Hardy v. Whitaker, No. 1:24-cv-11270 (2026)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington (J.) (unanimous Court)
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 575225Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D.Michigan, Northern Division.Gregory HARDY, Plaintiff,v.WHITAKER, et al., Defendants.Case No. 1:24-cv-11270|Signed March 2, 2026Honorable Thomas L. Ludington, United States DistrictJudgeAttorneys and Law FirmsGregory Hardy, Flint, MI, Pro Se.Barbara Patek, Detroit Mercy Law, Grosse Pointe Farms, MI,for Plaintiff.Barney R. Whitesman, Flint, MI, for Defendants Whitaker,Wallenman, Lipset.Tom Sparrow, City of Flint Law Department, Flint, MI, forDefendant Deshawn Perry.OPINION AND ORDER (1) ADOPTINGMAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT ANDRECOMMENDATION, (2) OVERRULINGPLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS, (3) DENYING ASMOOT DEFENDANT LIPSET, WALLENMAN,AND WHITAKER'S MOTION TO DISMISS, (4)REJECTING JUDGE STAFFORD'S OCTOBER20, 2025 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ASMOOT, (5) DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'SMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (6)DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONFOR LEAVE TO FILE NOTICE OF FILING, (7)DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT PERRY'SMOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A DIGITALRECORDING, (8) DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S“OMNIBUS” MOTION TO CONSOLIDATECASES, AND (9) ENJOINING PLAINTIFFSTEPHEN J. MURPHY, III, United States District Judge forThomas L. Ludington, United States District Judge*1 This case stems from a seemingly straightforwardset of facts involving the alleged false arrest of PlaintiffGregory Hardy and subsequent alleged mistreatment whileincarcerated at the Genesee County Jail. On April 25, 2025,after a year of litigation, Plaintiff filed a pro se AmendedComplaint. In it, he alleged (1) a count for a violationof his Fourth Amendment right due to false arrest under42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Deshawn Perry, and(2) a count for a violation of his Fourteenth AmendmentDue Process rights due to excessive force, also under 42U.S.C. § 1983, against the “Genesee County Defendants”:Defendants Deputy Whitaker, Lieutenant Wallenman, andSargeant Lipset.1On August 6, 2024, the Court referred all matters for thiscase to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford. On January12, 2026, Magistrate Judge Stafford filed a report (R&R)recommending dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Complaintunder Rule 41(b). On January 21, 2026, Plaintiff timelyobjected to Magistrate Judge Stafford's R&R and thenobjected again, this time untimely, on February 10, 2026.As explained below, the R&R will be adopted, Plaintiffs’Objections will be overruled, Plaintiff's Amended Complaintwill be dismissed, the seven remaining motions filed by bothPlaintiff and Defendants will be denied as moot, and Plaintiffwill be enjoined from further filing in federal court.I.A.While the facts of the case jump from arrest to detention,they remain straightforward. The case starts on August 7,2023, with Defendant Perry—an officer for the City of Flint,ECF No. 93 at PageID.756 —responding to a 9-1-1 call madeby Plaintiff concerning a “man with a gun.” Id. Plaintiffclaims he was first seen by Defendant Perry returning froma house located at 422 W. Austin Avenue in Flint, whichPlaintiff contends was the “[a]ssailants' [h]ouse.” Id. Hecontends that the gunman was the stepson of one of thepeople at the assailant's house: Tony Howard, whom Plaintiffalleges manufactures and distributes crack cocaine. Id. atPageID.758. Defendant Perry allegedly asked the members ofthe assailants' house, “who is that out here with a gun?”, towhich they pointed Defendant Perry to another house, 430 E.Austin Avenue, which is Plaintiff's address. Id. at 756.
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Perry took an “aggressiveapproach” to his house and took no further action toinvestigate whether there was a gun at the assailant's house.Id. Defendant Perry told Plaintiff to put his hands behind hisback but also let him know that he was “not under arrestbut was just being detained.” Id. at PageID.757. Plaintiffalleges that he was then placed into the backseat of DefendantPerry's squad car “without any cause.” Id. Plaintiff allegesthat he requested medical attention because he had begunhyperventilating “from being twisted in [the] restraints” andbecause he was “unable to move because he was fearful” dueto the fact that he felt that he had not been told “why he wasbeing arrested.” Id.*2 Plaintiff alleges that, seemingly at some point after hewas placed in Defendant Perry's squad car, the members of theassailant's house “gave conflicting statement(s)” and declinedto press charges. Id. Despite this, and the fact that Plaintiff wasnever armed or brandished any weapons, id. at PageID.758,Plaintiff states that he was still arrested. Id. at PageID.757.Plaintiff claims that he attempted to inform Defendant Perryabout the harassment he experienced at the hands of peopleat the assailant's house, including repeated threats—some ofwhich seemingly involved the use of guns, “making offersof protection,” intimidation, and even a shooting involvingPlaintiff's dog. Id. at PageID.758–59. But he was still arrested.As a result of his arrest, Plaintiff was brought to the GeneseeCounty Jail. Id. at PageID.760. It was inside the jail, Plaintiffclaims, that the Genessee County Defendants “created ahostile environment through aggressive, unwarranted andexcessive forceful actions.”2 Id. Allegedly, the uses ofexcessive force included: (1) a threat of tasing after Plaintiffknocked on a glass door seeking a mattress, (2) being forcedto remain in a “[w]rap suit” for 10-12 hours, (3) placing himin leg restraints, which Plaintiff allegedly told the GenesseeCounty Defendants were too tight, but of which nothing wasdone, (4) that he was treated “completely differently” fromother inmates, (5) that he “would cry out all night because hecould not feel his legs” due to the tight leg restraints, whichhe claims eventually made him go unconscious, and (5) thatthe leg restraints impacted his ability to walk in the daysfollowing their removal, causing him to fall within the jail. Id.at PageID.760–62.On August 12, 2023, Plaintiff was released from custody andwent to the McLaren Hospital in Flint. Id. at PageID.762.There, he allegedly received medical test results which“showed that [Plaintiff's] injuries were the result of theexcessively tight ankle restraints,” and he was diagnosed with“Foot Drop.” Id.B.On May 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint.ECF No. 1. And on August 6, 2024, the Court referred thiscase and all matters to Magistrate Judge Stafford. ECF No.10. But after the referral followed a dizzying number ofmotions before Plaintiff was finally allowed to amend hiscomplaint for the last time on April 25, 2025. ECF No. 93.The operative Complaint alleges (1) a violation of his FourthAmendment rights due to false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983against Defendant Deshawn Perry, id. at PageID.765, and (2)a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rightsdue to excessive force, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, againstthe Genesee County Defendants, id. at PageID.767.Since the filing of his Amended Complaint, both Plaintiffand Defendants have filed several pending motions. Thesemotions are represented in the following chart:Motion Filer Pending Report andRecommendation Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 142) Genesee County Defendants Yes (ECF No. 180) Motion for Summary Judgment(ECF No. 192) Plaintiff No Motion for Leave to File Notice ofCorrected Reply Brief (ECF No.206) Plaintiff No Motion for leave to File DigitalRecording (ECF No. 207)Defendant Perry No
