James v. Nat'l Bd. of Osteopathic Examiners, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-01607-JPH-TAB (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Jana James v. National Board of Osteopathic Examiners, Inc.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
JANA JAMES, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 772373Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D.Indiana, Indianapolis Division.JANA JAMES, Plaintiff,v.NATIONAL BOARD OF OSTEOPATHICEXAMINERS INC., Defendant.No. 1:23-cv-01607-JPH-TAB|03/19/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsJana James, Port Wentworth, GA, Pro Se.Stephen Berrios, O'Hagan Meyer, LLC, Chicago, IL, forDefendant National Board of Osteopathic Examiners Inc.ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'SMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT*1 Jana James alleges that the National Board of OsteopathicExaminers, Inc. ("NBOME") violated the Americans withDisabilities Act when it denied her testing accommodationsfor the Comprehensive Osteopathic Medical LicensingExamination ("COMLEX")-USA Level 1 exam. NBOME hasmoved for summary judgment. Dkt. [75]. The Court gavenotice of its intent to grant summary judgment in favor ofNBOME under Rule 56(f)(2) because Ms. James appearedto lack standing to request a prospective injunction, andmonetary damages were unavailable. Dkt. 97 at 5–8. Theparties have filed supplemental briefings, dkts. 98, 101, 1031. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS NBOME'smotion for summary judgment. Dkt. [75].I.Facts and BackgroundFor the purposes of summary judgment, the Court viewsand recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to thenonmoving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in thatparty's favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.2009).Ms. James is a former medical student. Dkt. 76-8 at 4(James Dep. at 10). She was required to take and pass theCOMLEX-USA Level 1 exam, the first level in "a three-level,national standardized licensure examination" for osteopathicmedicine. Dkt. 77 at 1. Defendant NBOME develops theCOMLEX tests and decides what accommodations, if any,students will receive when taking those tests. See id.On January 1, 2020, Ms. James submitted an accommodationsrequest for an upcoming COMLEX-USA Level 1administration. Dkt. 76-1 at 1. She requested an isolatedtesting environment, additional time to complete the exam,and additional breaks. Id. She reiterated this request viaemail, dkt. 76-2 at 2, and NBOME acknowledged the requeston January 20 after Ms. James formally registered forthe exam, id. at 1. NBOME granted Ms. James's requestfor additional break time but denied the remainder of herrequested accommodations. Id. at 3–5. Ms. James appealedwith additional documentation, and NBOME then approvedadditional accommodations of more break time and a separatetesting room. Id. at 11–12. Ms. James took the COMLEX-USA Level 1 exam for the first time on September 9,2020, but she did not pass. Dkt. 76-3 at 1. Ms. James thenregistered for the exam again, and NBOME granted the sameaccommodations. Dkt. 76-2 at 16–18. She took the exam for asecond time on December 1, 2020, but she did not pass. Dkt.76-4 at 1.Ms. James registered for the exam again and submittedadditional documentation in support of her requestedaccommodations. Dkt. 76-2 at 40. NBOME granted herthe requested accommodations for additional break timeand noise cancelling headphones but denied her request foradditional time to complete the exam. Id. at 20, 33, 39–40.This time, Ms. James passed the COMLEX-USA Level 1exam. Dkt. 76-5 at 1; see also dkt. 95 at 20.
