In re Koger, No. 20-23340-GLT (2025)

Case details
Full caption
In re: Todd Elliott Koger
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2807695Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor.In re: ELLIOT-TODD PARKER KOGER, Debtor.ELLIOT-TODD PARKER KOGER, TODD ELLIOTTKOGER, SR., and THE KOGER FAMILY, Plaintiffs,v.ISAAC USOROH, et al,.1 Defendants.Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Case No. 24-21081-GLT|Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT|09/30/2025Attorneys and Law FirmsRenee M, Kuruce, Esq. Robleto Kuruce, PLLC Pittsburgh, PAAttorney for Isaac UsorohRosemary C. Crawford, Esq. Crawford McDonald, LLCAllison Park, PA Chapter 7 TrusteePaul D. Krepps, Esq. Marshall Dennehey, PC Pittsburgh, PAAttorney for the Borough of Wilkinsburg, Marc V. Taiani, andMichael LefebvreJoseph P. Schalk Esq. Office of the United State TrusteePittsburgh, PA Attorney for the United States TrusteeKeri P. Ebeck, Esq. Bernstein-Burkley Pittsburgh, PAAttorney for Duquesne Light CompanyMaribeth Thomas Tucker Arensberg PC Pittsburgh, PAAttorney for Wilkinsburg School DistrictChapter 7Related to Dkt. Nos. 125, 137, 147, 186Related to Dkt. Nos. 44, 46, 51, 68, 75, 86, 87, 123, 125Related to Dkt. Nos. 4, 17, 20, 28, 30, 37, 43, 58, 59MEMORANDUM OPINIONGREGORY L. TADDONIO CHIEF UNITED STATESBANKRUPTCY JUDGE*1 Todd Elliott Koger (“Todd Sr.”) and his son, Elliott-Todd Parker Koger (“Elliott,” with Todd Sr., the “Kogers”),2have flooded the Court with a deluge of pleadings seekingrelief pro se under various theories in hopes of saving theirfamily home.3 Having fought to avoid its loss for nearly20 years and now facing ejectment following a sheriff's sale,they find themselves increasingly boxed in by unfavorablejudgments. Yet the Kogers remain defiant, arguing that someadverse rulings are invalid and others, more surprisingly, arenot actually adverse. Frankly, their arguments are disjointed,contradictory, and incoherent, to say nothing of the grossmischaracterizations of prior court proceedings upon whichthey rely. For the reasons set forth below, the Court cannotprovide Todd Sr. or Elliott any relief in the above-captionedcases, let alone what they have requested. Therefore, theCourt will dismiss the adversary proceeding and Elliott's casewith prejudice, and not reopen Todd Sr.’s case.4I. BACKGROUND*2 The Koger family resides in real property locatedat 515 Kelly Avenue in Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania (the“Property”).5 At various times, the household occupantsincluded Todd Sr., his wife Kellie Dillard, and sons ToddElliott Koger (“Todd Jr.”) and Elliott.6 As previewed above,the Property has been embroiled in litigation over unpaidreal estate taxes levied in July 2005.7 The Koger familyvigorously fought the collection, execution, and ejectmentactions at all levels of the state court system and filed a stringof eight bankruptcies among them to stymy the litigation.8Needless to say, the history is long and tortured so the Courtwill endeavor to limit its recitation to only those detailsnecessary to fairly frame the issues presented.9A central feature of every bankruptcy filing was that adifferent member of the Koger family would claim to bethe Property's owner.10 Former Bankruptcy Judge ThomasP. Agresti, who presided over Todd Sr.’s 2020 case, likenedthe apparent strategy to “Whack-a-Mole.”11 A noteworthyconsequence of this approach was that Todd Jr. was about12 years old at the time of his first bankruptcy. Former
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Bankruptcy Judge Bernard Markovitz dismissed that case asa “sham,” concluding that Todd Jr.’s parents were “usingthe bankruptcy case as an artifice to escape having to paytaxes due on the property in which they as well as their sonreside.”12*3 The title record reveals that the Property was conveyed to“Todd-Elliott Koger” in 1999.13 Todd Sr. and Elliott concedethat is the only deed transferring the Property to a memberof the Koger family.14 Still, the Kogers seize on a perceivedambiguity in the deed to contend that “Todd-Elliott Koger”was not Todd Sr., but a then four-year-old Todd Jr. The utilityof that assertion is that it would make Todd Jr. an unnamedindispensable party to the execution proceedings, which theybelieve renders the entire process void.15Todd Jr.’s purported ownership interest and its allegedprocedural impact has never gained traction with any court,16but that has not stopped the Kogers from claiming otherwise.Indeed, they stunningly argue that Judge Markovitz'sdismissal order, which called Todd Jr.’s case a “sham” and an“artifice” orchestrated by his parents,17 somehow confirmedTodd Jr.’s interest.18 After state courts disagreed, ToddSr. asked Judge Agresti to intervene based on a “reverseRooker-Feldman doctrine.”19 Judge Agresti, however, foundthat “there is no prior judgment of this Court holding thatthe Debtor's Son is the owner of the Property.”20 Perhapspredictably, the Kogers now cite Judge Agresti's decision ashaving determined, like Judge Markovitz before him, thatTodd Sr. “does not own the property.”21The Kogers also maintain that the PennsylvaniaCommonwealth Court conclusively determined Todd Jr. to bethe Property's owner in a ruling that “absolved Todd ElliottKoger Sr. from any liabilities regarding the tax debt....”22An examination of the case tells a different story, albeit lessblatantly than the bankruptcy rulings they rely on. Basically,Todd Sr. applied for relief from the Pennsylvania HomeownerAssistance Fund (“PAHAF”) in 2022, but was deemedineligible because he did not hold legal or equitable title tothe Property.23 Although it is unclear what initially promptedthat conclusion, the Commonwealth Court affirmed because“[Todd Sr.] acknowledged that Todd Elliott Koger, Jr., was thesole owner”24 and therefore “admi[tted] he was not eligiblefor the PAHAF program.”25 So rather than determiningthe Property's ownership, the Commonwealth Court merelyfound that Todd Sr.’s application was properly denied becausehe disavowed a requisite ownership interest.26 It alsoexpressly noted that Todd Sr.’s tax dispute was “not currentlyon appeal before this Court,”27 further undermining hisinterpretation of the decision.*4 Eventually, the Kogers’ losses cleared a path fora sheriff's sale of the Property to Isaac Usoroh28 inAugust 2022.29 Ejectment actions followed, and Usoroh wasawarded possession of the Property to the exclusion of ToddSr., Elliott, and any other occupants.30 Todd Sr. appealed, butElliott did not. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Superior Courtupheld the propriety of the sale and ejectment on appeal,soundly rejecting any assertion that the Todd Jr. owned theProperty:Father's contention that [Todd Jr.] owned the property iswrong ... It is absurd to think, as Father's theory necessarilyinsists, that the HUD Secretary deeded the property to afour-year-old boy. Any latent ambiguity in the deed, basedon the drafter's failure to include the word “Sr.” after “ToddElliot Koger,” is nothing more than an oversight in thedrafting of the deed ... the only logical conclusion is thatthe missing “Sr.” on the grantee line of the HUD-to-Kogerdeed is a scrivener's error.* * *Therefore, Father owned the property when the SchoolDistrict filed its lawsuit against him at GD-05-018165, andthe trial court had before it the appropriate defendant – i.e.,Father. Son was not an indispensable party to that action,as Father has speciously claimed for over a decade. Hence,we agree with the Commonwealth Court that the trialcourt had subject-matter jurisdiction in GD-05-018165.The judgment entered at GD-05-018165 is valid, binding,and final.31A. Elliott's Bankruptcy – Case No. 24-21081-GLTElliott filed a pro se chapter 7 petition (his first) on May 3,2024 in an effort to halt the eviction, presumably becausethe judgment for possession was not stayed pending appeal.On Schedule A/B, he listed a fee simple interest in theProperty and checked the box indicating at least one otherperson held an interest in the Property.32 No other propertyinterests or assets were scheduled. Beyond Usoroh and themunicipal taxing authorities,33 Elliott scheduled only four
