Hoosier v. Executive Ctr. Ass'n (Oct. 31, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Kaleb Alexander Hoosier v. Executive Centre Association, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Oct. 31, 2025
KALEB ALEXANDER HOOSIER, Plaintiff, v. EXECUTIVE CENTRE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3049764Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Hawai‘i.KALEB ALEXANDER HOOSIER, Plaintiff,v.EXECUTIVE CENTREASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 25-00459 MWJS-WRP|Filed 10/31/2025Attorneys and Law FirmsKaleb Alexander Hoosier, Honolulu, HI, Pro Se.ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATIONTO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ANDDISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMENDMicah W.J. Smith United States District JudgeINTRODUCTION*1 Pro se Plaintiff Kaleb Alexander Hoosier has filed acomplaint against the Executive Centre Association, AstonHotels & Resorts, LLC, and two security officers. Hoosierhas also applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), thatis, without prepayment of fees or security. When an IFPapplication is filed, the court must screen the proposedcomplaint to determine whether it states a claim upon whichrelief can be granted by the court.Hoosier cannot afford court fees, and so the court GRANTShis IFP application. But for the reasons stated below, thecomplaint does not currently state a claim for which thecourt can provide relief. The court therefore DISMISSES thecomplaint with leave to amend. If Hoosier wishes to continuepursuing this case, he must file an amended complaint byDecember 3, 2025.DISCUSSIONA. Application to Proceed In Forma PauperisTypically, a person who wishes to bring a lawsuit in federalcourt is required to pay various court fees. Federal law,however, permits federal courts to allow a person to proceedwithout prepaying those fees (or providing security for them)if that person submits an affidavit showing that they cannotafford the fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). While there is nospecific formula to determine whether an IFP applicant canafford the fees, an IFP affidavit must at least allege “thatthe affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford thenecessities of life,” and it must do so “with some particularity,definiteness and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015).Here, Hoosier's IFP affidavit indicates that he has no incomeor assets, is not employed, and has not been employed forat least two years. Dkt. No. 2, at PageID.7-9. The affidavitalso includes Hoosier's statement, “I am homeless,” as areason why he cannot pay for the cost of this lawsuit. Id. atPageID.11. Based on these representations, the court findsthat Hoosier has demonstrated an inability to afford court feespursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See, e.g., Bahrampour v. UnitedStates, No. 16-cv-00985, 2016 WL 11185590 (D. Nev. May9, 2016). The court therefore GRANTS his IFP application.B. Screening of Hoosier's ComplaintWhen a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the courtmust screen the complaint to ensure that it is not frivolous,malicious, and does not fail to state a claim on which reliefmay be granted. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). Because Hoosier is apro se plaintiff, the court construes his complaint liberally.See, e.g., Henderson v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., CV No.07-00101, 2007 WL 3332067, at *4 (D. Haw. Nov. 7, 2007).But even when construed liberally, the complaint of a pro seplaintiff must offer enough facts to state a claim for relief thatis plausible on its face. Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). And those facts must allow “thecourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant isliable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009).The court first describes the allegations in Hoosier'scomplaint and then considers whether they sufficiently statea claim for relief in their current form.1. The Allegations in Hoosier's Complaint*2 Hoosier alleges that on October 14, 2025, he was engagedin “peaceful panhandling” on a “public easement sidewalk”at or near 1088 Bishop Street in downtown Honolulu. Dkt.
