessary)
enforced
and
resolved
under
Fe
d.
R.
Civ.
P.
30.
But
because
he
will
no
longer
be
an
employee
of
a
party-
defendant
as
of
the
scheduled
date
of
his
deposition,
his
attendance
is
a
matter
governed
by
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
45.”
Id.
In
filings
late
the
night
of
April
29
and
the
morning
of
April
30,
i.e.,
Guy’s
last
day
of
federal
employment,
the
parties
raised
the
dispute
about
whether
plaintiffs
had
properly
served
Guy
and
whether
defendants
had
the
power
to
compel
his
attendance
at
his
deposition.
Dkt.
Nos.
356,
357.
On
April
30,
2026,
while
Guy
remained
employed
by
the
federal
government,
the
Court
ordered
defendants
to
“search
Guy’s
personal
phone
for
responsive
documents,
as
previously
ordered,
Dkt.
No.
351
at
4”
and
to
“accept
service
of
Guy’s
deposition
notice
to
comply
with
this
Court’s
April
22,
2026
order,
Dkt.
No.
351
at
1-
2.”
Dkt.
No.
358.
On
May
1,
2026,
plaintiffs
filed
an
urgent
request
with
the
Court
regarding,
in
part,
defendants’
position
that
service
of
a
Rule
45
subpoena
had
not
been
effectuated
on
Guy.
Dkt.
No.
360
at
1.
That
same
day,
the
Court
issued
an
order
clarifying
that
the
“deposition
noti
ce
and
subpoena
issued
to
Guy
are
deemed
served
and
are
effective,
based
on
service
on
defense
counsel
while
Guy
was
still
in
government
employment
,
pursuant
to
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
5(b)(1)
and
45.”
Dkt.
No.
362
at
1
.
On
May
4,
2026,
plaintiffs
deposed
Guy,
with
his
personal
counsel
and
counsel
for
defendants
present.
Later
that
day,
in
response
to
additional
emergency
filings
from
plaintiffs
and
defendants,
the
Court
issued
an
order
permitting
plaintiffs
another
half
-
day
to
depose
Guy,
in
light
of
plaintiffs’
representations
that
they
spent
a
“significant
amount
of
ti
me”
questioning
Guy
about
“previously
undisclosed
spoliation
issues.”
Dkt.
No.
370
at
2
(quoting
Dkt.
No.
368
at
6-
7).
The
Court
also
noted
that
at
the
deposition
Guy
revealed
the
existence
of
nearly
30
FEMA
-
related
Signal
group
chats
on
his
personal
phone,
which
included
20
participants,
and
that
on
April
30
or
May
1
Guy
had
deleted
these
Signal
messages
from
his
phone.
Id.
Case
3:25-cv-03698-SI
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395
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05/13/26
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United
States
District
Court
Northern
District
of
California
On
May
5,
2026,
the
Court
held
a
n
emergency
status
conference
to
discuss
ongoing
expedited
discovery
issues.
Dkt.
No.
377.
The
Court
ordered
that
Joseph
Guy
appear
for
a
continued
deposition
on
the
afternoon
of
May
8,
2026.
Dkt.
Nos.
377,
381.
On
May
6,
2026,
Guy
filed
an
emergency
motion
to
quash
his
deposition
subpoena
and
for
a
protective
order
in
the
Eastern
District
of
Virginia.
See
Guy
v.
Am.
Fed.
of
Gov’t
Emps.,
AFL
-
CIO
,
ECF
No.
1,
No.
1:26-
mc
-
8
(E.D.
Va.
May
6,
2026).
3
The
Eastern
District
of
Virginia
transferred
Guy’s
motion
to
this
Court.
See
id
.,
ECF
No.
5.
On
May
7,
2026,
Guy
filed
an
“Urgent
Request
for
Hearing
on
Emergency
Motion
to
Quash,”
requesting
an
immediate
hearing
prior
to
his
deposition
scheduled
for
the
next
day
.
Dkt.
No.
385.
The
Court
granted
the
request
to
postpone
the
continued
deposition
of
Guy
until
May
15,
2026,
and
ordered
plaintiffs
to
file
a
response
to
Guy’s
motion
quash
on
the
merits.
Dkt.
No.
386.
Plaintiffs
filed
their
response,
Dkt.
No.
389,
and
Guy
filed
a
reply,
Dkt.
