Kafeel v. CJDropshipping (May 22, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Saqib Kafeel v. CJDropshipping
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
May 22, 2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
SAQIB KAFEEL, Plaintiff, v. CJDROPSHIPPING, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1453740Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division,EASTERN DIVISION.SAQIB KAFEEL, Plaintiff,v.CJDROPSHIPPING, Defendant.No. 24 CV 11929|Filed: 05/22/2026Magistrate Judge Young B. KimMEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER*1 Plaintiff Saqib Kafeel sues Defendant CJDropshippingfor contributory trademark infringement and false designationof origin under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), andbreach of implied warranty, negligence, and indemnificationunder Illinois law. Kafeel says he suffered damages afterbeing sued for selling infringing products he first purchasedfrom Defendant. The court previously dismissed Kafeel'scomplaint and an amended version for lack of subject matterjurisdiction. (See R. 6; R. 7; R. 49.) Kafeel now contends thatthe inclusion of the Lanham Act claim in his second amendedcomplaint (“SAC”) establishes the requisite jurisdiction forthe court to adjudicate his case. Defendant disagrees, arguingthat the SAC suffers the same defects as Kafeel's priorversions, and then some. Before the court are Defendant'smotions: (1) to dismiss the SAC under Federal Rules of CivilProcedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) and the doctrineof forum non conveniens; and (2) for sanctions. For thefollowing reasons, the court grants the motion to dismisswith prejudice but denies the motion for sanctions withoutprejudice as moot:Background1Kafeel alleged in his original complaint that he usedDefendant's international dropshipping platform, whichconnects online retailers like his online store “Whimsyverse”with platforms such as Amazon, eBay, and Shopify,fulfilling orders and handling payment and shipment onbehalf of those online retailers. (R. 1, Compl. at 1-2.)He says he filed this lawsuit after he suffered “significantfinancial loss” when Blue Spring Partners, LLC (“BlueSpring”) sued Whimsyverse because Whimsyverse listedinfringing products for sale on those platforms and thecourt in that action froze his PayPal, Payoneer, and eBayaccounts. (Id.) Blue Spring in fact named Whimsyverse adefendant in Blue Spring Partners, LLC v. The Individuals,Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships,and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A,No. 24 CV 1548 (N.D. Ill.), after it determined that thesubject site was selling or offering for sale counterfeit goodsinfringing upon its trademarks, patents, and copyrights. (R.1, Compl. at 1; see also R. 49.) Kafeel alleges he contactedDefendant about his frozen accounts on June 28, 2024, butwhile Defendant “quickly deleted the infringing product from[its] website,” it “offer[ed] no support or resolution” forissues related to the frozen accounts, further “contribut[ing]to [his] financial losses and ongoing difficulties,” includingthe liquidation of certain crypto and stock accounts. (R. 1,Compl. at 2.)In the SAC Kafeel adds a Lanham Act claim based oncontributory trademark infringement and false designationof origin, in an apparent effort to cure defects in priorversions of the complaint—namely, the lack of subject matterjurisdiction. (R. 52, SAC ¶¶ 1, 5, 9-24, 26-28.) Defendantnow moves to dismiss the SAC on jurisdictional and othergrounds, (see generally R. 54, Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss), and forsanctions based on Kafeel's reliance on AI-hallucinated casecitations and quotations in court filings, (R. 59, Def.’s Mot.for Sanctions).AnalysisA. Motion to Dismiss*2 Defendant moves to dismiss the SAC under: (1) Rule12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Rule 12(b)(2) for failure to establish personal jurisdiction; (3) Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim; and (4) the doctrine of forumnon conveniens pursuant to a forum selection clause includedin the parties’ user agreement. (See generally R. 54, Def.’sMot. to Dismiss.)1. Rule 12(b)(6)The court turns first to Defendant's principal argument—thatKafeel has not sufficiently stated a Lanham Act claim. (R.
