Hawkins v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 4:25-CV-2194 (Feb. 23, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Kenneth Hawkins v. I.C. System, Inc.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Feb. 23, 2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
Dena Hanovice Palermo (J.) (unanimous Court)
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 497165Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff,v.I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 4:25-CV-2194|Filed 02/23/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsKenneth Q. Hawkins, Houston, TX, Pro Se.Jacob Michael Bach, Eugene Xerxes Martin IV, MartinGolden Lyons Watts Morgan PLLC, Dallas, TX, forDefendant I.C. System, Inc.JUDGE PALERMO'S ORDER ANDREPORT & RECOMMENDATION1Dena Hanovice Palermo United States Magistrate Judge*1 Before the Court is Defendant I.C. System's Motionto Dismiss, ECF No. 4. Pro se Plaintiff Kenneth Hawkinsalleges that Defendant I.C. System, Inc. violated the Fair DebtCollection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, byusing prohibited practices while attempting to collect on adebt. First Am. Compl., ECF No. 3. He also brings state lawclaims for violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct (“DTPA”), Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.001, intentionalinfliction of emotional distress (“emotional distress”), and“willful negligence.” Id. Defendant argues all of Plaintiff'sclaims should be dismissed because he failed to pleadessential elements of an FDCPA claim, did not allegesufficient conduct to support an emotional distress claim,did not establish DTPA consumer status, and failed to pleadnegligence elements. ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 7–13. Having reviewedthe briefing2 and the applicable law, the Defendant's motionto dismiss should be granted in part. Plaintiff is granted leaveto amend his complaint in part.I. BACKGROUNDThese facts are based on the allegations in the amendedcomplaint.3 On or around February 20, 2025, Plaintiffreceived a collection letter from Defendant for a debt heallegedly owed to AT&T Mobility, demanding $17,141.59and offering a settlement amount of $12,856.19. ECF No.3 8. The letter lacked details, such as complete notice ofPlaintiff's rights under the FDCPA, as well as the debt's ageand enforceability under any applicable statute of limitations.Id. 9. After Plaintiff sent a cease-and-desist letter toDefendant, as well as a dispute notice, Defendant informedPlaintiff that it had returned the debt to AT&T Mobility. Id. 10.Plaintiff sued Defendant in Texas state court in April2025, bringing claims for FDCPA violations, fraudulentrepresentation and procurement, DTPA violations, emotionaldistress, and willful negligence. ECF No. 1-4 at 2–6.4He then amended his petition: (1) retaining his FDCPA,DTPA, emotional distress, and willful negligence claims(2) modifying his fraudulent representation and procurementclaim to a claim for fraudulent procurement of federalobligation; and (3) adding a claim for unauthorized collectionof a debt in violation of Texas law. Id. at 13–16.*2 Defendant timely removed the case based on federalquestion jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FDCPA claim and askedthe Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff'sstate law claims. ECF No. 1 3. Plaintiff then filed theoperative amended complaint, retaining only his FDCPA,DTPA, emotional distress, and willful negligence claims. ECFNo. 3 ¶¶ 14–21.Defendant now seeks to dismiss the operative complaint. ECFNo. 4.II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION TODISMISSA court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claimupon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “are viewedwith disfavor and rarely granted.” Hodge v. Engleman, 90F.4th 840, 843 (5th Cir. 2024). “Under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plainstatement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled torelief.’ ” ADR Int'l Ltd., 667 F. Supp. 3d at 419 (quoting Iqbal,556 U.S. at 677–78).“The complaint must include more than mere ‘labels andconclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of acause of action will not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) “A complaint must‘contain sufficient factual matter ... to “state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on its face.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). A claim is plausible“when the pleaded factual contents allow the court to drawthe reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for themisconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen,Miss., 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012)). “[A] complaint‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’ but must providethe plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief—includingfactual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a rightto relief above the speculative level.’ ” Id. (quoting Cuvillierv. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly,550 U.S. at 555))).“The ultimate question ‘is whether the complaint states a validclaim when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Trustees Sealy Indep. Sch. Dist.,871 F. Supp. 2d 581, 590 (S.D. Tex. 2012)). “[I]n consideringa motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint mustbe liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and all well-pleaded facts taken as true.” Id. (internal citation omitted).“[C]ourts are required to dismiss, pursuant to [Rule 12(b)(6)],claims based on invalid legal theories, even though they maybe otherwise well-pleaded.” Id. (quoting Farshchi v. WellsFargo Bank, N.A., Civ. Action No. H-15-1692, 2016 WL2858903, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2016) (citing Flynn v. StateFarm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. (Tex.), 605 F. Supp. 2d 811, 820(W.D. Tex. 2009))).In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts are limited toconsidering the complaint—or a state court petition in aremoved case—as well as documents attached to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that are both referred to in the complaint andcentral to the plaintiff's claim. George v. SI Group, Inc.,36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022). Courts may also rely onevidence that is “subject to judicial notice under Federal Ruleof Evidence 201.” Id.“It is well recognized that ‘a pro se plaintiff's pleadings areliberally construed.’ ” Harvey v. Sullivan, No. 3:22-CV-337,2022 WL 17405834, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2022) (quotingPerez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002));see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holdingthat courts must hold a pro se complaint's allegations “toless stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted bylawyers”); SEC v. AMX, Int'l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 75 (5th Cir.1993) (recognizing the establish rules that courts construe prose plaintiffs' “allegations and briefs more permissively”).III. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULDBE PARTIALLY GRANTED.*3 Defendant argues that dismissal is warranted because“Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief upon which reliefcan be granted.” ECF No. 4 4. It claims Plaintiff has failedto plead essential elements of his FDCPA claim, id. 7, aswell as of any of his state law claims, id. 8.A. Plaintiff Fails To Plausibly Plead An FDCPAClaim.Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§1692g(a), 1692e(10)–(11), and 1692d. ECF No. 3 14.He claims “[t]hese actions were intentional, reckless, andcaused Plaintiff emotional and financial harm.” Id. 15.His pleading only identifies the specific statutory provisions.Id. 14. Defendant argues dismissal is warranted becausePlaintiff failed to plead essential FDCPA elements, “includingconsumer status of the debt and other required elements,such as the manner by which [Defendant] violated the citedprovisions of the FDCPA” because “Plaintiff's claims do notclearly set forth the alleged violations of the FDCPA at issue.”ECF No. 4 7.A plaintiff accusing a debt collector of FDCPA violationsmust show: (1) the plaintiff is the object of collectionactivity arising from consumer debt; (2) the defendant isa debt collector as defined by the FDCPA; and (3) thedefendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited underthe FDCPA. Clark v. City of Pasadena, No. 4:23-CV-04050,2024 WL 4354819, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2024), aff'd,No. 24-20447, 2025 WL 3076229 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025).Courts apply an “unsophisticated” or “least sophisticated”consumer standard in determining whether debt collectorshave violated the FDCPA. Hoestenbach v. AFNI, Inc., No.1:20-CV-818-LY, 2021 WL 2909144, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb.26, 2021), adopted, No. 1:20-CV-818-LY, 2021 WL 2878554(W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2021) (quoting Mahmoud v. De MossOwners Ass'n, 865 F.3d 322, 330 (5th Cir. 2017)).1. Plaintiff fails to allege the debtarises from a consumer transaction.A consumer debt is “any obligation or alleged obligationof [any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated] topay money arising out of a transaction in which the money,property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3transaction are primarily for personal, family, or householdpurposes.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(3), (5). “A plaintiff failsto establish an FDCPA claim when he alleges, withoutany accompanying factual content, simply a recitation of§ 1692a(5).” Tarazon v. LTD Fin. Servs., L.P., No. 7:18-CV-60, 2019 WL 13258507, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2019).Merely referencing the original creditor and stating a beliefthat the debt arises “from ‘transactions primarily for personal,family, or household purposes’ ” is also insufficient to state anFDCPA claim. Id.; see also Gardner v. Credit Corp Sols., Inc.,No. 4:24-CV-00296-O-BP, 2024 WL 4820229, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 30, 2024) (finding that a “lack of factual allegationsshowing a consumer transaction is fatal” to the plaintiff'sFDCPA claim and recommending the claim be dismissed)(citing Garcia v. Jenkins Babb, L.L.P., 569 F. App'x 274, 276(5th Cir. 2014) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5))), adopted, No.4:24-CV-00296-O-BP, 2024 WL 4821474 (N.D. Tex. Nov.18, 2024).Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead theconsumer status of the debt. ECF No. 4 7. In response,Plaintiff states he “alleges that the debt originated from AT&TMobility, clearly implicating personal consumer services (notcommercial),” which he frames as “satisf[ying] the FDCPA'sthreshold requirement that the debt must be for personal,family, or household purposes.” ECF No. 8 at 2. Defendantreplies that “[a] statement in response to [Defendant]'s[m]otion to dismiss, regarding what the debt allegedly wasincurred for, is not an allegation in a complaint sufficientenough to set forth a valid FDCPA claim.” ECF No. 9 3.5*4 Plaintiff's amended complaint states, in relevant part, that“[o]n February 20, 2025, Plaintiff received a collection letterfrom [Defendant] regarding an alleged debt purportedly owedto AT&T Mobility,” and notes that after issuing a disputenotice, Defendant “stated the account had been returned toAT&T.” ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 8, 10. He makes no other reference toAT&T or the character of the debt in his complaint, nor doeshe elaborate on the underlying transaction giving rise to thedebt.In Tarazon, a court in this district dismissed the plaintiff'sFDCPA claim for failing to state a claim even wherethe plaintiff's original pleading specifically discussed theconsumer nature of the underlying debt. 2019 WL 13258507,at *3. There, the plaintiff received a debt collection letterfrom the defendant debt collector, which allegedly violatedthe FDCPA. Id. at *1. The letter named Home Depot asthe original creditor. Id. The plaintiff's amended complaintinferred from the original letter that the debt in questionwas “alleged to have arisen from a consumer store creditcard ... [issued to purchase] goods sold at Home Depotretail store.” Id. It further alleged “that the debt arises from‘transactions primarily for personal, family, or householdpurposes.’ ” Id. at *3 (emphasis in original). The court foundthis deficient for two reasons. First, it gave the court “nofactual basis on which to rely” to find that the debt arosefrom a consumer transaction. Id. Second, the court concludedthat this left open “the possibility of the transaction beingbusiness in nature” and thus defeated any consumer status ofthe debt. Id. Based on these shortcomings, the court found thatthe plaintiff “insufficiently ple[d] facts plausible to state anFDCPA claim” and dismissed it. Id. at *3–4.Here, Plaintiff pleads only that the debt is purportedly owedto AT&T Mobility. ECF No. 3 8. Unlike in Tarazon, he doesnot discuss the nature of the underlying debt or transactions.As pled, his complaint is insufficient because it offers no factsfor the Court to rely on to conclude the debt is consumer debt.Garcia, 569 F. App'x at 276; Tarazon, 2019 WL 13258507, at*3; Gardner, 2024 WL 4820229, at *3.Thus, Defendant's motion should be granted and Plaintiff'sFDCPA claim should be dismissed.2. Plaintiff partially failed to plead defendant engagedin an act or omission prohibited under the FDCPA.Defendant also argues dismissal of Plaintiff's FDCPA claim iswarranted because “Plaintiff has failed to plead the essentialelements of an FDCPA claim, including ... the mannerby which [Defendant] violated the cited provisions of theFDCPA.” ECF No. 4 7. The Court interprets this as areference to the third element of an FDCPA claim: thedefendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited underthe FDCPA. Clark, 2024 WL 4354819, at *6 (identifying theelements of an FDCPA claim). Plaintiff responded that hepled violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a), 1692e(10)–(11),and 1692d in paragraphs eight through eleven of the operativecomplaint. ECF No. 8 at 1–2.a. Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a § 1692g(a) claim.Section 1692g(a) requires debt collectors to send theconsumer a written notice “[w]ithin five days of the initialcommunication with that consumer.” Because “days” is
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4undefined, the Court looks to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure6. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a) (“The following rules apply incomputing any time period specified ... in any statute thatdoes not specify a method of computing time.”). For a periodstated in days, the Court must “count every day, includingintermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays,” andwhere the last day of the period “is a Saturday, Sunday, orlegal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of thenext day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” Id.The notice must contain:*5 (1) the amount of the debt;(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty daysafter receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of thedebt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed tobe valid by the debt collector(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debtcollector in writing within the thirty-day period thatthe debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debtcollector will obtain verification of the debt or a copyof a judgment against the consumer and a copy of suchverification or judgment will be mailed to the consumerby the debt collector; and(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written requestwithin the thirty-day period, the debt collector willprovide the consumer with the name and address of theoriginal creditor, if different from the current creditor.15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). If that information is contained withinthe original communication with the consumer, an additionalnotice is not required. Id.Plaintiff pleads a “fail[ure] to include complete noticeof Plaintiff's rights” under § 1692g(a), specifically notingDefendant's failure to do so within the statutorily required fivedays. ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 8, 14. In giving the operative complaintliberal construction, Plaintiff asserts that he never receivedthe applicable notice with the above five required items.6 Hespecifically highlights a failure to provide that notice withinfive days, as the FDCPA requires. Id. 14; 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a). Plaintiff received the initial letter on February 20,2025. ECF No. 3 8. So the notice must have been sent byFebruary 25, 2025. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1). Insofar as Plaintiff means he did not receive the noticeat all, this is sufficient to plausibly allege a violation of 15U.S.C. § 1692g(a). Le v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No.1:25-CV-00870-ADA-SH, 2025 WL 4060085, at *3 (W.D.Tex. Nov. 10, 2025) (finding that a plaintiff's pleading thathe received no written notice after the debt collector's initialcommunication with him was sufficient for purposes of a Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss) (citing Koesler v. Beneficial Fin.I, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 873, 884 (W.D. Tex. 2016)), adopted,No. 1:25-CV-00870-ADA-SH, 2026 WL 130798 (W.D. Tex.Jan. 14, 2026).Plaintiff pled sufficient facts that plausibly allege a violationof § 1692g(a) because he pled that the initial letter did notcontain the five items enumerated in § 1692g(a), and thathe never received a separate notice supplying the missinginformation. Id. ¶¶ 9, 14. Defendant's motion should be deniedas to this allegation.b. Plaintiff pleads a § 1692e(10) claim.*6 Next, § 1692e(10) prohibits “[t]he use of any falserepresentation or deceptive means to collect or attemptto collect any debt or to obtain information concerning aconsumer.” In his complaint, Plaintiff states that Defendantviolated this section by using deceptive means. ECF No. 3 14.7 Liberally construing the complaint, it appears thatPlaintiff's claim rests on the fact that the letter “gave noindication whether [the debt] was enforceable under thestatute of limitations.” ECF No. 3 9. The Court bases thison the fact that his complaint alleges the “[u]se of deceptivemeans to collect a debt” where the only conduct identifiedas deceptive was allegedly making “false and misleadingrepresentations regarding debt enforceability,” while the onlyexplanation as to debt enforceability being at issue relatesto “whether [the debt] was enforceable under the statute oflimitations.” Id. at 1, ¶¶ 14, 16.Collection letters seeking payment on a time-barred debtwithout disclosing its enforceability under the statute oflimitations while also offering a “settlement” of that debt canbe sufficiently deceptive or misleading such that they violate§ 1692e(10). Christie v. Contract Callers, Inc., No. 4:20-CV-00518-P, 2021 WL 689548, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23,2021) (quoting Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.,836 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 2016); Manuel v. Merchants &Prof'l Bureau, Inc., 956 F.3d 822, 831–32 (5th Cir. 2020)).Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Defendant violated § 1692e(10)by simultaneously offering a settlement and failing to indicatethe debt's judicial enforceability. Id. Defendant's motionshould be denied as to this allegation.
