Harris v. Elementis Specialties, Inc. (Apr. 17, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Robert Harris v. Elementis Specialties, Inc.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Apr. 17, 2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Robert Harris v. Elementis Specialties, Inc. et al., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1104324Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, C.D. California.Robert Harrisv.Elementis Specialties, Inc. et al.Case No. EDCV 26-00171-KK-DTBx|Filed 04/17/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsDominique Carr, Deputy Clerk, Attorney(s) Present forPlaintiff(s): None PresentNot Reported, Court Reporter, Attorney(s) Present forDefendant(s): None PresentAndrew Scott Levine, Levine Labor Law, Irvine, CA, MeganAutumn Mackie, Mackie Law, APC, Irvine, CA, for RobertHarris.Devon A. Jack, Dimiana Saad, Ryan J. Krueger, SheppardMullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Los Angeles, CA, forElementis Specialties, Inc.Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order DENYINGDefendant's Motion for Sanctions [Dkt. 24]The Honorable KENLY KIYA KATO, UNITED STATESDISTRICT JUDGEI.INTRODUCTION*1 On February 27, 2026, this Court granted plaintiff RobertHarris's (“Plaintiff”) unopposed Motion to Remand the actionto San Bernardino County Superior Court and closed the case.ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 18. On March 26, 2026, defendantElementis Specialties, Inc. (“Defendant”) filed the instantMotion for Sanctions (“Motion”). Dkt. 24, Motion (“Mot.”).The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution withoutoral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.II.BACKGROUNDOn November 3, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action byfiling a Complaint against Defendant and Does 1 through50 in San Bernardino County Superior Court. Dkt. 1-1.The Complaint sets forth various state claims arising out ofPlaintiff's employment by Defendant. Id. On January 9, 2026,Defendant removed the action to this Court. Dkt. 1.On February 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed the First AmendedComplaint (“FAC”). Dkt. 12. One week later, on February 19,2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand. Dkt. 13. Anotherweek later, on February 26, 2026, Defendant filed a Motionto Dismiss the FAC arguing, among other things, Plaintiff'sclaims were preempted by the Labor Management RelationsAct (“LMRA”). Dkt. 16.On February 27, 2026, one day after Defendant filed itsMotion to Dismiss, the Court granted Plaintiff's unopposedMotion to Remand and closed the case. Dkt. 18. Hence, nofurther pleadings, including an opposition to the Motion toDismiss, were filed by the parties until the instant Motion.On March 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant Motionrequesting sanctions against Defendant and its counsel underthe Court's inherent authority and Local Rules 11-9 and83-7; 28 U.S.C. § 1927; or, in the alternative, 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). Mot. at 16-18. On April 2, 2026, Defendant filed anOpposition. Dkt. 26, Opposition (“Opp.”). On April 9, 2026,Plaintiff filed a Reply. Dkt. 67.This matter, thus, stands submitted.III.DISCUSSIONA. APPLICABLE LAW“Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested,by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect,and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawfulmandates.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43(1991) (citation modified). “These powers are ‘governed not
Robert Harris v. Elementis Specialties, Inc. et al., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested incourts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderlyand expeditious disposition of cases.’ ” Id. (quoting Link v.Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). “[T]he districtcourt may, in its informed discretion, rely on inherent power”to impose sanctions. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 994 (9thCir. 2001) (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43). However, “[i]norder to invoke its inherent power, the court must makean explicit finding of bad faith.” Am. Rena Int'l Corp. v.Sis-Joyce Int'l Co., No. CV 12-6972-FMO-JEMx, 2015 WL12732433, at *35 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015) (citing Mendez v.Cnty. of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008)).*2 The District's Local Rules also provide a basis forthe imposition of sanctions. Local Rule 11-9 states “[t]hepresentation to the Court of frivolous motions or opposition tomotions (or the failure to comply fully with this rule) subjectsthe offender at the discretion of the Court to the sanctions ofL.R. 83-7.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 11-9. Local Rule 83-7 also allowsa court to impose sanctions for conduct that “was willful,grossly negligent, or reckless,” and/or “rises to the level ofbad faith and/or a willful disobedience of a court order.” C.D.Cal. L.R. 83-7(a)-(b).In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“Section 1927”) provides“[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct casesin any court of the United States ... who so multiplies theproceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously maybe required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs,expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because ofsuch conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. To be sanctioned underSection 1927, the attorney must have “acted ‘recklessly or inbad faith.’ ” United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9thCir. 1983) (quoting Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d 1339,1343 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Bad faith is present when an attorneyknowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument[ ] orargues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing anopponent.” In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431,436 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation modified). “The frivolousnessof a claim or argument does not by itself justify an awardof sanctions under [Section] 1927; the additional elementof wrongful purpose is required.” Navarro v. Gen. NutritionCorp., No. C 03-0603 SBA, 2005 WL 2333803, at *22 (N.D.Cal. Sep. 22, 2005). “Ignorance, negligence, incompetence,or even a basic lack of professional courtesy do[es] notconstitute ‘bad faith.’ ” Id. (quoting Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d626, 630 (1st Cir. 1990)).Finally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“Section 1447(c)), a courtmay award costs and actual expenses, “including attorneyfees,” incurred from removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Absentunusual circumstances, courts may award attorney's feesunder [Section] 1447(c) only where the removing partylacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.”Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).Ultimately, fee awards under Section 1447(c) are “left to thedistrict court's discretion.” Id. at 139.B. ANALYSISHere, the Court finds sanctions under the Court's inherentauthority, Local Rules, or Section 1927 are not warranted.While there are different bases for imposing sanctions,ultimately, a common question is whether Defendant acted inbad faith. While the Court is neither impressed nor pleasedwith Defendant's litigation decisions, the Court does not findit rises to the level of bad faith necessary to impose sanctions.Plaintiff argues Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was filed“without reliable legal support” and cites “multiple authoritydefects.” Mot. at 11. Among other things, Plaintiff cites (andDefendant has confirmed) its use of AI resulted in severalcitation errors, including a completely hallucinated cite andother cites that do not support the proposition Defendant'sclaimed they did. See id. at 11-13. While the Court agreeswith Plaintiff that Defendant's failure to verify authority itcited in its filing before a federal court is inexcusable, theCourt cannot conclude Defendant “knowingly or recklesslyraise[d] a frivolous argument.”1 In re Keegan Mgmt. Co.,Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d at 436; see also Wilden v. Cnty. of Yuba,No. 2:11-CV-02246-JAM GGH, 2012 WL 3730657, at *2(E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (“The standard for awards under[Section] 1927 does not permit sanctions for incompetencein the absence of bad faith.”); Srinvasan v. Kenna, No. 18-CV-03977-HSG, 2020 WL 60226, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan.6, 2020) (“[I]gnorance or negligence is not a basis forsanctions under either [Section] 1927 or the Court's inherentpowers.” (citing Fink, 239 F.3d at 993)). Additionally, whilePlaintiff cites Defendant's subsequent filings and argumentsfollowing remand, the Court declines to consider conduct andlitigation that occurred in state court.2*3 Plaintiff also argues Defendant's attempt to preemptPlaintiff's claims through the LMRA was “frivolous undersettled law.” Mot. at 14. Plaintiff argues Defendant'spreemption theory “is not a fair extension of existing law”and is an “objectively unreasonable and oppressive use of
Robert Harris v. Elementis Specialties, Inc. et al., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3preemption doctrine.” Id. at 16. However, the issue is acomplex one and even assuming Defendant's position was notsupported by existing caselaw, arguing for an extension ofexisting law does not rise to the level of bad faith. See R.P. exrel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 1126(9th Cir. 2011) (concluding the fact that arguments were notsuccessful did not make them frivolous).Finally, for largely the same reasons already discussed, theCourt does not find Defendant's basis for removal objectivelyunreasonable and declines to exercise its discretion to imposesanctions on this basis under Section 1447(c).IV.CONCLUSIONAccordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff'sMotion is DENIED.IT IS SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 1104324Footnotes1Defendant and its counsel are explicitly warned that the Court will note this incident and consider it in futurelitigation should Defendant or its counsel make similar “mistakes” as a result of the unverified use of AI. TheCourt also questions defense counsel's claim they could not file a notice of withdrawal of its MTD becausethe case was “closed” in Pacer. Opp. at 14. To the contrary, as evidenced by the instant motion, opposition,and reply, counsel may still file pleadings regardless of whether a case is closed in Pacer. In other words,counsel should have and could have alerted the Court to the multiple citation misrepresentations in its Motionbut failed to do so.2The Court also notes the case was remanded the same day Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was filed; hence,Plaintiff did not incur costs or fees preparing an opposition or attending a hearing on the motion.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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