Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, No. 2025-CAB-8255 (D.C. (D.D.C.) 2026)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
District of Columbia (D.D.C.)
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1345470 (D.C.Super.) (Trial Order)Superior Court of the District of Columbia,Civil Division.Kimberlynn JURKOWSKI, Plaintiff,v.Mscott BERKOWITZ et al., Defendants.No. 2025-CAB-8255.April 21, 2026.*1 Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citation references that are incorrect or do notactually exist. These invalid citations appeared in the original court opinion and have been preserved aswritten since they are part of the official record. Any links to these invalid citations have been removed.Next Event: Remote Status ConferenceJuly 17, 2026, at 10:30 a.m.OrderVeronica Sanchez, Judge.This matter is before the Court on: (1) the WTU Defendants'1Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint, filed onJanuary 9, 2026; (2) the DCPS Defendants'2Motion for Clarification and Motion for Extension of Time to Respond, filed onJanuary 12, 2026; (3) Defendant Lona Valmoro's Motion to Dismiss, filed on January 14, 2026; (4) Plaintiff's Motion to AmendComplaint, filed on January 17, 2026; (5) Defendant Jonathan Stivers' Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 3, 2026; (6) DistrictDefendants, Capital Hill PTA, and Lona Valmoro's Joint Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, filed on February 21, 2026;(7) Plaintiff's Motion Disqualify OAG Opposing Counsel for Private Individuals and or Co-Defendants, filed on February 26,2026; (8) the WTU Defendants' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 23, 2026; (9) Defendant Applebaum's andWeir's Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 26, 2026; (10) Defendant Tull's Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 26, 2026; (11)Defendant Kitchel's Motion to Dismiss, filed on March 6, 2026; (12) Plaintiff's Motion to File Second Amended Complaint, filedon March 11, 2026; (13) Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of Video Evidence, filed on March 13, 2026; (14) Plaintiff's SecondMotion for Admission of Video Evidence, filed on March 13, 2026; (15) Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of Audio Evidence,filed on March 13, 2026; (16) Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of 28 Signed Declarations for Evidence of Plaintiff, filed onMarch 14, 2026; (17) Defendant Black's Motion to Dismiss, filed on March 16, 2026; and (18) Defendant Black's AmendedMotion to Dismiss, filed on March 19, 2026.I. BackgroundPlaintiff initiated this case on December 15, 2025. The initial Complaint includes three paragraphs. The Complaint is not veryclear, however, the allegations appear to be as follows: In December of 2021, Plaintiff was employed as a librarian at WatkinsElementary School in the District of Columbia. Compl. 1. At that time, Defendant Berkowitz was employed as the school'sprincipal, and Defendant Moxley was employed by the school as a teacher. Id. On December 17, 2021, Defendant Moxley“forced her students to write papers” that stated the students had participated in a Holocaust reenactment during their libraryclass with Plaintiff. Id. Defendant Moxley then brought those papers to Defendant Berkowitz, who initiated an investigation intowhether such a reenactment had taken place. Id. Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave, and her employment was ultimately
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2terminated on February 14, 2022. Id. Plaintiff raises eight counts: (1) Civil Conspiracy; (2) Tortious Interference with Contract;(3) Defamation; (4) “Fraud Misrepresentation”; (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (6) Negligence; (7) WrongfulTermination; and (8) Retaliation in violation of the DCHRA. Id. Plaintiff requests a variety of relief, including compensatoryand punitive damages, an order that Plaintiff's position be reinstated, and attorney fees and costs. Id. 2. The Complaint statesthat several Defendants other than Defendants Berkowitz and Moxley are connected to the case. However, the Complaint makesno clear allegations against those Defendants. Id. 3. Plaintiff filed the Complaint against thirty-one Defendants.*2 Since the initiation of the case, the Parties have filed multiple motions. Notably, Plaintiff has filed two motions to amendthe Complaint, which are among the motions that are addressed herein. Plaintiff also filed motions for default against all of theDefendants, as well as Motions for Default Judgment.On March 20, 2026, the Court held a Remote Initial Scheduling Conference. At the hearing, the Court set a Status Hearing toprovide the Court time to resolve the pending Motions. The Court granted the District Defendants until March 27, 2026, to filea response to Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend the Complaint, and granted the remaining Defendants until April 3, 2026, tofile their response to Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend the Complaint.On March 23, 2026, the Court issued a written order denying Plaintiff's Motions for Default and Motions for Default Judgment.II. DiscussionA. Plaintiff's Motion to DisqualifyOn February 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to disqualify the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) fromrepresenting individual Defendants. “[D]isqualification of an attorney is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of thetrial court ....” Derrickson v. Derrickson, 541 A.2d 149, 152 (D.C. 1988) (citing O'Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 344 (D.C.1982)).The Court notes that Plaintiff's motion is frequently disjointed and lacks focus. However, ultimately, the motion includes twomain contentions. Plaintiff