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3 Motion for Summary Judgment(ECF No. 210) Defendant Perry No Omnibus Motion to ConsolidateCases (ECF No. 218) Plaintiff No On January 12, 2026, Magistrate Judge Stafford submitted anR&R recommending this Court dismiss Plaintiff's AmendedComplaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), withprejudice, and enjoin Plaintiff from filing new actions infederal court. ECF No. 211 at PageID.2385. Under Civil Rule72, Judge Stafford provided all parties 14 days to object tothe R&R., id. at PageID.2414, and Plaintiff did so in a timelymanner, see ECF No. 213. But then Plaintiff filed yet anotherset of objections, which were untimely. ECF No. 221.II.*3 A party may object to and seek review of a R&R. SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2). If a party properly objects, then“[t]he district judge must determine de novo” the part of theR&R to which the objection pertains. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). A party must object timely and with specificity—failureto do so waives any right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.140, 151, 155 (1985) (citation omitted); Howard v. Sec'y ofHealth & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991);United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1981).Likewise, parties may not “raise at the district court stagenew arguments or issues that were not presented” before themagistrate judge issues the R&R. See Murr v. United States,200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).When reviewing an R&R de novo, this Court must reviewat least the evidence the parties presented to the magistratejudge. See Hill v. Duriron Co., 656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir.1981). After reviewing the evidence, the court can accept,reject, or modify the R&R. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3).III.When a party objects to a magistrate judge's report, the courtmust review de novo those portions of the report to whichthe party has properly objected. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). To that end, the court must review atleast the evidence that was before the magistrate judge. SeeHill v. Duriron Co., 656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981).After reviewing the evidence, the court may accept, reject, ormodify the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations.FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3); Peek v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 585F.Supp.3d 1014, 1017–18 (E.D. Mich. 2021). If the courtadopts the R&R, then it may simply “state that it engagedin a de novo review of the record and adopts the report andrecommendation” without “stat[ing] with specificity what itreviewed.” United States v. Robinson, 366 F. Supp. 2d 498,505 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (Lardie v. Birkett, 221 F. Supp. 2d 806,807 (E.D. Mich. 2002); 12 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3070.2 (2ded. 1997)), aff'd, 290 F. App'x 769 (6th Cir. 2008); FharmacyRecs. v. Nassar, 465 F. App'x 448, 456 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]hedistrict court's statement that it conducted de novo review isdeemed sufficient”).This Court has reviewed Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,ECF No. 93, Plaintiff's Objections, ECF No. 213, DefendantPerry's response to Plaintiff's Objections, ECF No. 214,Plainittiff's Reply to Defendant Perry's Response, ECF No.217, and Plaintiff's untimely filed Objections, ECF No. 221;as well as all other applicable filings on the docket. Havingconducted this de novo review, this Court concludes thatJudge Stafford's factual conclusions and legal reasoning arecorrect. For these reasons, Plaintiffs' Objections will beoverruled, and the Magistrate Judge's recommendations willbe adopted.IV.Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's objections, ECFNos. 213, 221, are OVERRULED.Further, it is ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Stafford'sReport and Recommendation, ECF No. 211, is ADOPTED.Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,ECF No. 93, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.Further, it is ORDERED, that the Genessee CountyDefendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 142, MagistrateJudge Stafford's R&R, ECF No. 180, Plaintiff's Motion for
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Summary Judgment, ECF No. 192, Plaintiff's Motin forLeave to File Notice for a Corrected Reply Brief, ECF No.206, Defendant Perry's Motion for Leave to File a DigitalRecording, ECF No. 207, Defendant perry's Motion forSummary Judgment, ECF No. 210, and Plaintiff's OmnibusMotion to Consolidate Cases, ECF No. 218, are all DENIEDAS MOOT.*4 Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff is ENJOINEDfrom filing any new federal actions in the Eastern District ofMichigan without obtaining leave of court, and any actionfiled without leave be stricken.Further it is ORDERED that to obtain leave to file a newaction Plaintiff must file a “Motion Pursuant to Court OrderSeeking Leave to File” with any proposed complaint; attachas an exhibit to that motion a declaration under 28 U.S.C.