KALEB ALEXANDER HOOSIER, Plaintiff, v. EXECUTIVE CENTRE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2No. 1, at PageID.1, 3. While panhandling, Hoosier wasapproached by a security officer, Defendant Derek DelosReyes, and an unnamed “management representative.” Dkt.No. 1, at PageID.3. Delos Reyes and the representativeaccused Hoosier of “loitering, refusing to leave, and sittingon a wall,” and informed Hoosier that he was beingtrespassed from the area for one year. Id. At some point,three Honolulu Police Department (“HPD”) officers, whomHoosier identifies by their badge numbers in the complaint,enforced the trespass order against Hoosier. Id.Twelve days later, on October 26, 2025, Hoosier was standingon the public sidewalk or in the street near 1088 Bishop Street.Id. at PageID.1, 3. An unnamed security officer (listed asJohn Doe in the complaint) saw Hoosier and allegedly calledout to passersby, “don't give him money, he is a pedophile.”Id. Hoosier states that this statement was false and that hehas no criminal record. Furthermore, Hoosier claims that thestatement “deterred donations, inflicted public humiliation,and caused severe distress, exacerbated by the prior trespass[order].” Id. at PageID.4.Hoosier filed this lawsuit the following day, Dkt. No. 1,and simultaneously filed an application to proceed in formapauperis, Dkt. No. 2. His complaint includes four total counts;Counts I, II, and IV are asserted against all defendants, whileCount III is asserted against all defendants except for DelosReyes. Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.4-5. Counts I and II bothstem from the October 14 trespass incident. Id. at PageID.4.In Count I, Hoosier claims that Defendants are liable toHoosier under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because by preventing himfrom panhandling on a public sidewalk, they violated hisFirst Amendment rights. Id. In Count II, Hoosier contendsthat the “baseless trespass” constituted false arrest or falseimprisonment under Hawai‘i state law and a Honolulu cityordinance. Id. Hoosier also asserts a third claim stemmingfrom the October 26 incident. In Count III, he alleges thatthe Doe security officer's statements about him were false anddefamatory, and constitute slander per se under Hawai‘i law.Id. at PageID.4-5. Finally, in Count IV, Hoosier brings a statelaw claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress basedon both incidents. Id. at PageID.5. He seeks compensatoryand punitive damages as well as injunctive relief for hisclaims. Id.2. The Complaint Does Not Survive Screening in itsCurrent FormAs the foregoing summary makes clear, Hoosier's complaintprovides a number of factual allegations in support of hisclaims, some of them quite detailed. But the question iswhether these factual allegations state a claim on which thiscourt could legally grant relief. And, at least in its currentform, they do not. The court addresses the problems with eachcount in turn.a. Count I alleges that Defendants violated Hoosier's FirstAmendment right to peacefully panhandle on a publicsidewalk, thereby violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Dkt. No. 1, atPageID.4. “To state a claim under [Section] 1983, a plaintiffmust allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitutionand laws of the United States, and must show that the allegeddeprivation was committed by a person acting under color ofstate law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). As a result,Section 1983 “generally applies to government officials andemployees, [but] a private actor may act under ‘color of law’in certain circumstances.” Minichino v. Wells Fargo Bank,N.A., Civil No. 11-00370, 2012 WL 3234425, at *4 (D. Haw.Aug. 3, 2012). These circumstances include when the privateactor “conspir[es] with state officials, ... engag[es] in jointactivity with state officials, and/or ... becom[es] so closelyrelated to the state that the person's actions can be said to bethose of the state itself.” Id. (citing Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d702, 708 (9th Cir. 1991)).*3 Here, all of the named Defendants are private parties.And the facts alleged in the complaint do not provide anyobvious reason to treat any defendant as a state actor. Thecomplaint does not allege that any defendant conspired withthe HPD officers who enforced the trespass order or any otherstate official. And although the defendants may have soughtout the help of HPD to enforce the trespass order, that factstanding alone does not convert their action into state action.See Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1155 (9th Cir.1989) (“merely complaining to the police does not converta private party into a state actor”). Nor does the mere factthat the defendants may have relied on a state or local law totrespass Hoosier from the premises. See Ballinger v. City ofOakland, 24 F.4th 1287, 1300 (9th Cir. 2022) (“an action bya private party pursuant to a statute, without something more,is not sufficient to justify a characterization of that party asa state actor.” (cleaned up)). As a result, the complaint in itscurrent form does not state a Section 1983 claim against anyof the named Defendants.But the complaint makes a number of factual allegationsabout the conduct of HPD officers, none of whom is currentlynamed as a defendant. These factual allegations suggest thatHoosier may be attempting to allege that HPD officers were
