Johnson v. Florida Dep't of Juvenile Justice, No. 8:24-CV-02195-WFJ-NHA (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Johnson v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice et al
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
Jung (Justice)
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 472321Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, M.D. Florida.QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff,v.DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANDREWCORREA, MATTHEW CLARK, and ROSA ARDITO,PAUL SHEFFER and SEAN SKILLERN, Defendants.Case No. 8:24-CV-02195-WFJ-NHA|02/19/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsQuintaurus L. Johnson, Lakeland, FL, Pro Se.Thomas Robert Thompson, Mallory Bennett Brown,Thompson, Crawford, Brown & Smiley, P.A., Tallahassee,FL, for Defendants.WILLIAM F. JUNG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGEORDER*1 Before the Court are Defendants Florida Department ofJuvenile Justice (“DJJ”) and Andrew Correa, Matthew Clark,Rosa Ardito, Paul Sheffer, and Sean Skillern's (jointly, the“Individual Defendants”) motions for summary judgment.Dkts. 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 115. Plaintiff Quintaurus L.Johnson, proceeding pro se, has filed responses in opposition,Dkts. 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 159, 161, and Defendants havereplied. Dkts. 152, 153, 154, 155, 156. Relevant evidencehas been provided by both parties. Dkts. 104, 113, 151. Aftercareful consideration, the Court grants Defendants’ motionsfor summary judgment.BACKGROUNDI. Factual HistoryIn 2015, Plaintiff was hired by DJJ as a juvenile probationofficer (“JPO”) and remains employed in this same position.Dkt. 104-1 at 10:2–13. According to Plaintiff, the position'sresponsibilities include monitoring and supervising youthsentenced to probation, with duties performed both in theoffice and in the field. Dkt. 104-1 at 16:11–12, 17:6–8.On May 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed a charge with the EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) againstDJJ, alleging sex discrimination, naming his then supervisorand Chief, who are not parties to the present litigation. Dkt.104-7.From September 2021 until November 2022, DefendantArdito held the position of Juvenile Probation OfficerSupervisor (“JPOS”) for Plaintiff's team. Dkt. 108-1 1. Inthat capacity, she directly supervised Plaintiff's team. Id.On January 20, 2022, Plaintiff received a counseling memofrom Defendant Ardito. Dkt. 113-2. This memo was promptedby an incident in which a youth assigned to Plaintiff wasinvolved in the murder of another individual. Dkt. 104-1 at45:19–21, 50:7–24. Plaintiff's case notes for this youth wereconsequently audited and reportedly found to be deficient.Dkt. 104-2 3. Specifically, it was found that Plaintiff did notadhere to DJJ policy by failing to timely refer this youth tocertain services and by missing a monthly face-to-face contactwith the youth. Dkt. 113. Plaintiff claims that this counselingmemo constituted “baseless disciplinary action.” Dkt. 36 18.An EEOC investigator later found that there was “no evidencegathered” to show that this counseling memo was “based onretaliation.” Dkt. 36-1 at 4–5.On June 3, 2022, Plaintiff made a complaint to HRregarding “the administration and [his] supervisor” at thetime, Defendant Ardito. Id. at 17. No details are on the recordregarding the subject of this complaint.On April 20, 2022, Plaintiff documented in his case notesthat he conducted a home visit for a youth assigned to him.Dkt. 104-8 at 1. On April 25, 2022, the youth's mothercalled Defendant Ardito to report that their video surveillanceon April 20 showed that Plaintiff did not attempt a homevisit at any point. Id. Defendant Ardito made a report tothe DJJ's Central Communications Center (“CCC”) hotline
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2regarding this reported discrepancy and apparent falsification.Id. (this report stated, “[Defendant Ardito] was contacted bythe mother of [the youth], and alleged that [Plaintiff] did notconduct a home visit on 4/20/22. According to the mother, shereviewed her home video surveillance and it does not show[Plaintiff] coming by the residence on that documented date.[Plaintiff] documented in the case notes that a home visit wasconducted on 4/20/22.”).*2 Once the report was made, Defendant Ardito was notinvolved in the ensuing investigation. See id. (showingDefendant Ardito's involvement limited to her being the“Reporting Person”); see also Dkt. 104-2 4. Plaintiff claimsthat Defendant Ardito initiated this CCC report against him“without justification, triggering unwarranted scrutiny,” Dkt.36 13, and that she “ignore[ed] evidence provided byPlaintiff on May 9, 2022,” Dkt. 146-1 6, which consistedof an email to Defendant Ardito where Plaintiff claims thatthe youth's mother initially filed this report as “retaliation for[Plaintiff] reporting her to DCF.” Dkt 151-2 at 19.On May 3, 2022, Defendant Ardito provided Plaintiff witha notice regarding the complaint and ongoing investigation,advising him that the investigation did not imply that hewas guilty of wrongdoing. Dkt. 113-3. Plaintiff refused tosign this notice. Id. at 2. An EEOC investigator later foundthat there was “no evidence gathered” to show that thisnotice was “based on retaliation”; instead, its purpose wasmerely to “inform [Plaintiff] of the complaint received.”Dkt. 36-1. Ultimately, the investigation ended with nofurther action being taken because “there was not enoughevidence to support or refute the mother's allegations,” as the“surveillance video she reportedly viewed to make her claim[was] no longer available.” Dkt. 104-8 at 2.Shortly after Plaintiff was advised of the investigation, heapproached Defendant Ardito's office and stated that hewould take action if she reported him to the CCC again.Dkt. 104-2 5 (Defendant Ardito claims that Plaintiff saidthat if she reported him again “there was going to be aproblem”); Dkt. 151-2 at 10 (Plaintiff claims that he saidthe “next time you report me I am going to report youand administration to Tallahassee”). Defendant Ardito feltthreatened by Plaintiff, so she reported the incident to hersupervisor and to the CCC, but no action was taken becausePlaintiff's statement lacked specificity. Dkt. 104-2 5; Dkt.146-1 8 (“The CCC...determined the June 2, 2022, incidentwas ‘non-reportable’ because it lacked a specific threat.”).Defendant's supervisor eventually provided Plaintiff with anEmployee Assistance Program (“EAP”) referral due to thisincident. Dkt. 104-2 5. Plaintiff claims that DefendantArdito “fabricated claims of hostility to justify [the] EAPreferral.” Dkt. 36 14.On June 16, 2022, Plaintiff acknowledged the receipt of aperformance evaluation drafted by Defendant Ardito. Dkt.104-9 at 6. Defendant Ardito scored Plaintiff's performanceas 3.25 out of 5, indicating “satisfactory” performance, andprovided areas for improvement. Id. (“There have beensome client complaints that he can be hard to get intouch with and some requests to be switched to anotherJPO due to this. [Plaintiff] could improve his customerservice skills by returning phone calls in a timely manner.”).Plaintiff challenged this evaluation, but it was eventuallyreviewed and approved both by Defendant Ardito's supervisorand the second-level supervisor. Dkt. 104-2 6. Plaintiffclaims that this evaluation constituted a “retaliatory negativeperformance review..., filled with inaccuracies, deliberatelyaimed at discrediting the Plaintiff's work.” Dkt. 36 128.Plaintiff has compared this performance evaluation withone received on June 22, 2021, which scored Plaintiff'sperformance as 4.50 out of 5, indicating “outstanding”performance. Dkt. 151-2 at 27–30. An EEOC investigatorlater found that “there was no evidence gathered to showthat [the] lower performance plan appraisal...[was] based onretaliation,” and that “it is not unusual for ratings to increaseor decrease each performance year.” Dkt. 36-1.*3 On August 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed an additional chargewith the EEOC, alleging retaliation by certain DJJ employeesfor his filing of the previous charge of harassment. Dkt.104-10. This is the EEOC charge that gave rise to thepresent case. See Dkt. 36 19 (“The EEOC completedits investigation in May 2024 and issued a Right-to-Sueletter soon after, enabling the Plaintiff to pursue his claimsin court.”) The entirety of Plaintiff's 2022 charge reads asfollows:I began employment with theDepartment of Juvenile Justice on July21, 2015, as a Juvenile ProbationOfficer. I continue to be harassed sincefiling a previous charge. I believeI am being “pushed out” by mynew supervisor and management dueto action being taken against me,for having a current lawsuit and
