In re Kilpatrick, No. 25-30619 (Nov. 24, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Nov. 24, 2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor.United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division. | November 24, 2025 | Slip Copy |2025 WL 3295748Document Detailsstandard Citation:In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., No. 25-30619, 2025 WL3295748 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2025)All Citations:Slip Copy, 2025 WL 3295748Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:OhioDelivery DetailsDate:November 27, 2025 at 12:19 PMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineChapter 7 (p.1)All Citations (p.15)
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3295748Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States Bankruptcy Court,S.D. Ohio, Western Division.In re: Marguerite LateteKilpatrick, Debtor.Case No. 25-30619|Filed 11/24/2025Chapter 7ORDER DENYING FORMER DEBTOR'SEMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY PENDINGDETERMINATION OF MOTION TOWITHDRAW THE REFERENCE (DOC. 85)Judge CristI. Introduction*1 This matter is before the Court on just thelatest in a series of sovereign citizen-based filingsby former pro se Debtor Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick(“Ms. Kilpatrick”), notwithstanding that her chapter7 bankruptcy case was dismissed on October 1,2025, that the dismissal order is final and non-appealable, and, by design, bars her from filing anotherbankruptcy for one (1) year so that she cannot furtherabuse the bankruptcy process for the sole purpose offurther staying a foreclosure action in the CommonPleas Court, Montgomery County, Ohio. In short,Ms. Kilpatrick, likely with the assistance of artificialintelligence (“AI”), such as ChatGPT, to cite theapplicable statute, case law (including non-existentcase law), and rules, is seeking to misuse the statutoryprocedure for withdrawal of the reference under 28U.S.C. § 157(d) to accomplish indirectly what she canno longer accomplish directly, which is to impose astay of a foreclosure action, which may have recentlyresulted in a lawful auction sale.1 But the dismissal ofher most recent pro se bankruptcy is final and non-appealable. And there is no merit to her present filings.Moreover, under Rule 5011(c) of the Federal Rulesof Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”),which Ms. Kilpatrick relies upon for her EmergencyMotion for Stay (as defined below), this Court cannotimpose a stay of the foreclosure action before theCommon Pleas Court, it could only stay “proceedingsin a case” before this Court; however, there is no casebefore this Court, only the retained issue of whetherand what type of sanctions to impose on Ms. Kilpatrickpursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c).Notwithstanding this Court's prior orders denying andultimately striking her twenty-seven (27) previoussovereign citizen filings based on debunked pseudo-legal theories that bore no resemblance to legitimatefilings,2 Ms. Kilpatrick has filed motions with thisCourt based on her complaint that one of her previoussovereign citizen filings was not respected or ruledupon. She also makes false assertions in support ofthose complaints, as well as citing non-existent caselaw.Now before this Court is Ms. Kilpatrick's EmergencyMotion for Stay Pending Determination of Motionto Withdraw the Reference (the “Emergency Motionfor Stay”) (Doc. 85), along with, and based upon,her Motion to Withdraw the Reference (Doc. 86) (the“Motion to Withdraw the Reference”) (together, the“Motions”).3 The Court will address the EmergencyMotion for Stay, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 5011(c),within this Order. The Court will also enter andtransmit a short Report and Recommendation to theDistrict Court, along with the Motion to Withdraw theReference pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), BankruptcyRule 5011(a), and Local Bankruptcy Rule 5011-1(d),to aid the District Court in its consideration of thismatter and to recommend that the Motion to Withdrawthe Reference likewise be denied.4 This Court will alsoattach its prior orders denying and striking all of Ms.Kilpatrick's sovereign citizen filings, as well as thisOrder, to the short Report and Recommendation, asExhibits A, B and C.*2 The Emergency Motion asserts that “[o]n May14, 2025, Movant filed a Verified Notice of Interest(“VNOI”) placing the Court and parties on actualand constructive notice of Movant's equitable andbeneficial interest in the identity-linked trust res.”Doc. 85 at 1, 1. She does not, however, attachthis VNOI to her current Motions, likely because
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2it clearly was not filed on May 14, 2025, as sheasserts. The most important point, however, is thatthe VNOI is a sovereign citizen type document withabsolutely no legal merit that Ms. Kilpatrick madeup (or adopted from somebody else who made itup) and does not create any legal interest in realestate or have the effect of staying any actual legalrights. This is simply a perpetuation of her sovereigncitizen-based quest and is deserving of no relief.At this point, it may be possible to classify Ms.Kilpatrick as a vexatious litigator who should nolonger be afforded the opportunity to file any paperswith this Court. Her filings are not only baseless,but they contain false, misleading, and inappropriateassertions. See Burks v. Licking Cnty. Child SupportEnf't Agency, No. 2:24-cv-2330, 2025 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 31341, 2025 WL 580389 (S.D. Ohio Feb.21, 2025) (describing voluminous filings related tosovereign citizen type arguments as frivolous andwasteful of court resources).II. SummaryThere are a myriad of procedural and jurisdictionalproblems with Ms. Kilpatrick's current Motions. Firstand foremost, she fails to appreciate that there isnothing to withdraw from this Court, given that thereis no longer a pending bankruptcy case. This was herthird pro se bankruptcy within the last year and itwas dismissed due to her failure to comply with herduties as a Debtor and because “the debtor is a serialbankruptcy filer who is using her bankruptcy filingsto improperly delay a pending foreclosure proceedingbefore the Montgomery County Court of CommonPleas.” U.S. Trustee's Mot. to Dismiss With Prejudice(Doc. 38) at 1 (citing to Case No. 2023 CV 04539 asthe “Foreclosure Case”5). Her conduct also constitutedcause to bar her from filing any further bankruptciesfor a full year pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(a). SeeOrder Granting U.S. Trustee's Mot. to Dismiss WithPrejudice and One (1) Year Bar to Refiling (Doc. 79) at5, 3 (“The Debtor is hereby BARRED from filing forbankruptcy protection anywhere in the United Statesfor a period of one (1) year from the date of entry ofthis Order pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 109(g)(1),and 349(a).”).The only matter remaining before this Court isthe imposition of appropriate sanctions against Ms.Kilpatrick, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c),under this Court's reservation of post-dismissal “cleanup” jurisdiction. But she is requesting the DistrictCourt to withdraw the reference for an entire dismissedbankruptcy case, from which no appeals have beentaken and nothing remains to be determined, exceptfor the matter of sanctions due to her numerous andcontinuing frivolous filings, which is uniquely withinthis Court's present knowledge. Even Ms. Kilpatrickadmits that “the estate has already been dismissed andno active administration remains.” Emergency Mot.for Stay at 2, II.3.In the Emergency Motion for Stay, she asks this Courtto stay its July 17, 20256 order granting relief fromthe automatic stay for Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC(“Mortgagee”) to continue its foreclosure action in theCommon Pleas Court, which this Court simply cannotdo given that there is no ability, and absolutely nocause, to reimpose a stay following the dismissal ofher bankruptcy case. By statute, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c),the dismissal of a bankruptcy terminates the automaticstay as a whole, not just for specific actions as wasthe case with the prior order granting relief from staythat she focuses on. Moreover, the order dismissingher chapter 7 bankruptcy specifically terminated theautomatic stay and barred her from filing anotherbankruptcy for one (1) year so that she could not furtherabuse the bankruptcy process for the sole purpose offurther staying the foreclosure action. Nevertheless,she asserts that “[t]he apparent completion of aforeclosure action, ... in disregard of a previously filedVerified Notice of Interest, constitutes good cause foremergency stay.” Emergency Mot. for Stay at 2, II.4(emphasis in original).*3 Ms. Kilpatrick did not oppose the underlyingmotion for relief from the automatic stay (Doc. 30)filed by the Mortgagee on June 16, 2025; she did notappeal the order granting stay relief (Doc. 34) enteredon July 18, 2025; she did not oppose the motion todismiss her bankruptcy case with prejudice (Doc. 38)filed by the United States Trustee on July 31, 2025; andshe did not appeal the order dismissing her bankruptcycase and barring her from filing another for one (1)year (Doc. 79) entered on October 1, 2025. Becauseher whole bankruptcy case has since been dismissed