§ 1746, or a sworn affidavit, certifying that his complaint isnot prohibited by the permanent injunction, and that it is notfrivolous or made in bad faith; identify and list in a secondexhibit: (1) the full caption of every suit which has beenpreviously filed by him or on his behalf in any court againstevery defendant in the suit that he wishes to file, and (2) thefull caption of every suit which he has currently pending;(3) provide, in a third exhibit, a copy of each complaintcovered by the preceding section and a certified record of itsdisposition, and he must serve a copy of this order on eachdefendant if leave to file is granted; (4) and attach the ordergranting the permanent injunction to any new action that hemay file in any court.Further, it is ORDERED that this injunction does not impairPlaintiff's ability to defend himself in any criminal action.Further, it is ORDERED that the Court retains jurisdictionto modify this injunction as necessary where circumstancesmay change.This is a final order and closes the case.REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TODISMISS ACTION UNDER FEDERAL RULEOF CIVIL PROCEDURE 41(b) AND ENJOINPLAINTIFF FROM FILING NEW ACTIONSELIZABETH A. STAFFORD United States Magistrate JudgeI. IntroductionPlaintiff Gregory Hardy, proceeding pro se and in formapauperis, sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violationsof his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenthamendments. ECF No. 93. The Honorable Thomas L.Ludington referred the matter to the undersigned for allpretrial matters under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 10.Throughout this litigation, Hardy has wasted the resources ofthe Court and opposing counsel by filing umpteen frivolousmotions and unauthorized documents. He filed those motionsand unauthorized documents without regard to court rules orprior orders, repeating the same violations over and over. TheCourt held many status conferences and tried many measuresto help Hardy make a course correction without imposingsanctions, but any progress was short-lived. Finding no hopethat Hardy will cease his wasteful litigation practices, theCourt now recommends that this case be dismissed withprejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), andthat Hardy be enjoined from filing new actions.II. BackgroundFor over 20 years, Hardy has been filing complaintsin Michigan's federal district courts. See, e.g., Hardy v.Southwestern Michigan Assessment Services, Case No. 1:98-cv-786 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 1, 1998); Hardy v. Lane, Case No.03-73517 (E.D. Mich., Jan. 20, 2004). As early as 2007, hewas an “active litigant in the federal courts in Michigan,” withmore than three lawsuits dismissed for failure to state a claim.Hardy v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., No. 1:07-cv-607, 2007 WL2030106, at *2 (W.D. Mich. July 11, 2007).*5 Courts have consistently found Hardy's endless lawsuitsto lack merit. See, e.g., Hardy v. Lansing Police Dep't,No. 1:20-cv-1224, 2021 WL 12258029, at *2 (W.D. Mich.Mar. 5, 2021) (“Plaintiff has a history of filing meritless orunsuccessful lawsuits in this Court.”)1; Hardy v. Kushman,No. 09-cv-14825, 2010 WL 3906327, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept.30, 2010) (dismissing “meritless action” against law firm andattorneys who had represented him pro bono at trial); Hardyv. City Rescue Mission of Lansing, No. 1:18-cv-628, 2018WL 8899332, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2018), adopted,2019 WL 3432435 (W.D. Mich. July 30, 2019) (sua spontedismissing action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).In Hardy v. City of Flint, the Honorable Mark A. Goldsmithdismissed a complaint against police officers, 911 operators,and a child protective services agent. Case No. 22-11351,ECF No. 49 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2023). Hardy claimed that
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5those defendants violated his constitutional rights after Hardycalled 911 and child protective services to report misconductby an unnamed neighbor. Id. In response to a motion todismiss, Hardy claimed that the neighbor held him at gunpointin June 2022. Id., ECF No. 29, PageID.220.Echoing his 2022 lawsuit, Hardy claims here that hisconstitutional rights were violated after he called 911 inAugust 2023 to report that an unnamed neighbor was armedwith a gun. ECF No. 93, PageID.756-757. Hardy was arrestedinstead. Id. If this Court's report and recommendation (R&R)to dismiss the Genesee County defendants is adopted, hisonly remaining claim here will be that Flint Police OfficerDeShawn Perry arrested him without probable cause. ECFNo. 93, PageID.765-766; ECF No. 180.Hardy began this case by clogging the docket with filingsthat lacked merit, including several motions to amend orsupplement his complaint. The Court denied or struck almostall those filings. See ECF No. 34; ECF No. 39; ECF No. 40;ECF No. 41; ECF No. 42; ECF No. 45; ECF No. 46; ECFNo. 49; ECF No. 51; ECF No. 53; ECF No. 68; ECF No. 69;ECF No. 73; ECF No. 75; ECF No. 78; ECF No. 113. Tryingto get the case on track, the Court held a status conference inApril 2025 and solicited the Federal Pro Se Legal AssistanceClinic, headed by Director Barbara Patek, to help him draftan amended complaint. ECF No. 89. Hardy then successfullyfiled the operative second amended complaint (SAC). ECFNo. 93.After accepting Hardy's SAC, the Court entered a June 2025R&R to deny defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule41(b). ECF No. 110. Defendants argued that Hardy had“repeatedly failed to follow this Court's instructions in ordersdenying and striking his proposed amended complaints.” Id.,PageID.848-849 (referring to ECF No. 34; ECF No. 40; ECFNo. 43; ECF No. 45; ECF No. 46; ECF No. 51; ECF No.73; ECF No. 76; ECF No. 78). The Court found that “Hardywas at fault for failing to follow the Court's instructionsabout amending his complaint” and that “defendants wastedtime moving to strike Hardy's amended complaints.” Id.,PageID.850. But because Hardy had “not engaged in badfaith, contumacious conduct, perverse resistance of authority,or stubborn disobedience” and because he had not beenwarned that he faced dismissal, the Court recommended thatdismissal be denied. Id., PageID.850-851. Judge Ludingtonadopted that recommendation. ECF No. 115.*6 Soon after the June R&R, Hardy returned to his practiceof flooding the docket with motions and other filings, manyof them repetitive or unauthorized supplements to motions,including for leave to supplement pleadings, to compeldiscovery, and to determine the sufficiency of defendants'answers. ECF No. 111; ECF No. 114; ECF No. 117; ECF No.118; ECF No. 120; ECF No. 125; ECF No. 131; ECF No. 132;ECF No. 139. And Hardy filed discovery motions despite thisCourt's order forbidding parties from filing discovery motionswithout leave of court. ECF No. 108, PageID.839; ECF No.125; ECF No. 132.Defendants' responses to Hardy's motions included requestsfor reimbursement of the costs associated with respondingto Hardy's filings. ECF No. 119, PageID.973; ECF No.133,PageID.1207; ECF No. 134, PageID.1288; ECF No. 136,PageID.1302-1306. The Court had discretion to grant thoserequests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B) (permitting a courtto order fees and costs be paid when motion challenging thesufficiency of an answer is denied); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)(permitting sanctions including fees and costs when a partyfiles a frivolous motion); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (requiring feesand costs be taxed when a party's certification violates thediscovery rule without substantial justification). But