No.
392.
The
Court
heard
oral
argument
on
the
motion
on
May
13,
2026.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
30,
a
party
may
request
the
deposition
of
another
party
to
the
litigation
by
serving
a
notice
upon
that
party.
Fed.
R.
Civ
.
P.
30(b)(1).
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
45
governs
subpoenas
of
non-
parties.
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
45(a).
Under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
45(d)(3),
a
district
court
“must
quash
or
modify
a
subpoena
that:
(i)
fails
to
allow
a
reasonable
time
to
comply;
(ii)
requires
a
person
to
comply
beyond
the
geographical
limits
specified
in
Rule
45(c);
(iii)
requires
disclosure
of
privileged
or
other
protected
matter,
if
no
exception
or
waiver
applies;
or
(iv)
subjects
a
person
to
undue
burden.”
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
45(
d)(3).
Under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
26(c),
the
court
may
for
good
cause
issue
a
protective
order
“to
protect
a
party
or
person
from
annoyance,
embarrassment,
oppression,
or
undue
burden
or
expense.”
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P
26(c).
A
protective
order
requires
a
showing
that
“particularized
harm
3
Plaintiffs
’
counsel
also
included
in
a
May
6,
2026
email
to
Guy’s
counsel
an
attachment
for
a
new
subpoena
for
the
continued
deposition
on
May
8,
2026.
See
Guy
v.
Am.
Fed.
of
Gov’t
Emps.,
AFL
-
CIO
,
ECF
No.
1,
No.
1:26-
mc
-80146
(
N.D.
Cal.
May
6,
2026)
at
5
-
6
&
Ex.
5.
Guy’s
counsel
replied
that
he
was
“not
authorized
to
accept
service
of
this
subpoena
.”
Id
.
,
Ex.
5
at
2
.
Case
3:25-cv-03698-SI
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395
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United
States
District
Court
Northern
District
of
California
will
result
from
disclosure
of
information
to
the
public.”
Phillips
ex
rel.
Ests.
of
Byrd
v.
Gen.
Motors
Corp.
,
307
F.3d
1206,
1211
(9th
Cir.
2002).
DISCUSSION
Guy
moves
“
to
quash
the
deposition
subpoena
s
purportedly
served
”
for
his
May
1,
2026
deposition
and
May
8,
2026
half
-
day
continued
deposition
pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
45(d)(3).
Mot.
at
1
-
2.
Guy
also
moves
for
a
protective
order
under
Rule
26(c)
“prohibiting
any
further
compelled
deposition
testimony
or
search
of
his
personal
property
pursuant
to
that
subpoena,
and
for
the
preservation
and
return
–
or
at
least
designation
as
confident
ial
–
[of]
any
documents
or
data
obtained
from
his
phone
in
violation
of
the
Fourth
Amendment.”
Id.
at
2.
Guy’s
motion
forwards
five
arguments,
none
of
which
are
availing.
First
,
Guy
argues
that
the
subpoena
must
be
quashed
because
it
was
never
served
as
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
45
requires
.
Mot.
at
7.
The
Court
finds
Guy’s
deposition
was
properly
noticed
.
Guy’s
papers
do
not
address
service
under
Rule
30
while
he
was
still
a
government
employee.
Pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
30,
a
party
may
request
the
deposition
of
another
party
to
the
litigation
by
serving
a
notice
upon
that
party.
Fed.
R.
Civ
.
P.
30(b)(1).
An
employee
or
agent
who
qualifies
as
an
“officer,
director
or
managing
agent”
is
subject
to
deposition
by
notice
pursuant
to
Rule
30(b)(1).
Cadent
Ltd.
v.
3M
Unitek
Corp.,
232
F.R.D.
625,
627-
28
&
n.1
(C.D.
Cal.
2005)
.
C
ourts
consider
several
factors
in
determining
whether
an
individual
is
a
managing
agent
under
Rule
30(b)(1)
:
“(
1)
the
discretionary
authority
vested
in
the
person
by
the
corporation;
(2)
the
employee
’
s
dependability
in
following
the
employer
’
s
direction
s;
(3)
whether
the
individual
is
more
likely
to
identify
with
the
corporation
or
the
adverse
party
in
the
litigation;
and
(4)
the
degree
of
supervisory
authority
in
areas
pertinent
to
the
litigation.”
E.I.