KALEB ALEXANDER HOOSIER, Plaintiff, v. EXECUTIVE CENTRE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3involved in the activities of which he complains. And Hoosiermay be able to state a claim under Section 1983 by moreexplicitly alleging that the HPD officers who enforced thetrespass order against him violated his First Amendmentrights by preventing him from panhandling on a publicsidewalk. To properly state a Section 1983 claim in thismanner, Hoosier would need to amend his complaint to namethe specific HPD officers as defendants, and would also needto include factual allegations clearly indicating how thosedefendants violated his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wells v.Santa Clara Cnty. Med. Ctr., No. 08-174, 2008 WL 4369783,at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2008) (Section 1983 plaintiffmust “name[ ] as defendants the individual state actors whoallegedly wronged him ... and link each of them to his claimby explaining what each defendant did or failed to do thatcaused a violation of his constitutional rights.”).b. Count II, which asserts false arrest and false imprisonmentstate law claims based on the October 14 incident, also suffersfrom factual defects. Under Hawai‘i law, “[f]or both falsearrest and false imprisonment, the essential elements are (1)the detention or restraint of one against his or her will, and(2) the unlawfulness of such detention or restraint.” Reed v.City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 76 Hawai‘i 219, 230, 873 P.2d 98,109 (1994) (cleaned up). Here, the complaint does not allegethat Hoosier was ever detained or restrained at all. It assertsthat “Defendants intentionally confined Plaintiff via baselesstrespass,” Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.4, but the facts alleged in thecomplaint do not otherwise support that statement. And if theonly basis for Hoosier's claim is the existence or enforcementof a trespass order, the complaint does not plausibly allegehow Hoosier could possibly be considered to have beendetained, restrained, or otherwise confined merely as a resultof that order. By its nature, a trespass order does not confine aperson to an area—rather, it excludes a person from an area.See Puente v. City of Phoenix, 123 F.4th 1035 (9th Cir. 2024)(explaining that “exclusion from a place, even if wrongful,does not ordinarily constitute confinement” for purposes offalse imprisonment).The complaint in its current form does not, therefore,plausibly state a claim for false arrest or imprisonment. IfHoosier can allege additional facts that would satisfy the twoelements of the claim as described in Reed, he must do soin an amended complaint. Otherwise, he should withdraw hisclaims for false arrest or imprisonment in any future amendedcomplaint.c. Count III asserts a state law defamation claim basedon the October 26 incident in which he alleges the Doesecurity officer shouted falsehoods about him to passersby.The complaint, its in current form, does not show that thiscourt has subject matter jurisdiction over Count III. Federalcourts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Conner v. Off. ofHawaiian Affs., Civil No. 14-00350, 2014 WL 7422344, at *1(D. Haw. Dec. 31, 2014). Generally, a federal court may onlyhear a case when the plaintiffs and defendants are citizens ofdifferent states and the amount in controversy is over $75,000,or when the case presents a federal question. Id. Hoosier'scomplaint alleges that this is a federal question case, basedon the asserted violation of Section 1983 in Count I. Dkt. No.1, at PageID.2. It also asserts that the court has supplementaljurisdiction over the remaining state law claims based on 28U.S.C. § 1367. Id.*4 The court agrees that the alleged violation of Section1983, if amended to properly state a claim, presents a federalquestion. But federal courts may only exercise supplementaljurisdiction over state law claims when “[t]he state andfederal claims ... derive from a common nucleus of operativefact.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.715, 725 (1966). And “when the basis of jurisdiction isa federal question, a party may not join a separate anddistinct nonfederal claim ... [unless] it arises out of the sametransaction or occurrence” as the federal claim. 6A WRIGHT& MILLER'S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §1588 (3d ed.).Here, Count III—as currently alleged—appears to be basedon a different transaction or occurrence from the one givingrise to Hoosier's federal claim under Section 1983. Whereasthe alleged violation of Hoosier's First Amendment rightstook place on October 14, the alleged defamatory statementswere made almost two weeks later, on October 26, bya different defendant, and under circumstances that, onthese facts, appear different from the prior trespass incident.The only claim in the complaint linking the two events isHoosier's assertion that the statements caused him distressthat was “exacerbated by the prior trespass.” Dkt. No. 1, atPageID.4. That is not enough to show that the defamationincident “arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, orseries of transactions or occurrences” as the earlier trespassincident. See Banks v. McHugh, Civil No. 11-00798, 2012 WL4715162, at *4 (D. Haw. Sept. 28, 2012). As a result, the courtcannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the defamationclaim as alleged.