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3utility creditors for which Todd Sr. and Todd Jr. were co-debtors.34 Later proceedings revealed that at least one ofthe utility accounts was solely in Todd Sr.’s name,35 raisingquestions about Elliott's alleged liability on the others.Usoroh moved for stay relief to continue the processof gaining possession,36 which Elliott (and Todd Sr.)37opposed.38 Rather than demonstrate that Elliott held aprotectable Property interest, they fell back on the repeatedlyrejected notion that the adverse judgments were invalid undera variation of Rooker-Feldman.39 As the Court understood it,the Kogers argued the sheriff's sale and ejectments were voidbecause the state courts failed to follow the CommonwealthCourt's precedent from the PAHAF appeal.40 Concludingtheir request amounted to a prohibited review of state courtrulings for consistency, the Court granted Usoroh's motionfinding Elliott failed to show any legal or equitable interestin the Property.41 The Kogers appealed, but the order wasaffirmed by the United States District Court for the WesternDistrict of Pennsylvania and no further appeal was taken.42*5 Before the Court heard Usoroh's motion for stay relief,he filed a motion to dismiss Elliott's bankruptcy for badfaith asserting it was filed simply to delay his efforts.43Although the Kogers filed a written objection,44 they failedto appear for the scheduled hearing. While the Court waspreparing a written dismissal order, the Kogers filed a motionfor reconsideration.45Elliott filed several more pleadings seeking affirmativerelief46 and, with “the Koger Family,” initiated an adversaryproceeding against Usoroh, PAHAF, Allegheny County, theWilkinsburg School District, the Borough of Wilkinsburg,two former Wilkinsburg councilmen, and Duquesne LightCompany.47 The nine causes of action, which range fromalleging a fraudulent transfer to a civil rights conspiracy, seekthe same relief as all other filings: a judgment voiding thesheriff's sale.48 The complaint basically rehashes rejectedarguments to frame the Kogers’ state court losses as aconspiracy to deprive them of the Property without dueprocess of law. Several defendants have sought dismissal,49while the Kogers requested entry of defaults and summaryjudgment.50 All outstanding matters were scheduled for asingle omnibus hearing.*6 For her part, the chapter 7 trustee filed a report of nodistribution, concluding that the bankruptcy estate lacks anyunexempt assets to administer for the benefit of creditors.51B. Todd Sr.’s Motion to Reopen – Case No. 20-23340-GLTAround the same time Elliott inundated the Court withhis complaint and similar requests for relief, Todd Sr.moved to reopen his 2020 chapter 7 case.52 The motionto reopen was substantially similar to a motion Elliottfiled seeking to nullify the sheriff's sale under section522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.53 Thereafter, Todd Sr.filed other pleadings that largely overlapped with Elliott'sand the adversary proceeding.54 He also challenged thedisinterestedness of a panel trustee who rejected anappointment in his case.55 A few words about the 2020 caseare necessary to place these requests in context.Todd Sr. filed a voluntary petition for chapter 7 relief onNovember 27, 2020, and received a discharge on March10, 2021.56 After the chapter 7 trustee found no assetsto administer and the case was on the verge of closing,Todd Sr. filed a series of motions seeking to “redeem”the property or, alternatively, effectuate a “reaffirmation.”57Judge Agresti denied Todd Sr.’s requests, concluding that: (1)“[t]he Bankruptcy Code does recognize a right of redemptionthat may be exercised by a Chapter 7 debtor” but onlywith respect to “tangible personal property;”58 (2) “[i]t isfar from clear that reaffirmation would even be applicableor effective ... to forestall a sheriff sale ... based on alien ... and not on the Debtor's personal liability for theunderlying debt;”59 and (3) assuming it was, Todd Sr.still could not unilaterally reaffirm without the creditor'sagreement.60 He also found that no bankruptcy court everheld that Todd Jr. owned the Property, and that Todd Sr.’salleged status as his heir did not grant a security interest.61Ultimately, Judge Agresti granted stay relief to both ToddSr. and the Wilkinsburg School District “for the purpose oftaking any action under or related to the pending state courtaction concerning the Property.”62 Todd Sr. unsuccessfullyappealed to the District Court,63 but no further appeal wastaken. The chapter 7 case was closed on September 6, 2023.*7 The Court heard all of Todd Sr.’s motions at thesame omnibus hearing scheduled to address Elliott's motionsand the adversary proceeding. Both Todd Sr. and Elliott
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4appeared and expounded on their positions at length.64 At itsconclusion, the Court took all matters under advisement.II. JURISDICTIONThis Court has authority to exercise jurisdiction over thesubject matter and the parties under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a),1334, and the Order of Reference entered by the United StatesDistrict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania onOctober 16, 1984. The dismissal and reopening of bankruptcycases are core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).65 A proceeding to avoid a fraudulent transfer is also(at least theoretically) core under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H).As will be explained more thoroughly below, the bulk of theKogers’ affirmative claims are non-core proceedings that arenot “related to” a case arising under title 11 of the UnitedStates Code.66 Notably, the Kogers do not consent to thisCourt entering final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).67III. POSITION OF THE KOGERSHaving thoroughly reviewed the 4-inch-tall stack of filings,the Court echoes Judge Agresti's observations about ToddSr.’s pleadings four years ago:These various motions ... areconfusing, redundant, and includemultiple requests for relief withina single document. They have alsoevolved over time as the Debtormade various filings which seemed tochange the exact nature of the relief hewas seeking.68As the Pennsylvania Superior Court put it, the Kogerspleadings largely consist of a “rambling list of grievancesfrom the tax-lien case.”69 Many include extensive statementsof undisputed fact that are clearly neither undisputed noreven facts. These “facts” are typically a series of disjointed,conclusory statements. While the Kogers reference a varietyof legal doctrines and cases, those authorities are eitherinapplicable, misapplied to the facts at hand, or completelymade up.70 And as outlined above, they have a habit ofselectively quoting decisions and misrepresenting prior courtproceedings to obscure what actually happened.71 Even aspro se parties, the Kogers have likely crossed the boundariesof permissible conduct under Bankruptcy Rule 9011.*8 Although the Koger filings are varied, they are reallyasking for just one thing: avoidance of the sheriff's sale.The prevailing theme is that past errors mandate a freshexamination of the entire process. Deciphering the Kogers’arguments is challenging, but four justifications emerge fromthe claims in which they are cloaked. First, the Kogersmaintain the state court proceedings are invalid because ToddJr., the alleged owner of the Property, was not a party and wasdenied due process. Second, if Todd Jr. is not the owner, thenthey contend Todd Sr.’s exercise of “redemption rights”—namely, his application for financial assistance from PAHAF—must be recognized by this Court. Third, they assert that thesheriff's sale of their home was a fraudulent transfer becausethe Property was worth over a $100,000 but was sold for only$51,000. Lastly, the Kogers argue that Todd Sr. was the targetof a criminal conspiracy to deprive him and his family oftheir home due to his racial identity and his failed politicalcampaigns.IV. DISCUSSIONThe Court recognizes the Kogers’ desperation as it appearslikely that they will lose their family home, assuming theyhave not already. Given that reality, the Court has affordedthem all process and consideration that is due and befits thegravity of their situation. But even with a substantial degree ofleniency as pro se parties,72 the Kogers’ positions are lackingin good faith. As the Court previously observed in a similarhigh-stakes epic:In our legal system, disappointed litigants have the right toexhaust every legitimate remedy available before resigningthemselves to the finality of an adverse judgment. But theymay not continually rehash rejected arguments, engagein forum shopping, and launch repeated collateral attacksin a futile attempt to forestall the inevitability of a finaljudgment.* * *It is fundamental ... that all litigation must end in due courseand reach a resolution that cannot be disturbed.73Despite Todd Sr.’s positive spin on various decisions, theKogers have repeatedly lost in the state courts and that isprecisely why they are here: to try again before a new court.