suggests on one hand that OAG may not represent private individuals in matters that do not involvethe District of Columbia's legal interests. Mot. to Disqualify at 8–12. Plaintiff also suggests that OAG should not be able torepresent the individual District Defendants because a conflict of interest exists. Id. at 7–8.The District Defendants filed an Opposition on March 5, 2026. In the Opposition, the District Defendants argue that OAG hasonly entered an appearance on behalf of individual defendants who are current or former employees of the District of Columbiaand that both common law and the D.C. Code support its authority to do so. Opp'n at 3–5. The District Defendants also arguethat no conflict of interest exists. Id. at 5–6.1. OAG AuthorityPlaintiff suggests that OAG does not have the authority to represent the individual Defendants. See id. at 8–12. The partieshave not provided, and the Court has not found precedent that directly addresses the issue. However, D.C. Code § 1-301.81provides that:The Attorney General for the District of Columbia (“Attorney General”) shall have charge and conduct of all law businessof the said District and all suits instituted by and against the government thereof, and shall possess all powers affordedthe Attorney General by the common and statutory law of the District and shall be responsible for upholding the publicinterest. The Attorney General shall have the power to control litigation and appeals, as well as the power to intervene inlegal proceedings on behalf of this public interest.
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not offered a sufficient argument as to why the representation of the individualDistrict Defendants in this lawsuit is not part of the law business of the District or a matter of public interest. Plaintiff's claimsarise from Plaintiff's employment with the District and the events surrounding the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.The termination of Plaintiff's employment with the District is the business of the District. A legal claim arising from the decisionto terminate Plaintiff's employment is therefore very plausibly law business of the District. While Plaintiff contends that thisa private matter, and that the Defendants have acted in their individual capacity outside the scope of their employment, thosebare allegations are not sufficient to disqualify OAG from providing representation in connection with this case.*3 Additionally, as the Defendants argue, OAG has reason to be concerned that the District could potentially be liable undera respondeat superior theory. See Opp'n at 4 (citing D.C. v. Davis, 386 A.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. 1978)). This provides furtherreason why this proceeding may constitute law business of the district.The Court notes that Plaintiff cites to a variety of rules in support of her Motion. However, Plaintiff simply provides no coherentor sufficient argument for disqualifying OAG from representing the individual District Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff'smotion to disqualify OAG for lack of authority is denied.2. Conflict of InterestPlaintiff argues that OAG may not represent individual Defendants in this matter because of a conflict of interest. Mot. toDisqualify at 1–2, 7–8. For a motion to disqualify based on a conflict of interest, the rule is that “[w]here any substantialrelationship can be shown between the subject matter of a former representation and that of a subsequent adverse representation,the latter will be prohibited.” Derrickson, 541 A.2d at 151 (quoting Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment,486 A.2d 37, 42 (D.C. 1984) (internal quotation omitted). For such a motion to succeed, the movant must show “than an attorney-client relationship formerly existed,” and that “the current litigation is substantially related to the prior representation.” Id. at 152.The Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she previously had an attorney-client relationship with OAG inconnection with any lawsuit. Nor does Plaintiff's motion appear to argue that one existed. The motion appears to argue that thereis a conflict among the Defendants, not between Plaintiff and OAG. See Mot. to Disqualify at 2 (“It is these defendants whohave not been given full disclosure, and it is these defendants who do not realize the conflict that exists between the loyaltiesof both OAG and James & Hoffman …”). However, Plaintiff's motion does not succeed on this ground for multiple reasons.First, Plaintiff does not explain the facts of the alleged conflict between the Defendants at all. Second, even if there were such aconflict between the defendants, Plaintiff does not provide a sufficient reason why the conflict would be grounds for Plaintiff'smotion to disqualify. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to disqualify based on a conflict of interest is denied.B. WTU Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to RespondOn January 9, 2026, the WTU Defendants moved to extend the time to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court may grantan extension of time to respond to the Complaint upon a showing of good cause. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b).In support of the Motion, the WTU Defendants represent that they “require additional time to address internal authorization forits Counsel to represent the former officers named as Defendants in this matter and for the execution of appropriate retaineragreements.” WTU Def.'s Mot. Extend 6. The WTU Defendants also represented that their Counsel would be on medicalleave from January 21, 2026 to February 5, 2026. Id. 7. Counsel also represented that they had spoken with OAG regardingthe District Defendants' motion that requested similar relief. Id. 9.Plaintiff filed an Opposition on January 15, 2026. The Court finds that the January 15, 2026, Opposition does not make anyreal argument against the extension of the deadline. It appears that the Opposition mainly argues that the WTU should notbe permitted to represent individual Defendants. Opp'n to WTU Def.'s Mot. Extend at 2. Plaintiff cites to a variety of rules,
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4primarily citing to the D.C. Rules of Professional conduct. Id. at 1. However, Plaintiff provides little to no explanation of howthose rules apply to the request for an extension or to the contention that WTU counsel should be disqualified from representingDefendants Fuchs, Pogue-Lyons, and Bell.*4 First, as it relates to disqualification, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not provided a sufficient argument as to why theWTU Counsel should not be permitted to represent individual defendants. Plaintiff's Opposition appears to suggest that theindividual WTU defendants are being sued in their individual capacity for acts taken outside the scope of their employment.Id. at 2. However, neither Plaintiff's Opposition, nor the pleadings make it clear that the individual Defendants are being suedfor acts unrelated to their relationship with the WTU.Second, the Court finds good cause to grant the requested extension. The extension was requested early in the litigation. ThisComplaint involves a large number of Defendants, which makes the administration of the case more difficult for all Parties.The Defendant's motion notes that counsel needed to research the issue of organizational representation of individuals in a legalmatter, which may take time. WTU Def.'s Mot. Extend 6. Defense counsel also noted that the extension was partly predicatedon a personal medical issue of limited duration. Id. 7. These factors weigh in favor of granting the requested extension andoutweigh any prejudice to Plaintiff that an extension may cause. Accordingly, the Court will grant the requested extension.C. The DCPS Defendants' Contested Motion for ClarificationOn January 12, 2026, the District of Columbia Public Schools, Susan Bloom, Katherine Moxley, Kathryn Kayne, CourtneyDeAnda, and Jill Stewart (collectively the “DCPS Defendants”)3, jointly filed a Contested Motion for Clarification and Motionfor Extension of Time to Respond. The Motion requests:“(1) clarification on the response deadline for former District of Columbia Employees sued in an individual capacity for anact or omission occurring in connection with the duties performed on the District's behalf under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(a)(3),and (2) that the deadline for all defendants who have been served be 60 days from the date of service or February 23, 2026,whichever is later.” Mot. Clarification at 1–2.Plaintiff filed an Opposition on January 15, 2026. Similar to Plaintiff's Opposition to the WTU Defendants' Motion to Extend,Plaintiff cites to a variety of rules, but does not explain how the rules apply. Plaintiff also does not argue against the requestedextension. In fact, the Opposition does not appear to make a request at all but asserts that the individual defendants are beingsued in their individual capacity, unrelated to DCPS business.1. Motion for ClarificationThe Court will address the Defendants' motion for clarification first. The Court is persuaded that Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(a)(3)should apply to former District employees. First, Defendant is correct that the Comment to the Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12 indicatesthat the Rules are nearly identical. And it is well established the Superior Court looks to the interpretation of the FederalRules for guidance to the extent that the Rules are the same. See e.g., In Re Herndon, 596 A.2d 592, 596, n.5 (D.C. 1991)(“We look to federal rule precedent in interpreting Superior Court discovery rules that are substantially the same as the federalrules.”) (citation omitted). Defendant is also correct that the Advisory Committee Notes for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureexplicitly provide that the Federal Rule12(a)(3) should apply to former employees who are sued in an individual capacity inconnection with their duties. Given the similarity between the rules, the Court does not find a reason for the Court to applythe Rule differently. Therefore, the Court finds that Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(a)(3) applies to former employees sued in connectionwith their duties.2. Motion to Extend Time for All Defendants
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5*5 As for extending the time to respond for all Defendants, the Court may grant an extension of time to respond to theComplaint upon a showing of good cause. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b).In support of extending the time to respond for all Defendants, the DCPS Defendants argue that some individual Defendants wereserved shortly before the December holiday season, that OAG required additional time to confirm representation of individualDefendants, and that the extension would streamline proceedings by putting all of the Defendants on a similar schedule. Mot.Clarification at 3. Defense also counsel indicated that they were preparing for a seven-day trial beginning on February 2, 2026.Id.The Court finds that under the circumstances, there is good cause to grant the extension for all Defendants. First, the numerosityof Defendants complicates the administration of the case. Second, the factual allegations of the claims are old, which couldcomplicate drafting a response. Third, providing the extension for all Defendants promotes the orderly administration of thecase. Accordingly, the Court will grant the