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5c. Plaintiff pleads a § 1692e(11) claim.Section 1692e(11) violations “include failure of a debtcollector to disclose in the ‘initial written communicationwith the consumer ... that the debt collector is attemptingto collect a debt and that any information obtained willbe used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose insubsequent communications that the communication is froma debt collector.’ ” Thompson v. Capital Link Mgmt. LLC, No.4:21-CV-03130, 2023 WL 8358008, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30,2023) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)). Plaintiff's complaintalleges that he “received a collection letter from [Defendant]regarding an alleged debt purportedly owed to AT&TMobility,” and also states that the notice “[f]ail[ed] to disclosethat the communication was from a debt collector.” ECF No.3 ¶¶ 8, 14. Taking these allegations as true and applying therequisite “unsophisticated” or “least sophisticated” consumerstandard, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly allegedthat Defendant violated § 1692e(11). Hoestenbach, 2021WL 2909144, at *3; see Thompson, 2023 WL 8358008,at *2–3 (granting default judgment because the plaintiff'sallegations of the defendant's failure “to inform [plaintiff] thatthe communication was from a debt collector” in its initialcommunication informing the plaintiff that a specific loanhad been transferred to the defendant “for collections” andinstructing the plaintiff to call to discuss new credit repairprograms, when taken as true, were sufficient to supporta well-pled FDCPA violation claim). Defendant's motionshould be denied as to this allegation.d. Plaintiff failed to plead a § 1692d claim.Finally, § 1692d prohibits debt collectors from “engag[ing]in any conduct the natural consequence of which is toharass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with thecollection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Beyond the specificactions identified in the section,8 “[t]he Fifth Circuit hasnot addressed § 1692d and determined what is ‘conductthe natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, orabuse’ ” in a general sense. Instead, courts rely on casesinterpreting § 1692d(5) to determine whether conduct outsideof the statute's enumerated acts are sufficiently harassing,oppressive, or abusive. Vazzano v. Receivable Mgmt. Servs.,LLC, No. 3:21-CV-0825-D, 2021 WL 3742618, at *3–4 (N.D.Tex. Aug. 24, 2021) (quoting Baye v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,Inc., 2017 WL 4918998, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2017)).Section 1692d(5) prohibits “[c]ausing a telephone to ring orengaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly orcontinuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any personat the called number.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5). In Vazzano,the court reasoned that due to the nature of phone calls,“if conduct engaged in by phone does not violate § 1692d,corresponding conduct carried out by letter would not either,”finding that phone calls are often “more intrusive, harassing,and abusive than letters.” 2021 WL 3742618, at *4. Itultimately concluded that courts “found violations of sections1692d and 1692(d) only when there were multiple harassingcalls or letters combined with other objectionable conduct.”Id. at *5. It then concluded that dismissal was appropriatewhere the plaintiff alleged only “that the sending of onecommunication” was harassing conduct and failed to “pleadadditional objectional conduct.” Id. (“[Debt collector's] oneletter, unaccompanied by other objectionable conduct, isinsufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under §1692d.”).*7 Here, Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant violated §1692d by engaging in “[c]onduct reasonably expected toharass or oppress.” ECF No. 3 14. He does not specificallyidentify what conduct he contends violated § 1692d. See id.¶¶ 8–15. Giving the complaint liberal construction, Plaintiff'scomplaint is that the act of sending the collection noticeitself was in violation of § 1692d—it appears that his injuriesresulted from having received the letter. For example, hestates that “the damage from the original letter had alreadybeen done,” inducing “immediate anxiety” because of “[t]hemisleading nature of the communication, combined with theomission of federally mandated disclosures.” Id. 11. Asin Vazzano, there was one contact—a letter—and no otherconduct that could be construed as objectionable. 2021 WL3742618, at *5. Like Vazzano, Plaintiff has failed to plausiblyallege a violation of § 1692d because he pled one contactwithout any other objectionable conduct. Id. Defendant'smotion to dismiss Plaintiff's FDCPA claim under § 1692dshould be granted.B. Plaintiff Fails To Plausibly Allege RequiredElements Of His State Law Claims.In addition to his FDCPA claim, Plaintiff brings claims forDTPA violations, emotional distress, and negligence. ECFNo. 3 ¶¶ 16–21. Defendant argues dismissal is appropriatebecause Plaintiff failed to “plead the essential elements of anyof these claims.” ECF No. 4 8.
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.61. Plaintiff does not plausibly allegeconsumer status for DTPA purposes.Plaintiff brings a claim under the DTPA. ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 16–17. He specifically alleges that “Defendant made false andmisleading representations regarding debt enforceability andfailed to disclose material facts,” and because Plaintiff “reliedon these omissions to his detriment,” he “qualifies for trebledamages.” Id. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff does not havestanding under the DTPA because Plaintiff has not allegedthat he was a consumer. ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 10–11.9The DTPA provides a private cause of action for consumersharmed by deceptive trade practices. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code§ 17.50. “Consumer” refers to “an individual ... who seeks oracquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services.” Id. §17.45(4). A DTPA claimant must show they are a “consumer,”regardless of whether they bring a pure DTPA claim or a “tie-in” claim. Id. § 17.50(h); Burch v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,N.A., No. 3:19-CV-0645-N-BH, 2019 WL 4919018, at *9(N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2019) (applying Texas law and findingthat a DTPA plaintiff must establish consumer status even fora tie-in claim) (citing Garcia v. Jenkins/Babb LLP, No. 3:11-CV-3171-N-BH, 2013 WL 3789830, at *12 (N.D. Tex. July22, 2013), aff'd sub nom. Garcia v. Jenkins Babb, L.L.P., 569F. App'x 274 (5th Cir. 2014); Cushman v. GC Servs., L.P., 397F. App'x 24, 28 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (applying Texaslaw)), adopted, No. 3:19-CV-0645-N-BH, 2019 WL 4918100(N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2019).Plaintiff has not alleged his consumer status because he neveralleged having sought or acquired goods or services directlyfrom Defendant. ECF No. 4 11. The only interactions healleges having with Defendant are the initial letter aboutthe debt, and Defendant's response to Plaintiff's cease-and-desist and dispute notice. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10. But the goods orservices at issue are alleged to come from AT&T Mobility, notDefendant. Id. 8. Without establishing his consumer status,he cannot bring a DTPA claim, alone or under the “tie-in”provision. See Burch, 2019 WL 4919018, at *9 (dismissing aDTPA tie-in claim because, among other reasons, the plaintifffailed to demonstrate his consumer status).*8 Because Plaintiff failed to allege his consumer status,Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff's DTPA claim should begranted.2. Plaintiff does not allege sufficient factsto support an emotional distress claim.Plaintiff's also claims emotional distress. ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 18–19.The entirety of his claim is to allege that “Defendant's conduct—initiated collection with deceptive notices and failing tovalidate the debt—was extreme, outrageous, and done withreckless disregard of Plaintiff's rights,” and that it causedhim “elevated anxiety, loss of sleep, and interference withhis personal and professional responsibilities.” Id. Defendantargues that Plaintiff fails to plead any conduct rising to therequired level of “extreme and outrageous” to support anemotional distress claim. ECF No. 4 9.To state an emotional distress claim, a plaintiff must showthat (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2)the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant'sactions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) theemotional distress was severe. Gonzales v. Gonzales, 704S.W.3d 54, 67 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.) (quotingHersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tex. 2017)). Tobe “extreme and outrageous,” conduct must “go beyondall possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded asatrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Id.(internal quotations omitted). The conduct must be more thanrude, insulting, annoying, overbearing, or meddlesome. Id.(quoting Kroger Tex. Ltd. P'ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788,796 (Tex. 2006); Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d814, 817–18 (Tex. 2005)).Successful emotional distress claims are rare because mostacts do not rise to the required degree. Id. (quoting KrogerTex., 216 S.W3d at 796); see also Havens v. Sheriff's Dep'tof Aransas Cnty., No. 2:24-CV-00283, 2025 WL 2984608,at *19 (S.D. Tex. May 27, 2025) (noting that successfulemotional distress claims are rare except where the factsborder “on serious criminal acts”), adopted, No. 2:24-CV-00283, 2025 WL 2960029 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2025).In Texas, they are also rare because a plaintiff bringing anemotional distress claim must show “there is no alternativecause of action available to redress the alleged misconduct.”Williams v. Republic Serv., No. 4:25-CV-00422, 2025 WL2393363, at *12 (S.D. Tex. July 23, 2025) (quoting Stelly v.Duriso, 982 F.3d 403, 407–08 (5th Cir. 2020)), adopted subnom. Williams v. Republic Servs., No. CV 4-25-422, 2025 WL2391767 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2025). “ ‘Where the gravamen ofa plaintiff's complaint is really another [claim],’ ” emotionaldistress is unavailable, even where that other claim proves
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7unsuccessful. Gongora Hinestroza v. United States, No. 1:25-CV-061, 2025 WL 1588349, at *9 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2025)(quoting Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d438, 447 (Tex. 2004)).Plaintiff's response highlights the first defect with hisemotional distress pleading: it is merely a formulaic recitationof the elements by way of conclusions, insufficient to survivea Rule 12(b)(6) motion. ECF No. 8 at 2–3; ADR Int'lLtd., 667 F. Supp. 3d at 419. Moreover, the gravamenof his complaint against Defendant—“initiating collectionwith deceptive notices and failing to validate the debt”—isfatally based on the same factual allegations supporting hisother causes of action. That those claims fail for want ofpleading does not mean he can bring an emotional distressclaim instead. See Gongora Hinestroza, 2025 WL 1588349,at *9–10, 13 (dismissing with prejudice a plaintiff's claimfor emotional distress because the plaintiff “offer[ed] nofactual allegation supporting his [emotional distress] claimindependent from those supporting his causes of action fornegligence, false imprisonment, or assault” and thereforedid “not present a viable [emotional distress] claim underTexas law”) (citing Miller v. Target Corp., 854 F. App'x567, 569 (5th Cir. 2021); Tubbs v. Nicol, 675 F. App'x 437,439 (5th Cir. 2017))). The gravamen of Plaintiff's complaintis another claim—FDCPA violations—so emotional distressis not available, even if those other claims are ultimatelyunsuccessful. Id. at *9 (“courts have precluded an [emotionaldistress] claim when the plaintiff's allegations sounded inother torts, even if those other claims proved unsuccessful”).