Holmes v. Univ. of Texas at Austin (Feb. 4, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Ericka Holmes v. The University of Texas at Austin
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Feb. 4, 2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Order Robert Pitman (J.) (unanimous Court)
ERICKA HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 297630Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division.ERICKA HOLMES, Plaintiff,v.THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXASAT AUSTIN, Defendant.1:24-CV-1135-RP|Filed 02/04/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.ORDERROBERT PITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff Ericka Holmes's (“Plaintiff”)Motion for Reconsideration Under Rule 59(e) or, in theAlternative, Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. (Mot.for Reconsideration, Dkt. 27). On September 2, 2025, theCourt granted Defendant University of Texas at Austin's (“UTAustin”) Motion to Dismiss, dismissing each of Plaintiff'sclaims, (Dkt. 25), and entered Final Judgment, (Dkt. 26).Plaintiff now moves for the Court to reconsider its dismissalof her claims. UT Austin responded, (Dkt. 28), and Plaintiffreplied, (30). Having considered the motion, the relevant law,and the factual record, the Court will deny the motion forreconsideration. The Court will also order Plaintiff's counselto show cause in writing for his apparent misuse of artificialintelligence (“AI”) and to appear for a show cause hearing onthis topic.I. LEGAL STANDARDA Rule 59(e) motion “calls into question the correctness of ajudgment.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478–79 (5th Cir. 2004). Rule 59(e) “serve[s] the narrow purposeof allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or factor to present newly discovered evidence.” Waltman v. Int'lPaper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989). It is not theproper vehicle to “raise arguments which could, and should,have been made before the judgment issued.” Simon v. UnitedStates, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990). Relief is alsoappropriate when there has been an intervening change inthe controlling law. Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group Inc.,342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003). Altering, amending, orreconsidering a judgment under Rule 59(e) is an extraordinaryremedy that courts should use sparingly. Templet, 367 F.3dat 479. The Rule 59(e) standard “favors denial of motionsto alter or amend a judgment.” S. Constructors Group, Inc.v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993). Motionsunder Rule 59(e) must be filed within 28 days of the judgment.Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).II. DISCUSSIONA. Motion for ReconsiderationApplying the Rule 59(e) standard, the Court does not findgood cause to vacate or amend its order granting UTAustin's motion to dismiss. The Court granted UT Austin'smotion because (1) UT Austin has sovereign immunityagainst Plaintiff's Age Discrimination in Employment Act(“ADEA”), due process, and wrongful termination claims,(Dkt. 25, at 5–6); (2) Plaintiff failed to state a viable racediscrimination claim under Title VII and Chapter 21 of theTexas Labor Code (“TCHRA”) because she failed to allegea nearly identical comparator, (id. at 6–7);1 (3) Plaintifffailed to state a viable claim for age discrimination under theTCHRA because she did not allege that she was replacedby someone younger, (id. at 7–8); (4) Plaintiff failed tostate a viable claim for retaliation under Title VII and theTCHRA because she did not sufficiently allege that herinternal complaints constituted protected activity, (id. at 8–9); and (5) Plaintiff failed to state a viable hostile workenvironment claim because her allegations did not rise to thehigh standard of being objectively unreasonable, (id. at 9–10). Finally, the Court denied Plaintiff's request for leave toamend, finding that amendment would be futile. (Id. at 11–12).*2 In analyzing Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, theCourt is guided by the Rule 59(e) standard, which dictatesthat this “extraordinary remedy” should be used “sparingly.”Templet, 367 F.3d at 479. Plaintiff's motion contends that the
ERICKA HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Court's “dismissal order contains clear errors of law regardingsovereign immunity scope, pleading standards, and liberalamendment policy.” (Mot. for Reconsideration, Dkt. 27, at2). She then spends approximately five pages rehashing oldfacts, which is not an appropriate use of a Rule 59(e) motion.See Templet, 367 F.3d at 478–79 (citing Simon v. UnitedStates, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)) (holding that aRule 59(e) motion “is not the proper vehicle for rehashingevidence”). The Court will briefly review each of Plaintiff'sarguments of clear legal error.1. Race Discrimination ClaimsFirst, Plaintiff argues that the Court's dismissal of her racediscrimination claim based on the absence of a nearlyidentical comparator was clear error under the Fifth Circuit'srecent decision in Hamilton v. Dallas County, 4 F.4th 494(5th Cir. 2023) (en banc). (Id. at 8). As UT Austin pointsout in their response, however, Hamilton's abandonment ofthe Fifth Circuit's prior holdings limiting Title VII's anti-discrimination provision to “ultimate employment actions” isentirely unrelated to the requirement for a plaintiff to pleadthat she was treated less favorably than similarly situatedmembers outside of the protected class. The Court's dismissalon this basis was therefore not clear error.Second, Plaintiff argues that the Court held her toan impermissible pleading standard, because employmentdiscrimination complaints “need not contain specific factsestablishing a prima facie case,” as the plaintiff need onlyallege facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim tosurvive a motion to dismiss. (Id. at 8–9 (quoting Swierkiewiczv. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–15 (2002)). Plaintiff iscorrect—and that is what the Court required. The Court didnot dismiss Plaintiff's race discrimination claim for failureto submit evidence of a similarly situated comparator; theCourt dismissed her claims for failure to sufficiently plead asimilarly situated comparator. The Court did not hold Plaintiffto an incorrect pleading burden.Third, Plaintiff argues that the Court's comparator analysis“misapplies precedent” and claims that “[w]hile supervisorscannot always serve as comparators, the analysis depends onwhether both shared the same ultimate decision-maker.” (Id.at 9). She cites no case law in support of this assertion,2perhaps because her assertion is incorrect. Fifth Circuitprecedent states:[A]n employee who proffers a fellowemployee as a comparator [must]demonstrate that the employmentactions at issue were taken “undernearly identical circumstances.” Theemployment actions being comparedwill be deemed to have been takenunder nearly identical circumstanceswhen the employees being comparedheld the same job or responsibilities,shared the same supervisor or hadtheir employment status determined bythe same person, and have essentiallycomparable violation histories.Lee, 574 F.3d at 260 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).The use of the conjunctive “and” means that a plaintiff mustplead more than a shared ultimate decision-maker. Even ifPlaintiff has pleaded that she and Garvey “shared the samesupervisor or had their employment status determined by thesame person,” she did not—and could not—plead that she andGarvey “held the same job or responsibilities.”*3 Plaintiff also argues that Garvey can be considered acomparator under the “cat's paw theory”: “The ‘cat's pawtheory’ permits a supervisor to be a comparator when aplaintiff shows that the supervisor[,] motivated by retaliatoryanimus[,] influenced the actual decisionmaker to take anadverse action.” (Id. at 11). This is an entirely incorrectstatement of the law, as the cat's paw theory instead relates toa method of proving retaliatory animus when plaintiffs cannotshow the decisionmaker herself harbored retaliatory animus;it is unrelated to who can be a comparator for the purposes ofa discrimination claim. See Zamora v. City of Houston, 798F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2015) (explaining the cat's paw theoryof liability).Plaintiff then argues that, by pleading that she was reassignedto tasks that non-licensed nurses were permitted to do,excluded from training, and subject to increased scrutiny notapplied to non-Black employees, she has pleaded a “pattern[that] supports viable discrimination claims under multipletheories.” (Id. at 9). Because Plaintiff makes no attempt ofexplaining which “multiple theories” these are, she has notshown clear legal error.
ERICKA HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.32. Age Discrimination ClaimsPlaintiff argues that, even if her ADEA claim is barred bysovereign immunity, her age discrimination claim is viableunder the TCHRA. (Id. at 9). She asserts that her allegations“state viable age discrimination claims under [the TCHRA]that survive the motion to dismiss regardless of federalADEA sovereign immunity issues. The Court's narrow focuson comparator evidence ignored viable alternative theoriesand failed to address the independent viability of state lawage discrimination claims under [the TCHRA].” (Id. at 10).Plaintiff's argument is entirely non-responsive to the Court'sreasoning. The Court did not dismiss her TCHRA claimbecause of immunity or failure to allege a comparator; rather,the Court found that “Plaintiff's claim requires her to pleadshe was replaced by someone younger or discharged becauseof her age.... Plaintiff has done neither.” (Order, Dkt. 25, at 7).Plaintiff also contends that the Fifth Circuit has held thatage discrimination claims can survive a motion to dismissso long as the complaint has “age-specific references,” evenif not direct replacement evidence. Plaintiff cites “Harrisv. City of Houston (5th Cir. 2022).” To the best of thisCourt's knowledge, that case does not exist. In fact, basedon searches conducted across both Westlaw and Lexis, theFifth Circuit does not appear to have ever used the phrase“age-specific references.” An apparently hallucinated casedoes not support the contention that this Court committedclear legal error.3. Retaliation ClaimPlaintiff disagrees with the Court's finding that her complaintsto UT Austin's Nursing Director were too vague to amount toprotected activity. (Id. at 12–13). She argues that complaintsof discrimination are protected when they alert the employerto a reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination isoccurring. The Court agrees, as it applied this exact standard—and found Plaintiff had not met that standard. Plaintiff hastherefore failed to show a clear error of law on this point.Plaintiff next contends that it was clear error for the Courtto refuse to consider an email that was solely attached to herresponse to UT Austin's motion to dismiss (and not attachedto her Complaint). Case law is clear: on a motion to dismiss,the Court may only consider allegations in the complaint andmaterials incorporated into the complaint. Dorsey v. PortfolioEquities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). It was notclear legal error for the Court to refuse to consider an emailoutside of the pleadings.