JANA JAMES, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2*2 Ms. James's operative complaint alleges that NBOMEviolated Title III of the Americans with Disability Act("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., when it did not provideall the accommodations requested by Ms. James each timeshe took the exam. Dkt. 6 at 4–7; see dkt. 56 (clarifying thatthe operative complaint is at docket number 6). As relief,Ms. James seeks compensatory damages and reimbursementfor tuition expenses, legal fees, and other costs incurred inbringing this case. Dkt. 6 at 6. She also seeks injunctiverelief in the form of a court order requiring NBOME to"[r]emove records of exam failures." Id. Last, Ms. Jamesseeks declaratory judgment asking the Court to declare that:(1) "NBOME failed to conduct an individualized, good faithassessment as required by the ADA and its implementingregulations...; (2) NBOME applied rigid documentationstandards that do not reflect clinical best practices or legalobligations; and (3) Plaintiff meets the legal definition of aperson with a disability under federal law." Dkt. 98 at 2.NBOME moved for summary judgment, dkt. 75, and theCourt notified the parties of its intent to grant summaryjudgment in favor of NBOME under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 56(f)(2), because Ms. James appeared to lackstanding to request a prospective injunction, and monetarydamages were unavailable. Dkt. 97 at 5–8. Rule 56(f)(2)permits the Court to grant summary judgment on groundsnot raised by a party after providing "notice and a reasonabletime period to respond." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2). The partiesresponded, dkts. 98, 101, 103, and the Court now addressesthe merits of those supplemental arguments about whetherthis relief is available to Ms. James.II.DiscussionA. DamagesIn its Rule 56(f)(2) order, the Court raised the issue that Ms.James could not recover monetary relief under Title III ofthe ADA as a matter of law. Dkt. 97 at 5; Scherr v. MarriotIntern, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1075 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[T]hestatute makes clear that injunctive relief [is available]...andonly injunctive relief—damages are not available under TitleIII[.]"); Ruffin v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 181 F. App'x 582,585 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Money damages . ..are not available toprivate parties under Title III[.]" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) and collecting cases)). In her response, Ms. James did notaddress this issue or present an argument as to the availabilityof monetary relief. See generally dkts. 98, 103.Because damages are not available under Title III of theADA, and Ms. James does not present any argument in thealternative, NBOME is entitled to summary judgment on Ms.James's request for monetary damages.B. Standing for injunctive and declaratory reliefMs. James seeks a prospective injunction requiring NBOMEto remove records of the exams where she did not receiverequested accommodations and to vacate its determinationregarding her disability status. Dkts. 6 at 6; 98 at 2. Inthe order on Defendant's motion for summary judgment,the Court explained it appeared that Ms. James lackedstanding for prospective injunctive relief. Dkt. 97 at 6–8. In response, Ms. James argues that she has Article IIIstanding because "NBOME's continued public denial ofPlaintiff's disability status causes reputational, educational,and professional harm." Dkts. 98 at 2; 103-1 at 3. NBOMEargues that Ms. James has not satisfied the "injury in fact"requirement because her alleged harms are not concrete,particularized, actual or imminent. Dkt. 101 at 2.The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standingconsists of three elements: the plaintiff "must have suffered(1) an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to thechallenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) is likely to beredressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo v. Robins,578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). To have standing for prospectiveinjunctive relief, Ms. James "must face a 'real and immediatethreat' of future injury as opposed to a threat that is merely'conjectural or hypothetical.' " Simic v. City of Chicago, 81F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing City of Los Angeles v.Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). At summary judgment, Ms.James is "not able to lean on mere allegations of injury; rather,she 'must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts,which for the purposes of the summary judgment motion willbe taken as true.' " Gracia v. SigmaTron Int'l, Inc., 986 F.3d1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 2021).*3 Ms. James provides three examples of ongoing harmshe faces: (1) NBOME's continued denial in court filings thatMs. James is a person with disability under the ADA; (2)her former university, A.T. Still University ("ATSU"), reliedon NBOME's refusal of accommodations when denyingMs. James other testing accommodations and to justify herdismissal; and (3) ATSU "continues to cite NBOME's positionin pending litigation." Dkt. 98 at 2. None of these situations