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3through an order that specifically and by operationof law terminated the automatic stay in its entirety,and because she has been barred from filing anotherbankruptcy case, there is no basis to impose a stayand this Court will not entertain her attempted end-runthrough the current Emergency Motion for Stay.The alleged emergency is false. There is nothingpending before this Court relating to Ms. Kilpatrick'sreal estate given that her bankruptcy case waspreviously dismissed and the automatic stay no longerexists under the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of theUnited States Code, as further discussed below. Thereis no pending matter before this Court relating to herreal estate that can be stayed at this time, but morepertinently, no way for this Court to reimpose anystay of the foreclosure action given that her case wasdismissed. Kilpatrick did not oppose or appeal thatdismissal, and she has been barred from filing furtherbankruptcies for one year. The only thing still “live”with respect to the dismissed bankruptcy case is thisCourt's retention of “clean up” jurisdiction to addressthe potential imposition of sanctions based on hernumerous frivolous sovereign citizen filings.The Motions are just another frivolous and misguidedeffort to use the bankruptcy process to attempt toforestall the completion of a foreclosure action againsther real estate,7 and possibly to stave off this Court'sconsideration of sanctions against her pursuant to Rule9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,resulting from her prior barrage of filings that began,in this Court, forty-six (46) days after Ms. Kilpatrickfailed to oppose relief from the automatic stay for herMortgagee to finally complete its foreclosure actioninitiated in the Court of Common Pleas, MontgomeryCounty, Ohio on August 25, 2023. These Motionspresume that her VNOI sovereign citizen filing validlyasserted a cognizable interest and that something is stillpending in this case regarding her real estate that couldbe withdrawn to the District Court. Neither is true. TheVNOI was previously stricken as a frivolous sovereigncitizen filing and stay relief was granted on July 18,2025, followed by the dismissal of her bankruptcycase. Thus, the Motions lack any basis and, just like herprior sovereign citizen filings on which they are based,they are frivolous.For all the foregoing reasons, which will be discussedin more detail below, this Court will deny theEmergency Motion for Stay.III. BackgroundA. OverviewThe background to the present Motions is somewhatinvolved due to Ms. Kilpatrick's serial pro sebankruptcies, bad faith conduct, and her mountain ofsovereign citizen filings. Ms. Kilpatrick has abused thebankruptcy process, has peppered this Court (and theCommon Pleas Court) with sovereign citizen filingsand, through her current filings, continues to do so,in an on-going effort to retain her real estate throughfrivolous legal maneuvers. This is notwithstandingthat her sovereign citizen filings, on which shebases the current Motions, have been rejected byboth the Common Pleas Court and this Court, andnotwithstanding that her underlying bankruptcy casewas dismissed on October 1, 2025 (Doc. 79) with a one(1) year bar to refiling.*4 To give context to consideration of the presentMotions, this Court will attempt to briefly describe thehistory of Ms. Kilpatrick's travails.B. Foreclosure ActionAccording to the online docket of the CommonPleas Court of Montgomery County, Ohio, LakeviewLoan Servicing, LLC initiated the foreclosure action,Case No. 2023 CV 4539, against Ms. Kilpatrick onAugust 25, 2023. This is the same foreclosure actionreferenced by the United States Trustee in his motion todismiss Ms. Kilpatrick's third bankruptcy case, whichshe filed to stop the foreclosure action.Interestingly, Ms. Kilpatrick, prior to and soon afterfiling her third bankruptcy case, had previously fileda number of sovereign citizen filings in the CommonPleas Court. The Common Pleas Court dealt with someof her similar submissions, months before she began tosubmit her sovereign citizen filings to this Court, in anEntry and Order Striking Defendant's Plea of Tenderand Notice of Special Deposit, entered on April 16,2025 (the “Entry and Order”). Therein, the CommonPleas Court wrote, in language similar to that later used
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4by this Court in rejecting her sovereign citizen filings,as follows:This matter is before the Court on the Declarationof Representative Capacity and Plea of Tender andNotice of Special Deposit, both filed on April 7,2025 by Defendant Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick,and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Plea ofTender and Notice of Special Deposit, filed April11, 2025. The Court does not find Ms. Kilpatrick'sfilings are proper and the filings are thereforestricken.* * *II. LAW AND ANALYSISIn the instant filings, Ms. Kilpatrick makes severalstatements that are consistent with the assertionof rights as a sovereign citizen not subject tothe Court's jurisdiction. Plaintiff contends Ms.Kilpatrick's arguments related to tender, paymentand dismissal are meritless and should be summarilyrejected, and the property should proceed to judicialsale.Sovereign citizen declarations have repeatedly beenrejected by numerous Ohio courts, including theSecond District, and arguments based on this theoryhave been routinely recognized as “meritless” and“wholly frivolous.” See e.g., State v. Huelsman,2023-Ohio-649, 14-15 (2d Dist.) citing Paris v.Galluzzo, 2015-Ohio-3385, 47 (2d Dist.); Statev. Few, 2015-Ohio-2292, 6 (2d Dist.); State v.Brown, 2024-Ohio-4808, 14 (2d Dist.); Y.A.B. exrel. E.E.W. v. Wallace, 2023-Ohio-551, 10 (2dDist.); In re S.H.O., 2019-Ohio-645, 16 (2d Dist.).* * *Finally, as noted by Plaintiff, Ms. Kilpatrick fileda Notice of Bankruptcy Filing and AutomaticStay on April 9, 2025 indicating she filed fora Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the U.S. BankruptcyCourt for the Southern District of Ohio under CaseNo. 3:25-bk-30619. This is Ms. Kilpatrick's thirdbankruptcy filing. Ms. Kilpatrick previously filedtwo bankruptcy petitions in the past twelve months,and both cases were later dismissed. See U.S.Br.S.D. Ohio Case No. 24-bk-31598 (filed 8/22/24 anddismissed 10/09/24; U.S.Br. S.D. Ohio Case No.24-bk-3461 (filed 12/17/24 and dismissed 1/29/25).Plaintiff maintains Ms. Kilpatrick is not entitled toan automatic stay as a result of her most recentbankruptcy filing. The Court agrees.*5 While “11 U.S.C. 362 provides a mechanismto automatically stay most actions against a debtorwhen that person files a qualifying bankruptcy,” italso applies limitations “to subsequent bankruptciesfiled by that same person.” Woods Cove II, LLCv. Williams, 2017-Ohio-9273, 10 (8th Dist.). 11U.S.C. § 362(c)(4) specifically provides that “if[two] or more ... cases of the debtor were pendingwithin the previous year but were dismissed, ...the stay ... shall not go into effect upon the filingof the later case.” Id. The debtor may obtain astay only if she is able to demonstrate that thefiling of the later bankruptcy case is in good faith.Woods Cove at 10 citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(internal citation omitted). Like the debtor in WoodsCove, Ms. Kilpatrick has not demonstrated “thatthis third bankruptcy was filed in good faith or thatthe bankruptcy court determined as much.” Id. at 12. Accordingly, no automatic stay is in effect, andPlaintiff may proceed with the sale of the foreclosedproperty.Entry and Order at 1-3, Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLCv. Kilpatrick, No. 2023 CV 04539 (Mont. Cnty. C.P.Apr. 16, 2025).As she has in this Court, and notwithstanding theCommon Pleas Court's Entry and Order, she continuedto file numerous meritless sovereign citizen stylepapers with the Common Pleas Court, as reflected onthe public docket for the foreclosure action, during theperiod from May 5, 2025 to June 4, 2025 (6 filings),and from September 26, 2025 to October 6, 2025 (4filings). Kilpatrick, No. 2023 CV 04539.C. Pro Se Bankruptcies – Three Within One (1)Year – And Prior AppealOn April 8, 2025, Ms. Kilpatrick filed her pro seVoluntary Petition (Doc. 1) initiating this case, herfourth bankruptcy case overall and third bankruptcycase within the span of less than a year. In her ScheduleA/B: Property (Doc. 14) she listed her ownershipof a single-family located at 108 Barnside Drive,Englewood, Ohio 45322 (“108 Barnside Drive”).8 But
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5having failed to list her mortgage in the first set ofschedules she filed on April 22, 2025 (Schedule D(Doc. 14 at 13-14)),9 Ms. Kilpatrick later filed anamended Schedule D (Doc. 26) on May 29, 2025 to listLakeview Loan Servicing, LLC as holding a securedclaim on her real property at 108 Barnside Drive, basedon an agreement she made, such as a mortgage, onwhich she owed $345,000.As recounted by the U.S. Trustee in his motion todismiss this case, Ms. Kilpatrick had previously fileda chapter 13 bankruptcy on August 22, 2024, CaseNo. 24-31598, on the eve of an auction sale inthe foreclosure action in Common Pleas Court. SeeMot. to Dismiss at 2, ¶¶ 4-6. That case forestalledthe foreclosure, but was ultimately dismissed onOctober 8, 2024 (No. 24-31598, Doc. 23) due to herfailure to timely file a chapter 13 plan. Then, onDecember 17, 2024, again on the eve of a foreclosureauction, she filed another chapter 13 bankruptcy,Case No. 24-32461. That case also forestalled theforeclosure but again was ultimately dismissed onJanuary 29, 2025 (No. 24-32461, Doc. 17) due,again, to Ms. Kilpatrick's failure to file a chapter 13plan. The dismissal of that bankruptcy case, however,was followed by a flurry of inappropriate filingsby Ms. Kilpatrick, in which she began to submitsovereign citizen filings to this Court and whichculminated in an appeal she took to the District Court.That appeal was dismissed by United States DistrictJudge Walter H. Rice for lack of prosecution. SeeOrder Dismissing Bankruptcy Appeal for Want ofProsecution Filed by Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick;Termination Entry, In re Kilpatrick, No. 3:25-cv-71,2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140938 (S.D. Ohio July 23,2025) (dismissing for failure “to show cause, filean opening brief, or otherwise prosecute this actionin any manner” Ms. Kilpatrick's appeal from theMemorandum Order Denying Debtor's Motion forReconsideration and Motion to Seal (Doc. 24), In reKilpatrick, No. 24-32461, 2025 Bankr. LEXIS 1411,2025 WL 1635420 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2025)(Humphrey, J.) (Doc. 33)).D. Relief from Stay*6 Although the Common Pleas Court had previouslyconcluded that no automatic stay went into effect withMs. Kilpatrick's third pro se bankruptcy due to 11U.S.C. § 362(c)(4), on June 16, 2025, Ms. Kilpatrick'sMortgagee filed a standard motion for relief from theautomatic stay (Doc. 30), pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(1) and (d)(2)10 with respect to 108 BarnsideDrive, in order to resume its foreclosure action. TheMortgagee served Ms. Kilpatrick at 108 BarnsideDrive and gave the requisite twenty-one (21)-daynotice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(a)(1)(C). Ms. Kilpatrick did not respond, and in themeantime her meeting of creditors was twice continueddue to her failure to provide the Chapter 7 Trustee withdocuments and information requested by the Trustee'soffice. See Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 38) at 4, 21. On July18, 2025, this Court entered the Order Granting Motionfor Relief from the Automatic Stay (Doc. 34) (the“Order Granting Stay Relief”) to modify the automaticstay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 for the Mortgagee,“its successors and assigns, to pursue its in remremedies under non-bankruptcy law regarding the realproperty located at 108 Barnside Drive, Englewood,Ohio 45322.” The Order Granting Stay Relief wasstayed for fourteen (14) days after entry pursuant toBankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(4). A copy was mailed toMs. Kilpatrick by the Bankruptcy Noticing Center, asreflected in the Certificate of Notice filed on July 20,2025 (Doc. 35). And the appeal period expired withoutany action. In fact, it was not until September 2, 2025,that Ms. Kilpatrick began filing her sovereign citizenstyle papers, which contained a VNOI, which hassince been stricken for being an inappropriate frivolousfiling.As with the dismissal of her immediately priorchapter 13 bankruptcy, relief from stay was eventuallyfollowed by a flurry of inappropriate sovereign citizenstyle filings by Ms. Kilpatrick.E. U.S. Trustee's Motion to Dismiss andSupplementOn July 31, 2025, the United States Trustee filedhis Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (Doc. 38) (the“Motion to Dismiss”). As summarized therein:28. The undisputed facts of this case demonstratethat the Debtor is a serial filer that repeatedlyfiles for bankruptcy protection on the eve of theforeclosure sale of the Property and who has failedto comply with the Trustee's reasonable, routine, andrepeated requests for information and documents.
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6The Debtor's conduct in this case constitutes badfaith and cause for the dismissal of this case, withprejudice, under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a).Mot. to Dismiss at 6, 28. The Motion to Dismisswas served on Ms. Kilpatrick and was supported bya Declaration of Patricia J. Friesinger, the Chapter 7Trustee appointed to Ms. Kilpatrick's case, in whichshe recounted all of the problems dealing with Ms.Kilpatrick over the course of three continued meetingsof creditors. See Decl. of Friesinger (Doc. 38-1).Because the docket reflected that the meeting ofcreditors had been subsequently concluded on August18, 2025, the Court issued an order (Doc. 48)requiring the U.S. Trustee to supplement the Motion toDismiss with any developments that would impact itsconsideration of the Motion to Dismiss. On September23, 2025, the U.S. Trustee filed his SupplementalMemorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss withPrejudice (Doc. 52), in which he confirmed that Ms.Kilpatrick had not cured any of her violations of theBankruptcy Code, and in which he further supporteddismissal of her case with a Supplemental Declarationof Patricia J. Friesinger (Doc. 52-1).F. Sovereign Citizen Filings and VNOIWhile the Motion to Dismiss was pending, Ms.Kilpatrick began to submit her multitude of “Embassyof Living Faith” sovereign citizen filings. It beganwith duplicate copies of Ministerial Cover Letteraddressed to “Dear Trustees de son tort” assertingthat “[t]his Ministerial Cover Letter tenders actualand constructive notice of sacred ecclesiasticalinstruments under the covering of The Embassy ofLiving Faith™, a private ecclesiastical trust estateestablished and administered under the Government ofGod.” Doc. 44 at 1 (emphasis in original); Doc. 45 at 1.And it goes on from there. One of the many documentsenclosed with that cover letter was described asa “Verified Notice of Interest (Instrument No.004.01) (anchor instrument).” Doc. 44-1 (emphasisin original). The VNOI was signed by Ms. Kilpatrick,albeit as “the Living Heir in Sacred Honor” as“Marguerite Latete of the House of Kilpatrick,” withthe titles “Beneficial Owner,” “Equitable Titleholder,”“Authorized Agent,” and “Custodian Ambassador forChrist and Minister within The Embassy of LivingFaith™.” VNOI (Doc. 44-1) at 9.*7 Although Ms. Kilpatrick asserts in her Motionsthat she filed the VNOI with this Court on May 14,2025, it is clear the VNOI was not filed until September2, 2025. There is no entry on this Court's docket onMay 14, 2025. Perhaps she is conflating the filingsin this Court with filings somewhere else, but boththe docket and her VNOI filed on this Court's docketare clear that she did not sign it, in her made-upcapacity,11 until August 28, 2025, and did not fileit until September 2, 2025. See VNOI (Doc. 44-1).This was well after, in fact 46 days after, this Courthad already entered its July 18, 2025 order (Doc. 34)granting the unopposed motion for relief from theautomatic stay with respect to 108 Barnside Drive,the real estate she is attempting to retain, which isthe subject of the foreclosure action pending in theMontgomery County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas,and is her apparent motivation in peppering both thisCourt and the Montgomery County, Ohio Court ofCommon Pleas with sovereign citizen filings. See, e.g.,Entry and Order, Lakeview Loan Servicing LLC v.Kilpatrick, No. 2023 CV 04539 (Mont. Cnty. C.P. Apr.16, 2025).It is readily apparent that Ms. Kilpatrick is unsatisfiedwith her loss or potential loss of her real estate; amatter she potentially could have addressed throughbankruptcy had she been willing to be forthcoming andcomply with her obligations as a debtor. However, it isalso readily apparent that the alleged interest she holdsin 108 Barnside Drive, which she refers to as the “trustres,” is a self-granted made-up interest based on her“Embassy of Living Faith” strain of sovereign citizentheories. For just a flavor (example) and because shedid not attach it to her Motions, the portion of theVNOI that appears to allegedly “grant” her interest,“under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Most HighGod (Psalm 24:1)” states as follows:VII. DECLARATION OF INTERESTI, the Living Heir, pursuant to my exclusivestanding in trust and sacred duty to operate inhonor, do hereby declare, retain, and assert sole,superior, equitable interest and beneficial titlein and to the Private Estate, including—but notlimited to—every derivative instrument styled inthe ALL CAPS designation.