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Yet “what's done, is done,”74 and the Kogers cannot escapebinding adjudications by simply changing the forum.Candidly, the relief the Kogers seek is a nonstarter.And they should know that because they have compelledcourt after court, including this one, to endlessly addressthe same rehashed arguments. The Kogers’ grievancethat their arguments and evidence have never beenheard nor sufficiently considered is disingenuous andbelied by the voluminous record of proceedings. In fact,considering their propensity for selective quoting and grossmischaracterization, it is fair to say that it is the Kogers whodo not listen. Unfortunately, lingering doubts will do nothingto bring these matters to a close, so the Court will addresseach issue raised by the Kogers if only to make matters easierfor the next court.A. There is No Such Thing as a “Familial” Claim or Interestin PropertyBefore going any further, the Court must address anoverarching problem with the Kogers’ claims: standing.“In essence[,] the question of standing is whether the litigantis entitled to have the court decide the merits of thedispute or of particular issues.”75 “Much more than legalniceties,”76 the absence of standing deprives a court of thesubject matter jurisdiction necessary to decide the case.77Standing “subsumes a blend of constitutional requirementsand prudential considerations.”78 The United States Court ofAppeals for the Third Circuit summarized the constitutionalelements of standing as follows:*9 (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, notconjectural or hypothetical;(2) there must be a causal connection between the injuryand the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairlytraceable to the challenged action of the defendant and notthe result of the independent action of some third party notbefore the court; and(3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, thatthe injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.79In terms of prudential standing, “the plaintiff generally mustassert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot resthis claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of thirdparties.”80 There is a limited exception for litigants with aclose relation to a third party and have themselves suffered aninjury in fact, but there must be “some hindrance to the thirdparty's ability to protect his own interests.”81It is no secret that Todd Sr. is driving the litigation and usinghis family members as proxies to keep it going. He clearlyinitiated Elliott's case, drafted all the filings, and is calling allthe shots,82 just as he undoubtedly did on behalf of a then 12-year-old Todd Jr. Though he is neither an attorney nor holdsa power of attorney, Todd Sr. engaged in the unauthorizedpractice of law by making legal arguments on his son's behalf.And rather than heeding admonitions that he lacks standingto do so, Todd Sr. has tried to conjure his own by filing anadversary proceeding and reopening his 2020 bankruptcy. It isapparent that these efforts are aimed at creating a beachhead inthe bankruptcy court (or perhaps the federal courts generally)from which to attack the state court proceedings.To that end, the Kogers gloss over notions of individualizedrights and injuries by advancing a familial claim or interestin the Property held by the “Koger family.”83 Despitepurporting to file a proof of claim on behalf of the Kogerfamily,84 the Kogers have never articulated the basis orscope of any such interest. As best as the Court can discern,the “interest” appears to be simply their understandablyvisceral attachment to their home and desire to avoid the“injurious” effect of its loss.85 As a result, the Kogers seemto believe that anyone who lives there may assert any claimor affirmative right to protect the home.*10 Needless to say, there is no legally recognizedfamily claim or interest in Property. Moreover, the lawcategorizes recognized property interests by type—such aslegal, equitable, possessory, and contingent—and affordsthem different levels of consideration. The point being thatthose without a legal title interest have far fewer rights toproperty to assert in court.86 An “injury” in the generalsense simply does not imply an “invasion of a legallyprotected interest” required for standing.87 And one cannotcommandeer the rights of a family member in the name ofsaving the family home simply because it is convenient.In sum, the “Koger Family” cannot maintain any causes ofaction based on such vaguely described rights.88 Nor mayTodd Sr. or Elliott bolster their standing by pressing the rights
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6of others such as Todd Jr. Ultimately, the Kogers’ claims mustrise or fall based on what they themselves have standing toassert in the context of their own bankruptcy cases.B. The State Court Judgments are Final and Binding on theCourtThere is no dispute that the validity of the sheriff's sale andsubsequent ejectments have been affirmed by a final order ofthe Pennsylvania Superior Court.89 While the Kogers arguethat this Court has “authority to decide ... how their decisionapplies to bankruptcy cases,”90 that is incorrect.The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been a recurring themeof this case, particularly because the Kogers have advanced“novel” formulations.91 This doctrine bars an inferiorfederal court from “from exercising jurisdiction over casesbrought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-courtjudgments rendered before the district court proceedingscommenced.’ ”92 The Third Circuit recently emphasizedRooker-Feldman’s narrow application: “an action that is, oris in effect, an appeal of a state-court judgment may notbe lodged in any federal court but the Supreme Court.”93Indeed, it does not “stop a district court [or bankruptcy court]from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because aparty attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previouslylitigated in state court.”94That said, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is only half the story:[T]he kind of case that triggersRooker-Feldman necessarily involvesa plaintiff who wants another go at it.Unhappy with her state-court results,she comes to the federal district courtto try again. But imagine a legalsystem in which that were a winningstrategy: If you whiff in state court,take your mulligan and come to federalcourt for another swing. State-courtjudgments would be near-worthless.To ensure those judgments receivethe full faith and credit promised bythe Constitution, art. IV, § 1, and tosafeguard the efficiency and finalityof litigation, we apply principles ofpreclusion.95*11 There are two forms of preclusion: claim and issue.96Claim preclusion, also known as res judicata, bars successivelitigation of a claim resolved by a final judgment.97Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, bars “‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actuallylitigated and resolved in a valid court determination essentialto the prior judgment,’ even if the issue recurs in the contextof a different claim.”98 The preclusive effect of a state courtjudgment is determined by the law of the state that enteredit.99Admittedly, bankruptcy courts are under certaincircumstances “empowered to avoid state court judgments,to modify them, and to discharge them.”100 As explainedby the Third Circuit, Rooker-Feldman is not offended whena bankruptcy court acts pursuant to a statutory bankruptcypower under the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction.101Nevertheless, a bankruptcy court can only exercise thosepowers subject to claim and issue preclusion.The takeaway is that the Kogers have not wiped the slateclean by moving the fight to the bankruptcy court. The statecourt judgments arising from the collection, execution, andejectment actions are res judicata.102 Similarly, issues anddefenses raised by the Kogers that were necessarily decidedby those rulings cannot be relitigated here in the context of anew claim.103 How these principles specifically impact theKogers’ theories will be discussed in the following sections.C. Todd Sr., Not His Sons, Owned the Property Prior to theSheriff's SaleTo cut right to it, the “Todd-Elliott Koger” on the 1999deed is Todd Sr. Any argument to the contrary is barred bythe preclusive effect of the Pennsylvania Superior Court'sdecision.104 Full stop.Since theories premised on Todd Jr.’s title to the Propertyare off the table, it is abundantly clear that Elliott could nothave received an ownership interest from him. That said,the Court notes that Elliott's claim as represented was neverlegally sustainable. No one disputed that he never receiveda deed.105 At best, the Kogers stated that Todd Jr. “moved