KALEB ALEXANDER HOOSIER, Plaintiff, v. EXECUTIVE CENTRE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4If Hoosier wishes to maintain his defamation claim, hemust include additional factual allegations in an amendedcomplaint to show that the claim arises from the samecommon nucleus of operative fact as the Section 1983 claim.If he cannot do so, he must remove his defamation claimfrom his amended complaint. He of course remains entitledto pursue the defamation claim in Hawai‘i state court.d. The court also appears to lack subject matter jurisdictionover Count IV, alleging intentional infliction of emotionaldistress, to the extent that claim is based on the October26 incident. See Dkt. No. 1, at Page ID.5 (Count IV “forboth incidents”). If Hoosier amends his complaint to reallegeCount III as described above, he may maintain Count IV'scurrent structure. If instead, he decides to drop his defamationclaim or proceed with it in state court, he should revise CountIV to seek relief only for the emotional distress that resultedfrom the October 14 incident.e. Two considerations apply to Hoosier's complaint generally.First, the complaint asserts all causes of action “against alldefendants” (except for Count III, which is asserted against alldefendants except for Delos Reyes). Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.4-5(capitalization omitted). That generalized allegation is notsufficient, however, because “a complaint must allege inspecific terms how each named defendant is involved and setforth an affirmative link between each defendant's actions”and the claimed violation or harm. Williams v. U.S. Dep'tof Justice, Civil No. 19-00081, 2019 WL 1768610, at *3(D. Haw. Apr. 22, 2019). If Hoosier chooses to amend hiscomplaint, he must explain how each named defendant causedhim harm. In other words, he should explain, in a clear andconcise manner, what each defendant did and how thosespecific facts create a plausible claim for relief.2 Hoosiershould not include any defendant as to whom he cannot makethese specific allegations.*5 Second, the court observes that several of Hoosier'scitations to legal cases and Honolulu city ordinances eitherdo not appear to exist or do not support the propositionfor which the complaint cites them. See Dkt. No. 1, atPageID.2, 3 (citing “Blair v. City of Honolulu,” which doesnot appear to exist); compare id. at PageID.3 (citing “ROH§ 14-1” in relation to a “public easement sidewalk”) withHONOLULU, HAW., REV. ORDINANCES (“ROH”) § 14-1(2025) (relating to the “Use of Indigenous and IntroducedPolynesian Plants in Public Landscaping”); compare id. atPageID.4 (citing “ROH § 29-7.2,” which does not appearto exist, for proposition that intentional confinement “viabaseless trespass” is unlawful) with ROH ch. 29 (relating to“General Affordable Housing Requirements”).These may be honest mistakes, but the court is mindful thatcitations to nonexistent cases or laws are increasingly theresult of artificial intelligence (“AI”) “hallucinations.” As aresult, the District of Hawai‘i has adopted a General Orderrequiring any counsel or pro se party who submits a filinggenerated by AI to also submit a declaration along with thatfiling entitled “Reliance on Unverified Source” that: “(1)advises the court that counsel or the pro se party has reliedon one or more unverified sources, and (2) verifies that thecounsel or pro se party has confirmed that any material is notfictitious.” D. Haw. General Order 23-1 (Nov. 14, 2023). IfHoosier is using AI to draft his complaints, he must submitthe required declaration alongside any amended complaint hefiles.Whether or not Hoosier is using AI to assist with his researchor drafting, he is reminded that all parties, including pro seplaintiffs, are required to comply with all local and federalrules. See Local Rule 81.1 (“Pro se litigants shall abide byall local, federal, and other applicable rules and/or statutes.”).Before filing an amended complaint, Hoosier should take careto ensure that his sources are accurately cited and support thepropositions for which they are cited. Doing so will ensurethat the court and opposing parties can fairly evaluate hisclaims.C. Leave to AmendAlthough the court dismisses the complaint, it recognizesthat Hoosier is proceeding pro se and could fix the problemswith his current complaint through amendment. The courttherefore GRANTS leave to amend. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052(9th Cir. 2003).Any amended complaint must be filed by December 3,2025, and it must fix the problems identified in this order.It must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureand this court's Local Rules, including Local Rule 10.4,which requires Hoosier to “reproduce the entire pleadingas amended”; he “may not incorporate any part of a priorpleading by reference.” Hoosier is cautioned that failure totimely file an amended complaint that fixes the problemsidentified in this order will result in the automatic dismissalof this case.
KALEB ALEXANDER HOOSIER, Plaintiff, v. EXECUTIVE CENTRE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Hoosier's informa pauperis application, but DISMISSES his complaintwith leave to amend. If Hoosier wishes to file an amendedcomplaint, he must do so by December 3, 2025.IT IS SO ORDERED.DATED: October 31, 2025, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3049764Footnotes1At this early point in the litigation, the court does not address whether Hoosier has a valid First Amendmentclaim. This order only addresses whether the alleged First Amendment violation states a claim for Section1983 purposes.2This is particularly important for the corporate defendants, Executive Centre Association and Aston Hotels& Resorts, LLC. Because these defendants are not human beings and can only commit the alleged tortsthrough human beings acting on their behalf, the complaint must allege why and how the defendants areliable for the actions of the human beings who personally harmed Hoosier. Although the complaint states, forexample, that Aston Hotels & Resorts, LLC, “is liable under respondeat superior” as the property managerof 1088 Bishop Street, Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.3, it does not offer facts from which the court could concludethat the doctrine of respondeat superior applies—for example, that either security officer was an employeeor agent of Aston Hotels & Resorts, LLC, or the Executive Centre Association. If Hoosier chooses to amendhis complaint, he must allege facts explaining the relationship between the corporate defendants and thehuman beings alleged to have harmed him.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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