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7These derivative instruments include, withoutlimitation, all records, securities, contracts,agreements, and estate identifiers arising from,or connected to, any and all presumedadhesion contracts, public filings, certificates,applications, administrative constructs, andcommercial encumbrances.The originating estate identifiers include, withoutlimitation:• The initial application resulting in the certificateof live birth;• The subsequent application producing thebirth certificate and establishing the registeredorganization;• The application for the Social Security Numberthat created a corresponding Social Securitytrust for tracking and control;• The passport application;• The driver's license application;• All applications or instruments resulting in theassignment of taxpayer identification numbers;• Any and all other applications-past, present,or future-derived from, associated with, orpresumed to bind the Private Estate, whetherexpressly listed herein or not.I hereby fully rebut all presumptions of:*8 • Constructive abandonment or dormancy,• Administrative or commercial control withoutfull disclosure and informed consent,• Commercial suretyship for public debt, and• Unauthorized agency or representation bycorporate or statutory actors.I further declare, preserve, and perfect theprivate, ecclesiastical status as Custodianexercising full equitable dominion over thePrivate Estate-including all originating andderivative instruments-under the spiritual andlegal covering of The Embassy of LivingFaith™.This Verified Notice of Interest is not tenderedby private will alone, but as a formalecclesiastical and equitable act, made inobedience to divine prompting and by spiritualdiscernment under the authority of the Holy Spirit—who bears witness with my spirit, confirms myecclesiastical calling, and secures all rights, titles,and beneficial interests rightfully belonging to theLiving Heir.Spiritual Witness:“The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, thatwe are the children of God: And if children, then heirs,heirs of God, and joint-heirs withChrist ...”~ Romans 8: 16-17 ~VNOI (Doc. 44-1) at 3-4 (emphasis in original).This is what she alleges is the basis for her currentEmergency Motion for Stay, nothing else. It would be“free speech” outside of court, but it is frivolous andsanctionable in court and creates no lawful rights. Asthis Court previously wrote in its Order Denying AllSovereign Citizen Filings:The themes invoked by the Debtor in her Filings are“commonly associated with the so-called ‘sovereigncitizen’ movement” and “have been uniformlyrejected by every federal court to confront them.”Morgan-Grant, 2025 Bankr. LEXIS at *2 (citingUnited States v. Williams, 29 F.4th 1306, 1308 (11thCir. 2022); United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228,233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013)). “The rule of law is not sofragile as to be undone at the whim of a litigantthrough invocation of spiritual sovereignty ordivine right. Federal jurisdiction cannot be waivedor revoked by incantation.” Id. at *2. “There isno parallel legal system grounded in personalbelief that exempts one from the obligations ofdebt, the authority of a duly appointed trustee,or the jurisdiction of this Court.” Id. at *7.Previous courts within the Sixth Circuit have foundthat these types of arguments lack merit. SeeClinton v. Coyaleski, No. 4:25-cv-1363, 2025 U.S.
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Dist. LEXIS 186480, 2025 WL 2711413 (N.D.Ohio Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases that rejectjurisdictional arguments based on similar sovereigncitizen arguments), Watts v. Cleveland Heights, No.1: 25 CV 1582, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176338,2025 WL 2615846 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2025)(finding Defendant's arguments claiming that thathe was not subject to traffic laws, similar to thoseadvanced in the filings, as being “devoid of merit”),and Burks v. Licking Cnty. Child Support Enf'tAgency, No. 2:24-cv-2330, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS31341, 2025 WL 580389 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21,2025) (describing the voluminous filings relatedto sovereign citizen arguments as frivolous andwasteful of court resources).*9 Order Dismissing All Sovereign Citizen Filings at4. Ms. Kilpatrick's latest filings are no less frivolousor wasteful of judicial resources. The VNOI, filedSeptember 2, 2025, had nothing to do with her actuallegal obligations and was based on a complicated webof sovereign citizen pseudo-legal theories by which shesupposedly put the property in a trust in which onlyher made-up entity could hold an interest under equityjurisdiction overseen by the Government of God thatapparently operates outside the bounds of this Court'sstatutory jurisdiction, but somehow would require thisand other courts to halt the foreclosure action againsther real estate. Obviously, her assertions are withoutany basis in law or relevance to the matters that wereactually before this Court, prior to dismissal of hercase.Ms. Kilpatrick continued with her Embassy of LivingFaith filings from September 24, 2025 throughSeptember 30, 2025 (Docs. 53-77). All told, includingthe first two duplicate Ministerial Cover Letter filingsto which her VNOI was attached, she submitted 27documents, albeit many were duplicates. She does not,however, appear to specifically reference any of thoseother filings (other than the VNOI) in her presentMotions.G. Order Denying All Sovereign Citizen FilingsAfter Ms. Kilpatrick filed her 27 sovereign citizenfilings based on the “Embassy of Living Faith” strain,and prior to entering the Dismissal Order (as definedbelow) but also on October 1, 2025, the Court entereda detailed (11-page) order denying any and all reliefbased upon those filings, including rejection of hersupposed “tender,” giving her a chance to withdrawher filings, and, absent withdrawal, giving her noticepursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c)(3) that she wasdirected to show cause, “within twenty-one (21) daysfrom the date of entry of this Order,12 why she hasnot violated Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b) by submittingthe Filings to this Court for an improper purpose ....”Order: (I) Denying All Assertions, Purported Claims,Relief, and All Other Matters Set Forth in FilingsReceived from Debtor on September 2, 2025 (Docs.44 & 45) and on September 24, 26, 29 And 30,2025 (Docs. 53 Through 77); (II) Giving Noticeto Debtor that the Filings Violate Federal Rule ofBankruptcy Procedure 9011(a) and Will be Stricken ifnot Withdrawn; (III) Requiring Debtor to Show CauseWhy She Has Not Violated Rule 9011(b) if the Papersare Not Withdrawn; and (IV) Ordering the ImmediateReturn of All Purported Tenders as Expressly Rejectedand Not Recognized by Law (Doc. 78) (the “OrderDenying All Sovereign Citizen Filings”).A history of Ms. Kilpatrick's twenty-seven (27)previous sovereign citizen filings is recounted in theCourt's prior Order Denying All Sovereign CitizenFilings, a copy of which will be provided to the DistrictCourt with the short Report and Recommendation, andtherefore is not repeated herein.To address Ms. Kilpatrick's false claim that her VNOIwent unaddressed, this Court concluded in its OrderDenying All Sovereign Citizen Filings as follows:After a careful review of the Filings,[13] the Court isunable to discern any relief requested by the Debtorthat is available under Title 11 of the United StatesCode (the “Bankruptcy Code”) or the Federal Rulesof Bankruptcy Procedure. Accordingly, all of theFilings are hereby DENIED with prejudice ....*10 * * *1. Being that there is no cognizable relief requestedin the Filings that Debtor has submitted underan alias name and alleged fanciful capacity,government, and jurisdiction, any and all reliefsought, described, or contemplated within theFilings—Document Numbers 44, 45, and 53through 77—is hereby DENIED in the entirety withprejudice.
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Order Denying All Sovereign Citizen Filings at 2, 9.The “Filings” denied by this Court included the VNOIthat Ms. Kilpatrick attempts to hang her hat on assome type of cognizable legal interest that the Courtshave failed to recognize. Thus, her frivolous VNOI wassquarely addressed.H. Dismissal of Ms. Kilpatrick's Last BankruptcyOn the same day as the Order Denying All SovereignCitizen Filings was entered, October 1, 2025, thisCourt also entered the Order Granting United StatesTrustee's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice and One(1) Year Bar to Refiling (Doc. 79) (the “DismissalOrder”). Her last bankruptcy case was therebydismissed, she was barred from filing any bankruptcyanywhere in the United States for a period of one (1)year, and the automatic stay was thereby terminatedas to any other property of the estate for which stayrelief had not already been granted. Further, this Courtreserved jurisdiction to address the Bankruptcy Rule9011 sanctions matters set forth in the Order DenyingAll Sovereign Citizen Filings (referred to therein as theOrder Denying All Filings).Summarizing the impact of the Dismissal Order andthe Order Denying All Sovereign Citizen Filings, bothentered on October 1, 2025, this Court no longer hasjurisdiction over anything but the issue of imposingsanctions upon Ms. Kilpatrick for her prior and on-going violations.I. Order Striking Filings and ReiteratingDeadline to Show CauseAfter Ms. Kilpatrick failed to withdraw any of hertwenty-seven (27) frivolous sovereign citizen filingswithin the time provided in the Order Denying AllSovereign Citizen Filings, and without any otherresponse from Ms. Kilpatrick, this Court then enteredan order striking her filings as violating BankruptcyRule 9011(a) (the “Order Striking Debtor's Filings”)(Doc. 83), including her VNOI (Docs. 44, 45), andreiterating that she had until October 22, 2025, twenty-one (21) days from the Court's prior order, to showcause why she had not violated Bankruptcy Rule9011(b) “ ‘by submitting the Filings to this Court for animproper purpose, such as to harass the Court and thepeople named therein, [that] have caused unnecessarydelay, contain legal contentions not warranted byexisting law or by nonfrivolous arguments, and containallegations and factual contentions that lack anyevidentiary support.’ ” Order Striking Debtor's Filings(Docs. 44, 45 and 53 through 77) as Violating FederalRule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011(a) and ReiteratingFiling Deadline Set Forth in Prior Order (Doc. 78) andthe Consequences for the Failure to Complete Such aFiling (Doc. 83), entered on Oct. 17, 2025 (quotingthe Order Denying All Sovereign Citizen Filings (Doc.78), Conclusion at 10, 4).J. Motion to Withdraw the Reference andEmergency Motion for Stay*11 Following this Court's Order Striking Debtor'sFilings, Ms. Kilpatrick proceeding to file the presentMotions on October 28, 2025. Notably, she did nottimely appeal the Dismissal Order.Her latest papers—the Motions—are based on hercomplaint that no court, neither this Court nor theCommon Pleas Court, have acknowledged or ruled onone of her sovereign citizen filings, the VNOI, whichshe asserts should have brought the foreclosure actionin Common Pleas Court to a halt. But the VNOI hasno merit, was a frivolous sovereign citizen filing, andgives her no more rights in 108 Barnside Drive thanshe already had as the owner.14IV. AnalysisA. The Motions are Moot Due to Dismissal of Ms.Kilpatrick's Bankruptcy.In her Emergency Motion for Stay, Ms. Kilpatrickstates that she wants this Court to stay “enforcementand effect of the July 17, 2025 order and all relatedpending orders ....” Emergency Mot. at 1. But thatcannot be done at this point. Due to the dismissal of herthird bankruptcy within a year, her present Motions arelikely moot. See, e.g., Hayden v. W. Steel Inc., No. 3:24-cv-00298-ART-CLB, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46510,at *2 (D. Nev Mar. 14, 2025) (concluding that becausethe adversary proceeding had been dismissed, “andthe bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction only for thepurpose of determining whether sanctions should beissued,” the debtor's “motion to withdraw the referenceis moot.”).
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10Although Bankruptcy Rule 5011(a), as discussedbelow, provides that the District Court must ruleon the Motion to Withdraw, this Court concludesthere is no likelihood that the pending motion towithdraw would be granted because there is no caseor proceeding to withdraw under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d)in the wake of dismissal of Ms. Kilpatrick's third badfaith bankruptcy, such that it is yet another in a stringof baseless filings. See In re Pick, No. 2:25-cv-5661-SPG, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216358, at *3 (C.D. Cal.Nov. 3, 2025) (“[A] district court cannot withdraw areference for an adversary proceeding that ... has beendismissed.... The Court is likewise skeptical that 28U.S.C. § 157(d) permits a district court to withdraw aclosed case from bankruptcy court.”); Hayden, 2025U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46510, at *2 (citing Lundahl v.Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 129 F. App'x. 479, 480 (10thCir. 2005) (motion to withdraw the reference was mootin light of dismissal of the underlying bankruptcycase)).15*12 Because there is no longer a bankruptcy case,there is no longer bankruptcy jurisdiction pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1334 over Ms. Kilpatrick's former realestate, 108 Barnside Drive, such that neither this Courtnor the District Court can order a stay of any actionswith respect to 108 Barnside Drive. That property isno longer “property of the estate” under 11 U.S.C. §§541 and 554(c). Ms. Kilpatrick's last bankruptcy wasdismissed on October 1, 2025 (Doc. 79) and no partytimely appealed the Dismissal Order. Likewise, theOrder Granting Motion for Relief from the AutomaticStay (Doc. 34) cannot be stayed because it is no longerpending before this Court. Moreover, the terminationof the automatic stay as to 108 Barnside Drive was latersubsumed by the termination of the automatic stay asto any and all property of the estate upon dismissal ofMs. Kilpatrick's third bankruptcy case, both by virtueof the express language of the Dismissal Order and bythe automatic operation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) and(c)(2) (providing that the stay of acts against propertyof the estate continue until no longer property of theestate and the stay of other acts continue until a caseis dismissed). A withdrawal of the reference is nota substitute for an appeal. Ms. Kilpatrick's time toappeal the order granting relief from the automatic stayexpired at the end of July, and her time to appeal fromthe Dismissal Order expired on October 15, 2025. SeeFed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1).There are no “pending orders” concerning theautomatic stay, there being none, or her real estate,it no longer being property of the estate. In fact, theonly remaining matter before this Court is the issueof imposing sanctions against Ms. Kilpatrick for hermany frivolous filings in accordance with BankruptcyRule 9011(c), including the present Emergency Motionfor Stay. The matter of sanctions is wholly independentfrom the prior grant of relief from the automatic stayand from the dismissal of Ms. Kilpatrick's bankruptcycase given that it arises from Ms. Kilpatrick's sovereigncitizen filings made 47 days after relief from theautomatic stay had already been granted. And hersovereign citizen filings did not in any way purportto oppose dismissal of her case; rather, they simplyconfirmed that her case should be dismissed becauseshe had no intention of complying with the law.Ms. Kilpatrick's (or ChatGPT's) citations to case law,such as Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), In reCinematronics, Inc., 916 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1990), andso forth in her Motion to Withdraw the Reference allsuffer from one fatal distinction. She has not asserteda valid interest, legal or equitable, such that thereis no other law at issue—no basis for mandatorywithdrawal under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). Her VNOI isbut one in a slew of sovereign citizen filings in whichshe asserted made-up self-appointed equitable intereststhat do not exist, are frivolous, and have been rejectedand debunked by every court, federal and state, toconsider them. To be clear, there are no merits toMs. Kilpatrick's assertions. Nevertheless, the Court hasanalyzed all her filings in detail and acted accordinglyin previously rejecting any and all relief that she hadpurportedly requested. Moreover, as to any claims toor interests in the real property that she owned whenshe filed her third bankruptcy within a year, this Courthad exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1334(e)(1). Thus, her assertions that this Court did nothave jurisdiction over her interests is false. And theassertion that this Court did not exercise its jurisdictionis likewise false. This Court adjudicated the legitimatelegal rights of her mortgage to grant stay relief andof the U.S. Trustee to dismiss her bad faith case.This Court also, after closely reviewing her post-stay