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7him there ... to be the owner” as evidenced by statementsin a state court transcript.106 But under Pennsylvania law,oral agreements to convey real property violate the statute offrauds and are unenforceable.107 So even if Todd Jr. had beenthe owner (he was not), the Court could not have found thatElliott had a protectable legal interest in the Property on thisrecord.108 That is why the Court already granted Usoroh stayrelief.109D. Neither Elliott nor Todd Sr. can Avoid the Sheriff's Saleas a Fraudulent Transfer*12 The Kogers each filed a motion invoking section522(h) to avoid the sheriff's sale of the Property as afraudulent transfer under section 548.110 Together, they alsoassert a cause of action under section 548 in the adversaryproceeding.111 For the reasons stated below, these requestsmust be denied.As a general matter, chapter 7 debtors do not possess standingto pursue a trustee's avoidance actions. Indeed, the plain termsof the statute provide that only the “trustee” is empoweredto bring a fraudulent transfer claim under section 548.112 Adebtor's ability to initiate such actions arises only in limitedcircumstances. One exception is section 522(h), which allowsa debtor to pursue an avoidable transfer under section 548 if atrustee refuses and the recovered property can be claimed asexempt by the debtor.113To state what should be obvious, Elliott cannot utilize sections522(h) and 548(a) to avoid a transfer of the Property becausehe never had an ownership interest in the first place. Section548(a) does not permit the avoidance of just any transfer, buta “transfer ... of an interest of the debtor in property.”114Similarly, Elliott cannot exempt something he does notown.115 Therefore, he lacks standing to bring an avoidanceaction.116Although Todd Sr. did own the Property prior to the sheriff'ssale, his attempt to avoid the transfer fares no better. Hefiled his chapter 7 case in November 2020, the trustee fileda no-asset report in January 2021, and Todd Sr. receiveda discharge in March 2021.117 The sheriff's sale occurrednearly a year and a half later in August 2022. By its own terms,section 548(a) only applies to transfers “made or incurredon or within 2 years before the date of the filing of thepetition.”118 It simply does not apply to a post-petition, letalone post-discharge, transfer of assets.119*13 In the interest of leaving no stone unturned, section549 allows a trustee to avoid an unauthorized post-petitiontransfer of property of the estate.120 While the sheriff's salewas clearly post-petition, it was also after the trustee fullyadministered the estate. As a result, the Property was nolonger property of the estate at the time of the transfer. Thetransfer also was not “unauthorized” because Judge Agrestigranted the Wilkinsburg School District stay relief to proceedagainst the Property.In sum, the Kogers cannot use sections 522(h) and 548 toavoid the sheriff's sale.E. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which ReliefMay be GrantedUnder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a courtmust dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim uponwhich relief can be granted.121 “To survive a motion todismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausibleon its face.’ ”122 Legal conclusions couched as fact andthreadbare recitals supported by conclusory statements mustbe disregarded.123 In assessing plausibility, the court mayalso consider “documents attached to the complaint andmatters of public record, ... and a court may take judicialnotice of a prior judicial opinion.”124 Ultimately, whetherto grant a motion to dismiss is a “context-specific task thatrequires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experienceand common sense.”125In addition to the fraudulent transfer action discussed above,the Kogers assert a myriad of other causes of action aimedat overturning the sheriff's sale. Though 40 pages in length,the complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief canbe granted.1. The Sheriff Sale Did Not Violate the Automatic StayIn Count One, the Kogers contend the sheriff's sale was voidab initio because the automatic stay was in effect at that time“in the case of 2:21-00579.”126 Because no bankruptcy caseis assigned that number, the Court presumes they meant CaseNo. 2:21-cv-00759, which was Todd Sr.’s appeal of JudgeAgresti's decision denying his request for redemption or
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8reaffirmation.127 The problem with this theory is that JudgeAgresti also granted stay relief to both Todd Sr. and the schooldistrict “for the purpose of taking any action under or relatedto the pending state court action concerning the Property.”128Therefore, the Wilkinsburg School District was expresslyauthorized to advance the state court proceedings and initiatea sheriff's sale of the Property. In the absence of a stay pendingappeal, which Todd Sr. did not seek, stay relief becameeffective no later than June 11, 2021.129 As a result, theautomatic stay was not in effect in August 2022 and cannotserve as a basis to void the sheriff's sale. Accordingly, CountOne must be dismissed.2. Rooker-Feldman Does Not Permit the Court to SetAside an “Inconsistent” State Court Decision*14 In Count Two, the Kogers reiterate the same flawedapplication of Rooker-Feldman that the Court previouslyrejected, and the District Court affirmed.130 These rulingsare law of the case, meaning that the “decision ... govern[s]the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”131The Court need not go further, but offers one additionalobservation.While the Court is sensitive to the Third Circuit's recentsuggestion that courts often say Rooker-Feldman when theymean preclusion,132 Rooker-Feldman was the appropriatedoctrine based on the Kogers’ argument. Their assertion thatthe Pennsylvania Superior Court and Commonwealth Courtissued inconsistent decisions literally asks the Court to reviewa state court ruling for error. As such, what they requested wasin effect an improper appeal.3. The Kogers Cannot Vindicate Todd Jr.’s AllegedDenial of Due ProcessThrough Count Three, the Kogers revive their core assertionthat Todd Jr. owned the Property and was denied dueprocess as an unnamed indispensable party to the executionproceedings.133 Essentially, they are attempting to turn theirunsuccessful defense to the execution and ejectment actionsinto affirmative claim for relief from those judgments. Puttingaside that neither Todd Sr. nor Elliott have standing tovindicate Todd Jr.’s rights, this strategy is obviously precludedby the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision. Todd Sr. raisedthis exact argument and it was explicitly rejected:Father owned the property when theSchool District filed its lawsuit againsthim at GD-05-018165, and the trialcourt had before it the appropriatedefendant – i.e., Father. Son was not anindispensable party to that action, asFather has speciously claimed for overa decade.134There is no question this finding was critical to their appellateruling else Todd Sr. would have prevailed. So, as the ThirdCircuit put it, he is not entitled “take [a] mulligan and cometo federal court for another swing.”135 Count Three must bedismissed.4. The Subsequent Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litemis Irrelevant to the Previously Completed Sheriff's SaleCount Four is a head-scratcher. The Kogers contend thatElliott's constitutional rights were violated when the statecourt appointed a guardian ad litem for him during theejectment proceeding.136 As they see it, the guardianimpeded Elliott's ability to successfully represent his and hisfamily's interests. Even assuming that were true, Elliott hasfailed to explain how the events of December 2023 couldundermine the validity of a sheriff's sale that took place overa year earlier. Without a sufficiently pled causal connection,Count Four is not plausible on its face and must be dismissed.5. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Todd Sr.’s Post-Petition Claims*15 Counts Six, Seven, and Eight are affirmative causesof action under the Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations Act,137 the Fair Housing Act,138 and theCivil Rights Act.139 Altogether, these counts allege that ToddSr. was the target of a criminal conspiracy to deprive him ofhis home based on his racial identity and political activities.Based on a review of the complaint, these claims appear to beasserted solely by Todd Sr., which is consistent with Elliottnot listing them on his Schedule A/B. Then again, neither didTodd Sr. in 2020.
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9While the allegations are difficult to parse, Todd Sr. focuseson two seemingly disparate events: (1) his “unjust” removalfrom the 2013 primary ballot for the Wilkinsburg mayoralelection;140 and (2) the “illicit” sale of the Property in August2022.141 The Court is unsure of the throughline, but Todd Sr.appears to contend that the sale was somehow a “cover up”for his removal from the ballot.142To the extent that Todd Sr. complains of conduct that occurredyears after his chapter 7 petition (namely, the sheriff's sale),that appears to be a post-petition claim that was neverproperty of his estate. Such a claim would not be “relatedto” Todd Sr.’s 2020 case, depriving the Court of subjectmatter jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the Court wereto focus on his prepetition removal from the 2013 mayoralballot, those allegations appear inadequately pled to establisha plausible claim for relief under the referenced statutes.143The connection to the Property and the relief sought after alsoappears tenuous at best.Accordingly, Counts Six, Seven, and Eight will be dismissed.F. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Todd Sr.’s RedemptionClaimFinally, as a last-ditch effort, the Kogers contend that theyhave “invoke[ed] a legitimate entitlement to redemption”and want the Court to assess that under the AmericanRescue Plan of 2021 (“ARP”).144 In effect, they areasking the Court to reverse the denial of Todd Sr.’sPAHAF application. In essence, this is the corollary totheir Rooker-Feldman argument since they believe that theSuperior Court and Commonwealth Court decisions areinconsistent regarding the Property's ownership.145 TheKogers contend bankruptcy courts can exercise jurisdictionover ARP disbursements and cite two appellate decisions thatsupposedly confirm that. They do not, and in fact are whollyunrelated to ARP or the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction withrespect to it.146*16 Having reviewed the statute, the Court is convincedthat no such jurisdiction exists. Homeowner assistance fundsare administered at the state level,147 and in Pennsylvania,that function is performed by the Pennsylvania HousingFinance Agency (“PHFA”).148 There is no authority forthe proposition that bankruptcy courts have any role in theprocess, nor is there a basis to pursue a private right of actionunder the ARP.149 So once again, the Kogers request whatthe Rooker-Feldman doctrine expressly forbids. Accordingly,their request for this Court to wade into their eligibility underthe ARP or any “redemption rights” they claim will be denied.G. Dismissal of Elliott's Case with Prejudice is WarrantedSection 707(a) provides that the Court may dismiss a chapter7 case “only for cause.”150 “Cause” is undefined by theBankruptcy Code, but it can include an “unreasonable delayby the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors.”151 The movingparty has the burden to demonstrate “cause,” the sufficiencyof which is left to the sound discretion of the BankruptcyCourt.152The Code also permits a court to dismiss the chapter 7 caseof an individual whose debts are primarily consumer debts ifgranting chapter 7 relief would be an “abuse.”153 The term“abuse” is also not defined, but section 707(b)(3) directs thecourt to consider “whether the debtor filed the petition inbad faith”154 or whether “the totality of the circumstances ...of the debtor's financial situation demonstrates abuse.”155Previously, this Court determined that “abuse” under § 707(b)(3)(B) can include “an improper use of the bankruptcy systemto take unfair advantage of one's creditors.”156 Once a partychallenges a debtor's good faith, the burden shifts to the debtorto prove his good faith.157If dismissal is warranted, section 349(a) permits the Court todismiss the case with prejudice to the filing of a subsequentpetition.158 A lack of good faith is sufficient cause to justifya dismissal with prejudice.159Here, the Court finds that Usoroh sustained his burden ofestablishing cause for dismissal. Put simply, this case lacksany valid purpose. Elliott has no assets and there is reasonto doubt that the few utility creditors he scheduled actuallyhave claims against him. In other words, there is nothing tobe administered, and likely nothing to be discharged.*17 Although the Court cannot discern a valid purposeto Elliott's case, an improper one is apparent: to obtain anautomatic stay of the ejectment proceedings and launch acollateral attack on the final decisions of the state courts. Noneof the motions and related filings had any legal basis and theyprimarily advanced arguments that had been conclusivelyrejected. And as the Koger family's eighth bankruptcy case,
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10the Court finds Elliott's to be merely the latest chapter in ToddSr.’s scheme to hinder legitimate collection and executionefforts. For these reasons, the Court finds that Elliott didnot commence the case in good faith, that it constitutes anabuse of the bankruptcy system, and dismissal is warranted.Moreover, due to the abusive nature of these proceedings, theCourt will impose a one-year filing bar.H. Reopening Todd Sr.’s Case Would be FutileUnder section 350(b), “[a] case may be reopened in the courtin which such case was closed to administer assets, to accordrelief to the debtor, or for other cause.”160 The burden is onthe moving party to establish cause to reopen.161 The courtenjoys broad discretion in making this determination,162 but“[w]here it is futile or a waste of judicial resources to reopenthe case, including when the movant cannot ultimately obtainthe substantive relief [sought], there is no reason to grant themotion.”163For all the reasons stated above, Todd Sr. cannot obtain any ofthe relief he seeks by reopening his 2020 case. The causes ofaction he wishes to pursue are either collateral attacks on priordecisions or are post-bankruptcy assets that were not part ofhis chapter 7 estate. Since reopening this case would be an actof futility, the Court will deny Todd Sr.’s motion.164V. CONCLUSIONIn light of the foregoing, the Court will enter ordersdismissing the adversary proceeding, dismissing Elliott's casewith prejudice, and denying Todd Sr.’s motion to reopen.This opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact andconclusions of law in accordance with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052.The Court will issue a separate order consistent with thisopinion.ENTERED at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2807695Footnotes1The other defendants include: the Pennsylvania Homeowners Assistance Fund PAHAF 19868; WilkinsburgSchool District; Borough of Wilkinsburg; Marc V. Taiani (former Wilkinsburg Councilman); Michael Lefebvre(former Wilkinsburg Councilman); Allegheny County; and Duquesne Light Company.2Given that this case involves three similarly named individuals—Todd Elliott Koger and his sons Todd ElliottKoger and Elliott-Todd Parker Koger—clarity requires the Court to identify them by their first names. Nodisrespect is intended.3In Todd Sr.’s Case: See Section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code Motion to Reopen, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 125; Request for Reinstatement of 11 U.S.C. § 362 Stay; Joinder 24-02040-GLT and Stay of24-21081-GLT4; and Request for Order to Nullify Sheriff's Sale, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 137; 11U.S.C. § 324 Motion Invoking the Catch-all Misconduct Provision of 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(14)(E) (sic); Requestfor Reinstatement of 11 U.S.C. § 362 Stay; Joinder of 24-02040-GLT and Stay of 24-21081-GLT; and Requestfor Order to Nullify Sheriff's Sale, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 147; Motion to Consolidate the ReopenedBankruptcy Case No. 20-23340-GLT into Adversary Proceeing No. 24-2040-GLT, Case No. 20-23340-GLT,Dkt. No. 186. In Elliott's Case: See Memorandum Request to Vacate GD-05-18165 Judgment and Rule 12(f)Motion to Strike All Isaac Usoroh's Filings as “Personal Attacks” Filed in Support Elliott-Todd Parker Koger'sResponse, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 46; Sworn Declaration as Response to Usoroh's Motion theDispute Here is Legal Rather than Factual There are No Material Facts in Dispute, Case No. 24-21881-GLT,Dkt. 51; Section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code Motion, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 68; Motion forReconsideration of August 15, 2024 Order (sic) Record Has Confused the Pro Se Litigants of the Scheduling(sic), Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 75; PAHAF 69522 Bankruptcy Form, Case No. 24-21081-GLT,