SAQIB KAFEEL, Plaintiff, v. CJDROPSHIPPING, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.254, Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1-5.) To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)motion, the complaint must assert a facially plausible claimand provide fair notice of its basis. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “whenthe plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court todraw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable forthe misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009). Under this standard, “[t]hreadbare recitals of theelements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusorystatements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at555).Kafeel generally alleges that Defendant is engaged in“ongoing violations of the Lanham Act” via “an ongoingpattern of introducing infringing products into U.S.commerce” and “false designation of origin.” (R. 52, SAC¶¶ 1, 5, 15 (emphasis omitted).) The Lanham Act imposesliability for trademark infringement when a defendant “‘use[s] in commerce,’ without consent, ‘any reproduction,counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered markin connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, oradvertising of any goods or services,” and “such use is likelyto cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.’ ”Davis v. Entities Listed on Ex. 1, No. 23 CV 10799, 2026 WL893345, at *5 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 2026). To state a claim forcontributory trademark infringement, a plaintiff must allegethat: “a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induce[d]another to infringe a trademark”; or that a manufacturer ordistributor “continues to supply its product” to someone it“knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademarkinfringement.” Inwood Lab'ys., Inc. v. Ives Lab'ys, Inc., 456U.S. 844, 854 (1982). Regarding the false designation oforigin claim, a plaintiff must show that the designation is “‘likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ...as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods.’” Phoenix Ent. Partners v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir.2016) (citation omitted). The plaintiff must also show: “ ‘(1)that its mark is protectable[;] and (2) that the defendant's useof that mark is likely to cause confusion among consumers.’” Id. (citing CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng'g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660,673-74 (7th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases)).Defendant asserts that the SAC—which it says is “more a listof topics” than “a recitation of well-pleaded facts” as requiredby Rules 8 and 9—fails to state a facially plausible claimunder the Lanham Act. (R. 54, Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1-5.)The court agrees. While pro se allegations are “construedliberally in favor of the plaintiff,” Johnson v. McDonald, No.23 CV 3200, 2025 WL 965703, at *1 (N.D. Ill. March 31,2025) (citing Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 557 (7th Cir.2023)), the plaintiff must still supply a “set of facts consistent”with those allegations to establish a right to recovery, Smallv. Chao, 398 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, evenconstruing Kafeel's allegations liberally, he fails to “raise aright to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.*3 Kafeel alleges that Defendant “committed a contributoryviolation of the Lanham Act by knowingly [sic] or havingreason to know that the Infringing Product would be soldto U.S. consumers, directly profiting from the deception”and by engaging in acts of bad faith, rendering “Defendant[ ] an ongoing danger to the U.S. commercial environment”and causing damages to Kafeel. (R. 52, SAC ¶¶ 12-14,19-24 (emphasis omitted).) Such “[t]hreadbare recitals,”Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and “allegations in the form of legalconclusions,” McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012), are insufficient. Noticeably absentfrom the SAC are allegations of “concrete facts” explainingDefendant's “contributory” role in selling infringing goods.Shenzhen Kangmingcheng Tech. Co., Ltd. v. PDD HoldingsInc., No. 23 CV 2697, 2024 WL 5221272, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 23, 2024). Specifically, Kafeel does not pleadfacts alleging that Defendant “intentionally induce[d] anotherto infringe” a trademark, or that Defendant continued tosupply goods knowing or having reason to know thatit was infringing trademarks. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854;see also PDD Holdings, Inc., 2024 WL 5221272, at *4(dismissing contributory infringement claim because thecomplaint included “no allegations about [the defendant]’sinducement of the [allegedly infringing] acts or its knowledgeof the trademark infringement”).The same is true as to Kafeel's false designation oforigin claim. Kafeel alleges in the SAC that: (1) “thefalse designation of the Infringing Product was ... theproximate cause of [Kafeel's] damages”; (2) “Defendant'sact of supplying the infringing product constituted a falsedesignation of compliance that proximately causes thecommercial injury”; and (3) “[t]he harm suffered ... floweddirectly from [ ] Defendant's violation.” (R. 52, SAC¶¶ 15-24.) But as discussed, “[t]hreadbare recitals” and“conclusory statements” are not enough to raise a reasonableinference that Defendant is liable for false designation oforigin. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Kafeel fails to pleadfacts showing a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deceitregarding “the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his [ ]goods,” or that he owns a protectable mark and Defendant