*9 Therefore, Defendant's motion should be granted as toPlaintiff's emotional distress claim.3. Plaintiff does not demonstrate aduty owed to him for negligence.Plaintiff also alleges a claim for “willful negligence.” ECFNo. 3 ¶¶ 20–21. The Court construes this as a claimfor gross negligence. Texas only recognizes “willful” or“gross” negligence for awarding exemplary damages, not asa separate cause of action. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 41.003(a)(3); Castro v. Wal-Mart Real Est. Bus. Tr., 645 F.Supp. 3d 638, 650 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (citing U-Haul Int'l, Inc.v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 137 (Tex. 2012)).Recovery on gross negligence requires first showing ordinarynegligence. Castro, 645 F. Supp. 3d at 652 (collecting cases).Ordinary negligence “requires showing that a legal duty isowed to a plaintiff, breach of that duty, and that damages wereproximately caused by that breach.” Good River Farms, L.P.v. TXI Operations, L.P., 100 F.4th 545, 554 (5th Cir. 2024)(citing Nabors Drilling, USA, Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d401, 404 (Tex. 2009)). “A threshold legal requirement fornegligence liability is that the defendant owes the plaintiff aduty.” Massage Heights Franchising, LLC v. Hagman, 712S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. 2025) (citing Kroger Co. v. Elwood,197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006)).The entirety of Plaintiff's negligence allegation is “Defendantbreached its legal duty to act with reasonable care whencollecting consumer debts, leading to avoidable harm” and“[t]his conduct caused Plaintiff to suffer both financial lossesand emotional hardship.” ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 20–21. Defendantargues Plaintiff's ordinary negligence claim cannot survivebecause he does not—nor can he—allege that Defendantowed him a duty of care. ECF No. 4 13. Plaintiff's responseand sur-reply to the instant motion clarify that his negligenceclaim is a “negligence-based FDCPA derivative claim” andthat the duty “to provide accurate validation information”arises under § 1692g of the FDCPA. ECF Nos. 8 at 3–4;1010 at 3.*10 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege more than a conclusorystatement that Defendant owed him a duty. ECF No. 4 13. The only duty Plaintiff pleads is a “legal duty to actwith reasonable care when collecting consumer debts.” ECFNo. 3 20. Texas courts routinely dismiss negligence claimsthat fail to offer more than conclusory statements abouta duty of care defendants purportedly owed the plaintiffwithout authority supporting that such a duty exists. See,e.g., Williams v. Bryan of Ladera, No. 4:22-CV-00057-SDJ-BD, 2024 WL 5098506, at *6–7 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2024)(recommending dismissal because the plaintiff “identifie[d]no precedent supporting a duty” to perform as alleged andthe court was unaware of any such duty), adopted, No.4:22-CV-00057-SDJ-BD, 2024 WL 5098049 (E.D. Tex. Dec.12, 2024); Davidson v. Heine, No. 08-24-00035-CV, 2025WL 1919336, at *8 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 11, 2025,pet. denied) (affirming dismissal of negligence claim whereplaintiff alleged no more than defendants owed him a legalduty not to engage in the acts alleged) (citing Vazquez v.Legend Nat. Gas III, 492 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied)). The same deficiency existshere; Plaintiff's ordinary negligence claim fails. Davidson,2025 WL 1919336, at *8. Therefore, any claim for gross or“willful” negligence also fails. Castro, 645 F. Supp. 3d at 652.
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8The Court alternatively considers Plaintiff's allegations as ifhe is bringing a claim for negligence per se. His clarifiedallegations appear to frame his negligence claim on only thesepropositions: Defendant violated § 1692g of the FDCPA, andthat violation caused him financial and emotional injuries.See ECF Nos. 3 ¶¶ 20–21; 8 at 3–4; 10 at 3. In Texas, anegligence per se claim requires establishing: “(1) the statuteor regulation at issue was intended to protect the class ofpersons and the type of injury in question; (2) a statutory orregulatory violation occurred; (3) the violation was withoutlegal justification or excuse; and (4) the violation proximatelycaused the injury.” Sisley v. Rowland Truck Lines, No. 3:23-CV-299, 2025 WL 3050065, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2025)(citing Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546,549 (Tex. 1985)).This theory fails, too. Several courts considering whether toextend negligence per se liability under state law for allegedFDCPA violations—including of § 1692g—have declinedto do so. See, e.g., Bruce v. Nationstar Mortg., No. 3:13-CV-3019-M-BH, 2015 WL 728028, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19,2015) (quoting Hackett v. G.D. Searle & Co., 246 F. Supp.2d 591, 594 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Johnson v. Sawyer,47 F.3d 716, 728–29 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc))); Thompsonv. Hughes, Watters & Askanase, LLP, No. 3:13-CV-0429-GBH, 2013 WL 4441979, at *9–10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2013)(same); see also Korth v. Credit Control, LLC, No. 4:23-CV-831-RWS, 2023 WL 6582001, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10,2023) (collecting cases). Bruce noted that “courts are ‘notrequired to find negligence per se from a violation of a federalstatute, particularly where the violation would not give riseto liability under state common law.’ ” 2015 WL 728028,at *4 (quoting Hackett, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 594); Thompson,2013 WL 4441979, at *9 (same). And where a plaintiff failsto “identif[y] a specific ‘duty’ to validate a debt under Texaslaw that is ‘analogous’ to” the statutory provision under whichthey seek negligence per se redress, that is fatal to theirnegligence per se claim. Bruce, 2015 WL 728028, at *4. Thesame is true of a plaintiff's failure to provide any reasons forapplying the negligence per se doctrine to FDCPA violations.Id. (citing Jackson v. Tae Jin Kim, No. 2:02-CV-200, 2004WL 6040969, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2004)).Here, Plaintiff provides no analogous duty under Texas law,nor can the Court identify one. Plaintiff similarly providesno basis for extending the negligence per se doctrine to theFDCPA. Any negligence per se claim therefore fails.*11 Therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff'swillful negligence claim should be granted.IV. PLAINTIFF IS GRANTED PARTIAL LEAVE TOAMEND HIS COMPLAINT.In his response, Plaintiff requests the Court “grant leave toamend should the Court find any claim insufficiently pled.”ECF No. 8 at 4. His sur-reply requests leave to file a secondamended complaint, indicating it would “incorporat[e] bond-violation allegations; clarified negligence duty; and correctedcitation.” ECF No. 10 at 4. Defendant argues Plaintiff shouldnot be allowed to amend futile claims. ECF No. 4 at 7.District courts generally should not dismiss pro se complaintsunder Rule 12(b)(6) without first giving the pro se plaintiff thechance to amend, except where it is obvious that the plaintiffhas pled his best case. Ricks v. Khan, 135 F.4th 296, 300–01(5th Cir. 2025). “A plaintiff has pleaded her best case aftershe is ‘apprised of the insufficiency’ of her complaint,” suchas by a motion to dismiss. Neuens v. Tulino, No. 24-40747,2025 WL 1445315, at *2 (5th Cir. May 20, 2025) (quotingWiggins v. La. State Univ.—Health Care Servs. Div., 710F. App'x 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Dark v. Potter,293 F. App'x 254, 257 (5th Cir. 2008))) (affirming dismissalwith prejudice of pro se plaintiff's complaint because theplaintiff failed to provide factual allegations that “wouldremedy his pleading deficiencies”). And “a bare request in anopposition to a motion to dismiss—without any indication ofthe particular grounds on which the amendment is sought—does not constitute a motion within the contemplation of Rule15(a).” Samtani v. City of Laredo, No. 5:22-CV-076, 2024WL 1559741, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2024) (quoting U.S.ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003)).Leave to amend should be denied where amendment would befutile. Id.; see also Smith v. Tex. Capital Loans, LLC, No. 4:24-CV-2757, 2025 WL 1914784, at *9 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2025)(citing U.S. ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d262, 270 (5th Cir. 2010)), adopted, No. 4:24-CV-02757, 2025WL 1793152 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2025). Amendment is futilewhere an amended complaint would still fail to state a claimupon which relief could be granted. Smith, 2025 WL 1914784,at *9 (citing Cinemark Holdings, Inc. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co.,No. 4:21-CV-00011, 2021 WL 3190508, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July28, 2021)).Here, Plaintiff has been apprised of the insufficiency of hiscomplaint by the pending motion to dismiss. Neuens, 2025
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9WL 1445315, at *2. His request for leave to amend hiscomplaint is no more than an insufficient “bare request” forthe same. Samtani, 2024 WL 1559741, at *16; ECF Nos. 8at 4; 10 at 4.As to his FDCPA claim, Plaintiff does not offer “anyindication of the particular grounds” on which he seeksleave to amend. Samtani, 2024 WL 1559741, at *16. Sucha bare request is insufficient grounds to grant Plaintiff whatwould be leave to make a fourth attempt at pleading therequired elements of an FDCPA claim. Id. However, thedetails provided in his response and sur-reply to the instantmotion to dismiss give the Court reason to believe Plaintiffcan amend his complaint sufficiently to make a prima facieshowing of an FDCPA violation by providing details asto the nature of the underlying debt. The Court thereforegrants Plaintiff leave to amend his prima facie FDCPA claim,subject to the adoption of this Report and Recommendation.However, the Court denies leave to amend his § 1692d claim,because nothing he has provided to the Court gives reason tobelieve amendment would not be futile.*12 Amendment of his state law claims would be futile.Based on the pleadings and briefing, it is not apparentthat Plaintiff can cure the defects identified above. BisharaDental, P.L.L.C. v. Morris, Lendais, Hollrah & SnowdenP.L.L.C., No. 21-20418, 2023 WL 2401586 (5th Cir. Mar. 8,2023) (affirming dismissal of DTPA claim brought againstdebt collector because plaintiff failed to “identif[y] anyspecific ‘goods or services’ that [he] sought or acquired” fromthe debt collector defendant) (citing Burton v. Prince, 577S.W.3d 280, 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019,no pet.)); Gongora Hinestroza, 2025 WL 1588349, at *9–10(dismissing an emotional distress claim because the gravamenof the plaintiff's complaint fell within other torts). As to hisnegligence claim, Plaintiff's proposed amendment would beto clarify the negligence duty that he has clearly positedand repeatedly stated arises from Defendant's violation ofthe FDCPA itself; in other words, a negligence per se claim.ECF No. 10 at 4; Sisley, 2025 WL 3050065, at *3; seeECF Nos. 3 ¶¶ 20–21; 8 at 3–4. An FDCPA violation-basednegligence per se claim does not survive in the Fifth Circuit,so amendment is futile. Bruce, 2015 WL 728028, at *4;Thompson, 2013 WL 4441979, at *9. The Court thereforedenies Plaintiff leave to amend his DPTA, emotional distress,and negligence claims.For these reasons, granting Plaintiff leave to file what wouldbe the equivalent of a fourth amended pleading would befutile as to his state law claims.11 Therefore, the Court grantsPlaintiff leave to amend only his FDCPA complaint, subjectto the adoption of this Report and Recommendation. SeeSamtani, 2024 WL 1559741, at *16.V. CONCLUSIONBased on the above, the Court RECOMMENDSGRANTING, in part, Defendant's motion to dismiss onPlaintiff's state law claims for DTPA violation, intentionalinfliction of emotional distress, and negligence as well as hisFDCPA claim arising under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. ECF No.4. Plaintiff's FDCPA claims under §§ 1692e(10)–(11), and1692g remain.Further, subject to the adoption of this Report andRecommendation, Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend hiscomplaint is GRANTED, but only with respect to his FDCPAclaim. ECF No. 8. Any amendment must be filed within thirtydays of the adoption of this Report and Recommendation, ifadopted.The Parties have fourteen days from service of this Reportand Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). Failure to file timelyobjections will preclude review of factual findings or legalconclusions, except for plain error. Quinn v. Guerrero, 863F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2017).IT IS SO ORDERED.Signed at Houston, Texas, on February 23, 2026.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 497165Footnotes