Defendants' Motion.D. Plaintiff's First Motion to AmendOn January 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion to File First Amended Petition and Complaint. The Motion suggests that it isfiled as of right pursuant to Rule 15.Rule 15 provides:A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course no later than: (A) 21 days after serving it; or (B) if the pleadingis one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service ofa motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15(a)(1). In this case, Plaintiff's Complaint is one to which a responsive pleading is required. DefendantValmoro filed an Answer and Motion to Dismiss on January 7, 2026. Plaintiff filed her Motion to file First Amended Petitionand Complaint ten days later on January 17, 2026. Therefore, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint was filed as of right pursuantto Rule 15, and the Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion to File First Amended Petition and Complaint.Additionally, as Defendant Valmoro's first Motion to Dismiss, filed on January 14, 2026, refers to the initial Complaint, thatMotion is moot.E. Plaintiff's Second Motion to AmendOn March 11, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion to File 2nd Proposed Amended Petition and Complaint (“Second Motion toAmend”). The filing does not formally request leave to amend, and it does not provide argument in support of a request for leaveto amend. The filing primarily appears to be a Proposed Second Amended Complaint as well as a variety of exhibits, totalingmore than three hundred pages. When the Court refers to the Proposed Second Amended Complaint, the Court is referring toPages 1–17 of Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend.On March 27, 2026, the District Defendants filed an Opposition to Defendant's Second Motion to Amend. The Opposition makestwo arguments. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint would be futile. Defendants also assertthat the proposed pleading contains false citations that appear to have been generated by an artificial intelligence tool and arguethat requiring the Defendants to respond to such a Complaint would be prejudicial. Regarding the merit of the Complaint, theDefendants argue that (i) all of Plaintiff's claims are time-barred; (ii) Plaintiff's claims are employment related and thereforebarred by the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act; and (iii) the Proposed Second Amended Complaint fails to state a legallycognizable cause of action against the Defendants.
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6*6 On March 30, 2026, Defendant Kitchel filed an Opposition that joins and adopts the District Defendants' Opposition. OnApril 3, 2026, Defendants Applebaum and Weir also filed an Opposition that joins the District Defendants' Opposition.On April 2, 2026, the WTU Defendants filed an Opposition that argues the claims against them cannot proceed because theclaims are properly within the scope of the CMPA, and therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction.1. Applicable Legal Standardsa. Motions to AmendThe Civil Rules provide that the Court should freely grant leave to amend “as justice so requires.” Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15(a)(3).“In determining whether ‘justice so requires' granting leave, [the court considers] five factors: (1) the number of requests toamend made by the movant; (2) the length of time the case has been pending; (3) bad faith or dilatory tactics on the part of themovant; (4) the merit of the proffered pleading; and (5) prejudice to the nonmoving party.” Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth.957 A.2d 45, 51 (D.C. 2008) (quoting Sherman v. Adoption Ctr. Of Washington, Inc., 741 A.2d 1031, 1037 (D.C. 1999)). Whilethe decision to grant leave to amend is within the discretion of the trial court, “there is a ‘virtual presumption’ a court shouldgrant leave to amend unless there is a good reason to the contrary.” Id. (quoting Howard University v. Good Food Services,Inc., 608 A.2d 116, 120 (D.C. 1992) (citation omitted)).Leave to amend may be denied where the amendment would be futile. Miller-McGee v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 920 A.2d 430, 436(D.C. 2007). “An amended complaint is futile if it merely restates the same facts as the original complaint in different terms,reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a legal theory or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.”Robinson v. Detroit News, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 101, 114 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Rayner v. Yale Steam Laundry Condo. Ass'n,289 A.3d 387, 402 (D.C. 2023) (declining to find an abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend where trial court consideredthe proffered pleading and concluded it did not have merit).b. Motions to Dismiss“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on its face.” Potomac Development Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 544 (D.C. 2011) (quotationand citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to drawthe reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quotation and citations omitted). “Wherea complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibilityand plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). “To satisfy Rule 8(a), plaintiffs must nudge theirclaims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Tingling-Clemons v. District of Columbia, 133 A.3d 241, 246 (D.C. 2016)(quotation and citation omitted).