absurd applications — a conventional office of statutory interpretation, even under “plain language” approaches, e.g.,
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69-70, 115 S.Ct. 464, 467-68, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994);
Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2566-67, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989);
United States v. Thomas, 77 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir.1996) (per curiam) — first to identify the prototype situation to which the statute is addressed. That need not be the most common case to which it is applied; the prototype may be effectively deterred because its legal status is clear. The second step is to determine how close to the prototype the ease before the court is — how close, in other words, the family resemblance is between the prototypical ease and the case at hand. Cf.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 1173, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993). The prototypical RICO case is one in which a person bent on criminal activity seizes control of a previously legitimate firm and uses the firm’s resources, contacts, facilities, and appearance of legitimacy to perpetrate more, and less easily discovered, criminal acts than he could do in his own person, that is, without channeling his criminal activities through the enterprise that he has taken over.
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2532-33, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981);
Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.1982);
United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1176-77 (2d Cir.1995).
A step away from the prototypical case is one in which the criminal uses the acquired enterprise to engage in some criminal activities but for the most part is content to allow it to continue to conduct its normal, lawful business — and many of the employees of the business may be unaware that it is controlled and being used by a criminal. E.g.,
United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 398, 407 (7th Cir.1993). In the next step beyond that, and now coming as close to this ease as any ease has yet done, the criminal seizes control of a subsidiary of a corporation and perverts the subsidiary into a criminal enterprise that manages in turn to wrest sufficient control or influence over the parent corporation to use it to commit criminal acts; and the issue is whether the subsidiary can be deemed the RICO “person.” Our decision in
Haroco allowed the subsidiary to be deemed the RICO “person” conducting the affairs of its parent through a pattern of racketeering activity, without requiring, as in our hypothetical case, that the subsidiary participate in the
control of the parent. See also
Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 730 (2d Cir.1987). But that requirement was later imposed by the Supreme Court,
Reves v. Ernst & Young, supra, 507 U.S. at 179, 113 S.Ct. at 1170, limiting
Haroco.What we cannot imagine, and what we do not find any support for in appellate case law, is applying RICO to a free-standing corporation such as Chrysler merely because Chrysler does business through agents, as virtually every manufacturer does. If Chrysler were even larger than it is and as a result had no agents, but only employees (it might own all its dealerships), it could not be made liable for warranty fraud under RICO. What possible difference, from the standpoint of preventing the type of abuse for which RICO was designed, can it make that Chrysler sells its products to the consumer through franchised dealers rather than through dealerships that it owns, or finances the purchases of its motor vehicles through trusts, or sells abroad through subsidiaries? We have never heard it suggested that RICO was intended to encourage vertical integration, yet that is the only effect that we can imagine flowing from a reversal of the district court’s judgment.
In the prototypical case with which we began, it is easy to see how the defendant gains additional power to do evil by taking over a seemingly legitimate enterprise. How, though, was Chrysler empowered to perpetrate warranty fraud by selling through dealers rather than directly to the public? The warranty was issued by Chrysler, not by the dealers, and certainly not by the other members of the Chrysler “family.” The dealers were merely a conduit, and the trusts and foreign subsidiaries were not even that. The dealers did not, by their incidental role in the alleged fraud (the other members of the “family,” other than Chrysler itself, had no role), lend an air of legitimacy to a person