SAQIB KAFEEL, Plaintiff, v. CJDROPSHIPPING, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3used such a mark. Phoenix Ent. Partners, 829 F.3d at 822.Indeed, Kafeel admits that he “does not assert ownership ofthe underlying trademark.” (See R. 55, Pl.’s Resp. at 3.) WhileKafeel says that nonparty Blue Spring owns intellectualproperty related to “Children's Mermaid Swimsuit, SPU:CJYD1648529,” and that entity is “[t]he party initiallyharmed by the Defendant's conduct,” (R. 52, SAC 9), he alsoindicates that Blue Spring “has no stake in this action,” (id. 18). And notably, Kafeel does not plead facts explaininghow Blue Spring's mark relates to the Lanham Act claimhe brings here. In short, Kafeel fails to plead a cognizableclaim connecting any protectable mark owned by him toDefendant's use thereof as part of an effort to confuse ordeceive others regarding the origin of goods so marked.Kafeel cites to “Lexmark” in the SAC to support his assertionthat he has standing and proximate causation to bring thissuit. (R. 52, SAC ¶¶ 15-18 (emphasis omitted); see also R.54, Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4.) But assuming Kafeelis referring to Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static ControlComponents, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), that decision does notfocus on the sufficiency of Lanham Act-related allegations,which Defendant challenges here, (R. 54, Def.’s Mot. toDismiss at 3). The Supreme Court in Lexmark made clearthat even if a plaintiff has Article III standing to bring alawsuit, meaning that his injury is “fairly traceable to thedefendant's conduct,” “the complaint must be dismissed”when the plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to establishan element required for the claim asserted. 572 U.S. at 134n.6; see also Lynn Scott, LLC v. Grubhub Inc., No. 20 CV6334, 2024 WL 3673718, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2024)(citing Lexmark for the proposition that “establishing ArticleIII standing should not be conflated with stating a claim”under the Lanham Act).*4 At bottom, Kafeel pleads the same cause of action—“shifting blame from Kafeel as an unwitting participant ininfringement to Defendant as the supplier of the infringinggoods”—that he alleges in prior versions of the complaint,albeit cloaked in a Lanham Act disguise this time. (R. 49 at6; see also R. 52, SAC ¶¶ 12-14, 18.) Dismissal of the SACis therefore warranted because Kafeel has failed to state afacially plausible claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.2. Rule 12(b)(1)Defendant argues that Rule 12(b)(1) also requires dismissalfor lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 54, Def.’s Mot. toDismiss at 5.) As this court has stated, Congress conferredsubject matter jurisdiction on the district courts only wherethere is a federal question or diversity of citizenship. (R. 49at 6 (citing Smart v. Local 702 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,562 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2009)).) Kafeel presented neithera federal question nor a sufficient basis to establish diversityjurisdiction in his prior complaints. (See R. 6; R. 7; R. 49.)And while Kafeel attempts to cure this jurisdictional defect bypleading a federal claim under the Lanham Act, as explained,he fails to do so. And as with the prior iteration, the SACdoes not sufficiently allege diversity of citizenship. (R. 49 at6-7; see also R. 52, SAC ¶¶ 7-8 (alleging only that Kafeelis “an individual citizen of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan”and Defendant “is a sophisticated international commercialsupplier that systematically targets and services the U.S.market,” without specifying citizenship).)2 It is not enoughto allege that a defendant is a “foreign” entity to establishcitizenship for diversity purposes. (See R. 49 at 7 (citingZeocrystal Indus., Inc. v. Fox Broad. Co., 923 F. Supp. 132,135 (N.D. Ill. 1996)).) Accordingly, dismissal is also requiredon this ground.3. Rule 12(b)(2)Defendant further contends that, even if Kafeel had stated aclaim and this court had subject matter jurisdiction to hearhis case, personal jurisdiction is absent. (R. 54, Def.’s Mot. toDismiss at 9-13.) Defendant “bears the burden of proving thecourt's lack of personal jurisdiction.” Liu v. Monthly, 170 F.4th1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 2026). Because Kafeel asserts federalquestion jurisdiction based on the addition of the Lanham Actclaim, this court “has personal jurisdiction over [Defendant]if either federal law or the law of [Illinois] authorizes serviceof process” to Defendant. Id. The federal law at issue—theLanham Act—does not supply a personal jurisdiction rule, soIllinois's long-arm statute applies, see id., and this court mayexercise jurisdiction on any basis “permitted by the IllinoisConstitution and the Constitution of the United States,” 735ILCS 5/2-209(c).In the SAC Kafeel alleges only specific personal jurisdiction,not general personal jurisdiction. (See R. 52, SAC 5.) ForDefendant to be subject to specific personal jurisdiction:(i) [its] contacts with the forum state must show that itpurposefully availed itself of the privilege of conductingbusiness in the forum state or purposefully directed itsactivities at the state; (ii) the plaintiff's alleged injury musthave arisen out of the defendant's forum-related activities;and (iii) the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comportwith traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
