KNIGHTS TEMPLARS’ & MASONS’ LIFE INDEMNITY COMPANY, Petitioner,

v.

ROSA B. JARMAN.

(See S. C. Reporter’s ed. 197-210.)

Insurance — suicide as defense — Missouri sui¬ cide act — application to assessment insur¬ ance-construction by state courts — pro¬ spective operation — repealing act — sub¬ ject expressed in title — impairment of ob¬ ligation of contract — consent to changes in constitution.

within the provisions of Mo. Rev. Stat. 1879, § 5982, that It shall be no defense to a suit on a policy of life insurance that the in¬ sured ’‘committed suicide,” unless the same was contemplated at the time application was made for the policy, as is the taking of one's own life voluntarily while sane and in the full possession of one’s mental faculties, — especially in view of Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, § 6570, declaring’ that words and phrases shall be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense.

that a repeal of Mo. Rev. Stat. 1879, § 5982, declaring that suicide shall be no defense to a suit on a policy of insurance, was effected as to all policies issued upon the assessment plan after the insurance company had ob¬ tained its certificate of authority to do busi¬ ness as an assessment insurance company under Mo. Laws 1887, p. 199, by the provi¬ sion of § 10 of that act, that corporations doing business thereunder shall not be sub-

Note. — As to insanity as affecting condition

as to suicide in life insurance policy — see notes to Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Wiswell (Kan.) 35 L. R. A. 258 ; and Billings v. Accident Ins. Co. (Vt.) 17 L. R. A. 89.

As to conflict beticeen by-law and certificate or policy of a mutual benefit society or insur¬ ance company — see note to McCoy v. North¬ western Mut. Relief Asso. (Wis.) 47 L. R. A.

L87 U. S.

197, 198

ject' to any provisions of the general insur¬ ance law of the state, ‘‘except as herein dis¬ tinctly set forth,” — are binding on the Su¬ preme Court of the United States.

sessment plan after the Insurance company obtained its certificate of authority to do business as an assessment insurance com¬ pany under Mo. Laws 1887, p. 199, are re¬ lieved from the provisions of Mo. Rev. Stat. 1879, § 5982, declaring that suicide shall be no defense to a suit on a policy of insurance, by the proviso of § 10 of the later act, that corporations doing business thereunder shall not be subject to any provisions of the gen¬ eral insurance law of the state, “except as herein distinctly set forth.”

4. A provision of a statute amending Mo. Rev.

Stat. 1889, § 5869, which had exempted in¬ surance companies doing business on the as¬ sessment pla-n from any provisions of the general insurance laws of the state except as therein distinctly set forth, by specially applying to such corporations the provisions of § 5855, that suicide shall be no defense to a suit upon a policy of insurance, is with¬ in the title, “An Act to Repeal” Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, § 5869, and “to Enact a New Section in Lieu Thereof.”

clared invalid by the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that some of its provisions are not within the scope of its title, where such title contains a reference to the statute amended, which, under the de¬ cisions of the state courts, is sufficient to sustain its validity.

ance companies doing business on the assess¬ ment plan, of the provisions of Mo. Rev. Stat. 1879, § 5982, that suicide shall be no defense to a suit on a policy of insurance, a provision in a policy issued prior to such repeal, relieving the company from liability in case of suicide, became effective, no im¬ pairment of the obligation of such contract was made by a subsequent enactment spe¬ cially applying the provisions of the former statute to such companies, since all that the later act purported to do was to reinstate the parties in their original rights prior to the repealing act, which rights had not been affected by anything done during the period which had elapsed between the two statutes.

of insurance issued on the assessment plan, to abide by the constitution, rules, and regu¬ lations of the company as they then were or might be constitutionally changed thereafter, did not amount to a consent to such changes which on their face Indicated that they ap¬ plied only to policies thereafter to be issued.

[No. 48.]

Argued October 17, 1902. Decided Decem¬ ber 8, 1902.

ON WRIT of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court for the Western District of Missouri in fa¬ vor of plaintiff in an action upon a policy of life insurance. Affirmed.

See same case below, 44 C. C. A. 93, 104 Fed. 638.

Statement by Mr. Justice Browns This was a writ of certiorari to review a

139

198, 199

judgment of the circuit court of appeals af¬ firming a judgment of the circuit court for the western district of Missouri, overruling the defense of suicide to an action upon a policy of life insurance, and awarding plaintiff judgment for the amount of the policy and assessments thereon.