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11relief sovereign citizen filings, rejected, denied, andultimately struck those frivolous filings.Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, thisCourt will further explain why this is so and why Ms.Kilpatrick has failed to meet her burden to obtain anyrelief.B. The Motions Lack Any Merit, are UntimelyForum Shopping Efforts, and are a ContinuingAbuse of the Bankruptcy Process.Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 5011(c), while a motionfor withdrawal of the reference is pending, this Courtcan only stay proceedings before it, as follows:*13 Rule 5011. Motion to Withdraw a Caseof Proceeding or to Abstain from Hearing aProceeding; Staying a Proceeding(a) Withdrawing a Case or Proceeding. A motionto withdraw a case or proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §157(d) must be heard by a district judge.* * *(c) Staying a Proceeding After a Motion toWithdraw or Abstain. A motion filed under (a)or (b) does not stay proceedings in a case or affectits administration. But a bankruptcy judge may, onproper terms and conditions, stay a proceeding untilthe motion is decided.Notwithstanding that the alleged “interest” based onwhich Ms. Kilpatrick filed her Motions—the VNOI—is a frivolous sovereign citizen filing, focusing onthe alleged procedural basis for her current EmergencyMotion for Stay, this Court has previously heldthat granting a stay under Bankruptcy Rule 5011(c)pending a motion for withdrawal of the referencerequires the movant to establish “the circumstancesunder which a preliminary injunction would beappropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure65.” Antioch Co. Litig. Trust v. Miller (In re AntiochCo.), 435 B.R. 493, 496-97 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010)(Humphrey, J.) (denying a motion to stay an adversaryproceeding pending the District Court's ruling on amotion to withdraw the reference). Thus, “a stayshould be granted only if the moving party can show”:(1) the likelihood that the pending motion towithdraw will be granted (i.e. likelihood of successon the merits); (2) that the movant will sufferirreparable harm if the stay is denied; (3) that thenon-movants will not be substantially harmed by thestay; and (4) the public interest will be served bygranting the stay.Id. at 497. “The burden on such a motion rests with theparty seeking the stay to establish that a stay under thecircumstances would be appropriate. Id. at 496 (citingMiller v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (In re Eagle Enters., Inc.),259 B.R. 83, 86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001)). Further, “itis clear from the plain language of the Rule that thegranting of a stay should be the exception—not thegeneral rule.” Id.Ms. Kilpatrick references the foregoing factors in herMemorandum of Points and Authorities in Support ofEmergency Motion for Stay (Doc. 85 at 5); however,the case she cites addressed “whether to release astate prisoner pending appeal of a district court ordergranting habeas relief.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S.770, 772 (1987). But she does not elaborate on how shebelieves she has carried her burden on these factors.And she does not allege any legitimate basis uponwhich she could establish these factors. All she writesis that “[a]ll four factors favor temporary relief here.The issues involve constitutional notice, equitable trustadministration, and jurisdictional propriety.” Memo. ofPoints and Authorities in Supp. at 2, § IV.Ms. Kilpatrick cites, as grounds for a stay, the allegedcase of In re Miller, 150 B.R. 834 (Bankr. N.D.Ohio 1993). See Emergency Mot. for Stay at 2, II.1; Memo. of Points and Authorities in Supp. at1, § II. However, that decision does not exist andmay be an AI “hallucination” that would constitutean independent basis for sanctions under Rule 9011.The citation 150 B.R. 834 is actually to a page ofthe opinion in Brandt v. 440 Assocs., 150 B.R. 833(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993), which concerns a motionfor summary judgment on avoidance of a postpetitiontransfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 549(a), not a motionfor stay under Bankruptcy Rule 5011(c). Thus, notonly does Ms. Kilpatrick continue to advance baselessand frivolous arguments, as further discussed below,she has also now cited made up case law, perhaps
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12generated by ChatGPT or an AI program, in furtherviolation of Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b).16*14 Moreover, this Court can envision nocircumstance in which her Motion to Withdraw theReference would be granted. She is, once again,relying solely on her sovereign citizen arguments, thistime specifically the VNOI. She claims that “[a]bsenta stay, Movant faces irreparable procedural harm,including potential sanctions and enforcement actionsunder orders entered without timely notice or anopportunity to respond.” Emergency Mot. for Stay at2, II.2 (emphasis in original). She also claims that“[t]he apparent completion of a foreclosure auction,without formal notice to Movant and in disregard of apreviously filed Verified Notice of Interest, constitutesgood cause for emergency stay.” Id. at 2, II.4(emphasis in original). Confusingly, Ms. Kilpatrickseems to allege that avoiding sanctions is a basis forthe stay, but she does not specifically ask this Court tostay the Order Denying All Sovereign Citizen Filings,entered on October 1, 2025; rather, she asks this Courtto stay the Order Granting Motion for Relief from theAutomatic Stay (Doc. 34), which has nothing to dowith this Court imposing sanctions upon her. Further,as it concerns the alleged “irreparable proceduralharm,” an oxymoron of sorts, Ms. Kilpatrick was giventhe opportunity to both (1) withdraw her sovereigncitizen filings, and (2) show cause as to why she shouldnot be sanctioned pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011.Thus, any “harm” is a direct result of her own conduct.And just to make absolutely certain that she has hada full and fair “opportunity to respond,” beyond anydoubt whatsoever, before this Court imposes sanctions,this Court will schedule a hearing to give her onelast opportunity to show cause why she should notbe sanctioned for her twenty-seven (27) prior filingsand the current Motions, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule9011(c).In a typical situation involving a motion to withdrawthe reference, a bankruptcy court has a case andproceedings before it, over which it would havejurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, such thatthere would be something to withdraw pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 157(d). Here, however, Ms. Kilpatrick'sbankruptcy case was dismissed due to her ownconduct. See Dismissal Order at 4-5 (“The Courtfinds ample cause set forth in the above-referenceddocuments and docket of this case to grant the reliefsought in the Motion to Dismiss and to bar the Debtorfor one (1) year from filing any type of bankruptcy.”)The Dismissal Order goes on to support this conclusionas follows:As asserted in the Motion to Dismiss, theDeclaration, the Supplemental Memorandum, andthe Supplemental Declaration, the Debtor is aserial filer2 “who has failed to comply with theTrustee's reasonable, routine, and repeated requestsfor information and documents” and her “conductin this case constitutes bad faith and cause for thedismissal of this case, with prejudice, under 11U.S.C. § 707(a).” Mot. to Dismiss at 6, 27-28(citing Riddle v. Greenberger (In re Riddle), No.19-8022, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1695, at *1 (B.A.P. 6thCir. June 29, 2020) (case dismissed under section707(a) with a three-year bar to refiling). Moreover,her recent barrage of baseless sovereign citizentype filings, as recited and addressed in the OrderDenying All Filings, further evidence her bad faithconduct warranting dismissal of this chapter 7 case.Dismissal Order at 5 & n.2 (“Debtor's prior two recentchapter 13 cases were both dismissed due to Debtor'sfailure to file chapter 13 plans as required by 11U.S.C. § 1321 and Bankruptcy Rule 3015(b). See No.24-31598, dismissed on Oct. 9, 2024; No. 24-32461,dismissed on Jan. 29, 2025”).The impact of dismissal was, amongst other things,that the automatic stay, to the extent it ever wentinto effect (though it likely did not pursuant to §362(c)(4)), and had it not previously been lifted (ithad), would have nonetheless been thereby terminated.See Dismissal Order at 5, 5 (“The automatic stayis hereby TERMINATED.”). The Dismissal Orderalso expressly provided that this Court reserved“jurisdiction to address the matters set forth in theOrder Denying All Filings.” Id. at 6, 7.Thus, the only jurisdiction remaining with this Courtis over the issue of imposing sanctions upon Ms.Kilpatrick under the reservation set forth in theDismissal Order, which refers to the Order DenyingAll Filings, referred to herein as the Order DenyingAll Sovereign Citizen Filings. This is a “core” matterthat is squarely within this Court's jurisdiction andis most efficient for this Court to address. Moreover,
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.13this is not what Ms. Kilpatrick specifically asked tobe stayed, and it has no direct connection to theForeclosure Action that she is attempting to forestall,notwithstanding that her bankruptcy case has beendismissed due to her own conduct.*15 In addition to the foregoing, not only is Ms.Kilpatrick's Motion for Withdrawal of the Referencelikely moot, but it is also untimely. And it is both forumshopping and a continued abuse of the bankruptcyprocess. Although LBR 5011-1 does not prescribe atime period for parties to file motions to withdrawthe reference, the statute and case law instructs thatsuch motions must be filed promptly. 28 U.S.C. §157(d) states that any case or proceeding referred tothe bankruptcy court may be withdrawn, but only onthe district court's own motion or “on timely motionof any party, for cause shown.”17 “Timely,” as used inin § 157(d), “refers to ‘as soon as possible after themoving party is aware of grounds for withdrawal ofreference’ or ‘at the first reasonable opportunity afterthe moving party is aware of grounds for withdrawalof reference.’ ” Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditorsof Appalachian Fuels, LLC v. Energy Coal Res., Inc.(In re Appalachian Fuels, LLC), 472 B.R. 731, 736(E.D. Ky. 2012) (quoting In re Black Diamond MiningCo., LLC, No. 10-84, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132325,2010 WL 5173271, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 14, 2010)(quoting In re Mahlmann, 149 B.R. 866, 869 (N.D.Ill. 1993))). “The timeliness requirement preventsparties from ‘forum shopping, stalling, or otherwiseengaging in obstructionist tactics.’ ” Id. (quoting Inre Black Diamond Mining Co., LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 132325, 2010 WL 5173271, at *1 (quoting Inre Mahlmann, 149 B.R. 866, 869 (N.D. Ill. 1993)).This is precisely what Ms. Kilpatrick seeks to dowith her present Motion to Withdraw the Referenceand accompanying Emergency Motion for Stay andis all the more reason why her Motions must bedenied. Anything less would permit a subversion of thebankruptcy process.Ms. Kilpatrick filed her Motion to Withdraw theReference almost a month after her bankruptcy casewas dismissed, after she was barred from filing anymore bankruptcies, and after the time to appeal theDismissal Order had run. Further, the dismissal ofher third pro se bankruptcy within a year occurredapproximately six months after she filed her VoluntaryPetition. It is readily apparent that her Motion toWithdraw the Reference is just a last-ditch frivolouseffort to stop the foreclosure and is a continuing abuseof the bankruptcy process in utter disregard of the priordismissal of third pro se bankruptcy and bar to herfiling any more bankruptcies.C. The Request to Stay the Imposition ofSanctions Likewise Lacks Any MeritAlthough not the main focus of her Emergency Motionfor Stay, the other reason for which it appears Ms.Kilpatrick might have asked for a stay pending theMotion to Withdraw the Reference is to avoid thisCourt proceeding to impose sanctions upon her. Restassured, however, that this Court has given and willcontinue to give Ms. Kilpatrick ample notice andopportunity to show cause to this Court why she shouldnot be sanctioned, in compliance with the processset forth in Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c). Although itis dubious that Ms. Kilpatrick will ever appear inperson to explain her actions as she has previouslyrequested this Court not to hold a hearing on her manyfilings after complaining she had not been affordeda hearing,18 this Court will provide her with anotheropportunity to do so.The consideration of imposing sanctions underBankruptcy Rule 9011(c) for filings made with thisCourt is certainly within this Court's core jurisdictionand this Court intends to address those issues in duecourse to be efficient and to conserve judicial resourcesgiven that this Court has already waded through andbecome familiar with all her filings. This is squarelywithin this Court's core jurisdiction, albeit “clean up”jurisdiction following dismissal of her chapter 7 case.See, e.g., In re Thompson, 322 B.R. 769, 772 (Bankr.N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that motions “seekingsanctions against a party for conduct arising directlyfrom a bankruptcy case are deemed core proceedingsfor purposes of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (citing In re Memorial Estates, 950 F.2d 1364, 1370(7th Cir. 1991) (“motion for ‘frivolous filing’ sanctionsgives rise to core proceeding regardless of whetherconduct occurred in core or noncore proceeding”))).See also In re DSC Ltd., No. 05-72779, 2005 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 25285, at *8-9 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2005)(discussing that all Circuit Courts, including the SixthCircuit, “have concluded that appeals are final despite
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.14unresolved issue[s] relating to sanctions.” (citationsomitted)). Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), a bankruptcycourt has “clean up” jurisdiction to deal with lingeringissues related to the issuance of sanctions underBankruptcy Rule 9011 that is “necessary or appropriateto enforce or implement court orders or rules, or toprevent an abuse of the process.” In re U.S. Corp.Co., No. 20-40375-KKS, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 745, at*6, 2021 WL 1100078, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Jan.22, 2021) (discussing that under 11 U.S.C. § 105).Moreover, Ms. Kilpatrick has not stated any basis uponwhich to withdraw the reference from this Court for thematter of sanctioning her pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule9011(c) and this Court finds that there is no basis.*16 That understood, the issue before this Courtis whether, as Ms. Kilpatrick has requested, to stay“enforcement and effect of the July 17, 2025 orderand all related pending orders[.]” Emergency Mot. forStay at 1. The order in question is the Order GrantingMotion for Relief from the Automatic Stay (Rel. Doc.No. 30) (Doc. 34), entered on July 18, 2025. Thestated reason for this request is “to prevent irreversibleprejudice, preserve the identity-linked trust res, andmaintain judicial integrity pending the District Court'sdetermination of Movant's concurrently filed Motionto Withdraw the Reference[.]” Id. In other words,her Emergency Motion to Stay is based on the samesovereign citizen theories she has espoused to boththis Court and the Common Pleas Court. Layer on topthe fact that there currently is no bankruptcy case orproceeding before this Court concerning the alleged“trust res”; namely, “108 Barnside Drive, Englewood,Ohio” and that Ms. Kilpatrick did not oppose the grantof stay relief in the order entered on July 18, 2025, didnot appeal that order, and did not oppose or appeal theorder dismissing her bankruptcy case, all readily leadsto the conclusion that this Emergency Motion for Stay,like Ms. Kilpatrick's numerous other submissions, isnot well-taken, is frivolous, and likely gives rise tofurther exposure for sanctionable conduct as it is rootedin continued reliance on the previously stricken VNOI.Moreover, as the Common Pleas Court held in a priororder, because Ms. Kilpatrick had two prior casesdismissed within the year prior to filing the most recentcase, pursuant to § 362(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Codeno automatic stay ever went into effect.Ms. Kilpatrick's prior stricken sovereign citizen papersare no more valid now than they were before. Thus,Ms. Kilpatrick's complaints in her present Motions thatno court – neither this Court nor the Court of CommonPleas, Montgomery County, Ohio – has heeded herpreviously asserted sovereign citizen interest in herreal estate, which she now asserts all hinge on one ofher many filings, the so-called VNOI, likewise have nomerit. She claims to have a superior equitable interestin her real estate being foreclosed under an allegedequity jurisdiction that operates outside of bankruptcylaw, and can only be adjudicated by an Article IIIcourt, although her interest is ultimately asserted underthe Government of God. These arguments carry zeroweight, do not entitle her to any relief, and do nothingbut dig her potential sanctions hole deeper.The main point is that because her Motions are basedon the VNOI, which is a frivolous sovereign citizenfiling, and has already been stricken by this Court,there is no possibility that she could establish any ofthe first, third, or fourth factors, regardless of whethershe is going to suffer any harm by the continuationof the Foreclosure Action in Common Pleas Courtor by virtue of the potential imposition of sanctions.However, as it concerns the Foreclosure Action, the“right” she is seeking to protect is no right at all, itis a frivolous made-up sovereign citizen theory of aninterest. Thus, she cannot possibly suffer any harmby the denial of a frivolous interest and the lawfulenforcement of rights against her real estate. In fact,the only harm would be in staying the Mortgagee'senforcement of its rights. And as to sanctions, those areonly under consideration because of her own actionsand filings, which she could resolve if she would havewithdrawn them and ceased filing them. Matters solelywithin her control. The only thing that could possiblybe stayed in this Court at this time is the considerationof sanctions; however, she has no likelihood ofprevailing on the merits of her Motion to Withdraw theReference, in this Court's estimation. Thus, it wouldbe perverse for this Court to hold, and this Court willnot hold, that its consideration of sanctions should bestayed while Ms. Kilpatrick continues to file frivoloussovereign citizen-based documents with this Courtwarranting sanctions. Accordingly, as noted above, theCourt will schedule a hearing to provide Ms. Kilpatrickyet another opportunity to address those matters. Andthe Court will send her notice of the hearing by email
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.15(to the last address she supplied in a prior bankruptcycase and any other address she provides to the Court)as well as by mail through the Bankruptcy NoticingCenter. In short, a stay is not warranted because Ms.Kilpatrick has not presented a legitimate legal interestor argument, has no chance of success on the merits,and has accomplished nothing but dig herself a deeperhole when it comes time for this Court to considersanctions for her conduct which continues to violateBankruptcy Rule 9011.V. Conclusion*17 At its essence, Ms. Kilpatrick's present Motionsare premised on her VNOI constituting a valid legalinterest. But it is not. It is a sovereign citizen stylefiling, based on made-up legal theories that have beenfully debunked. Thus, the VNOI is no basis to contestanything that happened in her now dismissed chapter7 case, and a motion to withdraw the reference is nosubstitute for an appeal, which she did not timely file.But more importantly, because her case was dismissedwith prejudice and she was barred from filing anotherbankruptcy for one (1) year, there is simply nothingto withdraw from this Court and case law indicatesthat, in this circumstance, a motion to withdraw thereference is moot. And if the Motion to Withdraw theReference is moot, there obviously is no basis to stayanything under Bankruptcy Rule 5011. Furthermore,the only thing this Court could possibly stay wouldbe the imposition of sanctions on Ms. Kilpatrick, asthat is the only matter now before the Court. However,her VNOI serves as no basis to stay the considerationof sanctions. Quite to the contrary, the fact that shecontinues to file motions and claim rights based onher frivolous sovereign citizen filings only confirmsthat this Court's consideration of the imposition ofsanctions is appropriate and necessary to hopefullydeter her future conduct in wasting judicial resources.In conclusion, upon review of Ms. Kilpatrick's latestfilings, there is nothing pending to withdraw andtherefore there is nothing to stay. Moreover, her caseis closed, she has not moved to reopen it (and wouldnot be successful in doing so), and, in any event, theCourt could not grant a stay of any previously issuedfinal, non-appealable orders.Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, any andall relief sought in the Emergency Motion for Stayis hereby DENIED, as there is absolutely no basisfor either her Emergency Motion for Stay or therelated Motion to Withdraw the Reference, given thather bankruptcy case was already dismissed through afinal, non-appealable order, for the very purpose ofterminating the stay and preventing her from obtaininganother stay through barring her from filing anotherbankruptcy. The Court will, however, at an appropriatetime, schedule a hearing to discuss Ms. Kilpatrick'scontinuing and past violations of Rule 9011(b) of theFederal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“BankruptcyRule”) in order to give her one last opportunity to purgeherself of the her ongoing violations under this Court'sprior orders and to show cause why sanctions shouldnot be issued by this Court under Bankruptcy Rule9011(c). Presuming that she either does not appear orcannot show cause, the Court may proceed to imposesanctions.In addition to entering this Order denying theEmergency Motion for Stay, this Court will transmita separate Report and Recommendation to the DistrictCourt, along with the Motion to Withdraw theReference, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and Rule5011(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedureand Local Bankruptcy Rule 5011-1(d), to recommendthat the Motion to Withdraw the Reference be denied.Finally, from a review of the docket in this case, itappears Ms. Kilpatrick did not provide a telephonenumber, which is required in all cases in which adebtor chooses to proceed pro se (without an attorney),pursuant to LBR 9011-2. She also omitted her emailaddress, even though she provided an address in herprior two cases, Nos. 24-31598 and 24-32461. Uponentry of this Order, as a courtesy to Ms. Kilpatrick,a member of the Court's staff will transmit a copy ofthis Order to Ms. Kilpatrick at her previously disclosedemail address, in addition to the service of a paper copythat she will receive by first-class U.S. Mail from theBankruptcy Noticing Center.IT IS SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3295748
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.16Footnotes1The online docket for the foreclosure action, Case No. 2023 CV 04593 (Mont. Cnty. C.P.) reflects that onOctober 8, 2025, a Return of Private Selling Officer on Writ for Order of Sale and Cost Report was filedstating that 108 Barnside Drive, Englewood, Ohio 45322 was sold through an online auction that ended onSeptember 30, 2025, to a third party for $258,821.2Interestingly, the Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County, Ohio had previously addressed hersovereign citizen filings before that Court (before she filed them in this Court) and had reached the sameconclusion as this Court—that they were meritless sovereign citizen filings.3Ms. Kilpatrick also filed a Notice of Errata Regarding Debtor's Capacity (Doc. 87), which appears to havebeen intended to recharacterize the purported capacity in which she signed all her prior sovereign citizenfilings, perhaps in an effort to purge her failure to sign those filings in compliance with Bankruptcy Rule9011(a). In the Notice of Errata Debtor “expressly ratifie[d] and adopt[ed] all prior pleadings, motions, andnotices.” Notice of Errata at 4.4Although this Court is reticent to transmit these frivolous filings, it appears that both Bankruptcy Rule 5011(a)and LBR 5011-1(d) compel this step.5Hereinafter, the Foreclosure Case will be referred to as the “foreclosure action.”6Ms. Kilpatrick refers to the filed date of July 17, 2025; however, the entry date of July 18, 2025, as reflectedin the ECF stamp, will be referred to in the remainder of this order.7In addition to requesting a stay of the “enforcement of the July 17, 2025 Order Granting Relief from Stay,” Ms.Kilpatrick asks that this Court “prohibit any foreclosure sale, transfer, or other disposition affecting identity-linked trust res, particularly 108 Barnside Drive, Englewood, Ohio, until jurisdiction is resolved.” EmergencyMot. for Stay at 3, V.3. But it is clear that neither this Court nor the District Court would have jurisdictionover the real estate at this point given there no longer is an estate.8She also listed ownership of a GMC Sierra, for which stay relief was also granted by this Court, unopposedby Ms. Kilpatrick, on September 15, 2025. See Schedule A/B: Property (Doc. 14) at 2; Order for Relief fromAutomatic Stay by MyUSA Credit Union Inc. (Doc. 46).9Notably, Ms. Kilpatrick clearly knew about the mortgage given that the foreclosure had been pending sinceAugust 25, 2023, and she had filed bankruptcy three times to stop the foreclosure. See Case No. 24-31598(Aug. 22, 2024), Case No. 24-32461 (Dec. 17, 2024), and Case No. 25-30619 (Apr. 8, 2025).10It is unclear and this Court could only speculate as to why the Mortgagee, Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC,did not seek an order from this Court, as it had argued before the Common Pleas Court, pursuant to § 362(c)(4)(A)(ii) or § 362(j), to confirm the automatic stay had not gone into effect upon the filing of Ms. Kilpatrick'sthird bankruptcy case in a year. See Mot. of Lakeview Loan Serv., LLC for Relief from Stay (Doc. 30), June16, 2025.11Ms. Kilpatrick has since attempted to cure her prior violations of Bankruptcy Rule 9011(a) through her Noticeof Errata Regarding Debtor's Capacity (Doc. 87), as filed on October 28, 2025, in which she writes that“Debtor previously submitted filings that, through clerical oversight, described the filer in a representative orfiduciary capacity.” Further, she wrote that she “hereby clarifies and affirms that all current and future filingsin this Court are submitted solely in the Debtor's personal capacity as the Chapter 7 Debtor, and not inany other representative, trustee, or managerial capacity.” (Emphasis in original). Moreover, she purportsto “expressly ratif[y] and adopt[ ] all prior pleadings, motions, and notices as of their original filing dates.”12Ms. Kilpatrick incorrectly asserts in her Emergency Motion for Stay that this Court imposed “a five-dayresponse deadline ending October 22, 2025” through the Order Striking Debtor's Filings (defined below)entered on October 17, 2025. Emergency Mot. for Stay at 2, I.9. The Order Denying All Sovereign Citizen
In re: Marguerite Latete Kilpatrick, Debtor., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.17Filings clearly set that deadline, 21 days out, and even if Ms. Kilpatrick's assertions about when she receivedmail are to be believed, she received the Order Denying All Sovereign Citizen Filings on October 10, 2025,leaving her twelve days to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for filing her 27 sovereign citizendocuments.13The term “Filings” was defined in the Order Denying All Sovereign Citizen Filings to include the papersdocketed as Correspondence that included the VNOI's (Docs. 44, 45).14Although the VNOI is clearly a made-up sovereign citizen document with no legal significance, at the risk ofpeeking down into the rabbit hole, there is no possibility of Ms. Kilpatrick having unilaterally created a lieninterest in 108 Barnside Drive superior to the Mortgagee's interest (or the Montgomery County Treasurer's)without their agreement. Moreover, the doctrine of merger would likely result in any such interest (althoughthere is no such legitimate interest) simply merging into her ownership interest, such that it would have noimpact upon the mortgage being foreclosed. See, e.g., Shah v. Smith, 908 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App.2009) (defining doctrine of merger by ownership as providing “that a servitude may not be impressed uponan estate of another estate when both estates are owned by the same person” (internal quotations omitted)).15On top of all of this, Ms. Kilpatrick did not pay the filing fee for her Motion to Withdraw the Reference, whichis $199. See https://www.ohsb.uscourts.gov/filing-fees.16Ms. Kilpatrick also cites In re Pan Am Corp., 159 B.R. 396, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) for the alleged propositionthat “maintaining the status quo is essential pending determination of withdrawal questions.” Memo of Pointsand Authorities in Supp. at 2, III.3. But that case actually concerned Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure and concluded that “Delta's appeals from the Bankruptcy Court's Orders dated December1, 1992, are dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. A.I. Leasing II, Inc. (In rePan Am Corp.), 159 B.R. at 402. That case did not involve a withdrawal of the reference or a stay.17Ms. Kilpatrick does not argue or refer to any “other laws of the United States regulating organizations oractivities affecting interstate commerce” as being implicated by her Motion to Withdraw the Reference, andthere are none, such that mandatory withdrawal cannot apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).18See Motion to Waive Hearing and Expedite Ruling on Pleadings for Motion for Reconsideration Due to WillfulViolation of Appellant's Due Process Rights and Motion to File Documents Under Seal, In re Kilpatrick, CaseNo. 24-32461 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2025) (Doc. 29) (asking the Court to “issue an expedited rulingbased solely on the pleadings already submitted ....”) (emphasis in original).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access