duringan August 2025 status conference, the Court denied thedefendants' requests for reimbursement of their costs.Rather than imposing sanctions, the Court cautioned Hardyduring the August conference that he was clogging thedocket with repetitive documents that lacked legal analysisshowing that he was entitled to relief. ECF No. 146,PageID.1483. For example, his requests for the Court todetermine the sufficiency of defendants' answers to requeststo admit included no legal analysis to guide the requesteddetermination. See ECF No. 125; ECF No. 132. And Hardy'smotions to supplement his complaint included no analysis ofhow the supplement was allowed under Federal Rule of CivilProcedures 15(d). See ECF No. 117; ECF No. 118.Hardy admitted during the August status conference that hefound the discovery process too complicated and that heneeded help because he does not know the law. ECF No. 146,PageID.1483. Thus, with Hardy's agreement, the Court againsolicited the Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance Clinic to helphim navigate the discovery process and scheduled anotherstatus conference for September 2025. Id.But days before the September 2025 status conference, Hardysent the Court an email objecting to the clinic's continued
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6assistance, claiming that he could “litigat[e] his own case” andneeded no help with responding to defendants' motions. Id.He sent the email without copying defense counsel, althoughthe Court had already warned him not to send ex partecommunications. Id., PageID.1483, n.1.Hardy revealed during the status conference that he was upsetby the clinic's legal advice. The Court permitted DirectorPatek to withdraw as counsel for Hardy, and warned him “thathis continued failure to follow procedural rules or orders,and filing of frivolous motions, could result in sanctions,including orders to reimburse defendants and the involuntarydismissal of his complaint.” ECF No. 146, PageID.1483; ECFNo. 151, PageID.1501.In October 2025, the Court denied Hardy's motion for leaveto file a third amended complaint (TAC) because of unduedelay and futility. ECF No. 144; ECF No. 179. One reasonthat the proposed TAC was futile was because adding theproposed new defendants—Genessee County Jail deputies—would lead to misjoinder under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 20(a)(2). ECF No. 179, PageID.1802-1803. TheCourt explained:*7 In Price v. City of Elyria, the court found misjoinderof defendants because, “the claims against the ElyriaDefendants concern conduct occurring before and duringthe search, whereas the claims against the Lorain CountyDefendants concern conduct occurring after the search.Furthermore, there are no counts in the Second AmendedComplaint that are brought against all Defendantscollectively.” No. 1:24-CV-1707-PAB, 2025 WL 2733667,at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2025) (emphasis in original).Hardy's proposed false arrest claims against [DefendantShawn] Perry concern conduct before and during his arrestin Hardy's neighborhood, while the claims against thedeputies involve conduct that occurred after his arrestwhen he was in jail. And the only claim Hardy broughtcollectively against Perry and the deputies is the conspiracyclaim are futile for the reasons already stated.Id.Before the hearing on Hardy's motion for leave and othermotions, the Court had described the authority aboutmisjoinder and ordered Hardy to be prepared to addressthe issue. ECF No. 162, PageID.1717-1719. But duringthe hearing, Hardy made no substantive argument to refutethe Court's analysis. Even so, after the Court rejected hisproposed TAC, Hardy both objected to that order and movedfor leave to file a permissive joinder under Rule 20 to add thedeputies identified in the rejected TAC. ECF No. 184; ECFNo. 185. Both filings lacked analysis showing that joinderwas proper.Still in October 2025, the Court issued an R&R to grantthe Genesse County defendants' motion for judgment onthe pleadings (MJOP).2 ECF No. 180. Hardy opposedthe motion in his response brief and at a hearing, andhe filed objections to the R&R. ECF No. 144; ECF No.185. But wasting judicial resources, he moved to strike theMJOP under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) morethan a month after the R&R was issued. ECF No. 197,PageID.2173. Hardy's motion to strike was both untimelyand frivolous. Under Rule 12(f), “[t]he Court may strikefrom a pleading any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, orscandalous matter.” (Emphasis added); Fox v. Mich. StatePolice Dep't, 173 F. App'x 372, 375 (6th Cir. 2006). Neithera response brief nor its supporting exhibits are “pleadings”under Rule 7(a). Lopez v. Trans Union LLC, No. 25-12733,2025 WL 2976840, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025) (“Aresponse brief is not a ‘pleading’ as defined under Rule7(a).”); Fox, 174 F. App'x at 375 (“Exhibits attached to adispositive motion are not ‘pleadings’ within the meaning ofFed. R. Civ. P. 7(a).”). So the Court denied the motion tostrike. ECF No. 209.The Court issued another warning to Hardy in October 2025.Hardy had “improperly suggested that he had a right toobject to deposition questions,” so the Court warned thathis continued “violations of discovery rules may promptsanctions, up to involuntary dismissal of his complaint.”ECF No. 162, PageID.1722-1724. Rather than heeding thewarning, Hardy moved the Court to recuse itself, accusingit of “repeatedly [bashing him] over the head with threats ofsanctions and dismissal because of errors in pleadings, actingpro se.” ECF No. 181, PageID.1815. Denying the motion, theCourt explained:Hardy alleges that the Court hasengaged in a pattern of hostility,but the record shows that theCourt solicited the Federal Pro SeLegal Assistance Clinic to help himprosecute his case and entered ordersto ensure that he obtained usablevideo evidence during discovery. ECF