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3for making complaints of harassmentsince filing with the EEOC. On my2021 Annual Performance AppraisalI scored a 4.2 [sic] (Outstanding),however my most recent PerformanceAppraisal in June 2022, I receiveda score of 3.2 [sic] (Average) bySupervisor Rosa Ardito. I haverecently received 2 counseling's andhave had 5 meetings with managementand union regarding accusations ofallegedly falsifying reports, failure tomake contact, and not always being atwork, which I denied. I was accusedof having “a rough couple of years”and that I may need therapy. I believeI am being targeted for terminationand nothing is being done to resolvethe issues. I believe I have beenretaliated against for complaining ofthe continued harassment and filinga previous charge with the EEOC inviolation of Title VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964, as amended.Dkt. 104-10.From March 2023 until October 2024, Defendant Correa heldthe position of Assistant Chief Probation Officer. Dkt. 104-3 1. In this capacity, he served as a supervisor over Plaintiff'steam. Id.In March 2023, Plaintiff applied for the position of AssistantChief Probation Officer. Dkt. 115-1 53. The only applicantsconsidered were those with DJJ supervisory experience,which excluded Plaintiff, who had none. Id.; Dkt. 113-1 at3. Plaintiff also applied for the position of Chief ProbationOfficer. Dkt. 115-1 54. The only applicants considered werethose with at least three years of supervisory experience,which similarly excluded Plaintiff. Id.; Dkt. 113-1 at 3.Plaintiff therefore did not receive either the Assistant Chief orthe Chief Probation Officer position. Dkt. 115-1 ¶¶ 53–54.In June 2023, while serving as Assistant Chief ProbationOfficer, Defendant Correa was a member of an interviewboard for the position of Operations Coordinator, a positionPlaintiff applied for. Dkt. 104-3 4; Dkt. 113-1 at 2.After interviewing Plaintiff for the position along with otherqualified applicants, the interview board selected an applicantother than Plaintiff who Defendants claim “scored higher andperformed better in the interview than all other interviewees.”Dkt. 104-3 4; see Dkt. 113-1 at 2; see also Dkts. 113-5, 113-6(showing the resumes for Plaintiff and the selected applicant).However, internal documents show that the selected applicantand Plaintiff both received the same score—25.00, Dkt. 151-6at 3, and that Plaintiff had a veteran's preference applied tohis application. Id. at 6.From March 2024 until January 2025, Defendant Clark heldthe position of Juvenile Probation Officer Supervisor forPlaintiff's team. Dkt. 104-4 1. In that capacity, he directlysupervised Plaintiff's team. Id. On March 27, 2024, Plaintiffmade a complaint to Defendant Correa regarding DefendantClark, alleging micromanagement and harassment. Dkt. 36-1at 18–19.*4 On May 10, 2024, the EEOC generated a right to sueletter for Plaintiff's 2022 EEOC Charge. Dkt. 104-11. Actingupon this letter, Plaintiff began litigating the present caseon August 5, 2024. Dkt. 1-1. Proceeding without counsel,Plaintiff sued DJJ and certain employees in Florida statecourt. Id. at 1–22. On September 17, 2024, this case was thenremoved to federal court. Dkt. 1.At some point during his supervision of Plaintiff, DefendantClark had issues with Plaintiff's job performance, whichClark discussed with him. Dkt. 104-4 2. For example,Defendant Clark reported that the family of a youth assignedto Plaintiff complained they were not being properly visited inaccordance with DJJ policies. Id. 3. According to DefendantClark, the family disputed Plaintiff's case notes that reflectedproper visitation. Id. When Defendant Clark met with Plaintiffto discuss this issue, Plaintiff walked out of the meetingand refused to return. Id. Later, Defendant Clark reportedlydiscovered discrepancies in Plaintiff's timesheet. Id. 4.When Plaintiff met with DJJ management about the matter, heagain walked out of the meeting. Id. Plaintiff asserts that theallegations of improper visitation and timesheet discrepancieswere “baseless claims used to intimidate him.” Dkt. 145-1 ¶¶4–5.On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint with HR regardingDefendant Clark, alleging micromanagement, harassment,and falsification. Dkt. 36-1 at 15– 16; Dkt. 151-1 at12–13. Also in June 2024, Defendant Correa attended ameeting where a discrepancy with Plaintiff's time sheetsubmissions was discussed with Plaintiff and his direct
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4supervisor, Defendant Clark. Dkt. 104-3 3 (listing thedate of this meeting as April or May 2024); Dkt. 151-1at 16–17 (listing the date of this meeting as June 2024and recounting Plaintiff's contemporaneous recollection).Plaintiff's timesheet allegedly did not match his documentedcase notes and he was told that working extra time that isnot documented could be perceived as falsification and thathis time worked needed to be reflected on his timesheet. Dkt.104-3 3; Dkt. 151-1 at 16–17 (“If you're working extra,that needs to be reflected ...even if we owe you money.”).Plaintiff claims that such allegations regarding his timesheetwere “fabricated.” See, e.g., Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 25, 79, 99, 107.In mid-2024, Defendant Clark drafted a performanceevaluation for Plaintiff. Dkt. 104-4 5. Defendant Clarkinitially scored Plaintiff's performance as 1 out of 5. See id.(“Based upon my experience supervising [Plaintiff], I wantedto score him under a three (out of five)[.]”); Dkt. 151-1 at23 (describing the initial performance evaluation as ratingPlaintiff with “all 1's”). After Plaintiff complained about thescore, Dkt. 104-1 at 41:12–42:5, Defendant Clark learned thathe could not maintain the initial rating because the prior year'sevaluation lacked objective performance goals against whichPlaintiff's current performance could be assessed. Dkt. 104-4 5. Therefore, Defendant Clark ultimately scored Plaintiff'sperformance as 3 out of 5, or “meeting expectations.” See id.;Dkt. 104-1 at 41:12–42:5.On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff made a complaint to HRregarding Defendant Clark, alleging an unfair performanceevaluation. Dkt. 36-1 at 20. On September 30, 2024, Plaintiffmade a complaint to HR regarding Defendant Clark, allegingunwarranted criticism, baseless accusations, and a toxic workenvironment. Id. at 12–13; Dkt. 151-1 at 34–35. HR foundthat the allegations were “not based on a protected class asdefined by applicable civil rights laws.” Dkt. 36-1 at 11; Dkt.151-1 at 35.*5 From October 2024, Defendant Sheffer has served as theacting Chief over Plaintiff's team, in addition to his position asChief Probation Officer. Dkt. 104-6 1. He remains employedin this position. Id. In this capacity, he directly supervisesPlaintiff's team. Id.On October 9, 2024, while Defendant Sheffer was actingBureau Chief, Hurricane Milton damaged certain DJJ offices,and employees, including Plaintiff, were moved to temporaryremote status while an alternative office location wassecured. Id. 2; Dkt. 104-13 at 1. On November 20,2024, Plaintiff voiced concerns to Defendant Sheffer byemail about overcrowding and safety violations, sanitationand hygiene deficiencies, and inadequate ventilation andwater damage concerns. Dkt. 104-13 at 1; Dkt. 151-1at 8–9. On December 5, 2024, Plaintiff emailed furtherconcerns regarding mold and COVID-19 exposure, Dkt.104-13 at 1–2, on December 6, 2024, Plaintiff reiteratedsimilar health-related concerns, Dkt. 151-1 at 10, and onDecember 18, 2024, Plaintiff further mentioned a lack oforganization, ineffective communication, micromanagement,distrust, unfair workloads, and unprofessional behavior. Dkt.104-13 at 2.In December 2024, Plaintiff submitted an ADAaccommodation request, which was temporarily grantedduring its consideration. Dkt. 104-6 2. On January 16, 2025,Defendant Sheffer provided Plaintiff with notice that histeleworking accommodations were revoked because furtheraccommodations would be “unduly extensive, substantial ordisruptive, or fundamentally alter the nature or operationof DJJ business.” Dkt. 104-12 (quoting EEOC guidancedocument on ADA implementation). The notice stated thatDJJ was “unable to accommodate [Plaintiff's] request at thistime due to there being no legitimate concerns which have notbeen addressed.” Id. Plaintiff claims that this revocation was“clearly retaliatory in nature.” Dkt. 36 115.On the same day, Defendant Sheffer responded in writingto Plaintiff to further address his concerns and explainthe revocation of his accommodations. Dkt. 104-13 at1–3. Defendant Sheffer stated that the workplace wasassessed and regularly cleaned, all relevant regulations werefollowed, and that all workplace concerns had been promptlyaddressed. Id. Regarding Plaintiff's allegations of unfairworkloads, Defendant Sheffer reported to Plaintiff that thecase assignments for Plaintiff's team appeared reasonablybalanced—Plaintiff landed approximately in the middle ofthe distribution with 14 new assignments, while other teammembers had 10, 12, and 15 new assignments. Id. at 2; seeDkt. 104-15 at 3.On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a health-relatedcomplaint regarding workplace conditions to the FloridaDepartment of Health. Dkt. 151-5 at 25–26. On February5, 2025, Plaintiff authored an internal complaint againstDefendant Sheffer. Dkt. 104-1 at 62:10–14. No evidence is onthe record regarding the details of this internal memo.1
