Jarvis v. County of Teton Wyoming, No. 25-8034 (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Ryan-Michael Jarvis v. County of Teton Wyoming
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Phillips (Circuit Judge); Eid (Circuit Judge); Federico (Circuit Judge)
RYAN-MICHAEL JARVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. COUNTY..., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1122106Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.RYAN-MICHAEL JARVIS,Plaintiff - Appellant,v.COUNTY OF TETON WYOMING;DISTRICT ATTORNEY ANDREWHARDENBROOK; CORPORAL TRAVISKINSLOW; SERGEANT SETH LEWIS;DEPUTY SARAH KING; CORPORAL ERIKELIZONDO; CORPORAL JUSTIN JENKINS;SHERIFF CODY WRIGHT; SHERIFFANTHONY-SCOTT COOMBES; SHERIFFDOUG RAFFELSON, Defendants - Appellees.No. 25-8034|April 24, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.(D.C. No. 2:24-CV-00245-ABJ) (D. Wyo.)Before PHILLIPS, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.ORDER AND JUDGMENT*Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge*1 After a dispute at a music festival, pro se appellantRyan-Michael Jarvis was arrested and detained overnight bythe Teton County Sheriff's Department. The county citedhim with two misdemeanor charges. His case was eventuallydismissed. Thereafter, he sued the County of Teton Wyoming,District Attorney Andrew Hardenbrook, and several TetonCounty Sheriff's Department officers alleging various claimsunder federal law. The district court dismissed the complaintunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Exercisingjurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirmI. BackgroundMr. Jarvis attended a music festival in Teton County,Wyoming. Teton County Sheriff's Department officersSergeant Seth Lewis, Deputy Sarah King, Corporal TravisKinslow, and Corporal Erik Elizondo were on patrol. At somepoint, Sergeant Lewis, Deputy King, and Corporal Kinslowwere called into the venue to investigate a report of a manwith a firearm. The officers arrived, and Mr. Jarvis admittedto having a “brief dispute with a gang of unknown people.” R.at 18. According to the police reports, multiple people statedMr. Jarvis had threatened them. Based on that information, theofficers advised Mr. Jarvis he was being detained and askedhim if he had a gun. Mr. Jarvis said he did not, and OfficerLewis proceeded with a pat-down search and escorted Mr.Jarvis out of the concert.The remaining officers then took additional witnessstatements that included reports that Mr. Jarvis wouldn't leavea woman's friends alone, he grabbed and put his hands onwomen, he threatened he had a gun, and he was generallybeing aggressive. While Mr. Jarvis was detained outside thevenue, Corporal Elizondo searched him again and removedMr. Jarvis's wallet, keys, glasses, and other personal items.The officers then discussed the situation and decided to arrestMr. Jarvis. Mr. Jarvis asked on what grounds, and CorporalElizondo told him: “They will tell you when you get there.”R. at 46.Mr. Jarvis arrived at the Teton County Jail around 9:00 p.m.and asked why he was being detained. Sherriff Anthony-ScottCoombes responded that he would produce warrants soon andconducted a third search of Mr. Jarvis. Following the search,Mr. Jarvis had to remove and relinquish everything but hispants and undergarments. Mr. Jarvis was released the next dayat noon after he paid his bail in the amount of $769.13. Uponhis release, Mr. Jarvis received citations and an affidavit insupport of a warrantless arrest.District Attorney Hardenbrook proceeded with prosecutingMr. Jarvis. He extended a plea offer, but Mr. Jarvis refused it.Mr. Hardenbrook eventually moved the state court to dismissthe case. At some point, Mr. Jarvis was refunded $750.00 ofthe bail he had paid.
RYAN-MICHAEL JARVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. COUNTY..., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Mr. Jarvis then commenced the underlying action againstTeton County, District Attorney Hardenbrook, and thefollowing Teton County Sheriff's Department officers:Corporal Kinslow, Sergeant Lewis, Deputy King, CorporalElizondo, Sheriff Justin Jenkins, Sheriff Cody Wright, SheriffCoombes, and Sheriff Doug Raffelson (together, the OfficerDefendants). Mr. Jarvis alleged various constitutional claimsunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil rights conspiracy claim under42 U.S.C. § 1985, conspiracy and racketeering claims under18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and criminal violations under 18U.S.C. §§ 241-242 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The defendants filedtwo motions to dismiss, one to dismiss the official capacityclaims against all defendants and the individual capacityclaims against Mr. Hardenbrook, and the second to dismissthe individual capacity claims against the Officer Defendants.*2 The district court dismissed with prejudice the criminalclaims asserted against all the defendants under 18 U.S.C. §§241-242 and § 1001, concluding any amendment as to thoseclaims would be futile. The district court dismissed withoutprejudice the official capacity and individual capacity claimsasserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and 18 U.S.C.§§ 1961-1968. The district court also entered a separate orderstating the claims dismissed without prejudice would convertinto a dismissal with prejudice if Mr. Jarvis did not amend thecomplaint within thirty days (the Order to Amend).II. JurisdictionIn the Order to Amend, the district court stated: “If [Mr.Jarvis] chooses not to [amend his Complaint], our dismissalshall convert to a dismissal with prejudice and a finaljudgment will be entered.” R. at 317. Rather than amend thecomplaint, Mr. Jarvis appealed. After the thirty-day period,the district court never entered a final judgment. This leftsome ambiguity in whether the order was final and appealableunder our case law, so the Clerk's Office entered an order toshow cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed forlack of jurisdiction. Mr. Jarvis timely responded.“In evaluating finality, ... we look to the substance andobjective intent of the district court's order, not just itsterminology.” Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 449(10th Cir. 2006). “In cases where the district court orderis ambiguous, our approach is to determine as best wecan whether the district court's order evidences an intentto extinguish the plaintiff's cause of action, and whetherthe plaintiff has been effectively excluded from federalcourt under the present circumstances.” Id. at 450 (brackets,citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). “If so, thenour appellate jurisdiction is proper.” Id.Here, the district court gave Mr. Jarvis leave to amend. UnderMoya, if Mr. Jarvis didn't want to amend his complaint, hewas supposed to “notify the district court of his ... decisionto stand on the original complaint and, once a final order orjudgment [was] entered, appeal the grounds for dismissal.”Id. at 451 n.9. At bottom, though, our analysis “look[s] tothe language of the district court's order, the legal basis ofthe district court's decision, and the circumstances attendingdismissal to determine the district court's intent in issuing itsorder—dismissal of the complaint alone or actual dismissal ofplaintiff's entire action.” Id. at 451 (internal quotation marksomitted).Even though Mr. Jarvis may have been premature in filing thenotice of appeal, it is now ripe for review. See In re SyngentaAG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th 1126, 1174 (10th Cir. 2023)(concluding that premature notice of appeal may ripen upondistrict court's adjudication of all remaining claims); see alsoFed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2) (“A notice of appeal filed after thecourt announces a decision or order--but before the entry ofthe judgment or order--is treated as filed on the date of andafter the entry.”). Although the district court never issued aseparate final judgment, we are convinced of our jurisdictionbecause the language in the Order to Amend shows that if Mr.Jarvis chose not to amend the complaint, the district court'sobjective intent was to dismiss the claims with prejudice. SeeIn re Syngenta, 61 F.4th at 1175 (“[R]ipening occurs so long asthe prematurely appealed order bears some indicia of finalityand is likely to remain unchanged during subsequent courtproceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).III. Discussion*3 Mr. Jarvis challenges the district court's orders dismissinghis claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 We review de novo the district court's dismissal underRule 12(b)(6). McNellis v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 116F.4th 1122, 1130 (10th Cir. 2024). We “must take as trueall well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusoryallegations, [and] view all reasonable inferences in favorof the nonmoving party,” but “a complaint cannot rely onlabels or conclusory allegations—a formulaic recitation of theelements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 1130-31(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead,“[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must containsufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
RYAN-MICHAEL JARVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. COUNTY..., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claimhas facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual contentthat allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that thedefendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.Mr. Jarvis only challenges the district court's rulings on the§ 1983 official capacity claims and the § 1983 individualcapacity claims against District Attorney Hardenbrook andthe Officer Defendants. He has therefore waived anychallenge to the remaining claims. See Sawyers v. Norton,962 F.3d 1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Issues not raised inthe opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived.” (internalquotation marks omitted)).A. Official Capacity Claims under § 1983“[A] [§ 1983] suit against a state official in his or herofficial capacity is not a suit against the official but ratheris a suit against the official's office.” Will v. Mich. Dep't ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Such a suit allows aplaintiff to sue a local official's office for a constitutionalviolation stemming from the governing body's policies. SeeMonell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Toplausibly allege a Monell claim, Mr. Jarvis had to “allege factsshowing (1) an official policy or custom, (2) causation, and(3) deliberate indifference.” Lucas v. Turn Key Health Clinics,LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1145 (10th Cir. 2023). A municipal policyor custom may take one of the following forms:(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informalcustom amounting to a widespread practice that, althoughnot authorized by written law or express municipal policy,is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom orusage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employeeswith final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification bysuch final policymakers of the decisions—and the basis forthem—of subordinates to whom authority was delegatedsubject to these policymakers’ review and approval; or (5)the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, solong as that failure results from deliberate indifference tothe injuries that may be caused.Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).Mr. Jarvis appears to argue that the Teton County Sheriff'sDepartment and the District Attorney's Office engaged inconduct to delay trial, failed to disclose relevant evidence,wrongfully detained him without prompt judicial review, andcharged him without probable cause. He asserts this conductis reflective of a systemic failure in training, supervision, andaccountability. Simply put, he argues that this case shows “apattern of neglect and tolerance for constitutional violations.”Aplt. Opening Br. at 67.*4 Despite his numerous filings and the breadth ofallegations Mr. Jarvis raised in the district court, he did notallege facts to show what the policy or custom might be or, ifthere was one, that it was a widespread practice within TetonCounty.2 Mr. Jarvis's failure to show that a Teton Countypolicy or custom caused the constitutional violations is fatalto this claim.B. Individual Capacity Claims under § 1983Like the district court, we address the individual capacityclaims against Mr. Hardenbrook and the Officer Defendantsseparately.i. Mr. HardenbrookMr. Jarvis alleged a malicious prosecution claim and a SixthAmendment claim against Mr. Hardenbrook for both damagesand injunctive relief. Mr. Jarvis argues Mr. Hardenbrook'sdecision to proceed with the prosecution despite no probablecause supporting his arrest was evidence of maliciousprosecution. Mr. Jarvis also cites Mr. Hardenbrook's motionto continue the trial and his plea deal offer as additionalevidence of malicious prosecution. He argues that arrestingand charging someone without probable cause or evidence isconduct like that of an investigator and therefore prosecutorialimmunity does not apply. For the Sixth Amendment claim,Mr. Jarvis contends Mr. Hardenbrook took deliberate actionsto delay the trial and to deny his ability to confront witnesses.The district court determined absolute prosecutorialimmunity barred the claims against Mr. Hardenbrook fordamages because his actions were associated with thejudicial process. See Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929F.2d 1484, 1489 (10th Cir. 1991) (“It is well establishedthat prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit undersection 1983 concerning activities intimately associatedwith the judicial process, such as initiating and pursuingcriminal prosecutions.” (ellipsis and internal quotation marksomitted)). The district court also determined the claims forinjunctive relief failed because Mr. Jarvis did not plead factssufficient to support either claim. After reviewing the briefs,record, and relevant law, we discern no error in the districtcourt's reasoning. So, we affirm for substantially the same
RYAN-MICHAEL JARVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. COUNTY..., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4reasons discussed in the district court's thorough and well-reasoned June 10, 2025 order granting the motion to dismissthe individual capacity claims against Mr. Hardenbrook. SeeR. at 273-88.ii. Officer DefendantsMr. Jarvis raises several issues challenging the district court'sruling on the individual capacity claims against the OfficerDefendants. Two issues involve new claims: (1) a Franksv. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) violation claim and (2)a First Amendment retaliation claim. Because he did notpresent these issues to the district court and does not arguefor plain error review now, we deem them waived and declineto consider them. See United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192,1196 (10th Cir. 2019) (“When an appellant fails to preservean issue and also fails to make a plain-error argument onappeal, we ordinarily deem the issue waived (rather thanmerely forfeited) and decline to review the issue at all—forplain error or otherwise.”).