DuPont
de
Nemours
&
Co.
v.
Kolon
Indus.,
Inc.
,
268
F.R.D.
45,
48-
49
(E.D.
Va.
2010)
(citing
In
re
Honda,
Am.
Motor
Co.
,
168
F.R.D.
535,
540-
41
(D.
Md.
1996))
.
Courts
recognize
that
the
third
factor
is
“paramount.”
Id.
at
49
(quoting
Honda
,
168
F.R.D.
at
541).
“[T]he
question
of
whether
a
particular
pe
rson
is
a
‘
managing
agent
’
is
to
be
answered
pragmatically,
on
an
ad
hoc
basis,
considering
the
facts
of
the
particular
case.”
Case
3:25-cv-03698-SI
Document
395
Filed
05/13/26
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United
States
District
Court
Northern
District
of
California
Calderon
v.
Experian
Info.
Sols.,
Inc.,
287
F.R.D.
629,
632
(D.
Idaho
2012),
aff’d
,
290
F.R.D.
508
(D.
Idaho
2013)
;
see
also
Founding
Church
of
Scientology
v.
Webster
,
802
F.2d
1448,
1452
(D.C.
Cir.
1986)
.
“[I]f
there
is
at
least
a
‘
close
question
’
as
to
the
managing
agent
status
of
a
potential
witness,
doubts
should
be
resolved
in
favor
of
allowing
the
deposition[.]”
Calderon
,
287
F.R.D
.
at
633.
Generally
the
determination
of
an
individual
’
s
status
as
a
“
managing
agent
”
is
“determined
as
of
the
time
of
the
deposition,
not
as
of
the
time
when
the
activities
disputed
in
the
litigation
occurred.”
E.I.
DuPont
,
268
F.R.D.
at
49
(citation
omitted).
However,
the
general
rule
that
“former
employees
cannot
be
managing
agents
of
a
corporation”
is
not
without
exceptions.
Id.
“
[C]ourts
have
made
exceptions
to
this
general
rule,
for
example
when
a
corporation
terminates
an
officer
in
light
of
pending
litiga
tion,
plans
to
rehire
the
individual
in
another
position,
or
an
individual
continues
to
act
as
a
managing
agent
despite
no
longer
being
an
employee.”
In
re
Lithium
Ion
Batteries
Antitrust
Litig.
,
No.
13-
MD
-
02420-
YGR
(DMR),
2015
WL
5440789,
at
*6
(N.D.
Cal.
Sept.
15,
2015)
(
quoting
Rundquist
v.
Vapiano
SE
,
277
F.R.D.
205,
208
(D.D.C.
2011)
)
(citing
Honda,
168
F.R.D.
at
541;
E.I.
DuPont,
268
F.R.D.
at
50-
51
(“[t]he
timing
and
circumstances
of
[defendant
’
s]
reassignment
or
termination
of
its
employees
render
the
true
status
of
the
proposed
deponents
highly
suspect,
and
allow
for
a
strong
inference
that
[defendant]
is
moving
its
employees
around
like
chessmen,
conveniently
shielding
them
from
[plaintiff
’
s]
access.”)).
In
In
re
Lithium
Ion
Batteries
,
for
instance,
the
court
applied
the
managing
agent
test
to
a
witness
even
after
the
company
asserted
he
was
no
longer
its
employee,
where
there
was
evidence
that
this
was
“a
key
witness
with
first-
hand
knowledge
of
the
alleged
conspiracy”
and
all
but
the
first
of
the
Honda
factors
weighed
in
favor
of
finding
him
a
managing
agent
as
of
the
time
his
deposition
was
requested.
2015
WL
5440789,
at
*6.
Here,
the
Court
finds
that
Guy
was
a
managing
agent
for
defendants
and
that,
pursuant
to
Rule
30,
he
was
effectively
served
with
a
deposition
notice
through
defense
counsel
while
he
was
still
in
federal
employment.
See
Honda,
168
F.R.D.
at
541;
In
re
Lithium
Ion
Batteries
,
2015
WL
5440789,
at
*6.
Guy
held
the
role
of
Deputy
Chief
of
State
at
the
Department
of
Homeland
Security
from
January
2025
to
March
2026,
before
moving
to
the
Department
of
State.
Dkt.
No.
359
-
1
(“Guy
Case
3:25-cv-03698-SI
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395
Filed
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of
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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United
States
District
Court
Northern
District
of
California
Decl.”)