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5*6 On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Charge ofDiscrimination with the Florida Commission on HumanRelations (“FCHR”), alleging color discrimination, disabilitydiscrimination, and retaliation at the new office location byboth Defendants Clark and Sheffer. Dkt. 104-14. Plaintiff didnot check the box for race discrimination. Id. Specificallyregarding retaliation, he alleged excessive case assignmentsand being forced to return to the workplace. Id. The FCHRprovided Plaintiff with a determination of no reasonable causeon August 4, 2025. Dkt. 104-16.On March 5 and March 12, 2025, Plaintiff made furthercomplaints to Defendant Sheffer about unfair workloads,workplace concerns, and retaliation. Dkt. 104-15. DefendantSheffer responded on March 18, 2025, by again explainingthat all concerns had been addressed. Id. at 2–3. DefendantSheffer further analyzed Plaintiff's workload as of March 18,2025, finding that Plaintiff was assigned 13 new assignments,while other team members had 11 and 14; furthermore, itwas found that Plaintiff had a total of 45 probation casesassigned to him, while other team members had 47 and 50probation cases assigned to them. Dkt. 104-15. Plaintiff'sworkload again appeared to land in the middle of thedistribution. Plaintiff maintains that he was subjected to“increased workloads” as retaliation for protected expression.See, e.g., Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 37, 41, 66, 69, 71, 81.On March 27, 2025, Plaintiff received an oral reprimand fromhis supervisor at the time, which alleged that he violatedcertain standards related to poor performance, negligence,inefficiency or inability to perform duties, insubordination,and violation of law or agency rules. Dkt. 151-5 at 38.Specifically, it was claimed that Plaintiff failed to completenumerous overdue assignments provided to him. See id. at38–39 (listing 18 different cases where Plaintiff failed tocomplete required assignments). Plaintiff failed to requestassistance when it was offered, and instead appears to havethreatened disciplinary action. See id. at 36–37 (“This is mylast warning before I escalate this issue to headquarters....Ifyou don't want to be in the mix I suggest you refrain fromappearing to single me out.”).Due to these assignments not being completed in thenecessary timeframe, Plaintiff was provided with theoral reprimand in “an effort to correct the...unacceptablebehavior.” Id. at 41. During a meeting to discuss thisreprimand, Plaintiff reportedly walked out of the meetingsaying “we are not doing this,” then returned to tell hissupervisor that she was “going to regret doing this.” Dkt.151-6 at 45. His supervisor felt threatened and made a reportof this behavior. Id. at 31. Lakeland Police later found that“[n]o threat was made,” and that the supervisor “just wantedto notify police.” Id. at 37. Plaintiff refused to sign a noticeof investigation dated April 14, 2025, regarding this incident.Id. at 46.At some point following the oral reprimand, Plaintiffsubmitted a complaint to HR regarding his assignments. Healleged “targeted discipline cloaked in policy, performancemischaracterized to justify punishment, and retaliationdisguised as routine oversight.” Dkt. 151-5 at 33–35.On March 31, 2025, the parent of two youths reportedto DJJ that Plaintiff failed to meet with them in person,and only communicated over the phone. Dkt. 151-6 at 43.Furthermore, the parent expressed concern regarding thedelays in Plaintiff's responses, the failure to provide certaininformation to the youth, and Plaintiff's agitation when theparent requested to speak with his supervisor. Id. Plaintiffrefused to sign a notice of investigation dated April 14, 2025,regarding this incident. Id. at 44.*7 On April 1, 2025, before being appointed to hiscurrent position, Defendant Skillern was brought into ameeting by the current supervisor for Plaintiff's team. Dkt.151-4 at 7. In attendance at the meeting were a youthassigned to Plaintiff and the youth's grandmother. Id. Thegrandmother complained about certain aspects of Plaintiff'sjob performance, including “failure to remove the youth's cellphone as ordered by the court, lack of home visits, refusalto communicate with her regarding [the youth's] progress,failure to speak with guardian when visiting the school, andfailure to hold the youth accountable to the terms of herprobation.” Id.; Dkt. 151-6 at 41. She was given a grievanceform to complete, detailing her complaints in writing. Dkt.151-4 at 7; see Dkt. 104-1 at 105:1–9. Immediately after thismeeting, Plaintiff reportedly “contacted the grandmother of[the youth] and spoke to [her] and accused her of lying,”after which the grandmother requested that Plaintiff no longercontact her. Dkt. 151-6 at 41. Plaintiff claims that DefendantSkillern “induce[d] [the] client's guardian to file a grievanceagainst the Plaintiff—a tactic clearly intended to underminethe Plaintiff's credibility and chill his protected speech.” Dkt.36 110. Plaintiff refused to sign a notice of investigationdated April 14, 2025, regarding this incident. Dkt. 151-6 at 42.From April 4, 2025, Defendant Skillern has held the positionof Juvenile Probation Officer Supervisor. Dkt. 104-5 1; Dkt.
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6151-6 at 18 11. He remains employed in this position. Dkt.104-5 1. In this capacity, he directly supervises Plaintiff'steam. Id.Shortly after being appointed as Juvenile ProbationSupervisor, Defendant Skillern signed off on the revocationof Plaintiff's telework accommodation. Dkt. 110-1 ¶¶ 5–6;Dkt. 104-1 at 108:6–14. This revocation was decided uponby Plaintiff's former supervisor due to the aforementionedoral reprimand received by Plaintiff; Defendant Skillern wasnot involved in the decision. Id. Plaintiff submitted multiplecomplaints to HR objecting to this revocation on April 17and 18, 2025, in which Plaintiff made claims of ADA-relatedretaliation. Dkt. 151-5 at 6–11.On April 20, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a complaint to theFlorida Inspector General. Plaintiff complained that hisseparate DJJ Office of Inspector General whistleblowercomplaint was disclosed in the present litigation. Dkt. 151-6at 11– 12.II. Procedural HistoryPlaintiff has filed four complaints here. Dkts. 20, 21, 35,36. Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint brings the presentclaims. Dkt. 36. Against DJJ are claims of: Retaliation underTitle VII (Count I); Retaliatory Hostile Work Environmentunder Title VII (Count III); Retaliatory Failure to Promoteunder Title VII (Count IV); Preliminary Injunctive Relief(Count V); and Violation of the Florida Whistleblower Act(Count VII). Id. Against the Individual Defendants is a singleclaim of First Amendment Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983(Count II). Id. The Court previously dismissed Count VI. Dkt.24; Dkt. 36 at 34–35 (“[Count VI] was previously dismissedby the Court. It is included herein solely to preserve theprocedural history of the case. Plaintiff does not reassert thisclaim and does not seek relief under this Count in the ThirdAmended Complaint.”). Plaintiff claims that the retaliationhas continued during the pendency of this case. See Dkt. 36 2.The Court's Case Management & Scheduling Order initiallyset the discovery cut-off for June 20, 2025. Dkt. 29. Plaintifffiled a motion to compel discovery on May 24, 2025, Dkt.45, which made June 23, 2025, the response deadline forDefendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) (providing 30 daysto respond). Plaintiff then filed a motion seeking to shortenDefendants’ response deadline so that Plaintiff could have anopportunity to compel further responses before the discoverycut-off. Dkt. 50. This motion was denied by the MagistrateJudge, as it was found to be “Plaintiff's responsibility totimely serve his discovery requests such that responses wouldbe due within the discovery period.” Dkt. 51. However, theMagistrate Judge later granted Plaintiff's motion to extend thediscovery period and thus extended the cut-off to June 24,2025, “for the limited purpose of permitting Defendants torespond to Plaintiff's May 24, 2025, Requests for Admission.”Dkt. 58. The cut-off for “all other discovery and all motionsto compel not related to those requests for admissions [wasto] remain June 20, 2025.” Id.*8 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed multiple ensuingdiscovery-related motions, including further motions tocompel and motions for sanctions, see Dkts. 45, 64, 74,83, 85, 92, 117, 118, 126, 127, which led the Court toissue orders compelling DJJ to properly respond to discoveryrequests. See Dkts. 79, 91, 94, 121, 125, 132. DJJ's failuresconcerned documents without required metadata, incompleteproduction, and inadequate privilege logs. Dkt. 132 at 2–5.At the time summary judgment motions and responses werefiled, the only missing discovery was the metadata associatedwith select emails. Dkt. 125 at 8. On October 28, 2025, theMagistrate Judge determined that DJJ was responsible fornoncompliance and found sanctions warranted, ordering DJJto pay Plaintiff's requested $600 in sanctions, Dkt. 132 at 7,which was timely paid. Dkt. 134. On November 13, 2025,the Magistrate Judge reiterated that the “cut-off for discoveryand all motions to compel...was June 20, 2025.” Dkt. 138. Itwas concluded that the Court had “ruled on all outstandingdiscovery issues,” and that “[n]o further discovery motions ornotices should be filed in this action.” Id.After Defendants filed the present motions, Plaintiff'sinitial responsive filing failed to address to the meritsof Defendants’ motions, did not contest Defendants’accompanying statements of facts, see Dkts. 106-1, 107-1,108-1, 109-1, 110-1, 115-1, and failed to include a separateStatement of Disputed Facts. See Dkt. 119. Plaintiff insteadutilized his response to merely raise further discovery-relatedobjections pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), Dkt. 119, whichwere untimely in light of the resolution of all outstandingdiscovery issues. Dkt. 138. Pursuant to Eleventh Circuitcaselaw noting that courts “should be particularly careful toensure proper notice to a pro se litigant,” Horton v. Gilchrist,128 F.4th 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Smith v. Sch.Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361, 1368 (11th Cir. 2007));see Couch v. Clark, 725 F. App'x 808 (11th Cir. 2018), theCourt notified Plaintiff of his deficient response and allowedhim additional time to file a substantive response to avoid