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11Dkt. 86; Motion for Reconsideration of September 9, 2024 Order (sic) Bankruptcy Court Mistakenly CitesPAHAF 19868 as State Issue, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 87; Motion for Sanctions (Violation of the11 U.S.C. § 362 Stay) Request for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 125.In the Adversary Proceeding: See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, andDamages, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 4; Motion for Default Judgment, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT,Dkt. No. 20; Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Summary Relief, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 43; Replyto Respondent(s) Reponse Filed as a Section 502(a) Proof of Claim, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. 59.4See Motion, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707, to Dismiss Chapter 7 Case, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 44;Motion to Dismiss Amended Adversary Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), Adv. Pro. No.24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 17; Motion to Join Motion to Dismiss Amended Adversary Complaint at ECF Doc.17, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 58; see also Isaac Usoroh's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’Motion for Default Judgment, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 28; Response to Plaintiff's Motion forDefault Judgment, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 30.5The mailing address for the property is 515 Kelly Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15221.6The reference to “Todd Jr.” is made simply to distinguish him from his father. The Court acknowledges that,according to the Kogers, Todd Jr.’s legal name lacks a suffix.7Municipal Lien, GD-05-018165, Dkt. No. 1. The lien was filed due to unpaid school taxes for the years2001-2002.8See In re Kellie Odessa Dillard, Case No. 04-24229-BM; In re Todd Elliott Koger, Case No. 05-23146-BM(Todd Sr.); In re Todd Elliott Koger, Case No. 07-25165-BM (Todd Jr.); In re Todd Elliott Koger, Case No.10-27397-BM (Todd Sr.); In re Kellie Odessa Dillard, Case No. 12-21075-JAD; In re Todd Elliott Koger, CaseNo. 16-21143-CMB (Todd Jr.); In re Todd Elliott Koger, Case No. 20-23340-TPA (Todd Sr.); In re Elliott-ToddParker Koger, Case No. 24-21081-GLT (Elliott). Todd Jr.’s first case was particularly noteworthy because heno more than 12 years old when it occurred. In re Todd Elliott Koger, Case No. 07-25165-BM, Dkt. No. 39.9Efficiently reducing twenty-years of convoluted litigation to a few pages mandates a healthy gloss to theprocedural history. Because the overarching issue is the degree to which the Kogers’ arguments areforeclosed, the Court will focus on topics and outcomes over establishing a strict chronology of events.10See Schedule A – Real Property, Case No. 04-24229-BM, Dkt. No. 1 at 6 (Dillard); Schedule A – RealProperty, Case No. 05-23146-BM, Dkt. No. 1 at 6 (Todd Sr.); Schedule A – Real Property, Case No. 07-25165-BM, Dkt. No. 1 at 6 (Todd Jr.); Schedule A – Real Property, Case No. 10-27397-BM, Dkt. No. 1 at 4 (ToddSr., Todd Jr., and Dillard as joint owners); Schedule A – Real Property, Case No. 12-21075-JAD, Dkt. No.1 at 8 (Dillard, Todd Jr., and Todd Sr. as joint owners); Schedule A/B: Property, Case No. 16-21143-CMB,Dkt. No. 1 at 16 (Todd Jr. and “another”); Schedule A/B: Property, Case No. 20-23340-TPA, Dkt. No. 1 at 11(Todd Sr.); Schedule A/B: Property, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 1 at 12 (Elliott and “another”).11Koger v. Wilkinsburg School Dist. (In re Koger), 630 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2021). As explained by JudgeAgresti, “Whack-a-Mole” is “a term used colloquially to ‘denote a repetitious and futile task – each time anadversary is ‘whacked’ it only pops up again somewhere else.’ ” Id. at 2-3.12Order of Court, Case No. 07-25165-BM, Dkt. No. 39 at 6.13The Court takes judicial notice of a deed dated November 18, 1999, from Andrew M. Cuomo, Secretary ofHousing and Urban Development, to Todd-Elliott Koger, on record with the recorder of deeds of Allegheny
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12County, Pennsylvania, and recorded on December 20, 1999, at DVB No. 10656 pg. 173. See Fed. R. Evid.201(b)(2).14Transcript of September 24, 2024 Hearing, Dkt. No. 79 at 12:15-25.15See, e.g., Sworn Declaration as Response to Usoroh's Motion the Dispute Here is Legal Rather than Factualthere are no Material Facts in Dispute, Dkt. No. 51 at ¶¶ 3-10. It is noteworthy that Todd Jr., the party allegedlyharmed by the exclusion, is not the one raising the argument.16See Wilkinsburg Sch. Dist. v. Koger, No. 422 C.D. 2017, 2019 WL 2997462, at *2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 10,2019) (“the Original Record supports the conclusion that Koger [Sr.] is the Property owner, and nothing ...counters that conclusion[.]”); Usoroh v. Koger, No. 22-013385, 2023 WL 12083252, at *1 (Pa.Com.Pl. Oct.27, 2023) (observing that “[t]he ejectment action relates to property ... the legal status of which was settledwell before the case on appeal.”).17Order of Court, Case No. 07-25165-BM, Dkt. No. 39 at 6.18Sworn Declaration as Response to Usoroh's Motion the Dispute Here is Legal Rather than Factual there areno Material Facts in Dispute, Dkt. No. 51 at ¶¶ 3, 6-7.19In re Koger, 630 B.R. at 9.20Id.21Sworn Declaration as Response to Usoroh's Motion the Dispute Here is Legal Rather than Factual there areno Material Facts in Dispute, Dkt. No. 51 at ¶¶ 3, 8-9.22Id. at 38.23Exhibit Letters, Dkt. No. 51 at 19-20.24Koger v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 302 A.3d 1272, 2023 WL 4752197, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2023).25Id. at *2.26Id. (“Based upon the determination, the record, and the applicable policy, the appeal committee did not violateKoger's constitutional rights, commit an error of law, or fail to support its findings of fact with substantialevidence.”). According to an email the Kogers attached to a pleading, Todd Sr. told the Pennsylvania HousingFinance Agency that he only filed an application in his name because “Judge Ward says Todd [Sr.] is theowner.” Reply to Respondent(s) Reponse Filed as a Section 502(a) Proof of Claim, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. 59 at 110. He made it clear that “[w]e disagree with Judge Ward” and “acknowledge Todd [Jr.] asthe ‘only’ owner with legal and equitable title,” and included information to that effect in his PAHAF application.Id.27Koger v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 2023 WL 4752197, at *1 at n.5.28Since clarity requires the Kogers to be identified by their first names, the Court will refer to Isaac Usoroh as“Usoroh” rather than “Mr. Usoroh” to avoid any perception of unfairness. No disrespect is intended.29Exhibit A, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 33-1
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1330See Exhibit B, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 33-2; Usoroh v. Koger, 2023 WL 12083252, at *4-6.Usoroh's claim for ejectment against Todd Jr. was dismissed when it was determined he no longer residedat the Property.31Usoroh v. Koger, 332 A.3d 1246, 2024 WL 5166362, at *4-5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024), reargument denied (Feb.14, 2025) (emphasis added).32Schedule A/B: Property, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 1 at 12.33Schedule D: Creditors Who Have Claims Secured by Property, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 1 at 24-25.34Schedule E/F: Creditors Who Have Unsecured Claims, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 1 at 27-30;Schedule H: Your Codebtors, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 1 at 35.35See Order, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 133 at 5 (“the Kogers readily admit that [Duquesne LightCompany] does not have a claim against Elliott.”).36See Motion for Determination of No Automatic Stay, or in the Alternative, Motion for Relief from the AutomaticStay, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 33.37Throughout these proceedings, Todd Sr. has co-signed Elliott's pleadings and has attempted to act ashis attorney-in-fact despite not being a licensed attorney nor having a valid power of attorney. See, e.g.,Response to Motion, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 41 at 7; Transcript of July 25, 2024 Hearing, Case No.24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 116. Todd Sr.’s unauthorized practice of law was also an issue during the state courtproceedings. See Exhibit D, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 44-4. In fact, the court appointed a guardianad litem for Elliott during the ejectment action. See id. at 11:8-12:5. The issue is now somewhat blurred byTodd Sr.’s requests to reopen his 2020 case and either join in or separately assert identical relief as Elliott.38See Response to Motion, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 41.39See Usoroh v. Koger (In re Koger), No. 24-21081-GLT, 2024 WL 4177876, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Sept. 9,2024), aff'd sub nom. Koger v. Usoroh, No. 2:24-CV-1287, 2025 WL 1780568 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2025).40Id. at 5.41Id.42Koger v. Usoroh, 2025 WL 1780568, at *2 (“The Court concurs with the Bankruptcy Court that Koger's versionof how the Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates is incorrect.”).43Motion, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707, to Dismiss Chapter 7 Case, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 44.44Sworn Declaration as Response to Usoroh's Motion the Dispute Here is Legal Rather than Factual there areno Material Facts in Dispute, Dkt. No. 51.45See Motion for Reconsideration of August 15, 2024 Order (sic) Record Has Confused the Pro Se Litigantsof the Scheduling (sic), Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 75.46See Memorandum Request to Vacate GD-05-18165 Judgment and Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike All IsaacUsoroh's Filings as “Personal Attacks” Filed in Support Elliott-Todd Parker Koger's Response, Case No.24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 46; Section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code Motion, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt.No. 68; PAHAF 69522 Bankruptcy Form, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. 86; Motion for Reconsideration ofSeptember 9, 2024 Order (sic) Bankruptcy Court Mistakenly Cites PAHAF 19868 as State Issue, Case No.