*4 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the time elapsed betweenher complaints and her termination establishes causation.Because the Court has found that she failed to sufficientlyplead protected activity, it did not—and does not now—reachthe causation element of her retaliation claim.4. Hostile Work Environment ClaimPlaintiff argues that the Court “misapplied establishedstandards” in dismissing her hostile work environment claim.(Id. at 14). She then rehashes allegations that may amountto discipline and reprimands, but as the Court already foundunder the correct standard, are not sufficiently pleaded ashaving a connection to her race or age. Plaintiff fails to showa manifest error of law or fact, newly discovered evidence, ora change in the controlling law. See Waltman, 875 F.2d at 473;Schiller, 342 F.3d at 567.5. Leave to Amend Her Due Process ClaimLastly, Plaintiff argues that the Court abused its discretionin denying her leave to amend her complaint. The Courtdetermined that it would be futile for her to add Jay Hartzell,the President of the University of Texas, as a defendant inhis individual capacity for her due process claim broughtunder Section 1983. In explaining its reasoning, rather thanspecifically addressing whether adding President Hartzell inhis individual capacity would be futile, the Court explainedthat her due process claim would be futile, regardless ofthe defendant. (Order, Dkt. 25, at 11–12). As previouslydiscussed, to bring a non-futile due process claim, Plaintiffmust first sufficiently allege she had a legally recognizedproperty interest at stake. Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 607(5th Cir. 1999). Because the procedure that Plaintiff allegesUT Austin violated, HOP 5-2420,3 (Compl., Dkt. 1-4, at30), explicitly states Plaintiff is an at-will employee, shedoes not plausibly have a property interest in her continuedemployment. See Johnson v. Sw. Mississippi Reg'l Med. Ctr.,878 F.2d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 1989).Plaintiff contends that, notwithstanding her being an at-willemployee, the Court ignored that “discharge from publicemployment under circumstances that put the employee's
ERICKA HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4reputation, honor or integrity at stake gives rise to a libertyinterest under the Fourteenth Amendment to a proceduralopportunity to clear one's name.” Rosenstein v. City of Dallas,876 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1989), opinion reinstated in part,901 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1990). She ignores, however, that toplausibly plead such a claim, she “must [plead] the following:that [s]he was discharged, that defamatory charges were madeagainst [her] in connection with the discharge, that the chargeswere false, that no meaningful public hearing was conductedpre-discharge, that the charges were made public, that [s]herequested a hearing in which to clear [her] name, and that therequest was denied.” Id. at 395–96. Along with other elementsof this claim, Plaintiff never pleaded that defamatory chargeswere made against her or that such charges were made public.The Court therefore did not make a manifest error.*5 Plaintiff similarly contends that, notwithstanding herbeing at-will employee, “she retains independent proceduraldue process rights regarding the methods and procedures usedin employment termination.” (Id. at 16). She proclaims that“[t]he Supreme Court has consistently distinguished betweensubstantive employment rights and procedural protections,holding that procedural due process applies even in situationswhere substantive rights may be limited.” (Id.). Notably,Plaintiff provides no citations for this “consistent[ ]” holdingby the Supreme Court, which would directly contradictholdings that are binding on this Court. See, e.g., McDonaldv. City of Corinth, 102 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1996)(stating the rule that employees are entitled to proceduraldue process prior to termination if they have a propertyright in their employment). The Court will therefore notreconsider Plaintiff's request to amend, as the Court's findingthat amendment would be futile was not clear error.B. Leave to AmendShould the Court deny Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration,Plaintiff asks the Court to alternatively grant her leave tofile an amended pleading. Though courts “should freely giveleave when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), thefutility of amendment a substantial reason to deny leave toamend. Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863,872–73 (5th Cir. 2000). A proposed amendment is futile if itfails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id.at 873.First, though Plaintiff references “proposed amendments,”Plaintiff failed to attach a proposed amended pleading to hermotion, which is a requirement under the Local Rules. W.D.Tex. Loc. R. 7(b) (“When a motion for leave to file a pleading,motion, or other submission is required, an executed copy ofthe proposed pleading, motion, or other submission shall befiled as an exhibit to the motion for leave.”). This is reasonenough for the Court to deny her motion.Second, even if the Court were to consider the arguments putforth by Plaintiff for amendment, this section of her motionis particularly disorganized and hard to follow. It is not clearwhat new allegations, if any, Plaintiff would now plead tomake a viable claim. See Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 295(5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 546(5th Cir. 2010)) (“[A] bare bones motion to amend remainsfutile when it ‘fails to apprise the district court of the facts[a plaintiff] would plead in an amended complaint.’ ”). TheCourt will therefore deny her motion to amend.III. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSEHaving resolved Plaintiff's motion, the Court addressesone additional matter: Plaintiff's counsel's apparent use ofgenerative AI in the drafting of his motion.4 As notedin Section II, supra, Plaintiff's counsel cites a nonexistentcase and mischaracterizes many other cases, each a hallmarkof generative AI use. The motion also mischaracterizessubstantive aspects of the Court's Order granting UT Austin'smotion to dismiss, (Dkt. 25). Finally, the motion is written insuch a manner that it is difficult to follow; certain argumentsare repeated verbatim throughout the motion, and manyarguments are irrelevant to the section heading they are placedunder.A district court may impose sanctions against a partyunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and under itsinherent authority. Rule 11 authorizes district courts to imposean “appropriate sanction” for various forms of attorneymisconduct “on any attorney, law firm, or party that violatedthe rule or is responsible for the violation.” Fed R. Civ. P.11(c)(1). Under Rule 11, a district court may award attorney'sfees sua sponte under Rule 11(c)(3) after issuing an orderto show cause. Tejero v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., L.L.C.,955 F.3d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 2020). Additionally, a federalcourt has the ability to sanction a party or attorney underits inherent authority. This power includes the ability todiscipline attorneys who appear before it. See Chambers v.NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). Under its inherentauthority, a court must determine whether the party that
ERICKA HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5exhibited potentially sanctionable conduct acted in bad faith.Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 722 (5th Cir. 1999).*6 The Local Rules of the Western District of Texasalso give this Court authority to discipline an attorney whoappears before it. Local Rule AT-7(d). Further, the LocalRules authorize this Court to refer an attorney to the DistrictDisciplinary Committee if it has reason to believe that anattorney has engaged in conduct that violates the TexasDisciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct or if the attorney“presents an impediment to the orderly administration ofjustice or the integrity of the Court.” Local Rule AT-7(c)(4),(6). Attorneys have a duty to present accurate informationin their filings before the court. Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 11(b)(3) provides: “By presenting to the court a ...written motion ... an attorney ... certifies that to the bestof the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formedafter an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ... theclaims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted byexisting law” and “the factual contentions have evidentiarysupport.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2–3). The Texas DisciplinaryRules of Professional Conduct, adopted as the standards ofprofessional conduct of this Court, see Local Rule AT-7(a),state: “A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement ofmaterial fact or law to a tribunal.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof.Conduct 3.03(a)(1).The Court has identified numerous instances in Plaintiff'sMotion for Reconsideration that, in the Court's experience,often indicate improper use of generative AI tools. The Courtnotes these instances as a non-exhaustive summary:• Plaintiff cites Harris v. City of Houston (5th Cir. 2022)for the proposition that “age discrimination requires‘age-specific references’ but not direct replacementevidence.” This case does not exist, nor does it appearthe Fifth Circuit has ever used the phrase “age-specificreferences.” (Mot. for Reconsideration, Dkt. 27, at 12).• Plaintiff mischaracterizes Hamilton v. Dallas County, 4F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc) as being relevant towhether Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a comparator, whenthe opinion has no relation to that element of Plaintiff'sclaim. (Id. at 8).• Plaintiff mischaracterizes Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2019), as holding that “discriminationclaims may proceed without traditional comparatorevidence when sufficient circumstantial evidenceexists,” when it made no such holding. (Id. at 9).• Page 9 of the motion provides: “Plaintiff alleges thatupon Garvey's appointment, she was reassigned to ‘tasksthat non-licensed nurses were permitted to do,’ excludedfrom training, and subjected to increased scrutiny notapplied to non-Black employees. This pattern supportsviable discrimination claims under multiple theories.”(Id.). Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff fails todiscuss or even name such “multiple theories,” thatquotation is repeated word for word on page 12 of themotion (again, without naming what these “multipletheories are”). (Id. at 12).• Plaintiff asserts that the Court's Order had a “narrowfocus on comparator evidence [that] ignored viablealternative theories and failed to address the independentviability of state law age discrimination claims under[the TCHRA].” (Id. at 10). But the Court did explicitlyaddress her age discrimination claim brought under theTCHRA and dismissed it for her failure to sufficiently“plead she was replaced by someone younger ordischarged because of her age”—unrelated to whethershe plausibly alleged a comparator. (Order, Dkt. 25, at7–8).• Plaintiff writes that the Court's “dismissal of [her] Section1983 claims based on sovereign immunity was legallyerroneous given the individual capacity claims.” (Mot.for Reconsideration, Dkt. 27, at 10). But the Courtdeclined to let Plaintiff amend her complaint to addindividual capacity § 1983 claims because she had failedto state a viable claim under § 1983, without reachingthe matter of sovereign immunity. (Order, Dkt. 25, at 11–12).• Plaintiff incorrectly formats multiple citations in anegregious manner, such as “Kittle Property Group, Inc.,2025 WL 315523 (2025)” and “Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc.(2d Cir. 2019).” (Mot. for Reconsideration, Dkt. 27, at11–12).• Section IV(A) of Plaintiff's motion is entitled“Race Discrimination Claims Satisfy Federal PleadingStandards.” (Id. at 8). Section IV(A)(3), underneaththat heading, then inexplicably discusses Plaintiff's agediscrimination claim, rather than her race discriminationclaim. (Id. at 9).*7 Based on above examples, it appears to the Court thatPlaintiff's counsel may have utilized generative AI not merelyfor legal research, but for the writing of his brief as well.
ERICKA HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6And, even worse, it appears he may have done so withoutverifying the accuracy of his legal contentions or his factualcontentions regarding the Court's Order dismissing this case.See Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Atthe very least, the duties imposed by Rule 11 require thatattorneys read, and thereby confirm the existence and validityof, the legal authorities on which they rely.”). If Plaintiff'scounsel did not utilize generative AI to research and writehis brief, it is equally concerning that he independentlygenerated the issues identified above and asserted the validityof those arguments to the Court. The Court will thereforeorder Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Gary Bledsoe, to show cause inwriting to explain whether he has violated his duties underFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and Rule 3.03(a)(1)of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Heshould also explain why he should not be subject to sanctionsdue to the mischaracterizations and hallucinated case citationidentified above. The Court will also order Mr. Bledsoe toappear for a show cause hearing on this topic.IV. CONCLUSIONAccordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion forReconsideration, (Dkt. 27), is DENIED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's alternativemotion for leave to amend, (Dkt. 27), is DENIED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, on or before February11, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Gary Bledsoe, shallSHOW CAUSE in writing why he should not besubject to sanctions for the hallucinated case citation andmischaracterizations presented to the Court in Plaintiff'sMotion for Reconsideration, (Dkt. 27).IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that a show cause hearing is setfor Tuesday, February 17, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom4, on the Fifth Floor, United States Courthouse, 501 WestFifth Street, Austin, TX. Mr. Bledsoe and counsel for UTAustin must appear in person for this hearing.SIGNED on February 4, 2026.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 297630Footnotes1More specifically, the Court found that the only comparator identified by Plaintiff was Amy Garvey (“Garvey”),Plaintiff's supervisor, and that Plaintiff and Garvey did not “work[ ] under nearly identical circumstances” asrequired by Fifth Circuit precedent. (Id. at 7 (citing Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5thCir. 2009)).2She does cite—without providing a citation to a reporter, database identifier, or case number—Lenzi v.Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2019), for the proposition that “discrimination claims may proceed withouttraditional comparator evidence when sufficient circumstantial evidence exists.” (Id. at 9). As pointed out byUT Austin, this is a clear mischaracterization of Lenzi, which instead held that Title VII plaintiffs need notestablish an equal pay violation. Id. at 110–11.32 The University of Texas at Austin University Policy Office, Policies and Procedures forDiscipline and Dismissal of Employees, HANDBOOK OF OPERATING PROCEDURES 5-2420, https://secure4.compliancebridge.com/utexas/public/getdoc.php?file=5-2420.4The Court does not reach whether Plaintiff used generative AI in the drafting of her reply in support ofher motion for reconsideration, (Dkt. 30), as the Court has already expended a significant amount of timereviewing her motion.
ERICKA HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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