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7No. 146, PageID.1480; ECF No. 162,PageID.1721-1722; ECF No. 166,PageID.1746. Hardy rejected the helpof the clinic despite admitting duringan August 2025 status conferencethat he needed help because he didnot know the law. ECF No. 146,PageID.1483. And despite Hardy'spattern of clogging the docket withmeritless motions, the Court hasdenied defendants' repeated requestsfor reimbursement of costs associatedwith those filings. See ECF No. 146,PageID.1481-1482.*8 ECF No. 190, PageID.1941.In November 2025, Hardy filed a meritless motion forsummary judgment (MSJ) under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 56. ECF No. 192. As noted, Hardy claimsthat Perry arrested him without probable cause. ECF No.93, PageID.765-766. In his MSJ, Hardy failed to setforth authority showing that his vague and conclusoryfactual allegations support that claim. Id., PageID.2006-2015.And contradicting the purpose of a MSJ, he argued that“[m]aterial factual disputes” preclude the Court from grantingsummary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.Id., PageID.2008. Hardy did not grasp the fundamentalrequirement of a MSJ that the “movant shows that there isno genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant isentitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a).Hardy also made arguments about claims not raised in hiscomplaint, including that he was subjected to a Terry3 stopwithout reasonable suspicion and detained too long underTerry standards; that he was deprived of equal protectionand due process; that Perry withheld exculpatory evidencein violation of Brady4; and that Perry violated state lawsand falsified evidence. Id. At the summary judgment stage, aplaintiff may not pursue claims not raised in his complaint.Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1011,1017 (S.D. Ohio 2007); Edison v. Twp. of Northville, 752 F.Supp. 3d 808, 822 (E.D. Mich. 2024).Making matters worse, Hardy's MSJ included fake citations:Patel v. City of Ferndale, 308 F.3d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 2002);Thompson v. City of Lebanon, 813 F.3d 318, 323 (6th Cir.2016); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 915 (5th Cir. 1999);Wesley v. Rigney, 860 F.3d 931 (6th Cir. 2017).5 ECF No.192, PageID.2007-2008, 2014. The Court suspects that thefake citations result from Hardy using generative artificialintelligence (AI).[T]he use of generative AI whendrafting legal filings is a very riskypractice, as pro se litigants andattorneys are still subject to therequirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) with respect to pleadings, motionsand other documents they sign andsubmit to the Court; even in theabsence of bad faith, Rule 11 sanctionsfor use of AI generated phantom casesmay be warranted.Smart v. Pro. Grp., No. 4:25-cv-11833, 2025 WL 3091139, at*5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 5, 2025).Then, after Perry responded to Hardy's MSJ, Hardy was notsatisfied with filing a reply brief, as allowed under E.D. Mich.LR 7.1(d)(1). ECF No. 194; ECF No. 195. He also burdenedthe Court and opposing counsel by frivolously moving tostrike portions of the response brief under Rule 12(f) “onthe basis that the arguments are factually false, immaterial,and without merit.” ECF No. 196, PageID.2159-2161. Perryresponded that Rule 12(f) allows only pleadings to bestricken. ECF No. 198. Rather than accepting that his motionto strike under Rule 12(f) was frivolous under the authorityPerry cited, Hardy moved to file a 16-page reply brief for hismotion to strike, well in excess of the 7-page limit for replybriefs under LR 7.1(d)(3)(B). ECF No. 202.*9 And the proposed oversized reply brief includes noarguments showing that Hardy's motion to strike is permittedunder Rule 12(f). Rather, the oversized brief equates to anextra brief in support of Hardy's MSJ in that it focuses onwhy Perry's affidavit in response to the MSJ should be foundinadmissible. Id. The proposed extra brief is not allowedunder LR 7.1(d)(1), which authorizes only a response briefand a reply brief to a motion. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co. v.Shepard, No. 19-cv-12777, 2021 WL 1087416, at *7 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 22, 2021) (defendant violated “Local Rule 7.1(d)by filing more than one brief to accompany her Motion to SetAside Default.”)
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Still not done, Hardy filed a “notice of admitted facts andsupplemental authority,” without leave of court, in supportof his MSJ almost a month after Perry responded to themotion, again in violation of LR 7.1(d)(1). ECF No. 205. TheCourt had already warned Hardy about filing unauthorizedsupplements to motions. ECF No. 146, PageID.1480 (citingECF No. 131; ECF No. 139).In December 2025, Perry moved for leave to file a digitalrecording of his bodycam video to support his plannedMSJ.6 ECF No. 207. Hardy filed a meritless opposition toPerry's motion for leave, arguing that the motion was madeafter briefing closed. ECF No. 208, PageID.207-208. Perry'smotion was timely, as the dispositive motions deadline isJanuary 13, 2026. ECF No. 109. Hardy also claimed that Perrywas “sandbagging” and that his “late-disclosed evidence”should be excluded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure37. ECF No. 208, PageID.2280. But the record shows thatthe video was not belatedly disclosed, as Hardy has formonths repeatedly described Perry's bodycam footage andclaimed that it contradicts the police reports. See ECF No.125, PageID.1103; ECF No. ECF No. 131, PageID.1187; ECFNo. 192, PageID.2003; ECF No. 205, PageID.2260. And inhis own MSJ, Hardy cited timestamped portions of the video,confirming that he viewed it. ECF No. 192, PageID.2003.Given Hardy's reliance on the bodycam video, his objection toPerry's motion to upload a digital copy of that video is anotherwaste of this Court's judicial resources.III. AnalysisCourts have the power to impose sanctions as “necessary inorder to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pendingcases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the DistrictCourts.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962).Exercising that power is increasingly important in the wakeof the exploding use of generative AI. Damien Charlotin, alegal analyst, has tracked more than 500 legal decisions aboutAI-generated hallucinated content in the United States.7The hallucinated content is “typically fake citations, but alsoother types of AI-generated arguments.” Id.; see also Sandersv. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 163, 169 (2025) (“It is nosecret that generative AI programs are known to ‘hallucinate’nonexistent cases, and with the advent of AI, courts have seena rash of cases in which both counsel and pro se litigants havecited such fake, hallucinated cases in their briefs.”).Likely because of the availability of AI, non-prisoner pro sefilings have skyrocketed in this district and circuit, and suchfilings exceed prisoner filings in this district for the first timein recent years.MIEDYear FY2025 FY2024 FY2023 FY2022 FY2021 PrisonerFilings 691 675 665 663 739 Non Prisoner Pro Se Filing315 542 431 359 285 Non Prisoner Non Pro Se CivilFilings 2440 2233 2201 2072 2027 Grand Total 39463450 3297 3099 3051*10 MIEDYear FY2025 FY2024 FY2023 FY2022 FY2021 PrisonerFilings 17.50% 19.57% 20.17% 21.56% 24.22% NonPrisoner Pro Se Filings 20.65% 15.71% 13.07% 11.53%9.34% Non Prisoner Non Pro Se Filings 61.33% 64.72%66.76% 66.36% 66.44% Grand Total 100% 100% 100%100% 100%Rest of the 6th CircuitYear FY2025 FY2024 FY2023 FY2022 FY2021 PrisonerFilings 3315 3234 3070 2833 2717 Non Prisoner Pro SeFiling 2212 1531 1307 1118 1215 Non Prisoner Non ProSe Civil Filings 9873 12463 11063 11173 13536 GrandTotal 15400 17233 15440 15129 17468Rest of the 6th CircuitYear FY2025 FY2024 FY2023 FY2022 FY2021 PrisonerFilings 21.53% 13,77% 19.88% 13,73% 15,55% NonPrisoner ProSe Filing 14.36% 8.88% 8.47% 