JANA JAMES, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3involve the type of ongoing or future injury required forstanding.First, Ms. James asserts that NBOME's continued stance inlitigation that she does not qualify as disabled under the ADAcauses her reputational, professional, and educational harm.Id. at 2. Ms. James does not, however, designate evidenceshowing concrete and particularized harm to her reputationor career caused by NBOME's statements in litigation thatMs. James is not disabled under the ADA. See dkt. 98; 103-1.Without such designated evidence, Ms. James's assertionsthat she faces ongoing harm are conjectural or hypotheticalin nature and therefore insufficient to establish injury atsummary judgment. Gracia, 986 F.3d at 1064 (vacatingdistrict court's finding of injury in fact because "the summaryjudgment record contains no showing that [the wrongdoing]had any impact on [plaintiff]").Next, Ms. James argues that she faces imminent harmbecause ATSU relied on NBOME's accommodation denialas justification to deny her accommodations on other examsand to dismiss her from the school. Dkt. 98 at 2. Ms.James designates as evidence an email from ATSU's disabilityresources advisor stating that Ms. James would not receiveaccommodations on the COMAT exam because NBOMEdenied her testing accommodations. Dkt. 98-2 at 9. Thisonly shows, however, past harm. Ms. James does not explainhow ATSU's past reliance on NBOME's accommodationdetermination imminently threatens her future rights—shehas not designated evidence, or even alleged, that she plansto re-enroll in ATSU, or any other medical school. See Simic,851 F.3d at 738 ("Unlike with damages, a past injury isinsufficient to establish standing for purposes of prospectiverelief."); Perry L. v. Milwaukee Montessori Sch., No. 22-cv-1244-bhl, 2025 WL 1191025, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Apr.24, 2025) (finding no imminent harm for injunctive reliefstanding when parents sought an injunction for reasonableschool accommodations under the ADA because parents didnot "have an immediate and concrete intention" to re-enrolltheir son).Last, Ms. James argues that she faces ongoing harm because"the denial of [her] disability status...is actively being usedas evidence against her in the ATSU litigation to justifyprior denial of accommodations and dismissal decision....Thelegal effect of NBOME's determination remains operativein defending ATSU's actions and undermining Plaintiff'sADA and civil rights claims in that case." Dkt. 98 at 2.Ms. James designates as evidence ATSU's brief in supportof summary judgment in the case Ms. James broughtagainst ATSU in the District of Arizona. Dkt. 98-2 at 5–8. There, ATSU states that Ms. James did not receiveaccommodations on COMAT, COMSAE, and COMLEXexaminations because she did not receive accommodationsfrom NBOME. Id. at 4. Although ATSU's legal filingsreference NBOME's accommodation determinations, Ms.James does not designate evidence showing how ATSU'scitations to NBOME's determination "continues to damageher legal position" or inflicts professional reputational harmor educational harm. See dkt. 98 at 2; 103-1 at 3. To meet theburden of establishing standing at summary judgment, Ms.James must "point to evidence establishing a concrete andparticularized injury," Gracia, 986 F.3d at 1064, and she hasnot done so here.*4 Ms. James contends that under Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019), she has standing to pursue injunctiverelief in the form of expungement. Dkts. 98 at 2, 103-1 at3. In Doe, the plaintiff sought to expunge his disciplinaryrecords, alleging that the university violated his proceduraldue process rights when finding him guilty of assault––whichforeclosed the plaintiff's ability to pursue his future careerin the U.S. Navy. Id. at 656. The Seventh Circuit held that"[plaintiff's] marred record is a continuing harm for whichhe [could] seek redress." Id. at 666. On remand, the districtcourt found that he adequately alleged standing for injunctiverelief because he alleged that his career in the Navy would beavailable to him if his guilty finding was expunged. Doe v.Purdue Univ., No. 2:17-cv-33, 2020 WL 2542674, at *9 (N.D.Ind. May 19, 2020).Here, Ms. James does not designate any evidence that therecords of her two failed COMLEX-USA Level 1 examsare preventing her from pursuing specific professional oreducational opportunities. See dkts. 98 at 2; 103 at 1. Instead,she generally argues that NBOME's determination "continuesto operate as an authoritative barrier to [her] professional andeducational opportunities," dkt. 98 at 2, without designatingevidence of concrete or imminent harm caused by NBOME'srecord of the exam results. She has not designated evidencethat she seeks to re-apply to medical school, that the testingrecords are publicly available or that anyone outside ofNBOME could access these records without her permission,or any other evidence that she faces a real or imminent threatto her rights without record expungement.Ms. James's claim for declaratory relief fails for the samereasons. As with injunctive relief, standing for declaratory