*5 Mr. Jarvis's remaining issues challenge the districtcourt's determinations regarding his (1) Fourth Amendmentunlawful seizure, false arrest, and malicious prosecutionclaims, asserting there was no probable cause to supportthe seizure, arrest, and prosecution;3 (2) Fifth and SixthAmendment claims, asserting he plausibly alleged thembecause he was arrested without a warrant, a clear explanationof the charges against him, or the ability to confront witnesses;and (3) Eighth Amendment excessive bail claim asserting theOfficer Defendants prolonged his detention without probablecause.4 Mr. Jarvis also takes issue with the district court'sapplication of qualified immunity to the individual capacityclaims.The district court determined the Officer Defendants hadprobable cause to arrest Mr. Jarvis and that qualifiedimmunity applied because Mr. Jarvis did not plead factssufficient to make out a constitutional violation. See VDAREFound. v. City of Colo. Springs, 11 F.4th 1151, 1175 (10th Cir.2021) (“In resolving a motion to dismiss based on qualifiedimmunity, the court considers (1) whether the facts that aplaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutionalright, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly establishedat the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct.” (internalquotation marks omitted)). Despite the breadth of Mr. Jarvis'sarguments, after reviewing the record, briefs, and relevantlaw, we find no error in the district court's reasoning. So, weaffirm for substantially the same reasons articulated by thedistrict court in its thorough and well-reasoned June 17, 2025order granting the motion to dismiss the individual capacityclaims against the Officer Defendants. See R. at 289-316.IV. Conclusion*6 We affirm the district court judgment.Entered for the CourtAll CitationsNot Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2026 WL 1122106Footnotes*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would notmaterially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case istherefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under thedoctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive valueconsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.1Because Mr. Jarvis proceeds pro se, his filings “are ... construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formalpleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (internalquotation marks omitted). However, the court will not act as his advocate or “take on the responsibility of serving as [his]attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Id.2In the Opening Brief, Mr. Jarvis presents anecdotal evidence of others who had experiences similar to his. But thatevidence is not in the record. Accordingly, we decline to consider it. See Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641,648 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We generally limit our review on appeal to the record that was before the district court when itmade its decision.”).
RYAN-MICHAEL JARVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. COUNTY..., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.53Mr. Jarvis contends that the unsworn witness testimony the Officer Defendants collected was insufficient to supportprobable cause. In support, he includes a quote purportedly from Spinelli v United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969)abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): “The mere assertion of a complaint ... without corroboration orpersonal knowledge of a crime, fails to establish probable cause.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 21 (alteration in original) (internalquotation marks omitted). But we cannot find this quote (or any similar proposition) in Spinelli. Nor does the quotationappear in any other federal or state case. We therefore suspect that Mr. Jarvis's quotation is a fabrication generatedby his use of a generative artificial intelligence (AI) tool. Cf. Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489, 497 (D. Wyo.2025) (“It is ... well-known in the legal community that AI resources generate fake cases.”). Such fabrications are oftenreferred to as “AI [h]allucination[s],” which happen “where an AI large language model generates an output that is fictional,inaccurate, or nonsensical.” Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 164 F.4th 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2026). We must, ofcourse, disregard Mr. Jarvis's reliance on this quotation. Although we decline to sanction Mr. Jarvis for this fabrication, wewarn him—and all litigants appearing before this court, whether pro se or represented by counsel—of the responsibilityto ensure that quotations actually appear in the cases to which they are attributed and cited cases arguably stand for thepropositions for which they are cited. See 10th Cir. R. 46.5(B)(2).4Mr. Jarvis claims that in Meechaicum v. Fountain, 696 F.2d 790, 791 (10th Cir. 1983) this court “held that a pretrialdetainee may raise an Eighth Amendment claim where false or misleading information prolongs detention.” Aplt. Opening.Br. at 40. But this holding is not found in Meechaicum. Again, we suspect that Mr. Jarvis's citation was a fabricationgenerated by his use of an AI tool. Cf. Wadsworth, 348 F.R.D. at 497; Jones, 164 F.4th at 969.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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