7.39% 6.96%Non Prisoner Non Pro Se Civil Filings 64,11% 72,35%71,65% 73.88% 77,49% Grand Total 100% 100% 100%100% 100%The office of the Eastern District of Michigan's CourtAdministrator provided the data in the above charts. The“filings” in the charts reflect the number of complaints ratherthan the number of documents filed by pro se plaintiffs. Butthe Court has observed that non-prisoner pro se plaintiffsare increasingly likely to clog dockets with frivolous andimproper documents.The sharp increase in frivolous pro se filings burdensthe Court. See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184-185(1989) (“Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, nomatter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portionof the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court'sresponsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9a way that promotes the interests of justice.”); U.S. ex relVerdone v. Circuit Court for Taylor Cnty., 73 F.3d 669, 671(7th Cir. 1995) (“Frivolous, vexatious, and repeated filingsby pro se litigants interfere with the orderly administrationof justice by diverting scarce judicial resources from caseshaving merit and filed by litigants willing to follow courtorders.”); Thanedar v. Time Warner, Inc., 352 F. App'x. 891,900 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[i]t is well-settled that a plaintiff's prose status does not give him a license to harass others, clog thejudicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse alreadyoverloaded court dockets.”).Courts and opposing counsel are also burdened by the carelessuse of AI by pro se filers.Litigants who simply file the materialthat AI tools generate, withoutcarefully reviewing it first foraccuracy, have the potential to swampcourts with what appear at first glanceto be legal arguments built on lawand precedent, but which are in factnothing of the sort. And not onlyare these problems in their ownright, but they also heighten the twoconcerns the Court highlighted above—that defendants will be forced tospend more time and incur morecosts parsing through copious baselessfilings to defend an action, and thatCourts will waste precious time doingthe same in ruling on motions andmoving matters along.Muhammad v. Gap Inc., No. 2:24-cv-3676, 2025 WL1836657, at *14 (S.D. Ohio July 3, 2025). And whilemonetary sanctions under Rule 11 may effectively discourageattorneys from carelessly relying on AI, imposing a monetarysanction on plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP)would likely be futile. See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180,184 (1989) (“[P]aupers filing pro se petitions are not subjectto the financial considerations—filing fees and attorney's fees—that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions.”);Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541, 544 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Monetarysanctions are generally not as effective against a pro seplaintiff proceeding as a pauper, as Hoskins does here.”);Simmons v. Gilmore, No. 2:17-cv-00996, 2020 WL 4016331,at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 16, 2020) (“Imposing a monetarysanction on Simmons would be ineffective as he appears tobe impecunious.”). Imposing monetary sanctions on a pro seplaintiff who has a history of clogging the docket would alsoonly “provoke further litigation.” Jones v. Michigan Dep't ofC.R., No. 18-11934, 2020 WL 4812700, at *2 (E.D. Mich.Feb. 7, 2020).*11 So rather than imposing monetary sanctions, the betteroptions for sanctions against pro se plaintiffs proceeding IFPwho engage in bad faith conduct include: (1) involuntarydismissal with prejudice; (2) revoking the plaintiff's IFPstatus;8 and (3) enjoining the plaintiff from filing lawsuits inthis district without leave of court.9 Revoking Hardy's IFPstatus is unlikely to be effective because, in Hardy v. Cityof Flint, he paid the filing fee after his IFP application wasdenied. Case No. 22-cv-11351, ECF No. 4.The Court instead recommends that Hardy's complaint bedismissed under Rule 41(b) and that he be enjoined fromfiling more lawsuits without leave of court.Dismissal under Rule 41(b)Rule 41(b) authorizes courts to involuntarily dismiss an actionwith prejudice “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to complywith these rules or a court order.” A court also has theinherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct, “derive[d]from its equitable power to control the litigants before it andto guarantee the integrity of the court and its proceedings.”First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307F.3d 501, 512 (6th Cir. 2002). “A primary aspect of [a court'sinherent authority] is the ability to fashion an appropriatesanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.”Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991).Although dismissal is a severe sanction, it is within a court'sdiscretion. Bradley J. Delp Revocable Tr. v. MSJMR 2008Irrevocable Tr., 665 F. App'x 514, 520 (6th Cir. 2016). Fourfactors guide whether dismissal is proper:(1) whether the party's conduct wasdue to willfulness, bad faith, orfault; (2) whether the adversary wasprejudiced by the dismissed party'sconduct; (3) whether the dismissed
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10party was warned that failure tocooperate could lead to dismissal;and (4) whether less drastic sanctionswere imposed or considered beforedismissal was ordered.Id. at 520-21 (cleaned up).10 Although no one factoris dispositive, bad faith is the preeminent consideration.Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 379 F. App'x 522, 524 (6thCir. 2010). And while pro se litigants are generally entitledto a degree of leniency, “pro se filings do not serve as animpenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no licenseto harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritlesslitigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.”Porton v. SP One, Ltd., No. 6:15-cv-566–Orl-40KRS, 2015WL 1648893, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2015) (cleanedup); see also Simmons v. Henry Ford Health Sys., No. 18-cv-14058, 2023 WL 1767473, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 3,2023).*12 Applying these factors, dismissal is proper here.For the first factor, to qualify as “bad faith, willfulness,or fault,” a party's conduct “must display either an intentto thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard forthe effect of [his] conduct on those proceedings.” Mulbahv. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 261 F.3d 586, 591 (6th Cir. 2001)(quoting Shepard Claims Serv. v. William Darrah & Assocs.,796 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1986)). There must be “a clearrecord of delay or contumacious conduct” that is “perverse inresisting authority and stubbornly disobedient.” Carpenter v.City of Flint, 723 F.3d 700, 704-05 (6th Cir. 2013) (cleanedup). The type of conduct to which the bad-faith standardapplies includes a pattern of violating court orders; “delayingor disrupting the litigation”; or “hampering enforcement of acourt order.” Metz v. Unizan Bank, 655 F.3d 485, 489 (6th Cir.2011) (cleaned up); Simmons, 2023 WL 1767473, at *4.As described above, despite the Court's best efforts, Hardyhas continued to clog the docket with frivolous and improperfilings. He has been stubbornly resistant to the Court'sorders, persistently pursing relief that has already beenrejected. For example, after the Court recommended that theGenessee County defendants be dismissed, Hardy repackagedarguments he had already made by filing a motion to strike.After the Court rejected his proposed TAC because addingjail deputies would result in misjoinder, he filed a motion forpermissive joinder asking to add the same jail deputies. Andafter being warned that he had no right to file supplementalbriefs without leave of court, he continued to do so. Hardyacknowledged that he does not understand the law, but herefused the assistance of the Federal Pro Se Legal AssistanceClinic because he did not like its advice.Hardy's failure to learn and follow basic court rules is notablebecause “this is not his first rodeo”; he is “no ordinary prose litigant” given his “share of experience” in federal courts.Muhammad, 2025 WL 1836657, at *8. He has been filinglawsuits since 1998, and a Bloomberg Law search shows thathe has filed 42 civil cases in this district and in the WesternDistrict of Michigan (see attached).Hardy's pattern of vexatious litigation may stem from mentalillness. In 2011, he was diagnosed as having bipolar disorderwith severe psychotic features. ECF No. 194, PageID.2141.He is disabled and receives Supplemental Security Income.ECF No. 2, PageID.12-13. And though he describes himselfas a “65-year-old male who suffers in memory lost, paranoia,schizoaffective and bipolar disorders,” he acknowledges thathe “stopped taking his psychotropic medications about 4years ago.” ECF No. 88, Page.725-726. Hardy's paranoiamight also explain his repeated calls to 911 complaining abouthis neighbor(s) possessing a firearm, as well as the respondingofficials' apparent failure to find wrongdoing on the part ofthe neighbor(s).Whatever the cause, Hardy has been stubbornly disobedientof court rules and orders. The bad faith factor is satisfied.*13 Addressing the second factor, defendants have beenprejudiced by having to waste time and resources filingresponses and motions to strike Hardy's endless, meritless,and repetitive filings. The Court resisted defendants' effortsin April 2025 to dismiss Hardy's complaint based on hisrepeated failures to follow orders about his proposed amendedcomplaints. ECF No. 83; ECF No. 110; ECF No. 115.In the R&R to deny the motion to dismiss, the Courtfound that “Hardy was at fault for failing to follow theCourt's instructions about amending his complaint” and that“defendants wasted time moving to strike Hardy's amendedcomplaints.” ECF No. 110, PageID.850. But the Court foundat the time that bad faith and a prior warning were lacking.Id., PageID.850-851.After defendants' motion to dismiss was denied, Hardyintensified his practice of clogging the docket with repetitive,unauthorized, and meritless documents, multiplying the
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11prejudice to defendants. The prejudice Hardy has causeddefendants warrants dismissal of this case.For the third factor, Hardy has been warned repeatedly thathe faced dismissal of his complaint if he continued to fail tofollow procedural rules or orders, or file frivolous motions.ECF No. 146, PageID.1483; ECF No. 151, PageID.1501;ECF No. 162, PageID.1722-1744. Rather than heeding thosewarnings, he moved for the Court to recuse itself, accusingit of “repeatedly [bashing him] over the head with threats ofsanctions and dismissal because of errors in pleadings, actingpro se.” ECF No. 181, PageID.1815. Hardy's refusal to respectthe Court's warnings supports dismissal of his complaint.And as to the fourth factor, the Court has consideredother sanctions, but for the reasons stated above, finds thatmonetary sanctions and revoking his IFP status would beineffective.Filing Injunction“There is nothing unusual about imposing prefilingrestrictions in matters with a history of repetitive or vexatiouslitigation.” Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264,269 (6th Cir. 1998). There is nothing wrong with an orderthat “restrains not only an individual litigant from repeatedlyfiling an identical complaint, but that places limits ona reasonably defined category of litigation because of arecognized pattern of repetitive, frivolous, or vexatious caseswithin that category.” Id.To determine whether a permanent injunction is warranted,courts consider:(1) the litigant's history of litigationand in particular whether it entailedvexatious, harassing or duplicativelawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive inpursuing the litigation, e.g., does thelitigant have an objective good faithexpectation of prevailing?, (3) whetherthe litigant is represented by counsel;(4) whether the litigant has causedneedless expense to other parties orhas posed an unnecessary burden onthe courts and their personnel; and(5) whether other sanctions would beadequate to protect the courts andother parties. Ultimately, the questionthe court must answer is whether alitigant who has a history of vexatiouslitigation is likely to continue to abusethe judicial process and harass otherparties.Kersh v. Borden Chem., a Div. of Borden, Inc., 689 F. Supp.1442, 1450 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (cleaned up). Application ofthese factors supports the issuance of an injunction.Addressing the first consideration, Hardy has an extensivehistory of filing meritless lawsuits. Assessing Hardy's motivesin pursuing litigation, the second consideration, the Courtbelieves that his litigious conduct stems from his mentalillnesses and the ample time that he has on his hands becauseof his disability. The third consideration highlights thatfiling injunctions are especially appropriate for unrepresentedlitigants like Hardy with histories of filing repetitive,frivolous, or vexatious lawsuits. See also Gilmore-Bey v.Schneider, No. 24-cv-10689, 2025 WL 1618975, at *7 (E.D.Mich. May 29, 2025); Jones, 2020 WL 4812700, at *2;Johnson v. Bell, No. 2:15-cv-0048, 2016 WL 5339599, at *5(W.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2016).*14 As to the fourth consideration, Hardy has causedneedless expenses to other parties and has unnecessarilyburdened the courts and personnel in this district and theWestern District of Michigan. And the prejudice other partiesexperience in having to respond to Hardy's frivolous motionsis ongoing in other cases. For example, in Hardy v. GenesseeCounty, he has moved for judgment on the pleadings underRule 12(c), arguing that the Court “must accept all factualallegations in the complaint as true.” Case No. 24-cv-11190,ECF No. 58, PageID.393 (emphasis added). But whenconsidering a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court must accept astrue “all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadingsof the opposing party.” Moderwell v. Cuyahoga Cty., 997F.3d 653, 659 (6th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up, emphasis added).Despite filing dozens of lawsuits over decades, Hardy doesnot understand the basic rules of civil procedure. For the fifthconsideration, no other sanctions will protect the Court andother parties from Hardy's litigiousness.When it comes to the ultimate question, “whether a litigantwho has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continueto abuse the judicial process and harass other parties,” Kersh,
