The policy of a State may rely for the common good on the free play of conflicting interests and leave conduct unregulated. Contrariwise, a State may deem it wiser policy to regulate. Regulation may take the form of legislation, e. g., restraint of trade statutes, or be left to the ad hoc judicial process, e. g., common law mode of dealing with restraints of trade. Either method may outlaw an end not in the public interest or merely address itself to the obvious means toward such end. The form the regulation should take and its scope are surely matters of policy and, as such, within a State’s choice.
If because of the compulsive features inherent in picketing, beyond the aspect of mere communication as an appeal to reason, a State chooses to enjoin picketing to secure submission to a demand for employment proportional to the racial origin of the then customers of a business, it need not forbid the employer to adopt such a quota system of his own free will. A State is not required to exercise its intervention on the basis of abstract reasoning. The Constitution commands neither logical symmetry nor exhaustion of a principle. “The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific.” Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. A State may “direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed.” Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160. See also Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 81; Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 227; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 384; Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 661-62; James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 125; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 396; Labor Board v. Jones &