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7the Court deeming the material facts of Defendants’ motionsas admitted. Dkt. 141. Plaintiff did so, and filed relevantresponses, Dkts. 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 161, andevidence. Dkt. 151.2Plaintiff's response to Defendant DJJ's Motion for SummaryJudgment regarding Count I, III, IV, V, and VII was thenstruck by the Court, Dkt. 158, as it cited to hallucinated cases.See Dkt. 150 at 7, 13, 16 (citing Watson v. Amedisys Holding,LLC, 298 F. App'x 395, 396 (5th Cir. 2008), Martin v. Dep'tof Corrections, 682 So. 2d 331, 333 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), andCampbell v. DCF, 201 So. 3d 164, 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016),which are non-existent). The Court granted Plaintiff leave torefile his response with proper citations, Dkt. 158, and he didso. Dkt. 159.LEGAL STANDARDA district court should grant summary judgment when itdetermines that there are no genuine issues as to any materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as amatter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v.Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material if itmay “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Agenuine dispute means evidence “such that a reasonable jurycould return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.The burden of a moving party “varies depending on whichparty would bear the burden of proof on a disputed issueat trial.” Poer v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, 100 F.4th 1325,1335 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Fitzpatrick v. City of Atl., 2F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993)). “With regard to issueson which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof,the moving party need not support its motion with evidencenegating the opponent's claim.” Cohen v. United Am. Bankof Cent. Fla., 83 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 1996) (citationmodified). Instead, the moving party “has the burden of eithernegating an essential element of the nonmoving party's caseor showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessaryto the nonmoving party's case.” McGee v. Sentinel OffenderServs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013).*9 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a courtmust resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favorof the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398U.S. 144, 157–58 (1970); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms.,372 F.3d 1250, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, although apro se complainant “is entitled to a liberal interpretation” ofhis pleading, he is not excused from meeting the “essentialburden under summary judgment standards of establishingthat there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case.”Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990).DISCUSSIONI. Count I: Retaliation under Title VIIDefendant DJJ seeks summary judgment on Count I, whichalleges “unlawful retaliation against the Plaintiff for hisprotected whistleblowing activities” under Title VII. Dkt. 36 93.Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee “becausehe has opposed any practice made an unlawful employmentpractice under [Title VII], or because he has made a charge,testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in aninvestigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A plaintiff may support a claim ofretaliation by offering either direct or circumstantial evidence.Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir.2004).In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation—as is the casehere—the Court evaluates the claim by using the McDonnellDouglas burden shifting framework. McDonnell DouglasCorp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework,a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation.See Young v. UPS, 575 U.S. 206, 213 (2015). A primafacie retaliation claim under Title VII requires the plaintiffto establish that “(1) he engaged in statutorily protectedexpression...; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action;and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protectedexpression.” Rosado v. Sec'y, Dep't of the Navy, 127 F.4th858, 876 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). If a prima faciecase of retaliation is established, the burden then shifts to thedefendant employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatoryreason for its actions. Berman v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,160 F.3d 697, 702 (11th Cir. 1998).Alternatively, “an employee may always prove a claim ofdiscrimination by presenting sufficient evidence that would‘permit[ ] a reasonable factfinder to find that the employer[discriminated] against the employee,’ ” even if the employeedoes not rely on the McDonnell Douglas burden shiftingframework. Melton v. I-10 Truck Ctr. Inc, No. 23-14175, 2026WL 319183, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (quoting Berry v.
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310–11 (11th Cir.2023)).a. Statutorily Protected ExpressionThe first element of a prima facie retaliation claim under TitleVII is a “statutorily protected expression,” which is definedby 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). See E.E.O.C. v. Total SystemServs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000). Underthis statute, an employer may not discriminate against anemployee because “he has made a charge, testified, assisted,or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,or hearing under [Title VII],” (participation clause), orbecause “he has opposed any practice made an unlawfulemployment practice by [Title VII]” (opposition clause). 42U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); see Total System Servs., 221 F.3dat 1174. The participation clause “protects proceedings andactivities which occur in conjunction with or after the filingof a formal charge with the EEOC,” requiring the plaintiff tohave “participat[ed] in the machinery set up by Title VII toenforce its provisions.” Total System Servs., 221 F.3d at 1174(citation omitted).*10 As an initial matter, the Court recognizes that theMay 28, 2019, EEOC charge, the August 12, 2022, EEOCcharge, and the August 5, 2024, initiation of the presentlitigation, which arose from the 2022 EEOC charge, arecertainly considered “statutorily protected expression” underthe participation clause. See Vincent v. Jefferson Cnty.Bd. of Educ., 152 F.4th 1339, 1353 (11th Cir. 2025)(holding that “protected activity includes...filing formalEEOC complaints”); Total System Servs., 221 F.3d at1174 (“[The participation] clause protects proceedings andactivities which occur in conjunction with or after the filingof a formal charge with the EEOC.”); see also Tolar v.Marion Bank and Tr., Co., 378 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1122 (N.D.Ala. 2019) (citing Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad.Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000)) (“Filing acharge of discrimination with the EEOC or filing a subsequentTitle VII lawsuit constitutes statutorily protected participationactivity.”).Plaintiff describes further acts by him that are alleged tobe “statutorily protected expressions,” which the Court willanalyze under the opposition clause. The opposition clauseprohibits employers from discriminating against an employeebecause the employee opposed an “unlawful employmentpractice” under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). TheCourt finds that, amidst the myriad of complaints made byPlaintiff, most fall outside the purview of Title VII.Plaintiff made complaints on the following dates: June 3,2022, complaint with no details on the record, Dkt. 36-1 at 17;March 27, 2024, complaint alleging micromanagement, id. at18–19; June 6, 2024, complaint alleging micromanagementand falsification; Dkt. 151-1 at 12–13; August 19, 2024,complaint alleging an unfair performance evaluation, Dkt.36-1 at 20; September 30, 2024, complaint regardingunwarranted criticism, baseless accusations, and a toxicwork environment, id. at 12–13; Dkt. 151-1 at 34–35;November 20, 2024, complaint alleging issues with safetyand hygiene in the office, Dkt. 104-13 at 1; Dkt. 151-1 at 8–9; December 5, 2024, complaint alleging issues with moldand COVID-19 in the office, Dkt. 104-13 at 1–2; December6, 2024, complaint regarding health-related concerns, Dkt.151-1 at 10; December 18, 2024, complaint alleging lack oforganization, ineffective communication, micromanagement,and unfair workloads, Dkt. 104-13 at 2; January 23, 2025,complaint to the Florida Department of Health regardinghealth-related concerns, Dkt. 151-5 at 25–26; February 5,2025, complaint with no details on the record, Dkt. 104-1 at62:10–14; March 5 and 12, 2025, complaints alleging unfairworkloads and issues with safety and hygiene in the office,Dkt. 104-15; April 17 and 18, 2025, complaints allegingADA-related retaliation, Dkt. 151-5 at 6–11; and April 20,2025, complaint to the Florida Inspector General regardingthe use of Plaintiff's whistleblower complaint in the presentlitigation. Dkt. 151-6 at 11–12.Although Plaintiff has certainly expressed opposition in thesecomplaints to certain aspects of DJJ's work culture andenvironment, these concerns are not related to unlawfulemployment practices under Title VII, as they did not mentionrace, color, religion, sex, national origin, opposition to TitleVII employment discrimination, or the submission or supportof a complaint about Title VII employment discrimination.Therefore, these complaints fall outside the purview of TitleVII and were not “statutorily protected expressions.” See 42U.S.C. § 2000e– 3(a); see also Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Unfairtreatment, absent discrimination based on race, sex, ornational origin, is not an unlawful employment practice underTitle VII.”); Jeronimus v. Polk Cnty. Opportunity Council,Inc., 145 F. App'x 319, 326 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding thatcomplaints regarding being “singled out,” being subjectedto “a campaign of harassment,” and working in a “hostileenvironment” were not “statutorily protected expression[s]”because the plaintiff “never suggested that this treatmentwas in any way related to his race or sex”); Duncan v.