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12689 F. Supp. at 1450 (E.D. Mich. 1988), a filing injunction isappropriate even when the vexatious litigation has occurredwithin a single lawsuit. See Jones, 2020 WL 4812700, at*2 (“Although Jones has not filed a series of duplicativelawsuits, he has filed a multitude of motions, amendments,and requests that reflect his refusal to accept that his lawsuithas been dismissed.”). In this case alone, Hardy has filed amultitude of motions, proposed amendments to his complaint,and unauthorized supplements, and has refused to accept theCourt's decisions in orders and R&Rs. And Hardy's historyof filing 42 total civil lawsuits is extraordinary. There canbe no question that Hardy will continue to abuse the judicialprocess and unnecessarily burden opposing parties if no filinginjunction is imposed.Thus, an injunction should be entered against Hardy that is“sufficiently tailored to the vice so as not to infringe upon thelitigator's right of access to the courts.” Ortman v. Thomas,906 F. Supp. 416, 422 (E.D. Mich. 1995). The injunctionshould preclude him from:• filing any new federal actions in the Eastern District ofMichigan without obtaining leave of court, and order thatany action filed without leave be stricken; and• filing any new action in “any court whatsoever (stateor federal) against any state or federal judge, officeror employee, or court employee, for actions taken inthe course of their official duties as a judge, officer,employee, or court employee,” without leave of court.Kersh, 689 F. Supp. at 1452.To obtain leave to file a new action, Hardy should be orderedto:• file a “Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave toFile” with any proposed complaint;• attach as an exhibit to that motion a declaration under 28U.S.C. § 1746, or a sworn affidavit, certifying that hiscomplaint is not prohibited by the permanent injunction,and that it is not frivolous or made in bad faith;• identify and list in a second exhibit: (1) the full caption ofevery suit which has been previously filed by him or onhis behalf in any court against every defendant in the suitthat he wishes to file, and (2) the full caption of everysuit which he has currently pending;• provide, in a third exhibit, a copy of each complaintcovered by the preceding paragraph and a certifiedrecord of its disposition. He must serve a copy of thisorder on each defendant if leave to file is granted; and• attach the order granting the permanent injunction to anynew action that he may file in any court.The injunction should state that it does not impair Hardy'sability to defend himself in any criminal action. Finally, theCourt should retain jurisdiction to modify this injunction asnecessary where circumstances may change.11IV. Conclusion*15 The Court RECOMMENDS that this case beDISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under Rule 41(b), andthat Hardy be enjoined from filing new actions as describedabove.All Citations--- F.R.D. ----, 2026 WL 575225Footnotes1The Amended Complaint does not provide the first names of the Genesee County Defendants.2Notably, it is unclear from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint which of the Genessee County Defendants areaccused of committing which acts of excessive force. See ECF No. 93 at PageID.760–62.1Citing “Gregory Hardy v. Community Mental Health, et al., 1:16-cv-815 (dismissed for failing to pay filing fee)(ECF No. 11, PageID.65); Gregory Hardy v. Community Mental Health, et al., No. 1:16-cv-1415 (Judgmentfor defendants); Gregory Hardy v. Ingham County Jail, et al., 1:17-cv-20 (Judgment for defendants); Gregory
Hardy v. Whitaker, --- F.R.D. ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.13Hardy v. East Lansing Police Department, et al., 1:17-cv-338 (Judgment for defendants); Gregory Hardy v.City Rescue Mission of Lansing, et al., 1:18-cv-628 (Judgment for defendants); Gregory Hardy v. InghamCounty Jail, et al., 1:18-cv-839 (Judgment for defendants); Gregory Hardy v. Letavis Enterprises, Inc., et al.,1:18-cv-1077 (dismissed for failure to state a claim); and, Gregory Hardy v. Bill Johnston, et al., 1:20-cv-649(case dismissed).” Hardy v. Lansing Police Dep't, 2021 WL 12258029 at *2.2The parties described the motion as one to dismiss, but it was really a MJOP under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 12(c).3Referring to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).4Referring to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).5The Court has not checked all of Hardy's filings for fake citations; there may be other instances of him usingthem.6Perry filed his MSJ on January 9, 2026. ECF No. 210.7AI Hallucination Cases, https://www.damiencharlotin.com/hallucinations/?q=&sort_by=-date&states=USA&period_idx=0&page=2 (last visited on January 9, 2025).8See Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409, 420 (6th Cir. 2003); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445(1962); Molter v. Trinity Health, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2025 WL 3295122, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2025).9When the pro se plaintiffs have electronic document upload privileges, revoking those privileges is anothersanction to consider. Hardy does not have those privileges. See Evans v. Robertson, No. 24-13435, 2025WL 3243458, at *3-4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2025) (revoking parties' pro se electronic upload privileges assanctions after parties filed briefs with factitious citations).10These factors are the same whether proceeding under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(f), 37, 41(b), orthe Court's inherent authority. Mager v. Wisc. Cent. Ltd., 924 F.3d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 2019); Coleman v. Am.Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1094 n.1 (6th Cir. 1994).11This recommended injunction borrows heavily from, and is supported by, Kersh, 689 F. Supp at 1452-53,and Shophar v. Gorski, No. 17-cv-13322, 2018 WL 4442268, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2018).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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