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.101The district judge to whom this case is assigned referred the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Order, ECF No. 5. A motion to dismiss is appropriate for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1); Davidson v. Georgia-Pac., L.L.C., 819 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 2016).2Plaintiff filed a response, ECF No. 8. Defendant filed a reply in support, ECF No. 9. Plaintiff was givenretroactive permission to file a sur-reply. Order, ECF No. 16; Sur-Reply, ECF No. 10.3All well pleaded facts are taken as true, and the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to thePlaintiff. ADR Int'l Ltd. v. Inst. for Supply Mgmt. Inc., 667 F. Supp. 3d 411, 419 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (quotingAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009)).4He also brought a surety bondholder liability claim under Texas law against the since-dismissed defendantSavvy Logic Systems LLC #1. ECF No. 1-4 at 2–6. Plaintiff retained that claim in his amended petition, ECFNo. 1-4 at 13–16, and in the operative amended complaint, ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 22–23. He has since voluntarilydismissed Savvy Logic Systems LLC #1 and withdrawn the claim he brought against it. ECF Nos. 12–13.5Plaintiff's briefing in response to the instant motion offer additional facts, which the Court cannot considerbecause they are beyond the confines of the “four corners of the complaint.” See ECF Nos. 8 at 2; 10 at 2;North v. Merscorp Holdings, Inc., No. CIVIL ACTION H-24-4236, 2025 WL 1634081 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2025)(“the court is constrained to the ‘four corners of the complaint’ to determine whether the plaintiff has stated aclaim”) (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 401 (5th Cir. 2011)), adopted, No. CV H-24-4236, 2025WL 1635703 (S.D. Tex. June 6, 2025).6The deficiencies identified in his operative complaint—lack of complete notice of Plaintiff's rights under theFDCPA, as well as of the debt's age and enforceability under any applicable statute of limitations—are onlypartially relevant here, because the FDCPA rights he refers to are described in § 1692g(a), but the debt'sage is not relevant here. ECF No. 3 9.7Plaintiff's response offers minimal additional clarity, noting only that the purported “settlement” language wasdeceptive because it implied legal obligation. ECF No. 8 at 2. And his sur-reply fares little better, not evenaddressing this subsection of the statute. See ECF No. 10.8Those acts are the (1) “use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person,reputation, or property of any person”; (2) “use of obscene or profane language or language the naturalconsequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader”; (3) “the publication of a list of consumers whoallegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirementsof section 1681a(f) or 1681b(3) of this title”; (4) “advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of thedebt”; (5) causing of “a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly orcontinuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number”; and (6) “placement oftelephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity” except “as provided in section 1692bof this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.9Plaintiff's response notes that “claims under the Texas Debt Collection Act (Tex. Fin. Code Ch. 392) maybe brought under the DTPA ‘tie-in’ statute, so long as the plaintiff seeks relief for violations related todebt collection—even if the defendant is not a traditional goods/services provider.” ECF No. 8 at 3 (citingHansberger v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 04-08-00438-CV, 2009 WL 2264996 (Tex. App. July 29, 2009)). ButPlaintiff has not raised any claims under the Texas Debt Collection Act, so even if that statement were true,it is inapplicable here.10Some of Plaintiff's cited authorities in support of this argument do not appear to exist. The Courtunsuccessfully exhausted efforts to locate these cases. Plaintiff is reminded of his obligations to this Courtunder Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even though he proceeds pro se. Hamilton v. Collier,
KENNETH HAWKINS, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11711 F. Supp. 3d 676, 685 (S.D. Tex. 2024) (citing Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993)).“By presenting to the court a ... written motion ... an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the bestof that person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under circumstancesthe ... legal contentions are warranted by existing law.” FED R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (emphases added). Providingthese nonexistent citations wastes this Court's and counsel's time. Plaintiff is cautioned that Rule 11'sobligations and consequences—up to an including stricken filings or monetary sanctions—apply to all whopresent writings to the Court, including those appearing pro se. Fletcher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No.25-20086, 2026 WL 456842, at *5–6 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 2026) (discussing the appropriateness of sanctionsfor “hallucinated” cases); Vargas v. Salazar, No. 4:23-CV-04267, 2024 WL 4804091, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 1,2024) (noting that future presentation “of pleadings or motions that contain ‘made up’ citations” could subjectthe pro se plaintiff to sanctions), adopted, No. 4:23CV4267, 2024 WL 4804065 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2024).11Plaintiff filed his original state court petition on April 3, 2025. ECF No. 1-4 at 2–8. He then filed an amendedstate court petition on April 26, 2025. Id. at 13–19. After this case was removed to federal court, he filedthe operative complaint on May 20, 2025, styled “First Amended Complaint,” even though it is his secondamendment to his pleadings. ECF No. 3.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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