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Madison Cnty., 272 F. App'x 859, 863 (11th Cir. 2008)(finding that complaints regarding office conditions did notrelate to employment practices forbidden under Title VII,and therefore such complaints are not “statutorily protectedexpressions”).*11 While some of the aforementioned complaintsmentioned retaliation, none were specifically related to TitleVII employment discrimination. See, e.g., Dkt. 36-1 at 20(alleging retaliation related to unspecified former complaints—“This is a classic example of retaliation given that Ireported [Defendant Clark] previously and others.”); Dkt.151-1 at 12–13 (alleging general retaliation, not related toanything specific—“More so [Defendant Clark] have [sic]demonstrated a pattern of harassment and have engagedin retaliatory harassment.”); Dkt. 151-5 at 6–11 (allegingADA-related retaliation—“[T]he revocation of my teleworkprevileges may constitute retaliation in violation of [theADA]). However, at some point following the March 27,2025, oral reprimand, Plaintiff complained to HR regardingthe various reprimands than he had received. Id. at 33–35.He claimed that these were “textbook adverse employmentaction[s] following protected activity under... Title VII[.]” Id.at 34. The reference to retaliation under Title VII is sufficientto be considered a “statutorily protected expression.”The remaining complaint left to be analyzed under theopposition clause is Plaintiff's February 7, 2025, chargefiled with the FCHR. Dkt. 104-14. Although this complaintdoes allege color discrimination, which is an unlawfulemployment practice under Title VII—to establish thatthis was a “statutorily protected expression,” Plaintiff mustfurther demonstrate “that he subjectively (that is, in goodfaith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawfulemployment practices, [and] that his belief was objectivelyreasonable in light of the facts and record presented.”Harrison v. Belk, Inc., 748 F. App'x 936, 943 (11thCir. 2018) (quoting Butler v. Ala. DOT, 536 F.3d 1209,1213 (11th Cir. 2008)). “Thus, [Plaintiff] must allege boththat he honestly believed [DJJ] was engaged in unlawfulemployment practices, and that his belief was objectivelyreasonable.” Ceus v. City of Tampa, 803 F. App'x 235, 245(11th Cir. 2020) (citing Furcron, 843 F.3d at 1311). “Objectivebelief is measured against the controlling substantive law.” Id.(citing Butler, 536 F.3d at 1214).Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's allegation of colordiscrimination was not objectively reasonable in light of thefacts presented, as the only aspect of the FCHR charge thatmentions color merely states that “there appears to be a clearand deliberate pattern of targeting individuals of color inthe decision-making process, reinforcing the discriminatoryand retaliatory practices within the [DJJ's] workplace.” Dkt.104-14 at 2. Plaintiff provided no supporting facts or furtherelaboration. Because Title VII color discrimination requiresmore than mere allegations, see Word v. AT&T, 576 F.App'x 908, 914 (11th Cir. 2014), the Court finds Plaintiff'ssubjective belief that DJJ was engaging in color-basedemployment discrimination was not objectively reasonable.See Butler, 536 F.3d at 1213; see also Muhammad v. AudioVisual Servs. Grp., 380 F. App'x 864, 873 (11th Cir. 2010)(finding that due to a lack of evidence of race discrimination,the plaintiff's “belief that race discrimination had occurredwas not objectively reasonable”). Plaintiff further allegesdisability discrimination in this charge, Dkt. 104-14 at 1, butthis falls outside the purview of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e–3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (listing the protectedclasses as “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” andnot disability). The Court thus finds that the February 7, 2025,FCHR charge was not a “statutorily protected expression.”Therefore, the only “statutorily protected expressions”sufficient for the first element of the prima facie case ofretaliation are the following: the May 28, 2019, EEOC charge,the August 12, 2022, EEOC charge, the August 5, 2024,initiation of the present litigation, and the complaint thatoccurred at some point following the March 27, 2025, oralreprimand.b. Adverse Employment Actions & CausationThe second element of a prima facie retaliation claimunder Title VII requires a plaintiff to establish an “adverseemployment action.” Burlington N. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68(2006) (citation modified). The third element then requiresthat any adverse action be shown to be causally related tothe statutorily protected expression. Rosado, 127 F.4th at 876.The Eleventh Circuit has construed the causation element“broadly,” requiring that “a plaintiff need only demonstrate‘that the protected activity and the adverse action were notwholly unrelated.’ ” Debe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,860 F. App'x 637, 639 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Shotz v.City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1180 n.30 (11th Cir.2003)). But, to the extent the only link proffered betweenthe protected activity and the adverse employment action is“temporal proximity,” the temporal proximity must be “veryclose” to infer causation. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc.,506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Clark Cnty. Sch.Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)) (holding that a
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10three-month period between the expression and the adverseaction was not “very close”). “If there is a substantial delaybetween the protected expression and the adverse action inthe absence of other evidence tending to show causation, thecomplaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law.” Higdon v.Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004).*12 Here, Plaintiff's claim of Title VII retaliation fails toprovide any argument regarding a nexus and has insteadoffered only conclusory statements. See Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 92–94. Construing the Plaintiff's pleading liberally, the Courtinterprets his claim of Title VII retaliation to rely whollyon temporal proximity to establish causation— i.e., Plaintiffappears to claim that causation exists because he was subjectto adverse employment action after he engaged in protectedactivities.The first protected activity was Plaintiff's May 28, 2019,EEOC charge. Dkt. 104-7. The claimed adverse employmentaction closest in time to this charge is the January 20,2022, counseling memo he received from Defendant Ardito.See Dkt. 113-2. Without analyzing whether this action byDefendant Ardito constitutes an adverse employment action,the Court finds that these two events—thirty-one monthsapart—do not have temporal proximity sufficient to establishcausation. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. Thus, Plaintiff failsto establish a prima facie case of retaliation as to the 2019EEOC charge.The next protected activity was Plaintiff's August 12, 2022,EEOC charge. Dkt. 104-10. The claimed adverse employmentaction that is closest in time to this charge is the March2023 denials of the Assistant Chief and Chief ProbationOfficer positions. See Dkt. 113-1 at 3; Dkt. 115-1 ¶¶ 53–54.Without analyzing whether these actions constitute adverseemployment actions, the Court finds that these events—at least six months apart—do not have sufficient temporalproximity sufficient to establish causation. See Thomas, 506F.3d at 1364. Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish a prima faciecase of retaliation as to the 2022 EEOC charge.The next protected activity was the initiation of thepresent litigation on August 5, 2024. Dkt. 1-1. Theclaimed adverse employment actions that are closest intime to this charge are Defendant Clark's discussions withPlaintiff about his job performance, Dkt. 104-4 ¶¶ 2–4,Defendant Clark's performance evaluation, id. 5; seeDkt. 