¶
1.
Defendants
previously
submitted
a
declaration
identifying
Guy
as
one
of
three
DHS
individuals
involved
in
the
decisions
regarding
the
renewal
of
the
CORE
employees.
Dkt.
No.
327-
1
(“Prieur
Decl.”)
¶
5.
The
acting
head
of
FEMA
also
testified
at
her
deposition
that
it
was
Guy
who
instructed
her
to
include
an
option
for
a
50%
cut
to
FEMA’s
staffing
plan.
Evans
Dep.
at
235:10-
19.
The
record
indicates
that
plaintiffs
served
defendants
’
counsel
with
a
notice
for
Guy’s
deposition
on
April
10,
13,
and
27,
2026,
while
he
was
still
employed
by
defendant
Department
of
State.
Defendants
originally
agreed
Guy
would
appear
for
deposition
on
April
30;
after
that
date
was
moved,
and
on
less
than
one
week’s
notice,
they
informed
plaintiffs
that
April
30
would
be
Guy’s
last
day
of
federal
employment
.
Guy’s
departure
from
high-
level
government
employment
just
prior
to
his
scheduled
deposition
should
not
shield
him
from
discovery
unquestionably
relevant
to
this
case
,
particularly
where
the
record
indicates
he
has
taken
wit
h
him
relevant
official
government
communications
that
may
exist
only
on
his
personal
cell
phone
.
Accordingly,
the
Court
finds
that
Guy
is
a
managing
agent
of
defendants
under
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
30(b)(1)
for
purposes
of
his
continued
deposition
and
ORDERS
Guy
to
appear
for
his
May
15,
2026
continued
deposition
as
previously
ordered.
4
Second
,
Guy
argues
that
the
Court
entered
its
May
1,
2026
order
without
providing
him
notice
or
opportunity
to
be
heard,
in
violation
of
his
due
process
rights.
Mot
.
at
8.
However,
there
is
no
dispute
that
G
uy
had
actual
notice
of
his
deposition.
The
Court
first
ordered
Guy’s
deposition
on
April
22,
2026,
while
he
was
still
employed
as
a
high-
level
government
official.
See
Dkt.
No.
351
at
1-
2.
At
that
time,
Guy’s
interests
were
represented
by
government
counsel.
Jason
Greaves,
Guy’s
personal
counsel,
has
since
represented
Guy’s
interests
at
the
May
4,
2026
deposition
and
in
two
appearances
before
this
Court.
Third
,
Guy
argues
that
the
Court’s
May
1,
2026
order
compelling
a
search
of
his
personal
cell
phone
by
Department
of
Justice
attorneys
violates
the
Fourth
Amendment.
Mot
.
at
9.
The
Fourth
Amendment
guards
against
“unreasonable
searches
and
seizures.”
U.S.
CONST.
amend.
IV.
4
The
Court
further
notes
plaintiffs
delivered
Rule
45
subpoenas
for
Guy’s
deposition
through
defense
counsel
(while
Guy
remained
in
federal
employment)
and
through
his
personal
counsel
(after
Guy
left
federal
employment).
Case
3:25-cv-03698-SI
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United
States
District
Court
Northern
District
of
California
Guy
cites
no
authority,
apart
from
a
misquoted
case
regarding
the
limits
of
discovery
under
the
federal
rules
of
civil
procedure,
for
the
proposition
that
the
Fourth
Amendment
has
any
bearing
on
relevant
discovery
in
a
civil
lawsuit
.
See
Mot.
at
8
(
misquoting
Henson
v.
Turn,
Inc.
,
No.
15-
cv
-
01497-
JSW
(LB)
,
2018
WL
5281629,
at
*5
(N.D.
Cal.
Oct.
22,
2018)
as
saying
compelled
production
of
mobile
devices
for
forensic
imaging
“is
highly
intrusive”).
The
Court
finds
his
argument
to
be
frivolous.
See
United
States
v.
Int’l
Bus.
Machines
Corp.
,
83
F.R.D.
97,
102
(S.D.N.Y.
1979)
(“It
strains
common
sense
and
constitutional
analysis
to
conclude
that
the
fourth
amendment
was
meant
to
protect
against
unreasonable
discovery
demands
made
by
a
private
litigant
in
the
course
of
civil
litigation.”)