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1424-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 87; Motion for Sanctions (Violation of the 11 U.S.C. § 362 Stay) Request for InjunctiveRelief and Damages, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 125.47See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages, Adv. No. 24-02040-GLT,Dkt. No. 4.48Id. The claims include: (1) “Enforcement 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) Stay [sic] Case 2:21-00579”; (2) “Rooker-Feldman Doctrine”; (3) “Liberty Interest in Due Process”; (4) “Section 548 Fraudulent Transfer”; (5) “18 U.S.C.§ 1964(c)”; (6) “No. 733052 July 7, 2023 Fair Housing Right to Sue”; and (7) “42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, and1985 claims.”49See Motion to Dismiss Amended Adversary Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), Adv. No.24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 17 (filed by Duquesne Light Company); Motion to Join Motion to Dismiss AmendedAdversary Complaint at ECF Doc. 17, Adv. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 58 (filed by Borough of Wilkinsburg,Marc Taiani, and Michael Lefebvre).50See Motion for Default Judgment, Adv. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 20; Plaintiffs Amended Motion forSummary Relief, Adv. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 43. The Court denied the Motion for Default Judgmentas to defendants Duquesne Light Company, Usoroh, the Borough of Wilkinsburg, Marc Taiani, and MichaelLefebvre. See Order Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment, Adv. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt.No. 37.51See Chapter 7 Trustee's Report of No Distribution, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, dated August 21, 2024.52See Section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code Motion to Reopen, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 125.53Unless expressly stated otherwise, all references to “Bankruptcy Code” or to specific sections shall beto the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and ConsumerProtection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, 11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. All referencesto “Bankruptcy Rule” shall be to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.54See Request for Reinstatement of 11 U.S.C. § 362 Stay; Joinder 24-2040-GLT and Stay of 24-21081-GLT;and Request for Order to Nullify Sheriff's Sale, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 137; 11 U.S.C. § 324 MotionInvoking the Catch-all Misconduct Provision of 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(14)(E) (sic); Request for Reinstatementof 11 U.S.C. § 362 Stay; Joinder of 24-2040-GLT and Stay of 24-21081-GLT; and Request for Order to NullifySheriff's Sale, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 147; Motion to Consolidate the Reopened Bankruptcy CaseNo. 20-23340-GLT into Adversary Proceeding No. 24-2040-GLT, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 186.55See 11 U.S.C. § 324 Motion Invoking the Catch-all Misconduct Provision of 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(14)(E) (sic);Request for Reinstatement of 11 U.S.C. § 362 Stay; Joinder of 24-2040-GLT and Stay of 24-21081-GLT; andRequest for Order to Nullify Sheriff's Sale, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 147. Rosemary C. Crawfordwas initially selected by the United State Trustee to serve as the chapter 7 trustee in Todd Sr.’s case, but shepromptly rejected the appointment citing a conflict. See Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 24. It is unclearwhat “misconduct” Todd Sr. believes Ms. Crawford committed, but it appears he is making hay over heracceptance of an appointment in Elliott's case four years later. Regardless, since Todd Sr. failed to articulateany specific reason to question Ms. Crawford's disinterestedness, the motion will be denied.56See Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. Nos. 1, 35.57In re Koger, 630 B.R. at 3.58Id. at 7-8.
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1559Id. at 8.60Id. at 8-9.61Id. at 8-10.62Id. at 10-11.63See Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 114.64During the hearing, Todd Sr. suggested that a conflict of interest existed because the chapter 7 trustee inTodd Jr.’s case, Robert Shearer, is related to an attorney representing Allegheny County in the sheriff's sale.See Transcript of September 24, 2024 Hearing, Dkt. No. 79 9:6-10:8. The Court notes that Todd Jr.’s casewas closed on August 11, 2016 and nothing had been previously raised in that proceeding or elsewhereto challenge Mr. Shearer's capacity to serve as trustee. See Case No. 16-21143. Beyond that, Todd Sr.’sarguments on this point were difficult to follow and he failed to establish any grounds for relief by this Court.Moreover, to the extent a conflict existed in the execution proceedings, that was an issue for the state courtto decide.65A core proceeding is one that is either listed in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), invokes a substantive right provided bythe Code, or could only rise in the context of a bankruptcy case. In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d1171, 1178 (3d Cir. 1996).66See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). “[T]he test for determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy iswhether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administeredin bankruptcy. Halper v. Halper, 164 F.3d 830, 837 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pacor v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984,994 (3d Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added).67Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT,Dkt. No. 4 at 200.68In re Koger, 630 B.R. at 3.69Usoroh v. Koger, 2024 WL 5166362, at *5.70If the Court had to speculate, it seems the Kogers used artificial intelligence to draft their pleadings becausesome of their citations relate to cases that do not exist. See, e.g., Addendum Correction of Legal Authorities,Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 175 at 8 (citing “In re: Foreclosure of 123 Main St., No. 22-1456 (3dCir. 2023)” for the proposition that the Third Circuit ruled that “material facts and ownership of the property,as previously adjudicated by the state agency and affirmed by the Commonwealth Court, could not besubsequently challenged in an appeal before the Superior Court or Court of Common Pleas.”).71See, e.g., Sworn Declaration as Response to Usoroh's Motion the Dispute Here is Legal Rather than Factualthere are no Material Facts in Dispute, Dkt. No. 51 at 3 (“this Bankruptcy Court has determined at least“three times” (No. 10-27397-BM, No. 07-25165-BM, and No. 20-23340-TPA), that the [state] trial court lackedfundamental jurisdiction: Todd Elliott Koger, Sr., the lone defendant at GD-05-18165, does not own theproperty.”).72See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (recognizing a “tradition of leniency”descending from the Supreme Court's instruction “to hold pro se complaints ‘to less stringent standards thanformal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ ”) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)).
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1673Butko v. Ciccozzi (In re Butko), 624 B.R. 338, 343, 365 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2021).74WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act III, Scene 2.75Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975).76Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998).77Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2003).78Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).79Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 484–85 (3d Cir. 1998).80Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499.81Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d at 299 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-411,111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991)).82Beyond calling the Court an “idiot,” see Transcript of September 24, 2025 Hearing, Case No. 24-21081-GLT,Dkt. No. 79 at 40:4-5, Elliott has said little beyond parroting Todd Sr.’s talking points and has not exhibited anysubstantive knowledge of his own papers. Indeed, the state court appointed a guardian ad litem on his behalfduring the ejectment proceeding because “there seem[ed] to be a lack of appreciation that [Elliott] may nothave a living space within so much time.” See Exhibit D, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 44-4 at 11:8-12:5.83Although the Koger family is purportedly a plaintiff in the adversary proceeding, the complaint does not defineits membership.84See Reply to the Respondent(s) Response as a Section 502(a) Proof of Claim, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT,Dkt. No. 59 at 1.85See, e.g., Sworn Declaration as Response to Usoroh's Motion the Dispute Here is Legal Rather than Factualthere are no Material Facts in Dispute, Dkt. No. 51 at 17.86There is an irony in that Todd Sr. disavows a title interest but then tries to assert the rights of everyone elseto defend it.87Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d at 484.88Accordingly, the Koger family is not a plausible plaintiff and will not be considered further.89See Usoroh v. Koger, 2024 WL 5166362, at *5.90Transcript of September 24, 2025 Hearing, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 79 at 18:6-10.91“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from two Supreme Court cases policing the boundary betweenthe original jurisdiction of the district courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.” In re Adams,No. 24-1212, 2025 WL 2525854, at *3 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2025). See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed. 2d 206 (1983).92Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 1199, 163 L.Ed. 2d 1059 (2006) (quoting Exxon MobilCorp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)).