151-1 at 23, and the January 16, 2025, revocation ofPlaintiff's teleworking accommodations. Dkt. 104-12. As aninitial matter, without analyzing whether the revocation ofaccommodations constitutes an adverse employment action,the Court finds that the August 5, 2024, initiation of litigationand the January 16, 2025, revocation—five months apart—do not have sufficient temporal proximity to establishcausation. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. This sets theouter bound of what is considered temporally proximate, andthus only Defendant Clark's discussions and his performanceevaluation need be analyzed.Defendant Clark's discussions with Plaintiff were describedas occurring “during his time as Plaintiff's supervisor,” Dkt.104-4 2, and Defendant Clark held this position from March2024 until January 2025. Id. 1. Furthermore, DefendantClark's performance evaluation is described as occurring in“mid-2024.” Id. 5. A specific date has not been establishedby either party for either of these actions— therefore, theCourt resolves this ambiguity in favor of Plaintiff, seeAdickes, 398 U.S. at 157–58; Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1280,and will construe these actions as occurring within a timeconsidered temporally proximate to the initiation of litigation.See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364.If Defendant Clark's discussions with Plaintiff andperformance evaluation are construed as temporallyproximate to statutorily protected activity, the Court mustthen address the second element to determine if theseactions constitute “adverse employment actions” sufficient toestablish a prima facie retaliation case. See Burlington N.,548 U.S. at 68. To establish the second element, “a plaintiffmust show that a reasonable employee would have found thechallenged action materially adverse, which in this contextmeans it well might have dissuaded a reasonable workerfrom making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id.The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court'sstandard in Burlington to “strongly suggest[ ] that it is fora jury to decide whether anything more than the most pettyand trivial actions against an employee should be considered‘materially adverse’ to [the plaintiff] and thus constitute anadverse employment actions.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d961, 973 n.13 (11th Cir. 2008).*13 Although the Court does not find Defendant Clark'sperformance evaluation to be “materially adverse,” seeRainey v. Holder, 412 F. App'x 235, 238 (11th Cir. 2011)(quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1240(11th Cir. 2001)) (“[W]hen a lower performance evaluationdoes not result in a ‘loss of pay or benefits or furtherdiscipline,’ it does not constitute an adverse employment
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11action.’ ”), the Court does find Defendant Clark's discussionswith Plaintiff about his job performance to be “materiallyadverse,” as these discussions were more than mere petty andtrivial actions, Crawford, 529 F.3d at 974 n.13, and “wellmight have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making orsupporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N., 548U.S. at 68. Thus, the Court considers these discussions to bean “adverse employment action” sufficient for establishing aprima facie case for retaliation.The final protected activity was the complaint to HRregarding the oral reprimand that occurred at some pointfollowing March 27, 2025. Dkt. 151-5 at 33– 35. Becauseno date is provided for this complaint, the Court resolvesthis ambiguity in favor of Plaintiff, see Adickes, 398 U.S.at 157–58; Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1280, and will consider allfollowing actions as temporally proximate. See Thomas, 506F.3d at 1364. The potential adverse employment actions arethus the three notices of investigation Plaintiff received onApril 14, 2025, Dkt. 151-6 at 41–46, and the revocation ofPlaintiff's teleworking accommodations resulting from hisoral reprimand. Dkt. 151-5 at 6–11.The Court finds the notices and revocation to be “materiallyadverse,” as these were more than mere petty and trivialactions, Crawford, 529 F.3d at 974 n.13, and “well might havedissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supportinga charge of discrimination.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.Thus, the Court considers these to be “adverse employmentactions” sufficient for establishing a prima facie case forretaliation.c. Legitimate Non-Retaliatory ReasonThe burden, therefore, shifts to Defendant DJJ to articulate alegitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the discussions, notices,and revocation. Berman, 160 F.3d at 702; see Perrymanv. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir.1983) (noting that “the defendant's burden is merely one ofproduction, not proof,” and is “exceedingly light”); see alsoon Flowers v. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327,1338 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Nix v. WLCY Radio/RahallCommc'ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984)) (holdingthat employers are free to take adverse employment actionsfor “a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneousfacts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for adiscriminatory reason.”).Regarding the discussions, at least two instances led toDefendant Clark's discussions with Plaintiff about his jobperformance. Dkt. 104-4 ¶¶ 3–4. First, Defendant Clark“learned [that] a family of a youth assigned to [Plaintiff's]supervision complained they were not being properlyvisited in accordance with DJJ policies. They disputed[Plaintiff's] case notes that reflected proper visitation.” Id. 3.Additionally, Defendant Clark discovered “discrepancies in[Plaintiff's] timesheet.” Id. 19. The Court finds each of theseto be legitimate and non-retaliatory reasons for DefendantClark's discussions with Plaintiff regarding job performance.In response, Plaintiff has argued that the articulated reasoningis fabricated. Dkt. 150-1 at 5–7. The Court rejects thisattempted refutation.Regarding the notices of investigation, each had independentcauses. One of the notices was related to Plaintiff reportedlytelling his supervisor that she was “going to regret” providinghim with his oral reprimand, which she perceived as a threat.Dkt. 151-6 at 45. Another of the notices was related to areport made to DJJ by the parent of two youths alleging thatPlaintiff failed to meet with them in person, was delayedin his responses, failed to provide certain information, andbecame agitated when the parent requested to speak withhis supervisor. Id. at 43. The last notice was related toanother report made to DJJ by the grandmother of a youthregarding Plaintiff's alleged “failure to remove the youth's cellphone as ordered by the court, lack of home visits, refusalto communicate with her regarding [the youth's] progress,failure to speak with guardian when visiting the school, andfailure to hold the youth accountable to the terms of herprobation.” Dkt. 151-4 at 7; Dkt. 151-6 at 41. The Court findseach of these to be legitimate and non-retaliatory reasons forthe notices. Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence to refutethe reasoning articulated in each of the notices. See id. at 41–46.*14 Regarding the revocation of Plaintiff's teleworkingaccommodations, this resulted directly from his oralreprimand. Dkt. 110-1 ¶¶ 5–6; Dkt. 104-1 at 108:6– 14.Plaintiff was reprimanded regarding his reported violationof certain standards related to job performance; specifically,it was claimed that Plaintiff failed to complete numerousoverdue assignments. See Dkt. 151-5 at 38–39. The oralreprimand was reportedly provided to Plaintiff in “an effortto correct the...unacceptable behavior.” Id. at 41. The Courtfinds this to be a legitimate and non-retaliatory reasonfor the revocation. In response, Plaintiff has argued thatthe articulated reasoning is contrived merely to justify theretaliation. Dkt. 150-1 at 8. The Court rejects this attemptedrefutation.