;
Ariz.
Yage
Assembly
v.
Barr
,
No.
CV
-20-02373-
PHX-
ROS,
2024
WL
1011677,
*2
(D.
Ariz.
Feb.
22,
2024),
appeal
dismissed
sub
nom.
Ariz.
Yage
Assembly
v.
Garland
,
No.
24-
1385,
2024
WL
5001830
(9th
Cir.
Mar.
28,
2024)
(“Where
a
plaintiff
brings
claims
[against
the
government,]
the
protections
of
the
Fourth
Amendment
do
not
provide
a
shield
against
civil
discovery
going
to
those
issues.”)
(internal
citation
omitted).
Fourth
,
Guy
argues
the
subpoena
imposes
an
undue
burden
under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
45(d)(3)(A)(iv)
because
he
is
a
non
-
party
.
Mot
.
at
9.
The
Court
disagrees.
The
scope
of
the
Court’s
discovery
orders
pertain
only
to
Guy’s
activities
as
a
high-
level
government
employee
,
are
limited
to
government
-
related
business
at
issue
on
the
pending
motion
for
preliminary
injunction,
and
are
relevant
and
proportional.
The
additional
half
-
day
deposition
would
not
have
been
needed
if
plaintiffs’
counsel
hadn’t
been
constrained
to
spend
so
much
of
the
first
day
on
spoliation
of
relevant
government
communications.
Fi
fth
,
in
support
of
a
protective
order,
Guy
argues
that
plaintiffs’
examination
of
Guy’s
cell
phone
at
the
May
4,
2026
deposition
exceeded
the
scope
of
the
Court’s
May
1,
2026
order
and
therefore
warrants
return
of
any
records
obtained
or
a
t
minimum
a
designation
of
confidentiality.
Mot
.
at
10
-
11.
The
Court
finds
no
good
cause
exists
to
prevent
disclosure
of
Guy’s
deposition
testimony
about
official
government
communications.
The
deposition
transcript
from
Guy’s
May
4,
2026
deposition
reflects
that
Guy’s
personal
counsel
who
attended
the
deposition
asserted
confidentiality
designations
only
over
Guy’s
home
address,
telephone
number,
and
current
employer.
Moreover,
Guy’s
personal
counsel
consented
to
Guy
himself
searching
through
his
Case
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United
States
District
Court
Northern
District
of
California
Signal
chat
apps
for
groups
related
to
DHS
during
the
May
4,
2026
deposition.
Finally,
as
discussed
at
the
hearing,
t
he
Court
is
troubled
by
the
multiple
citations
in
Guy’s
motion
to
purported
case
quotations
that
do
not
exist
in
the
cases
as
cited
.
See
Mot.
at
7
(“A
subpoena
that
does
not
strictly
comply
with
Rule
45(b)
is
invalid”),
8
(forensic
imaging
“is
highly
intrusive
”),
9
(“the
status
of
a
person
as
a
non
-
party
is
a
factor
that
weighs
against
disclosure”).
Plaintiffs
pointed
out
this
problem
in
their
response
,
along
with
other
sources
that
do
not
stand
for
the
cited
proposition.
Dkt.
No.
389
at
11
&
n.3.
Guy’s
counsel
did
not
explain
these
non-
existent
misquotations
in
hi
s
reply
brief
filed
with
the
Court.
See
Dkt.
No.
392.
When
questioned
by
the
Court
about
these
hallucinated
quotations
at
the
hearing,
Guy
’s
counsel
was
unaware
of
them
and
had
no
explanation
for
the
errors.
CONCLUSION
For
the
foregoing
reasons
and
for
good
cause
shown,
the
Court
hereby
DENIES
the
motion
to
quash
and
for
a
protective
order
.
The
Court
ORDERS
Mr.
Guy
to
appear
for
the
continuation
of
his
deposition
on
May
15,
2026.
Further,
no
later
than
May
15,
2026,
counsel
for
Mr.
Guy
shall
file
a
declaration
under
penalty
of
perjury
explaining
the
fabricated
case
quotations
contained
in
the
motion
to
quash.
IT
IS
SO
ORDERED
.
Dated:
______________________________________
SUSAN
ILLSTON
United
States
District
Judge
May
13,
2026
Case
3:25-cv-03698-SI
Document
395
Filed
05/13/26
Page
9
of
9
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