“A complaint should not be dismissed because a court does not believe that a plaintiff will prevail on its claim; indeed it mayappear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” Carlyle InvestmentManagement, LLC v. Ace American Insurance Co., 131 A.3d 886, 894 (D.C. 2016) (quotations, brackets, and citations omitted).In addition, the Court should “draw all inferences from the factual allegations of the complaint in the plaintiff's favor.”Id. (quotations and citations omitted). However, legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” PotomacDevelopment Corp., 28 A.3d at 544 (quotation and citation omitted), so “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause ofaction, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Sundberg v. TTR Realty, LLC, 109 A.3d 1123, 1128–29 (D.C.2015) (quotation omitted). The “complaint must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference thatdefendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Poola v. Howard University, 147 A.3d 267, 276 (D.C. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.72. Futility of Amendment*7 Upon review, the Court finds that granting leave to amend would be futile because the Proposed Second AmendedComplaint would not overcome a motion to dismiss based on the untimeliness of the claims.In short, the Proposed Second Amended Complaint does not include allegations from which the Court could reasonably inferthat any of the alleged conduct took place within the applicable statute of limitations period. The pleading mentions only thefollowing dates: December 14, 2021, December 17, 2021, January 6, 2022, and March 7, 2022. The pleading alleges that onDecember 14, 2021, Plaintiff participated in an unspecified complaint process. See Second Mot. Am. at 6, 12. There does notappear to be any allegation that any Defendant took any action against Plaintiff on that date. As for December 17, 2021, thepleading generally states the Defendants' alleged wrongful conduct began on this date. Id. at 2, 6, 9, 10. Plaintiff indicates thatto be the date on which Plaintiff alleges Defendant Moxley brought the student's papers to Defendant Berkowitz. Id. at 3. Asfor January 6, 2022, Plaintiff appears to claim that statements were published on the Edwin Black Show, and possibly a varietyof other social media outlets. Id. at 4. The pleading indicates that Plaintiff's employment was terminated on March 7, 2022.Id. at 12. Finally, the Court notes that in multiple places in the proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that theDefendants' violations have occurred from “12-17-21-present,” or some variation thereof. Id. at 2, 9, 10, 13.The statute of limitations for defamation claims is one year. D.C. Code § 12-301. The statute of limitations for Plaintiff's DCHRAclaims are also one year. D.C. Code § 2-1403.04. The statute of limitations for the remaining claims is three years. D.C. Code §12-301(8). Plaintiff initiated this case on December 15, 2025. Except for the allegation that some of the conduct occurred from“12-17-21-present,” the Complaint does not allege that any Defendant took any action within three years prior to December15, 2025. As for Plaintiff's allegations that conduct has occurred “12-17-21-present,” the Court finds these allegations areinsufficient to establish that any of the alleged conduct occurred within the limitation period because the claims are extremelyvague and functionally conclusory. The claims simply do not provide sufficient factual information from which the Court couldreasonably infer that any Defendant is responsible for the alleged conduct within the limitation period.a. Continuing-Tort TheoryThe Court notes that Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants have committed a continuing tort. Second Mot. Am. at 2(“Because this conspiracy involved continuous, ongoing, and interconnected wrongful acts causing cumulative harm, the statuteof limitations under D.C. Code § 12-301 did not begin to run until the final act on [2025].”) (brackets in original). A continuingtort may function to toll a statute of limitations. See e.g., National Tel. Coop. Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.1998). However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled a continuing tort theory.“Under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff establishes a continuing tort by showing ‘(1) a continuous and repetitious wrong,(2) with damages flowing from the act as a whole rather than from each individual act, and (3) at least one injurious act withinthe limitation period.”’ National Tel. Coop. Ass'n, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting Whelan v. Abell, 953 F.2d 663,673 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Because the Proposed Second Amended Complaint does not allege sufficient facts from which the Courtcould infer that the Defendants took any actions taken after March 7, 2022, there is nothing in the pleading from which the Courtcould infer that at least one injurious act occurred within the limitation period. Further, the proposed pleading does not allegehow the damages flowed from the acts as a whole rather than from each individual act, and it is not otherwise clear from thenature of the allegations that they would have. Therefore, a continuing tort theory does not overcome the issue of the time bar.b. Discovery-Rule Theory*8 In Plaintiff's Reply to the District Defendants' Opposition, Plaintiff suggests that she recently discovered information thatgave rise to her claims. See Reply in Supp. of Second Mot. Am. at 2–3. As a general rule, under D.C. law, “[w]here the factof an injury can be readily determined, a claim accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations at the time the injury actually