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12Because DJJ articulated legitimate, non-discriminatoryreasons for its conduct, Plaintiff cannot prevail underthe McDonnell Douglas framework unless he identifiessubstantial evidence that DJJ's reasoning was pretextual.Plaintiff fails to satisfy this burden. Therefore, DefendantDJJ has successfully rebutted Plaintiff's prima facie case ofretaliation.d. Convincing MosaicThe Court lastly turns to the metaphor of the convincingmosaic, but this argument is likewise availing. Even undera “looser frame,” Melton, 2026 WL 319183, at *5, Plaintiffmust still “put forward enough evidence for a reasonable juryto conclude that illegal [retaliation] occurred.” McCreight v.AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2024). He hasnot done so.Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues ofmaterial fact and that Defendant DJJ is entitled to judgment asa matter of law, as no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiffwas a victim of illegal retaliation under Title VII.II. Count III: Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment underTitle VIIDefendant DJJ seeks summary judgment on Count III, whichalleges a retaliatory hostile work environment under Title VIIdue to “continuous and pervasive harassment as retaliation forfiling an EEOC complaint.” Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 124– 131.Although a “retaliatory-hostile-work-environment claim issomewhat of a hybrid of a traditional protected-characteristic-based hostile-work-environment claim and a traditionalretaliation claim,” the Eleventh Circuit uses the same standardto assess both Title VII retaliation claims and Title VIIretaliatory work environment claims. Buckley v. Sec'y ofArmy, 97 F.4th 784, 799 (11th Cir. 2024); see Debe, 860 F.App'x at 640 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Monaghan v. WorldpayUS, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 862-63 (11th Cir. 2020)) (holding thatcourts should “analyze retaliatory hostile work environmentor retaliatory harassment claims like retaliation claims”); seealso Curet v. Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc., No.8:21-cv-1801-VMC-TGW, 2022 WL 4464751, at *6 (M.D.Fla. Sep. 26, 2022) (“Retaliatory hostile work environmentclaims are analyzed under the same standard as retaliationclaims[.]”). However, unlike Title VII retaliation claims,which are based on discrete acts, Title VII retaliatory hostilework environment claims consider the “totality of events thatallegedly create[d] a hostile work environment,” Curet, 2022WL 4464751, at *6, similar to the more lenient “convincingmosaic” standard.As with Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim, the Courtconsiders Plaintiff's “statutorily protected expression” to bethe May 28, 2019, EEOC charge, the August 12, 2022,EEOC charge, the August 5, 2024, initiation of the presentlitigation, and the complaint regarding the oral reprimandthat occurred at some point following March 27, 2025.Plaintiff claims that the retaliatory harassment consisted of“excessive micromanagement, unwarranted scrutiny, baselessdisciplinary actions, and negative performance reviews,” aswell as “public humiliation.” Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 124– 131.*15 First, regarding “excessive micromanagement,”Plaintiff alleges that DJJ supervisors “imposed unreasonabledemands, monitored [him] excessively, and unjustlyincreased his workload.” Dkt. 36 127. Plaintiff has failedto provide sufficient evidence of excessive monitoring.As to unreasonable demands, the only evidence that theCourt construes as supporting this claim is the complaintmade to HR regarding the oral reprimand that occurred atsome point following March 27, 2025. Dkt. 151-5 at 33–35. This complaint describes a tight one-week timeline tocomplete numerous overdue assignments. Id. at 33–35, 36–37. However, Plaintiff was offered the assistance of otherJPOs to help complete this timeline—it appears he neverrequested this proposed assistance. See id. at 36–37. Withrespect to the alleged unjust increase in his workload—twoseparate analyses by Defendant Sheffer found that Plaintiff'sworkload was in the middle of the distribution, as comparedto his coworkers. Dkt. 104-13 at 1–3; Dkt. 104-15.Next, regarding “unwarranted scrutiny,” “baselessdisciplinary actions,” and “public humiliation,” Plaintiffalleges that he was subjected to “unfounded investigationsand reprimands” and “ambush-style meetings.” Dkt. 36 129. There are multiple instances that may fit these claims,but Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that any of themwere unjustified. On January 20, 2022, Plaintiff receiveda counseling memo from Defendant Ardito regarding anaudit of his case notes that revealed certain deficiencies.Dkt. 113-2. On April 25, 2022, the mother of a youthassigned to Plaintiff filed a complaint with DJJ, alleging thatPlaintiff's case notes were falsified—this required DefendantArdito to file a report with DJJ's CCC hotline. Dkt. 104-8at 1. Defendant Ardito notified Plaintiff that CCC initiatedan investigation. Dkt. 113-3. Following this notification,
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.13Plaintiff confronted Defendant Ardito in what was perceivedas a threatening manner, and was thus provided with anEmployee Assistance Program referral. Dkt. 104-2 5. InJune 2024, DJJ supervisors met with Plaintiff to discussdiscrepancies between his time sheet submissions and hisdocumented case notes. 104-3 3; Dkt. 151-1 at 16–17. During his supervision of Plaintiff, Defendant Clarkdiscussed job performance issues with Plaintiff, such ascomplaints he received from the family of a youth assignedto Plaintiff regarding insufficient visitation. Dkt. 104-4 ¶¶2–4. On April 14, 2024, Plaintiff received three notices ofinvestigation, of which their respective causes have alreadybeen discussed in a previous analysis. Dkt. 151-6 at 45–46.Lastly, regarding “negative performance reviews,” Plaintiffalleges that “Defendant Ardito authored a retaliatory negativeperformance review in 2022, filled with inaccuracies,deliberately aimed at discrediting the Plaintiff's work.”Dkt. 36 128. Plaintiff has failed to provide evidenceof inaccuracies regarding the 2022 performance evaluation.Defendant Ardito scored Plaintiff's performance as 3.25out of 5, indicating “satisfactory” performance. Dkt. 104-9.Defendant Ardito listed several areas for improvement,including communication. Id. After reviewing this matter, anEEOC investigator opined that “it is not unusual for ratingsto increase or decrease each performance year.” Dkt. 36-1.Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiff was subjectto harassment due to the totality of instances detailed, andeven if the Court were to find that this claimed harassmentwas “not wholly unrelated” to Plaintiff's protected activities,Debe, 860 F. App'x at 639 (quoting Shotz, 344 F.3d at1180 n.30), the Court still finds that legitimate and non-retaliatory reasons have been articulated for each interaction,as articulated above. This is sufficient to rebut any prima faciecase that might be established. Plaintiff has failed to refute thearticulated reasoning.Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues ofmaterial fact and that Defendant DJJ is entitled to judgmentas a matter of law, as no reasonable jury could return a verdictfor Plaintiff regarding the Title VII claim of retaliatory hostilework environment. Defendant DJJ's motion for summaryjudgment is thus granted as to Count III.III. Count IV: Retaliatory Failure to Promote under Title VII*16 Defendant DJJ seeks summary judgment on Count IV,which alleges failure to promote under Title VII done “inretaliation for whistleblowing.” Id. 141.To bring a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must first file a chargeof discrimination with the EEOC. Gregory v. Ga. Dep't ofHum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004). Because ofthis exhaustion requirement, “a plaintiff's judicial complaintis limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation whichcan reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge ofdiscrimination.” Id. at 1280 (citation modified). “The factsalleged in the charge matter most for determining what canreasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC charge.”Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1345 (11th Cir.2022).Plaintiff's 2022 EEOC charge, from which this case arose,mentions general claims of retaliation and harassment—specifically, Plaintiff mentions lower performanceevaluations, counseling memos, meetings, and a commentbeing made to him about therapy. Dkt. 104-10. Plaintiff failsto allege any facts about Defendant DJJ's hiring practices. Seeid. This is to be expected, as the denials of the Assistant ChiefProbation Officer, Chief Probation Officer, and OperationsCoordinator positions took place the year following the 2022EEOC charge. Dkt. 115-1 ¶¶ 33, 53–54. Plaintiff failed toamend his 2022 EEOC charge to add any mention of thesedenials.Therefore, even under the “liberal EEOC charge strictures,”Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280, the Court finds that Plaintiff hasfailed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding hisretaliatory failure to promote claim, as this claim could not bereasonably expected to grow out of the facts described in the2022 EEOC charge. The Court finds that there are no genuineissues of material fact and that Defendant DJJ is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law, as no reasonable jury couldreturn a verdict for Plaintiff regarding the Title VII claimof retaliatory failure to promote. Defendant DJJ's motion forsummary judgment is thus granted as to Count IV.IV. Count VII: Violation of the Florida Whistleblower ActDefendant DJJ seeks summary judgment on Count VII, whichalleges retaliation against Plaintiff for “exposing unethicalconduct” in violation of the Florida Whistleblower Act(“FWA”). Id. 150.The FWA prohibits the state from retaliating against anemployee for disclosing violations of law, threats to publicwelfare, or acts of gross mismanagement, fraud, abuse, orneglect by the state. Fla. Stat. § 112.3187. Specifically,the FWA protects the disclosure of “[a]ny violation or