SAQIB KAFEEL, Plaintiff, v. CJDROPSHIPPING, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4*5 Liu, 170 F.4th at 1093. The Seventh Circuit has“cautioned that merely operat[ing] a website, even a highlyinteractive website, that is accessible from, but does nottarget, the forum state is not enough to sustain jurisdiction.”Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).Kafeel alleges here that Defendant had “continuouscommercial contacts” with Illinois and the Northern Districtof Illinois based on Defendant's use of its platform “to solicitand facilitate the sale, shipment, and fulfillment of goodsto consumers and retailers.” (R. 52, SAC 5 (emphasisomitted).) To support such allegations, Kafeel attaches to theSAC sample orders of infringing products he says can beshipped through Defendant's platform to a Chicago residence.(Id., Ex. A.) But it is not enough to show that it is “possibleto order [Defendant's] products and have them shipped toIllinois.” Liu, 170 F.4th at 1093. Instead, the evidence mustshow “a completed purchase” of infringing goods sold toIllinois and other United States residents to establish specificpersonal jurisdiction. Id. at 1093-94. Such evidence is lackinghere, and Defendant offers a declaration attesting that it didnot ship any infringing products or direct business to Illinois.(See R. 56, Def.’s Reply at 4 (citing R. 22-1, Penju Zhou Decl.¶¶ 4, 9 & Ex. K).) Accordingly, dismissal is required on thisground too. Liu, 170 F.4th at 1094.Taken together, Kafeel's allegations in the SAC remain“baseless and futile.” (R. 56, Def.’s Reply at 7.) The court hasalready given him three opportunities to state a valid claimand/or allege proper jurisdiction. While the court understandsthat Kafeel is proceeding pro se, and Rule 15(a) “providesthat leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice sorequires,’ ” Kafeel's “repeated failure to cure deficiencies”warrants dismissal with prejudice at this stage. Johnson v.Cypress Hill, 641 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2011) (findingthat “[t]here must be a point at which a plaintiff makes acommitment to the theory of [his] case” (internal citationsomitted)). Defendant should not be forced to incur additionalfees and costs to defend against claims that lack plausibilityin federal court.3B. Motion for SanctionsDefendant seeks sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and thiscourt's inherent authority based on Kafeel's submissions tothe court that “appear to be produced using Chat-GPT or asimilar generative AI platform” and include “ ‘hallucinated’citations to cases that don't exist as well as ‘hallucinated’direct quotations from real court opinions that have not beenverified by [Kafeel].” (R. 59, Def.’s Mot. for Sanctions at 1.)As an initial matter, Section 1927 applies only to an “attorneyor other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of theUnited States or any Territory thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927.That said, this court may invoke Rule 11 or its inherentauthority to sanction a pro se plaintiff who “ ‘willful[ly]abuse[s] ... the litigation process.” Allen v. Casper, No. 25CV 10438, 2026 WL 674309, at *9 (N.D. Ill. March 10,2026). To be sure, one of the courts in this district recentlysanctioned a pro se plaintiff $1,500 for “[f]iling a documentthat contains citations to nonexistent cases, quotes languagethat comes from no real case, or [ ] contains arguments whollyunsupported by the record” because such misrepresentationsviolate Rule 11. Id. at *10 (explaining that “fail[ing] to makea reasonable inquiry into the supporting law or facts ... wastesboth the parties’ and the Court's time attempting to locatenonexistent cases and unpack made up factual assertions”).In so finding, the court emphasized that “ ‘[p]ro se statusdoes not shelter plaintiffs from sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.”Id. at *9. Instead, any “self-represented party [that] files adocument in federal court ... [must] certify[ ] to the court thatthe legal contentions contained in it ‘are warranted by existinglaw.’ ” Id.*6 Given the number of citations to fake cases andquotations in Kafeel's briefing on the current motion todismiss and other court filings in this case, the court certainlyshares Defendant's concerns about Kafeel's carelessness,which borders on willful abuse in making misrepresentationsto the court. (See R. 59, Def.’s Mot. for Sanctions, Exs. 1,2 (documenting numerous instances in which Kafeel citesto nonexistent cases and quotations as well as to citationsthat conflict with his claims)); see also D'Ambrosio v. MetaPlatforms Inc., ___F.4th___, 2026 WL 1361951, *8 (7thCir. May 15, 2026) (holding that submission of a briefwith nonexistent cases amounts to making a false statementto the court). Although the court could invoke Rule 11or its inherent authority to sanction Kafeel for the alleged“hallucination” offenses, it need not do so here becausedismissal with prejudice is already required for the reasonsset forth above. The motion for sanctions is therefore deniedwithout prejudice as moot.ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss isgranted and this case is dismissed with prejudice.
SAQIB KAFEEL, Plaintiff, v. CJDROPSHIPPING, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5ENTER:All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 1453740Footnotes1The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the SAC and draws all reasonable inferences in Kafeel's favor. SeeLewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 2016).2Kafeel admits that he used the incorrect name for Defendant in the SAC and that “the correct operating name” is Yiwu CuJia Trade Co., Ltd. (R. 55, Pl.’s Resp. at 2.) In his response, he asks the court for leave to amend any “technical pleadingdefect” in the SAC. (Id. at 5.) The court denies the request, as it is improper to seek leave to amend in a responsivepleading. In any event, there are several bases for dismissal beyond the technical defect in misnaming the defendant.3Because dismissal of the SAC is appropriate on several grounds, the court need not also determine whether there isa more convenient forum for this action. See Instituto Mexicano Del Seguro Social v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc.,29 F.4th 351, 357 (7th Cir. 2022) (“The doctrine of forum non conveniens, effectively a supervening venue provision,empowers a court to dismiss a suit when litigating in that court as opposed to an alternative forum unreasonably burdensthe defendant.” (citation omitted)).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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