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8occurs.” Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust 2001-4, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16, 41 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Mullin v. Wash. FreeWeekly, Inc., 785 A.2d 296, 298 (D.C. 2001)). However, where the fact of an injury is not readily apparent, the Court may applythe discovery rule to determine when the claim accrued. Id. “Under the discovery rule, ‘the statute of limitations will not rununtil [a] plaintiff[] know[s] or reasonably should have known that they suffered injury due to the defendants' wrongdoing.”’ Id.(quoting Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 614 A.2d 469, 473 (D.C. 1994)). “[F]or a cause of action to accrue where the discoveryrule is applicable, one must know or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know (1) of the injury, (2) its cause in fact,and (3) of some evidence of wrongdoing.” Id. at 42. The discovery rule may apply where fraudulent concealment has preventeda plaintiff from discovering an injury. See Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth. v. Quik Serve Foods, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 198, 202(D.D.C. 2005) (“Situations where the discovery exception tolls the statute of limitations include … fraudulent concealment.”).In this case, Plaintiff's Reply seems to suggest that she has discovered that Defendants have fraudulently concealed someinformation. See Reply 5–6. However, Plaintiff does not explain how Defendants fraudulently concealed the alleged injuryeither in her Reply, or in the proposed pleading. The central allegation of the proposed Second Amended Complaint is thatthe Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy to defame Plaintiff by falsely accusing her of certain workplace actions, and thatthe defamation led to Plaintiff's termination and related injuries that resulted from widespread publication of the accusations.Nowhere in the proposed Second Amended Complaint does Plaintiff suggest that she was not made aware of the allegedlydefamatory statements prior to her employment termination. In fact, Plaintiff alleges that some of the Defendants “joined topush the news story out to the local, national, and international news [], starting 2pm 12-17-21.” Second Mot. Am. at 3. Thisis significant because, “[i]n defamation cases … at least where mass media are involved, ‘the fact of … injury can be readilydetermined,’ and thus any resulting defamation claims will ‘accrue … for purposes of the statute of limitations at the time theinjury actually occurs,’ i.e., publication.” Mullin v. Wash. Free Weekly, 785 A.2d 296, 299 (D.C. 2001) (quoting Colbert, 614A.2d at 472 (D.C. 1994)). Therefore, assuming Plaintiff's allegations are true, and that publication was in fact made by local,national, and international news, then the alleged defamatory statements would likely have begun to accrue at least within theperiod between December 17, 2021, and March 7, 2022. Accordingly, it appears from the Proposed Second Amended Complaintthat Plaintiff was aware of the alleged injuries, and therefore the discovery rule would not apply to Plaintiff's claims.For these reasons, the Court finds that the proposed amendment would time-barred, and therefore, amendment would be futile.Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend. Because the time-bar is sufficient at this stage to deny theMotion, the Court will not address the Defendants' arguments related to the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act or failure tostate a claim, though the Court acknowledges that they may be merited. The Court addresses the District Defendants' argumentsregarding the use of artificial intelligence below.F. Additional Opportunity to Move to AmendAlthough the Court herein denies Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend because the claims appear to be untimely, the Court willgrant Plaintiff an additional opportunity to move to amend the Complaint. In the District of Columbia, the Court recognizes thestrong judicial and societal preference for resolution of disputes on the merits, and a strong presumption in favor of amendment.See e.g., Abell v. Wang, 697 A.2d 796, 800 (D.C. 1997) (discussing the preference for resolution on the merits); Taylor v. D.C.Water & Sewer Auth., 957 A.2d 45, 51 (D.C. 2008). While the Court finds that Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaintis deficient, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff has attempted to add factual allegations in an attempt to cure the deficiencies ofher prior pleadings. The Court also recognizes that Plaintiff has attempted to argue theories that she believes may overcome thetime bar or otherwise overcome the Defendants' arguments for dismissal of this action. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffis proceeding pro se, and the Court considers its obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally. See e.g., Elmore v. Stevens,824 A.2d 44, 46 (D.C. 2003) (discussing limitations to the Court's duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally). The Court alsoconsiders the strong presumption in favor of granting leave to amend. Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 957 A.2d 45, 51(D.C. 2008).*9 Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiff an additional opportunity to file a motion to amend the Complaint. Plaintiff mayfile a new motion to amend the Complaint within thirty days of the issuance of this Order. In the motion, Plaintiff must address