JANA JAMES, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4relief "require[s] ongoing or impending harm." Swaniganv. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d 577, 584 n.2 (7th Cir. 2018)(citing Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 857 (7th Cir. 1989)).Here, Ms. James does not argue that she satisfied the standingrequirements for declaratory judgment. Seedkts. 98 at 2–3; 103-1 at 3. Rather, Ms. James contends that declaratoryjudgment would "clarify her legal status and help repairthe ongoing harm caused by NBOME's refusal to recognizeher disability." Dkt. 98 at 2. These general statements areinsufficient to establish standing for a#: 804declaratory judgment, as Ms. James has not designatedevidence of specific ongoing or impending harms as requiredto satisfy the injury in fact requirement. See Swanigan, 881F.3d at n.2.2*5 Ms. James has not designated evidence showing howher career, education, or reputation are or will be affected byNBOME's maintenance of the exam records. She thereforehas not established real and imminent harm as required toshow injury in fact for constitutional standing for eitherinjunctive or declaratory relief.3C. Discovery & case management issuesMs. James raises the additional argument that summaryjudgment is inappropriate under Rule 56(d) because "shewas denied a fair opportunity to obtain discovery critical toresolving material factual disputes [because of]#: 805Defendant's conduct[,]...and the Court's denial of appointedcounsel [ ] resulted in an uneven process that prejudiced herability to oppose summary judgment." Dkt. 98 at 4.Under Rule 56(d), when a non-moving party demonstratesthat it cannot present facts "essential to justify its position,"the court can defer or deny ruling on the summary judgmentmotion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). "A party seeking relief underRule 56(d) must show by affidavit or declaration specificreasons discovery should be extended, which requires morethan a fond hope that more fishing might net some goodevidence." Smith v. OSF HealthCare Sys., 933 F.3d 859,864 (7th Cir. 2019). Here, Ms. James did not submit therequired an "affidavit or declaration" listing specific reasonswhy discovery should be extended. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d);see Kallal v. CIBA Vision Corp., 779 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir.2015) ("Kallal failed, however, to file a Rule 56(d) affidavitexplaining why he needed additional discovery. His failure todo so fully justified the district court's ruling."); First Nat'lBank & Tr. Corp. v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 378 F.3d 682,694 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Because Inlow Estate failed to submita Rule 56(d) affidavit...it was not an abuse of discretion bythe district court to rule on the motion for summary judgmentbefore Inlow Estate was satisfied that all necessary discoveryhad occurred."). Furthermore, the additional fact discoveryMs. James seeks relates to the merits of the claim, not the lackof standing. See dkts. 98 at 3–4; 103-1 at 3. Therefore, theCourt#: 806declines to delay or deny this ruling on the grounds that Mr.James was unable to depose a NBOME representative.4III.ConclusionDefendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.Dkt. [75]. Final judgment will issue by separate entry. SOORDERED.Date: 3/19/2026Distribution:JANA JAMES200 Magnolia Blvd., Blg. 200, Apt. 203Port Wentworth, GA 31407All electronically registered counselAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 772373
JANA JAMES, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Footnotes1Ms. James filed a Motion for Leave to File Surreply, dkt. [103], and filed a Notice of Correction to Exhibit A,dkt. 106. That motion is GRANTED, and the Court will consider her surreply in ruling on this Order.2Ms. James cites two cases, Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2004) and Knakmuhsv. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 990 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (D. Minn. 2014), to support the contention that "exam-relatedADA violations warrant declaratory relief." Dkt. 98 at 3. In Powell, the Second Circuit did not address orgrant declaratory relief. 364 F.3d at 87–88. Rather, the Court reviewed the lower court's grant of summaryjudgment on standing grounds and turned to the merits, where it found that Ms. Powell was not a qualifiedindividual under the ADA. Id. The Court is unable to locate the second cited case, Knakmuhs v. MinneapolisPub. Sch., 990 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1047 (D. Minn. 2014). The citation is to a different case, Cooper v. TokyoElec. Power Co., 990 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (S.D. Cal. 2013), and the Court's search using the parties' namesdid not return any case.Although Ms. James is a pro se litigant, she is not excused from complying with the Federal rules of CivilProcedure. See Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Room, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008). Future filings that containnon-existent cases or cases that do not stand for the proposition that she claims in violation of Rule 11(b),will result in sanctions.3Because Ms. James does not satisfy the "injury in fact" element of standing, the Court does not addresswhether her claim satisfies the remaining elements of standing.4The Court acknowledges the frustrations and difficulties that can result from proceeding pro se. Ms. Jameshas demonstrated, however, the ability to navigate the litigation process, file briefs, and form cogent legalarguments in this case. In other words, the record demonstrates that she has been able to effectivelyrepresent herself. There is no right to appointed counsel in a federal civil case, Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d938 (7th Cir. 2018), and here, Ms. James's inability to secure counsel does not support delaying ruling onsummary judgment.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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