An agreed statement of facts shows de¬ fendant to be an Illinois corporation, organ¬ ized “for the purpose of furnishing life in¬ demnity or pecuniary benefits to widows,” etc.; and that on October 19, 1885, it issued to John P. Jarman, plaintiff’s husband, and a citizen of Missouri, a policy of insurance or certificate of membership, subject to the constitution and by-laws of the company and certain conditions in the policy, one of which provided for its avoidance in case of self-destruction, “whether voluntary or in¬ voluntary, sane or insane.” The seventh stipulation was that “John P. Jarman, while insane to such an extent as to be in¬ capable of understanding the nature or con¬ sequences of his act, took his own life, and came to his death on the 12th day of Sep¬ tember, 1898, by a gunshot wound, inflicted by himself. It is hot contended, however, by plaintiff that such self-destruction was the result of accident.” The further mate¬ rial facts are set forth in the opinion.

[199J “Defendant having refused to pay the amount of the policy on account of the sui¬ cide of the insured, Rosa B. Jarman, his widow and beneficiary, brought an action January 19, 1899, in the circuit court of Grundy county to recover the amount of the policy, $5,000, and assessments, which ac¬ tion was subsequently removed to the cir¬ cuit court of the United States for the western district of Missouri, upon the ground of diversity of citizenship. The case was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, and resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $6,006.30, which was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. Whereupon peti¬ tioner sued out a writ of certiorari from this court.

the United States. Oct. Term,

does not enter into them and become a part of the agreement.

3 Story, Const. §§ 1377, 1378; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 606.

It is true the Constitution of Missouri prohibits retrospective legislation. But this statute is not, in tnat sense, retrospective.

Shields v. Clifton Hill Land Co. 94 Tenn. 123, 26 L. R. A. 509, 28 S. W. 668.

It is not enough that the act embrace but a single subject or object, and that all its parts are germane; the title must express that subject, and comprehensively enough to include all the provisions in the body of the act.

Sutherland Stat. Constr. 887 ; Kansas v. Payne, 71 Mo. 159; Mewhcrter v. Price, 11 Ind. 201; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; Dorsey’s Appeal, 72 Pa. 192; Knoxville v. Lems, 12 Lea, 180; Stiefel v. Maryland Inst, for Instruction of the Blind, 61 Md. 144; Fishkill v. Fishkill & B. PI. Road Co. 22 Barb. 634 ; Grover v. Ocean-Grove Camp Meeting Asso. 45 N. J. L. 399; State, Shi¬ vers, Prosecutor, v. Nexcton 0 45 N. J. L. 469; Cooley, Const. L. 6th ed. 179; Greaton v. Griffin, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 310.

The whole act can be valid, only when the subject stated includes all the provisions in the body of the act.

Montgomery Mut. Bldg, d- Loan Asso. v. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413; Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 99; Grover v. Ocean Grove Camp-Meet¬ ing Asso. 45 N. J. L. 399; State, Shivers, Prosecutor, v. Newton, 45 N. J. L. 469; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269.

When the title of the act is specific, the act must not include matters not specified, though they be of the same general charac¬ ter.

Taylor v. Kirby, 31 Ill. App. 658; North Chicago City R. Co. v. Lake View, 105 Ill. 207, 44 Am. Rep. 788; People ex rel. Chit¬ tenden v. Mellen, 32 Ill. 181.

The measure of retrospective legislation is to ascertain whether or not it takes away any vested right which existed before tne new law became operative.

Leetc v. State Bank, 115 Mo. 184, 21 S. W . 788; Hope Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 38 Mo. 483, 90 Am. Dec . 438; Fisher v. Patton, 134 Mo. 52, 33 S. W. 451, 34 S. W. 1096.

.Jarman had no vested right to commit suicide at common law, even if there was no provision in the contract respecting suicide.

Hitter V. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 139, 42 L. ed. 693, 18 Sup. Gt. Rep. 300.

Jarman’s beneficiary could not acquire anything but an expectancy during his life¬ time, because the right was reserved to him to change his beneficiary at any time with¬ out her consent.

Martin v. Stubbings, 126 Ill. 387, 18 N. E. 657 ; Hopkins v. Northwestern Life As- sur. Co. 40 C. C. A. 1, 99 Fed. 199; Wist v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. IF. 22 Or. 271, 29 Pac. 010; Masonic Mut. Ben. Soc. v. Burkhart, 110 Ind. 192, 10 N. E. 79, 11 N. E. 449; Sabin v. Phinney, 134 N. Y. 423, 31 N. E. 1087 ; Chambers v. Supreme Tent, K. of M. (1901) 200 Pa. 244, 49 Atl. 784; Carpenter v. Knapp (1897) 101 Iowa, 712, 38 L. R. A.

187 TJ. S.

Messrs. S. S. Gregory and Hervey

Bryan Hicks argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner:

The obligation of a contract is not im¬ paired by legislation which relieves it from some illegality fastened upon it by prior leg¬ islation, thus permitting the contract to take effect as it was originally made.

Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 374; 3 Story, Const. § 1392; White Water Valley Canal Co. v. Valletta, 21 How. 414, 16 L. ed. 154; Little Rock v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 98 U. S. 308, 25 L. ed. 108 ; Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 27 L. ed. 682, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408; Satterlee v. Mattnewson, 2 Pet. 380, 7 L. ed. 458; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 8 L. ed. 876; Gross v. United States Mortg. Co. 108 U. S. 479, 27 L. ed. 795, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 940, 93 Ill. 483; llosenplantcr v.' Provident Sav. Life Assnr. Soc. 46 L. R. A. 473, 37 C. C. A. 566, 96 Fed. 721 ; Phenix Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 63 Miss. 641 ; Butler v. United States Bldg. ct- Loan Asso. 97 Tenn. 679, 37 S. W. 385.

However- law may act upon contracts, it 1*40

Supreme Court of

1902

Knights Templars’ & Masons’ Life Indemnity Go. v. Jarman.

128, 70 N. W. 765; Supreme Council C. K. of A. v. Morrison, 16 R. I. 468, 17 Atl. 57 ; Peterson v. Gibson, 191 Ill. 365, 54 L. R. A. 836, 61 N. E. 127.

A prohibitive statute cutting off a defense provided for in a contract, to be effective in a stated contingency, was not intended to be within the constitutional limitation as to retrospective laws.

Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 29 L. ed. 483, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209 ; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9; Berry v. Clary, 77 Me. 482, 1 Atl. 360; Medical College v. Muldoon, 46 Ala. 603; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51, 27 L. ed. 648, 2 Sup. Gt. Rep. 236; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Chi¬ cago, M. <& St. P. R. Co. 62 Fed. 904; Love- ren v. Lamprey, 22 N. H. 434; Kring v. Mis¬ souri, 107 U. S. 221, 27 L. ed. 506, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 43 L. ed. 569, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308.

Ry a long line of judicial decisions pre¬ vious to the enactment of the suicide stat¬ ute, the words “commit suicide” had been held to include only the “act of a person in the possession of his ordinary reasoning fac¬ ulties,”- — a sane man.

Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 21 L. ed. 236; Pliadenhauer v. Germania L. Ins. Co. 7 Heisk. 567, 19 Am. Rep. 623; American L. Ins. Co. v. Isett, 74 Pa. 176; Phillips v. Louisiana Equitable L. Ins. Co. 26 La. Ann. 404, 21 Am. Rep. 549; Pierce v. Travelers’ L. Ins. Co. 34 Wis. 3S9 ; Moore v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 1 Flipp. 363, Fed. Cas. No. 9,755; Merritt v. Cotton States L. Ins. Co. 55 Ga. 103; Bigelow v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co. 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. ed. 918: Life Asso. of America v. Waller, 57 Ga. 533; Charter Oalc L. Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 235, 24 L. ed. 433; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Groom, 86 Pa. 96, 27 Am. Rej). 689; Newton v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 76 N. Y. 426, 32 Am. Rep. 335 ; Scheffer v. Na¬ tional L. Ins. Co. 25 Minn. 534.

When a member of a mutual benefit asso¬ ciation agrees in his contract with such asso¬ ciation to be bound by the laws, rules, and regulations of the association then existing, and by those which may thereafter be prop¬ erly adopted, he is, by the force of this agreement, bound by all the subsequent amendments to such laws, rules, and regula¬ tions.

Rom v. Mutual Assur. Soc. 6 Cianch, 192, 3 L. ed. 195; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Hamlin, 139 U. S. 297, 35 L. ed. 167, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 614; Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Withers, 177 U. S. 260, 44 L. ed. 762, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611; Haydel v. Mu¬ tual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 44 C. C. A. 169, 104 Fed. 718, 98 Fed. 200; Lloyd v. Supreme Lodge K. of P. 38 C. C. A. 654, 98 Fed. 66; Supreme Commandery, K. of G. R. v. Ainsworth , 71 Ala. 436, 46 Am. Rep. 332; Stohr v. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc. 82 Cal. 557, 22 Pac. 1125; Bowie v. Grand Lodge, L. of W. 99 Cal. 392, 34 Pac. 103; Masonic Mut. Ben. Asso. v. Severson, 71 Conn. 719, 43 Atl. 192; Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Kutscher, 179 Ill. 340, 53 N. E. 187 U. S.

620; Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Trebbe, 179 Ill. 348, 53 N. E. 730; Fullemcider v. Su¬ preme Council, R. L. 180 Ill. 621, 54 N. E. 4S5; Baldwin v. Begley, 185 Ill. 180, 56 N. E. 1065; Covenant Mut. Life Asso. v. Kent- ner, 188 Ill. 431, 58 N. E. 966; Moersch- baecher v. Supreme Council, R. L. 188 Ill.

9, 52 L. R. A. 281, 59 N. E. 17; