Jones v. DC Office of Unified Communications (Oct. 22, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Alexandria Jones v. DC Office of Unified Communications
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Oct. 22, 2025
Disposition
Dismissed
ALEXANDRIA JONES, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2977585Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, District of Columbia.ALEXANDRIA JONES, Plaintiff,v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OFUNIFIED COMMUNICATIONS, Defendant.Civil Action No. 25-1129 (RC)|Filed 10/22/2025Re Document No.: 8MEMORANDUM OPINIONRUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District JudgeGRANTING DEFENDANT'SPARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISSI. INTRODUCTION*1 Plaintiff Alexandria Jones, a former Assistant WatchCommander in the District of Columbia's Office of UnifiedCommunications (“Defendant” or “OUC”), brings this actionagainst her former employer for discrimination, retaliation,and hostile work environment under the Americans withDisabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the AgeDiscrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §621, et seq., and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; aswell as interference with the Family and Medical Leave Act(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. Plaintiff alleges thatOUC subjected her to discriminatory acts based on her ageand disability once she began taking intermittent medicalleave, culminating in her eventual termination. Defendanthas filed a partial motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff'sallegations fail to state claims for age-based discrimination,retaliation to the extent this claim relies on Title VII, andhostile work environment. For the reasons below, the Courtgrants Defendant's partial motion to dismiss.II. FACTUAL BACKGROUNDPlaintiff Alexandria Jones worked at OUC from September1998 until she was terminated in October 2023, whenshe was 59 years old. Compl. ¶¶ 7–9, 96, ECF No. 1.At the time of her termination, she was an AssistantWatch Commander, a supervisory position in the Districtof Columbia's Management Supervisory Service. Id. 10.Her duties as an Assistant Watch Commander included“supervising operations staff within the District's emergencyand nonemergency call center system, overseeing shiftactivities, managing personnel issues, and ensuring theconsistent delivery of essential communication services toresidents and first responders.” Id. 11.Around May 2023, Plaintiff “began experiencing symptomsconsistent with a psychological and cognitive healthcondition,” including “difficulty concentrating, reducedcognitive functioning, mental fatigue, and episodicpsychological distress.” Id. ¶¶ 19–20. These symptoms“affect[ed] her ability to perform day-to-day tasks andsupervisory duties.” Id. 20. Around June 14, 2023, Plaintiffrequested intermittent medical leave under the federal FMLAand the D.C. FMLA. Id. ¶¶ 17, 23. On June 26, 2023, theDistrict of Columbia granted Plaintiff's request, authorizingher to take intermittent medical leave for up to two workdaysper week between May 26, 2023 and December 31, 2023. Id.¶¶ 28–29.Soon after she began using her approved leave, Plaintiffalleges that supervisory personnel “subjected [her] todisparaging and dismissive comments” regarding herabsences. Id. 33. She describes one such comment: aroundAugust 12, 2023, Operations Manager Calvin Williams statedin the presence of others that Plaintiff was “just using FMLAas an excuse to get out of work.” Id. 34. Followingthis incident, Plaintiff alleges that she “was subjected toincreasing professional isolation” because of her medicalleave. Id. 38. She was excluded from group emails, staffmeetings, team briefings, key meetings, and decision-makingdiscussions, and she was ignored or no longer consulted onoperational and personnel matters that fell within her purview.Id. ¶¶ 38–41.*2 Plaintiff further alleges that around July 2023, sheapplied for a lateral transfer opportunity within the OUCfor a supervisory role in the non-emergency 311 OperationsDivision. Id. ¶¶ 45–47. Although she “met all minimum andpreferred qualifications” and had “internal seniority,” Plaintiffwas not interviewed for this position. Id. ¶¶ 47–48. OUCoffered the position to a “younger, less experienced female
ALEXANDRIA JONES, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2employee who had fewer years of service and less supervisorytenure with the Agency” than Plaintiff. Id. 49. Then,in August 2023, Plaintiff applied for a Watch Commanderposition, which was an opportunity for a “promotionaladvancement from her current role” as Assistant WatchCommander. Id. 51. Although she “had previously servedin an acting capacity in that role and possessed all requisitequalifications,” she was not interviewed for the position. Id.¶¶ 52–53. “The selected candidate was a younger employee.”Id. 54. Plaintiff alleges that the timing of her exclusionfrom both hiring processes, “occur[ing] within weeks of herdisclosure of a disability and the start of her intermittentFMLA leave,” id. 55, “coupled with the selection ofyounger candidates,” id. 58, raises “a strong inference ofdiscriminatory motive based on both age and disability,” id.Around September 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed an internalcomplaint with OUC Director Heather McGaffin, claimingthat she had suffered discriminatory and retaliatory acts. Id. 59. Plaintiff alleges that she identified three areas of concernin her complaint: (1) her non-selections for the lateral 311 andWatch Commander positions; (2) the disparaging commentsby Operations Manager Calvin Williams regarding her useof FMLA leave; and (3) the broader pattern of retaliatoryconduct and professional marginalization she experiencedonce she began using her FMLA leave. Id. 60. She furtheralleges that she “expressed in clear terms that she believedshe was being discriminated against on the basis of ageand disability, and that her recent treatment appeared to bein retaliation for taking protected leave and engaging inprotected EEO activity.” Id. 61.OUC did not act on her internal complaint. Id. ¶¶ 64–65.Instead, on September 14, 2023—one week after Plaintifffiled her complaint—OUC sent her a letter terminating heremployment. Id. 66. “The termination letter cited no specificpolicy violations, misconduct, or performance concerns, andinstead simply stated that [Plaintiff] was an ‘at-will employee’and that her employment would be ending effective October6, 2023.” Id. 67.On the same day as her termination, Plaintiff filed a Chargeof Discrimination with the Equal Employment OpportunityCommission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination based onage, disability, and retaliation. Id. 5. After the EEOCissued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue in February 2025,Plaintiff brought this suit against OUC, alleging disabilitydiscrimination under the ADA (Count I); age discriminationunder the ADEA (Count II); retaliation under the ADA,ADEA, and Title VII (Count III); interference with the FMLA(Count IV); and hostile work environment under the ADA andTitle VII (Count V). Id. 6.III. LEGAL STANDARDTo survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficientfactual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550U.S. 544, 570, (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility whenthe plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court todraw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liablefor the misconduct alleged.” Id. In evaluating a motion todismiss, a court must assume the truth of the plaintiff's factualallegations and grant the plaintiff “the benefit of all inferencesthat can be derived” therefrom. Spaeth v. Georgetown Univ.,839 F. Supp. 2d 57, 62 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Am. Nat'lIns. Co. v. FDIC., 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).Nevertheless, the court “need not accept as true any legalconclusions couched as factual allegations or inferencesunsupported by facts” in the complaint. Id.IV. ANALYSISDefendant observes that the “core” of Plaintiff's complaint“consists of her accusation that she suffered discriminationon account of her alleged disability.” See Def.’s Reply toPl.’s Opp'n to Def.’s Mot. (“Def.’s Reply”) at 1, ECF No. 10.While Defendant disputes the truth of these claims, it has notmoved to dismiss them. Instead, it moves to dismiss Plaintiff'sclaims of age discrimination under the ADEA and retaliationunder Title VII, arguing that Plaintiff's focus on OUC's anti-disability animus undercuts these claims. See id. It also movesto dismiss Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim underthe ADA and Title VII. Id. The Court examines Plaintiff'sage discrimination, Title VII retaliation, and hostile workenvironment claims in turn, and concludes that dismissal iswarranted as to these claims.A. Age Discrimination*3 In Count II of her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that OUCdiscriminated against her because of her age when it rejectedher applications for the lateral 311 and Watch Commander
ALEXANDRIA JONES, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3positions and offered these positions to younger candidates.1Compl. ¶¶ 95–104. Defendant argues that this claim shouldbe dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts givingrise to a reasonable inference of age discrimination. See Def.’sPartial Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 6–7, ECF No. 8-1. TheCourt agrees.Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer ... tofail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual orotherwise discriminate against any individual with respectto [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges ofemployment, because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C.§ 623(a)(1). There are two “essential elements” to an agediscrimination claim: (1) that “the plaintiff suffered anadverse employment action” (2) “because of the plaintiff'sage.” Barot v. Aldon Mgmt., No. 18-cv-140, 2023 WL6199075, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2023) (citation modified)(quoting Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C.Cir. 2008)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must“present facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination.”Yoder v. Architect of the Capitol, No. 23-cv-2214, 2025 WL915611, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2025) (citation modified).A plaintiff can establish this inference “through either directevidence of animus” or “by showing that [she] was treateddifferently from similarly situated employees.” Regis v.Noem, No. 24-cv-2405, 2025 WL 1580808, at *3–4 (D.D.C.June 4, 2025) (citation modified).Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff's non-selectionsfor the lateral 311 and Watch Commander positions were“adverse employment actions.” Rather, Defendant arguesthat Plaintiff's allegations do not support an inference thatPlaintiff's age motivated OUC's hiring decisions. See Def.’sMot. at 7. Defendant primarily takes issue with Plaintiff'sfailure to provide the ages of the two candidates whomOUC allegedly hired instead of her. Id. In Defendant's view,Plaintiff cannot defeat its motion to dismiss through generalallegations that the two candidates, whom Plaintiff offers assimilarly situated comparators, were “younger” than her. Id.At a minimum, Defendant argues, Plaintiff “must provide adescription of ‘the events leading to [an adverse employmentaction], provid[ing] relevant dates, and includ[ing] the ages ...of at least some of the persons involved.’ ” Id. (alterationsin original) (ultimately quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations do not give riseto a reasonable inference of age discrimination. However,this does not follow inexorably from Plaintiff's failureto plead the ages of her two proposed comparators. Inthat regard, Defendant's reliance on Swierkiewicz appearssomewhat misplaced. The Supreme Court in that case didnot, as Defendant insinuates, establish minimum pleadingrequirements for an age discrimination claim; instead, itheld a petitioner's complaint sufficient to state a claim underthe ADEA where it “detailed the events leading to histermination, provided relevant dates, and included the age[ ]”of an employee who replaced him. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S.at 514; see also Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (“The [comparators’] exact ages arenot ultimate issues or even legally mandated elements.”). Infact, other courts in this District have allowed well-pleadedage discrimination claims to proceed to discovery even wherecomparators’ precise ages were not identified. See, e.g.,Regis, 2025 WL 1580808, at *1, *4 (finding a complaintsufficient to raise an inference of age discrimination wherethe plaintiff, a 59-year-old Fingerprint Specialist, alleged thathe experienced less favorable treatment than other FingerprintSpecialists “who were not ... over the age of 40”); Washingtonv. D.C. Hous. Auth., 170 F. Supp. 3d 234, 242 (D.D.C. 2016)(same where the plaintiff, a 47-year-old photographer, allegedthat other photographers “outside of the ADEA's protectedclass” were not discharged like he was). This makes sense asa practical matter, given that “a plaintiff at the pleading stage,before conducting discovery, may not be able to establish acomparator's age with any certainty.” Milam v. ASCAP, No.23-cv-238, 2023 WL 5673953, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 1,2023).*4 Although a plaintiff need not allege a comparator'sage to raise an inference of discrimination, this does notmean, however, that a plaintiff can avoid dismissal simplyby pleading that a comparator is “younger,” as Plaintiff herehas done. See Compl. ¶¶ 49, 54, 58, 84, 100. As the SupremeCourt explained in O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp.,a prima facie case of age discrimination requires evidenceadequate to create an inference of discrimination, and suchan inference cannot be drawn when a plaintiff is treatedless favorably than someone “insignificantly younger.” 517U.S. 308, 313 (1996). There is no “magical formula” fordetermining when an age gap is “significant” enough to makeout a prima facie case of discrimination, see Barber v. CSXDistribution Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 699 (3d Cir. 1995), butthe D.C. Circuit, for example, found a difference of sevenyears to be insufficient where the plaintiff relied exclusivelyon comparator evidence in support of her age discriminationclaim, see Dunaway v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758,767 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
ALEXANDRIA JONES, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4True, “a plaintiff need not allege facts establishing a primafacie case of discrimination” at the pleading stage. Yoder,2025 WL 915611, at *4. Thus, an ADEA plaintiff proceedingon a comparator theory need not specifically allege thatshe was treated less favorably than someone at least sevenyears her junior, for example. See, e.g., Milam, 2023 WL5673953, at *5. However, the plaintiff must plead at leastsome facts that, if proven, would give rise to an inference ofage discrimination, whether through direct or circumstantialevidence. See Yoder, 2025 WL 915611, at *4. And thisinference cannot be drawn, at any stage of the litigation,through a plaintiff's comparison to someone “insignificantlyyounger.” See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 313. Accordingly, wherea plaintiff attempts to raise a circumstantial inference of agediscrimination at the motion-to-dismiss stage based solely oncomparator evidence, her allegations must suggest that shewas disadvantaged in favor of an employee “significantlyyounger” than her. See Townsend v. United States, 236 F.Supp. 3d 280, 307 (D.D.C. 2017); Martinez, 986 F.3d at267 (holding that a plaintiff's “commonsense” allegationthat comparators were “significantly younger” than him was“enough to get to discovery”).Here, Plaintiff pleads that OUC offered the positions sheapplied for to “younger” candidates, but that is not enoughfor the Court to infer that she was disadvantaged in favorof “significantly younger” candidates. See Real-Loomis v.Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., No. 20-cv-441, 2021 WL 1907487,at *6 n.10 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2021) (“Plaintiff doesnot plead any ‘significant’ difference in age; she simplypleads they were ‘younger.’ This is simply insufficient.”);Townsend, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 307 (holding that becausethe plaintiff did not plead a comparator's age, but simplyidentified her as a “younger female,” “no inferencecan be drawn that [the comparator] was ‘significantlyyounger’ than the plaintiff, undercutting any inference thatage was a factor for any alleged disparate treatment”).Furthermore, even assuming Plaintiff's proposed comparatorswere “significantly younger,” she alleges no facts at allabout the candidate who was offered the Watch Commanderposition, which would preclude the Court from inferringthat this candidate was similarly situated to Plaintiff. SeeMarcus v. Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc., 661 F. App'x 29, 32 (2dCir. 2016) (holding that the absence of “any informationas to whether [the comparator] employees were otherwisesimilarly situated” prevents “even a minimal inference of agediscrimination”).Notably, Plaintiff's complaint contrasts with those that courtshave deemed sufficient to state an age discrimination claimdespite not including the ages of proposed comparators orspecifically alleging that the comparators were “significantlyyounger.” For example, in Regis v. Noem, referred to above,the 59-year-old plaintiff's allegation that he was treatedworse than other employees “who were not ... over the ageof 40” indicated that he was at least nineteen years olderthan his alleged comparators, which, unlike here, impliesa “significant” age gap. 2025 WL 1580808, at *1, *4; seealso Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 336 (6thCir. 2003) (noting that most circuits consider age differencesof ten or more years to be significant). And in Washingtonv. District of Columbia Housing Authority, the 47-year-oldplaintiff's allegations regarding employees “outside of theADEA's protected class”—individuals aged 40 and older—suggested an age gap of at least eight years. 170 F. Supp. 3dat 242.*5 To be clear, Plaintiff could have survived dismissalwithout necessarily pleading that her two alleged comparatorswere “significantly younger.” As the Third Circuit hasexplained, “[e]ven circumstantial-evidence cases do notalways require an age gap ... [if] [t]he plaintiff can allegeactions by an employer that, if otherwise unexplained,are more likely than not based on the considerationof impermissible factors.” Martinez, 986 F.3d at 266–67 (citation modified); see also Aliotta v. Bair, 567 F.Supp. 2d 113, 125 n.6 (D.D.C. 2008) (suggesting that aninference of discrimination can be raised even with “a slightdifference in age” if there is further evidence “showingage was a determining factor”). But here, beyond Plaintiff'sidentification of proposed comparators, her complaint isentirely devoid of factual allegations tying OUC's actions toher age. Accordingly, because Plaintiff's allegations fail toraise a reasonable inference of age discrimination, her agediscrimination claim must be dismissed in its entirety.B. RetaliationCount III of Plaintiff's complaint pleads retaliation underthe ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII, claiming that OUCterminated her in retaliation for her use of intermittent FMLAleave and for filing an internal complaint of discriminationwith OUC Director Heather McGaffin. Compl. ¶¶ 105–12.Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she was informed of hertermination on September 14, 2023, just one week after shecomplained about various alleged discriminatory incidents
ALEXANDRIA JONES, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5to the OUC Director and two months after she begantaking approved FMLA leave. See id. ¶¶ 59–61, 66, 106–09. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claimonly to the extent it relies on Title VII, arguing that Plaintiffhas not alleged that she suffered retaliatory acts based on anycharacteristic protected under Title VII. See Def.’s Mot. at 8.The Court concurs that dismissal of Plaintiff's retaliationclaim is warranted to the extent it relies on TitleVII. “Title VII protects employees from retaliation foropposing discriminatory employment practices, or making acharge, testifying, assisting, or otherwise participating in aninvestigation, proceeding, or hearing related to discriminatoryemployment practices under that subchapter.” Walker v.Child.’s Nat'l Med. Ctr., 236 F. Supp. 3d 136, 145 (D.D.C.2017). Here, though, Plaintiff does not allege that shesuffered retaliation after making a discrimination chargeor otherwise engaging in protected activity related todiscriminatory employment practices based on Title VII'sprotected characteristics of “race, color, religion, sex, ornational origin.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Her allegedprotected activity includes taking FMLA leave and filing acomplaint “express[ing] ... that she believed she was beingdiscriminated against on the basis of age and disability.”Compl. 61 (emphasis added). Plaintiff's retaliation claimthus arises under the ADEA and the ADA—and Defendanthas not moved to dismiss this claim to the extent it relieson those statutes. But Plaintiff's retaliation claim must bedismissed to the extent it relies on Title VII, as she has notpleaded a claim cognizable under this latter statute.2 SeeWalker, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 145.C. Hostile Work Environment*6 In Count V, Plaintiff pleads a hostile work environmentclaim under the ADA and Title VII based on allegationsof “repeated and escalating hostility from supervisorsand colleagues.” Compl. ¶¶ 121–28. Specifically, Plaintiffdescribes a “disparaging” comment regarding her disability—Operations Manager Calvin Williams's claim that Plaintiffwas “just using FMLA as an excuse to get out ofwork”—and alleges that she was “exclud[ed] from meetingsand communications central to her role” and “remov[ed]from supervisory responsibilities.” See id. ¶¶ 33–42, 123.These changes, Plaintiff alleges, “created an environmentof professional alienation” and undermined her “ability toeffectively lead and perform her duties.” Id. 43. Defendantargues that this alleged conduct is insufficient as a matter oflaw to support a hostile work environment claim. See Def.’sMot. at 8–10.To state a hostile work environment claim under boththe ADA and Title VII, “a plaintiff must show that [her]employer subjected [her] to discriminatory intimidation,ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive toalter the conditions of the victim's employment and create anabusive working environment.” Garrett-Herndon v. Districtof Columbia, No. 21-cv-1204, 2025 WL 2779982, at *5(D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2025) (quoting Hill v. Assocs. for Renewalin Educ., Inc., 897 F.3d 232, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2018)); see alsoHill, 897 F.3d at 237 (assuming without deciding that a hostilework environment claim is cognizable under the ADA).“Determining whether an actionable hostile environmentclaim exists requires an examination of all the circumstances,including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; itsseverity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonablyinterferes with an employee's work performance.” Nat'l R.R.Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 103 (2002). “The‘conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in theterms and conditions of employment.’ ” Hill, 897 F.3d at 237(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788(1998)).Even drawing all reasonable inferences from her allegationsin her favor, Plaintiff has not stated a hostile workenvironment claim. First, as discussed in Section IV.B, supra,Plaintiff does not tie her supervisors’ and colleagues’ allegedharassment to any characteristic protected under Title VII,which is fatal to a hostile work environment claim underthat statute. See Byrd v. Vilsack, 931 F. Supp. 2d 27, 45(D.D.C. 2013) (“Importantly, the plaintiff must establish thatthe allegedly harassing conduct complained of was basedon a protected characteristic.”). Second, although Plaintiffdoes allege that her supervisors discriminated against herbecause of her disability, her allegations do not describebehavior that is sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to constitutea hostile work environment. Mr. Williams's alleged criticismof Plaintiff's use of FMLA leave, for example, resembles thesort of “offensive utterance” and “sporadic use of abusivelanguage” that the Supreme Court has deemed insufficientlysevere to make out a hostile work environment claim. SeeFaragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Furthermore, Plaintiff supportsher hostile work environment claim with “the same discreteacts” upon which she bases her ADA discrimination andretaliation claims, which is “disfavored.” Townsend, 236 F.Supp. 3d at 312; see also Lester v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11,
ALEXANDRIA JONES, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.633 (D.D.C. 2003) (“Discrete acts constituting discriminationor retaliation claims ... are different in kind from a hostilework environment claim that must be based on severe andpervasive discriminatory intimidation or insult.”). AlthoughPlaintiff's allegations that she was “exclud[ed] from meetingsand communications” and “remov[ed] from supervisoryresponsibilities,” see Compl. 123, might constitute discretediscriminatory acts, Plaintiff cannot transform these acts,without further allegations showing of a “pervasive pattern ofsevere harassment,” into a hostile work environment claim.Wade v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.D.C.2011); see also Davis v. Ashcroft, 355 F. Supp. 2d 330, 347–48 (D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting a hostile work environment claimbased on alleged exclusion from management decisions anda partial loss of job duties). Accordingly, the Court dismissesPlaintiff's hostile work environment claim in its entirety.V. LEAVE TO AMEND*7 In her opposition brief, Plaintiff requests leave to amendher complaint to “cure any perceived pleading deficiencies”should the Court rule for Defendant. See Pl.’s Opp'n to Def.’sMot. at 20, ECF No. 9. Plaintiff is right that Federal Ruleof Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) instructs courts to “freely” giveleave to amend “when justice so requires.” However, “anopposition brief is not the proper place to request leaveto amend a complaint.” Strum v. Mardam-Bey, No. 24-cv-401, 2025 WL 405120, at *11 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2025)(citation omitted). Without the benefit of a separate motion forleave to amend and proposed amended pleading, as requiredunder our local rules, the Court is unable to evaluate themerits of Plaintiff's request for leave to amend. See id. TheCourt therefore denies Plaintiff's present request, but withoutprejudice to Plaintiff's filing of a separate motion for leave toamend in compliance with our local rules.VI. USE OF NONEXISTENT QUOTATIONSAs Defendant observes, Plaintiff's counsel, Donald Quinn,cites to nonexistent quotations at several points in Plaintiff'sopposition brief. See Def.’s Reply at 3 (noting that Plaintiff's“opposition brief persistently attributes quotations to casesthat do not contain the quoted material”); see also id. at 4& n.1. Mr. Quinn's citations to nonexistent quotations bearthe hallmarks of reliance on an artificial intelligence tool.See Williams v. Cap. One Bank, N.A., No. 24-cv-2032, 2025WL 843285, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2025) (“Courts haverecently seen increasing reliance on artificial intelligence inlegal proceedings, leading to the use of nonexistent citationsin court documents.”).Reliance on misquoted or nonexistent authorities in courtfilings is not acceptable: it contravenes an attorney's dutytoward his client to exercise professional judgment andresponsibility. See Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610, 614–15 (2dCir. 2024); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (“By presenting tothe court a pleading, written motion, or other paper ... anattorney ... certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonableunder the circumstances ... the claims, defenses, and otherlegal contentions are warranted by existing law ....”); D.C.R. Pro. Cond. 3.3(a)(1) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly ...[m]ake a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal ....”).Given Mr. Quinn's apparent violations of the Federal Rulesof Civil Procedure and the District of Columbia Rules ofProfessional Conduct, Mr. Quinn is advised that furtherviolations will not be tolerated and may result in sanctionsand/or referral to a disciplinary committee.VII. CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Partial Motion toDismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED. Counts II and V ofPlaintiff's complaint are dismissed in their entireties, andCount III is dismissed to the extent it relies on Title VII. Anorder consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separatelyand contemporaneously issued.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2977585Footnotes
ALEXANDRIA JONES, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.71Plaintiff also alleges that her termination occurred “in a context that gives rise to an inference of age-based discrimination.” Compl. 102. However, her complaint contains no facts elaborating on this allegation.Without more, this conclusory allegation is insufficient to withstand Defendant's motion to dismiss. SeeAshcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.2The Court further agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's opposition brief fails to address the substance ofDefendant's arguments in support of dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim. See Def.’s Reply at5. “It is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition brief to a dispositive motionand addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that theplaintiff failed to address as conceded.” Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Glob. Ministries, 284 F. Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003). Although the Court has chosen to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim on themerits, dismissal would have also been warranted based on Plaintiff's concession.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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