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.14suspected violation of any federal, state, or local law, rule,or regulation,” Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(5), and thus covers abroader range than Title VII retaliation protection, whichis limited to disclosures of those types of discriminationprotected by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (listing the protected classes as “race, color,religion, sex, or national origin”).The Eleventh Circuit has held that FWA claims and TitleVII retaliation claims are governed by the same standard.Ray v. City of Tallahassee, 664 F. App'x 816, 818 (11thCir. 2016) (“Claims under the [FWA]...are governed by theburden-shifting standard for Title VII retaliation claims.”);see McAlpin v. Town of Sneads, 61 F.4th 916, 927 (11th Cir.2023) (utilizing the Title VII retaliation standard for FWAclaims).*17 Thus, because Plaintiff's FWA claim is governed bythe same fact pattern and standard as Plaintiff's Title VIIretaliation claim, the Court restates and incorporates theanalysis of Count I. This resolves all aspects of Plaintiff'sFWA claim covered by the prior Title VII analysis—includingall allegations of retaliation except for those disability-relatedallegations of Plaintiff's February 7, 2025, FCHR charge.Dkt. 104-14 at 1. Although the disability-related allegationfell outside the purview of Title VII, it would be considereda “statutorily protected expression” under the FWA, as theFWA protects the disclosure of a suspected violation ofany state law to an investigative body like the FCHR, Fla.Stat. § 112.3187(5), (6), and Plaintiff's FCHR charge allegeddiscrimination in violation of “Chapter 760 of the FloridaCivil Rights Act,” among other laws. Dkt. 104-14 at 1.With the disability-related allegation of Plaintiff's FCHRcharge considered a “statutorily protected expression”sufficient for the first element, the Court proceeds to ananalysis of adverse employment actions and causation. Here,like in Count I, Plaintiff has failed to provide any argumentregarding a nexus and has instead offered only conclusorystatements. See, e.g., Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 150–52. The Court thussimilarly interprets the FWA claim to rely wholly on temporalproximity to establish causation.The actions that were temporally proximate to Plaintiff'sFCHR charge are as follows: on March 27, 2025, whenPlaintiff received an oral reprimand, Dkt. 151-5 at 38–41; onApril 1, 2025, when the grandmother of a youth assigned toPlaintiff was given a grievance form after making a complaintabout Plaintiff, Dkt. 151-4 at 7; Dkt. 151-6 at 41–42; onApril 14, 2025, when Plaintiff received three notices ofinvestigation; Dkt. 151-6 at 41–46; and the revocation ofPlaintiff's teleworking accommodations resulting from hisoral reprimand. Dkt. 151-5 at 6–11.Even if the Court were to determine that these actionsconstituted “adverse employment actions” sufficient to satisfythe second element and establish a prima facie case ofretaliation, the Court still finds that legitimate and non-retaliatory reasons have been articulated sufficient to rebuta prima facie case—namely that the oral reprimand wasbased upon Plaintiff's failure to complete numerous overdueassignments within the required timeframe, Dkt. 151-5 at 38–41; the grievance form was provided in direct response toallegations that Plaintiff failed to properly supervise a youth,Dkt. 151-6 at 41; the three notices of investigation were givenfor reasons already discussed in a previous analysis, Dkt.151-6 at 45–46; and the revocation of Plaintiff's teleworkingaccommodations was related to the aforementioned oralreprimand. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. The Court further finds that Plaintiffhas failed to put forward sufficient evidence to establish a“convincing mosaic” of retaliation under the FWA.Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues ofmaterial fact and that Defendant DJJ is entitled to judgmentas a matter of law, as no reasonable jury could return a verdictfor Plaintiff regarding the FWA retaliation claim. DefendantDJJ's motion for summary judgment is thus granted as toCount VII.V. Count II: First Amendment Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §1983The Individual Defendants seek summary judgment on CountII, which alleges retaliation against Plaintiff for claimedprotected activities in violation of the First Amendment under§ 1983. Dkt. 36 at 23. The Individual Defendants argue thatsummary judgment should be granted as to this claim becausethey are each entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. 106 at 7–8;Dkt. 107 at 6–7; Dkt. 108 at 8–9; Dkt. 109 at 7–8; Dkt. 110at 7–8.*18 The defense of qualified immunity shields “governmentofficials performing discretionary functions...from liabilityfor civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violateclearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which areasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800, 818, (1982); see Loftus v. Clark-Moore,690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012). To receive qualifiedimmunity, an official must first “establish that he or she acted
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.15within the scope of discretionary authority when the allegedlywrongful acts occurred.” Robinson v. Sauls, 46 F.4th 1332,1340 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Once this showingis made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that “(1) thedefendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right wasclearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. at1340–41 (quoting Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)).As an initial matter, there is no dispute that the IndividualDefendants were acting within the scope of their discretionaryauthority as employees of DJJ. Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 96, 116, 123.Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that the Individual Defendantswere “acting under color of state law” when they took theirallegedly violative actions. Id. 96. As such, Plaintiff has theburden to show that the Individual Defendants violated thedecedent's First Amendment right against retaliation and thatthis right was clearly established at the time of the allegedviolation.a. First Amendment ViolationThe “First Amendment protects a public employee's right,in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressingmatters of public concern.” Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187,196–97 (2024) (citation modified). The state employer mustnot take an “adverse employment action,” which involvesan “important condition of employment” and is likely to“chill the exercise of constitutionally protected speech.”Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 618–19 (11th Cir.2004) (citation omitted).3 When bringing a First Amendment§ 1983 claim for retaliation, courts apply a “four-stageanalysis.” Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d 613, 617(11th Cir. 2015). The third stage requires a plaintiff to showthat his speech was a “substantial motivating factor” in theadverse employment action. Id. at 618.Here, even if the Court were to grant the first two stages—including that the actions of the Individual Defendantswere sufficient to meet the higher First Amendment standardfor “adverse employment actions”—Plaintiff has failed toestablish the third element. He fails to establish any causalrelationship by providing no evidence of protected speechplaying a “substantial role” in these alleged adverse actions.Instead, Plaintiff has relied wholly on temporal proximity.See, e.g., Dkt. 36 ¶¶ 101 (“Correa's actions intensifiedimmediately after the Plaintiff's reports to Tallahassee in2024, exposing systemic failures and misconduct withinthe Department.”), 105 (“Ardito's retaliatory conduct beganafter the Plaintiff reported systemic corruption within DJJ.”),108 (“Clark's actions escalated after the Plaintiff's protectedreports to HR and the EEOC.”), 112 (“Sheffer's actionsoccurred shortly after and in direct response to the Plaintiff'sconstitutionally protected speech.”). Therefore, withoutevaluating the first two stages of the First Amendmentretaliation analysis, Plaintiff has failed to establish the thirdelement, an essential part of this claim.4 The Court findsthat there are no genuine issues of material fact and thatPlaintiff's First Amendment right against retaliation was thusnot violated.b. Clearly Established Right*19 To defeat a claim of qualified immunity, Plaintiff mustestablish both that there was a violation of his constitutionalrights and that the right was “clearly established” at the timeof the Individual Defendants’ alleged violations. Robinson,46 F.4th at 1340. Because the Court has concluded thatthe Individual Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's FirstAmendment right against retaliation, there is no need toaddress the “clearly established” prong. Id.The Court finds no genuine issues of material fact and thatthe Individual Defendants are entitled qualified immunity asto Count II, based on the undisputed record.VI. Count V: Preliminary Injunctive ReliefBecause the purpose of a preliminary injunction is “merelyto preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial onthe merits can be held,” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.390, 395 (1981), and all claims are now resolved by summaryjudgment in favor of Defendants—the Court finds Plaintiff'srequest for preliminary injunctive relief to be moot.CONCLUSIONAccordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:1. Defendant Florida Department of Juvenile Justice's Motionfor Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Counts I, III, IV,and VII. Dkt. 115.2. Defendants Andrew Correa, Matthew Clark, Rosa Ardito,Paul Sheffer, and Sean Skillern's Motions for SummaryJudgment are GRANTED as to Count II. Dkts. 106, 107, 108,109, 110, 115.
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.163. Plaintiff's request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (CountV) is MOOT.4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter final summary judgmentin favor of Defendants Florida Department of JuvenileJustice, Andrew Correa, Matthew Clark, Rosa Ardito, PaulSheffer, and Sean Skillern and against Plaintiff Quintaurus L.Johnson, and is DIRECTED to terminate all pending motionsand deadlines and to close the case. DONE AND ORDEREDat Tampa, Florida, on February 19, 2026./s/ William F. JungWILLIAM F. JUNGUNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGECOPIES FURNISHED TO:Counsel of RecordAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 472321Footnotes1In his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that this memo alleged “hostile work environment, racialdiscrimination, and retaliation.” Dkt. 36 40. Aside from this claim, no supporting evidence has been providedby Plaintiff. The Court is left with no evidence substantiating the details of this internal memo. Although theCourt views all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court declines to creditthis unsupported allegation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11thCir. 2005) (citation modified) (“For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in therecord. For instance, mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeata summary judgment motion.”).2In Plaintiff's most recent responses, he continues to raise issues related to discovery. See, e.g., Dkt. 145 at17; Dkt. 146 at 14–16; Dkt. 147 at 18–19; Dkt. 148 at 16; Dkt. 149 at 12–13; Dkt. 150 at 16–18; Dkt. 159 at16–18; Dkt. 160 at 4; Dkt. 161 at 16; Dkt. 167 at 5. In light of the aforementioned holdings, the Court declinesto consider these issues.3In Bell v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 6 F.4th 1374, 1377 (11th Cir. 2021), the Eleventh Circuit held thatalthough Title VII retaliation claims are now governed by the more lenient “might have dissuaded” standardfor adverse employment actions, see Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, First Amendment § 1983 retaliation claimsremain subject to the higher Stavropoulos requirement that the adverse employment action must “involvean important condition of employment.” 361 F.3d at 619. Therefore, a First Amendment § 1983 retaliationclaim imposes a higher burden on the plaintiff for establishing an “adverse employment action” than a TitleVII retaliation claim.4“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time fordiscovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence ofan element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such asituation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerningan essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex,477 U.S. at 322–23 (quoting Fed. R. Civ P. 56(c)); see McGee, 719 F.3d at 1242 (“[The moving party] hasthe burden of either negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case or showing that there is noevidence to prove a fact necessary to the nonmoving party's case.”)
QUINTAURUS L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.17End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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