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9why the Court should grant leave to amend under the circumstances. Plaintiff should be aware that the Court will not grantleave to amend if Plaintiff is unable to cure the deficiencies of her Complaint. The Defendants may file an opposition to anymotion to amend in the ordinary course pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12-I, i.e. within fourteen days after service of the motion.Plaintiff may file a reply within seven days after service of an opposition.F. Plaintiff's Motions for Admission of EvidenceOn March 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed three Motions to Admit Evidence. These motions ask the Court to rule that certain audio andvideo evidence is admissible. At this juncture, the motions are moot. The three motions do not relate the described evidencethat Plaintiff seeks to admit to any other motion or relevant filing. The Court will not decide, prior to the parties engaging inany discovery, whether the proposed evidence would be admissible at trial or for any other unspecified purpose. The Court willdeny these three motions as moot.On March 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Admit 28 Signed Declarations into the record. For this Motion, Plaintiff appearsto request that the Court admit her own declarations into the record. No party has filed an opposition. To the extent that Plaintiffseeks to admit her own affidavits into the record, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion. However, to the extent that Plaintiffwishes for the Court to review these affidavits in connection with a motion or pleading, Plaintiff must reference them specifically.This filing consists of three-hundred and ninety pages. Many of these pages are extremely unfocused. The Court is not obligatedto sift through Plaintiff's voluminous record to determine whether Plaintiff has made her case. It is Plaintiff's responsibility todirect the Court to the specific portion of the record that she believes supports her claims.G. Remaining Motions to DismissThere remain nine pending Motions to Dismiss, which are listed below.4 Because the Court is granting Plaintiff an additionalopportunity to move to amend the Complaint, the Court will at this time deny the pending Motions to Dismiss as moot, andwithout prejudice. The Defendants may renew their motions to dismiss at a later date, if the motions remain relevant.F. Use of Artificial IntelligenceMultiple Defendants have suggested that Plaintiff has used artificial intelligence tools to draft her pleadings. In particular, theDistrict Defendants assert that Plaintiff's use of artificial intelligence resulted in Plaintiff submitting nonexistent or spuriouscase citations to this Court. District. Def.'s Opp'n to Second Mot. Am. at 12–14.First, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Proposed Second Amended Complaint, and other filings, such as Plaintiff's Reply to theDistrict Defendants in support of the Second Motion to Amend, and Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify do appear to have beenconstructed using artificial intelligence tools. The Court bases this finding on the extremely disjointed, and often incoherentnature of the writing combined with the use and misuse of technical legal language, as well as the appearance that some portionof Plaintiffs' filings appear to include questions that were generated by an artificial intelligence tool in response to user prompts.*10 Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff did submit one case citation to this Court that does not exist. In Plaintiff'sProposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff submitted the citation Chisholm v. Kidder Peabody Asset Mgmt, Inc., 810 A.2d900 (D.C. 2002) for the proposition that “civil conspiracy is a ‘parasitic tort.[’]” Second Mot. Am. at 2. This Court was unableto find this case in the Court reporters, either by searching the case name or the reporter number. A Lexis search of the casename within District of Columbia precedent returns no results. A Lexis search of the reporter number returns the case Harkinsv. United States, 810 A.2d 895 (D.C. 2002). Harkin does not include the proposition that Plaintiff states, nor does Harkin appearto be otherwise relevant to this case.
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10The Court also finds that Plaintiff did submit case law that does not stand for the proposition that it is asserted for. Plaintiffsubmitted the citation Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929 (D.C. 1995), asserting that it “distinguish[es] between acontinuous tort and a single act with continuous effects.” Second, Mot. Am. at 2. This case does not discuss such a distinction.While the use of artificial intelligence tools is not in and of itself a violation of the Civil Rules, the submission of nonexistentor egregiously inaccurate legal citations may violate Superior Court Civil Rule 11. To ensure that the Parties are aware of theirobligations, the Court will remind the parties that Rule 11 states:By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper, including an electronic filing—whether by signing, filing,submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increasethe cost of litigation;(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument forextending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support aftera reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based onbelief or a lack of information.D.C. SCR-Civil Rule 11. Failure to comply with Rule 11 may result in sanctions, including the striking of a motion or pleading.H. Continued Initial Scheduling ConferenceFinally, given that the Court herein grants Plaintiff an additional opportunity to move to amend the Complaint, the Court willcontinue the Remote Status Hearing now set for April 22, 2026, to provide for a briefing schedule. The Court will reschedulethe hearing for July 17, 2026 at 10:30 a.m.Accordingly, it is on this, 21st day of April, 2026, hereby:ORDERED that (1) the WTU Defendants Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint, filed on January 9, 2026,is GRANTED; it is furtherORDERED that the DCPS Defendants Motion for Clarification and Motion for Extension of Time to Respond, filed on January12, 2026 is GRANTED; it is furtherORDERED that Defendant Lona Valmoro's Motion to Dismiss, filed on January 14, 2026, is DENIED AS MOOT; it is furtherORDERED Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, filed on January 17, 2026, is GRANTED AS OF RIGHT; it is furtherORDERED that Defendant Jonathan Stivers' Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 3, 2026, is DENIED AS MOOT; it is further*11 ORDERED that the District Defendants, Capital Hill PTA, and Lona Valmoro's Joint Motion to Dismiss AmendedComplaint, filed on February 21, 2026, is DENIED AS MOOT; it is further
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion Disqualify OAG Opposing Counsel for Private Individuals and or Co-Defendants, filed onFebruary 21, 2026, is DENIED; it is furtherORDERED that the WTU Defendants' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 23, 2026, is DENIED AS MOOT;it is furtherORDERED that Defendants Applebaum and Weir's Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 26, 2026, is DENIED AS MOOT;it is furtherORDERED that Defendant Tull's Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 26, 2026, is DENIED AS MOOT; it is furtherORDERED that Defendant Kitchel's Motion to Dismiss, filed on March 6, 2026, is DENIED AS MOOT; it is furtherORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to File Second Amended Complaint, filed on March 11, 2026, is DENIED; it is furtherORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of Video Evidence, filed on March 13, 2026, Plaintiff's [Second] Motion forAdmission of Video Evidence, filed on March 13, 2026, and Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of Audio Evidence, filed on March13, 2026, are DENIED AS MOOT; it is furtherORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Admission of 28 Signed Declarations for Evidence of Plaintiff, filed on March 14, 2026,is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to admit her own affidavits into the record; it is furtherORDERED that Defendant Black's Motion to Dismiss, filed on March 16, 2026; and Defendant Black's Amended Motion toDismiss, filed on March 19, 2026, are DENIED AS MOOT; it is furtherORDERED that Plaintiff may file a motion to amend the Complaint within thirty days of the issuance of this Order, and thatthe parties may file opposition and replies in the ordinary course pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12-I; it is furtherORDERED that the Remote Status Hearing scheduled for April 22, 2026 is CONTINUED to July 17, 2026 at 10:30 a.m.SO ORDERED.<<signature>>Judge Veronica SanchezCopies to parties.Instructions for Remote Hearings Before Judge Veronica Sanchez Courtroom 200Parties and counsel may access Virtual Courtroom 200 in the following ways:(1) Going to the WebEx website at https://dccourts.webex.com/meet/ctb200 or going to https://dccourts.webex.com and, under“Join a Meeting,” entering Meeting ID number 179 813 6225; or(2) Downloading the WebEx Meetings app, opening the app, selecting Join Meeting, and entering https://dccourts.webex.com/meet/ctb200; or(3) Calling 1-844-992-4726 or 202-860-2110 and entering Meeting ID number 179 813 6225 #, then # again.
Jurkowski v. Berkowitz, 2026 WL 1345470 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12Parties having trouble connecting to their remote hearing may contact chambers at JudgeSanchezChambers@dcsc.gov. Staffwill be monitoring the e-mail closely during hearings. Failure to appear at a proceeding, including remote proceedings,may result in dismissal of a case or entry of default.PLEASE NOTE: Counsel is required to appear via WebEx video and log in so that their name appears on screen, absentextenuating circumstances that make it necessary for them to appear via telephone, or unless telephonic appearance isapproved by Chambers prior to the hearing. All other parties are highly encouraged, but not required, to appear viaWebEx video and identify themselves by name.*12 When entering the virtual courtroom (by dialing in on a phone, or signing in through the website or app), the party shouldnot attempt to speak because another hearing may be underway. Each party should be automatically muted by the courtroomclerk when you first arrive. If you are using the WebEx website or the app, you may check in with the courtroom clerk usingthe “chat” function. If you are on a telephone, you should wait for your case to be called.Footnotes1The WTU Defendants include the Washington Teachers' Union, Local #6, AFT, AFL-CIO (“WTU”), and Defendants Fuchs, Pogue-Lyons, and Bell.2The DCPS Defendants include District of Columbia Public Schools, Susan Bloom, Katherine Moxley, Kathryn Kayne, CourtneyDeAnda, and Jill Stewart. This filing was submitted prior to the Office of the Attorney General entering their appearance on behalfof the current set of District Defendants.3The Court notes that at this time, OAG had not entered an appearance on behalf of all of the current District Defendants.4(1) Defendant Jonathan Stivers' Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 3, 2026; (2) District Defendants, Capital Hill PTA, and LonaValmoro's Joint Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, filed on February 21, 2026; (3) the WTU Defendants' Consolidated Motionto Dismiss, filed on February 23, 2026; (4) Defendant Applebaum's and Weir's Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 26, 2026; (5)Defendant Tull's Motion to Dismiss, filed on February 26, 2026; (6) Defendant Kitchel's Motion to Dismiss, filed on March 6, 2026;(7) Plaintiff's Motion to File Second Amended Complaint, (8) Defendant Black's Motion to Dismiss, filed on March 16, 2026; and(9) Defendant Black's Amended Motion to Dismiss, filed on March 19, 2026.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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