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1793In re Adams, 2025 WL 2525854, at *4.94Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. at 293.95In re Adams, 2025 WL 2525854, at *4.96Id.97New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001).98Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008) (quoting NewHampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 748-49).99See 28 U.S.C. § 1738.100In re Adams, 2025 WL 2525854, at *6 (citations omitted).101Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334).102See Callery v. Municipal Authority of Blythe Twp., 432 Pa. 307, 243 A.2d 385 (1968) (res judicata requiresthe following conditions to be met: “(1) identity of the thing sued upon; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3)identity of persons and parties to the action; and, (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suingor sued.”).103See Balent v. City of Wilkes–Barre, 542 Pa. 555, 564, 669 A.2d 309, 313 (1995) (for collateral estoppel toapply, “[t]he identical issue must have been necessary to final judgment on the merits, and the party againstwhom the plea is asserted must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior action and must havehad a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question.”).104Usoroh v. Koger, 2024 WL 5166362, at *5.105Transcript of September 24, 2025 Hearing, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 79 at 12:11-24.106Id. at 30:23-31:1, 77:19-78:14.107See Fannin v. Cratty, 480 A.2d 1056, 1058 (Pa. Super. 1984); 33 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1 (transfer of an interestin real property should be in writing).108Although not articulated in any pleading, Todd Sr. also argued during the hearing that Elliott has rights tothe Property as an “heir” under Pennsylvania law. See Transcript of September 24, 2025 Hearing, Case No.24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 79 at 17:6-10. As mentioned above, Todd Sr. previously argued in his 2020 casethat he had rights to the Property as Todd Jr.’s heir. See In re Koger, 630 B.R. at 8. Judge Agresti rejectedthat argument, concluding that “the law is clear that during the lifetime of a property owner a presumptiveheir of that owner has no interest in the owner's property.” Id. The Court agrees and finds this would applyto Elliott with equal force.109See In re Koger, 2024 WL 4177876, at *5.110See Section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code Motion to Reopen, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 125;Section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code Motion, Case No. 24-21081-GLT, Dkt. No. 68.111Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages, Case No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt.No. 4 at ¶¶ 153-159 (Count Five).
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1811211 U.S.C. § 548(a).11311 U.S.C. § 522(h) provides:The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor or recover a setoff to the extent that the debtorcould have exempted such property under subsection (g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided suchtransfer, if—(1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this titleor recoverable by the trustee under section 553 of this title; and(2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer.11411 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (emphasis added).115See In re James, 96 B.R. 590, 594 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2013) (“exemptions can only be claimed to the extentthe debtor has an ownership interest in the property”); In re Zieg, 409 B.R. 917, 919 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009)(a debtor cannot claim an exemption in property that he does not own).116See In re Ryker, 315 B.R. 664, 673 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) (debtor lacked standing under section 522(h) whenhe could not assert a valid homestead exemption in the subject property).117See Case No. 20-23340, Dkt. Nos. 1, 35, and the unnumbered docket entry preceding Dkt. No. 33.11811 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (emphasis added). Todd Sr. is acutely aware of this limitation, having cited this provisionin his motions. See Section 522(h) of the Bankruptcy Code Motion to Reopen, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt.No. 125 at 5. To the extent he invites the Court to depart from the statutory language as part of a requestfor “additional or alternative relief,” it declines to do so.119See In re Nat'l Audit Def. Network, 367 B.R. 207, 218 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007) (“Section 548 only coverstransfers occurring before the petition date.”).12011 U.S.C. § 549(a).121See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), made applicable to adversary proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b).122Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 556 U.S. 662, 678,129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940-41, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quotingBell Alantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).123Id.124McTernan v. City of York, Penn., 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see Tanksley v. Daniels,902 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2018).125Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.126Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages, Case No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt.No. 4 at ¶¶ 122-124.127See Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court, Case No. 20-23340-GLT, Dkt. No. 114.128In re Koger, 630 B.R. at 10.
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.19129See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) (an order granting stay relief “is stayed until the expiration of 14 days afterthe entry of the order, unless the court orders otherwise.”).130In re Koger, 2024 WL 4177876, at *5 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2024), aff'd sub nom. Koger v. Usoroh, 2025WL 1780568, *2 (“The Court concurs with the Bankruptcy Court that Koger's version of how the Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates is incorrect).131Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S. Ct. 1382, 1391, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983), decisionsupplemented, 466 U.S. 144, 104 S. Ct. 1900, 80 L.Ed.2d 194 (1984); see Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S.476, 506–07, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 196 (2011).132In re Adams, 2025 WL 2525854, at *3-5.133See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 4 at ¶¶ 131-145.134Usoroh v. Koger, 2024 WL 5166362, at *5 (emphasis added).135In re Adams, 2025 WL 2525854, at *4.136See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 4 at ¶¶ 147-152.13711 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages,Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 4 at ¶¶ 153-174.13842 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; see Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages,Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 4 at ¶¶ 175-189.13942 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985; see Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Reliefand Damages, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 4 at ¶¶ 190-199.140See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages, Adv. Pro. No. 24-2040-GLT, Dkt. No. 4 at ¶¶ 166, 178-179, 199.141Id. at ¶¶ 167, 193.142See id. at 189 (“Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the RICO conspiracy thattargeted the family was intentionally done because of race (African American) with the intention of unjustlyremoving Todd Elliott Koger, Sr. from the 2013 primary ballot for Wilkinsburg Mayor and thereafter coversuch up as per the August 10, 2022 ‘fraudulent transfers’ of the Koger family property.”).143Even assuming Todd Sr. could amend his complaint to assert a plausible prepetition claim, that claim wouldbe property of the estate and the chapter 7 trustee would become the only person with standing to pursueit. See Cellco P'ship v. Bane (In re Bane), 426 B.R. 152, 159 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010), order aff'd, No. 02:10-CV-00655-TFM, 2010 WL 11693611 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2010); Mini-Miners, Inc. v. Lansberry (In re Lansberry),177 B.R. 49, 55 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995).144See Reply to the Respondent(s) Response Filed as Section 502(a) Proof of Claim, Adv. No. 24-2040, Dkt.No. 59 at ¶¶ 1-5.
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.20145As previously explained, the Commonwealth Court never said Todd Jr. owned the Property. Instead, it heldthat his application was properly denied because he disavowed an interest in the Property which was aprerequisite to obtaining relief. Basically, Todd Sr. clouded his own title to his detriment.146See Bravo v. Att'y Gen. United States, No. 23-1356, 2024 WL 243340 (3d Cir. Jan. 23, 2024) (dismissingan appeal of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals refusing to reopen immigration proceedings);In re Aleckna, 13 F.4th 337 (3d Cir. 2021) (upholding the finding of stay violation against a university thatwithheld a student's transcript due to unpaid tuition).147See 15 U.S.C. § 9058d.148See VonNieda-LaGrassa v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 5:23-CV-03407-JMG, 2024 WL 4761390, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 8, 2024).149See Johnson v. HAF, No. 6:24-CV-01141-AA, 2024 WL 4057520, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 5, 2024).15011 U.S.C. § 707(a).151Id.152See In re Boyce, No. CIV.A.04-1369, 2006 WL 3061633, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2006); In re Jong HeeKang, 467 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2012); In re Jabarin, 395 B.R. 330, 337 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008); Inre Aupperle, 352 B.R. 43, 45 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005).15311 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).15411 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A); see also Tamecki v. Frank (In re Tamecki), 229 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000)(finding that a lack of good faith can constitute cause for dismissal under section 707(a)(1) prior to the 2005amendments to the Bankruptcy Code).15511 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B).156U.S. Tr. v. Kubatka (In re Kubatka), 605 B.R. 339, 367 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2019); see U.S. Tr. v. Campayno(In re Campayno), No. 21-22319-GLT, 2022 WL 1272578, at *5 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2022).157In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d at 207.15811 U.S.C. § 349(a).159See In re Reppert, 643 B.R. 828, 847 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2022); In re Ward, 610 B.R. 804, 807 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. 2020); In re Stone Fox Cap. LLC, 572 B.R. 582, 591 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2017) (citing In re JER/JamesonMezz Borrower II, LLC, 461 B.R. 293, 304 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)).16011 U.S.C. § 350(b).161Burnett v. Janocha (In re Janocha), No. BR 06-20191-JAD, 2015 WL 128152, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Jan. 8,2015) (citing In re Janssen, 396 B.R. 624, 634 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008)).162See In re Lazy Days’ RV Ctr. Inc., 724 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Zinchiak, 406 F.3d 214, 223 (3dCir. 2005).163Murphy v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Murphy), 547 B.R. 875, 879 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2016).164See Minech v. Clearview Fed. Credit Union (In re Minech), 632 B.R. 274, 279–80 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2021).
In re: TODD ELLIOTT KOGER, Debtor. In re: ELLIOT-TODD..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.21End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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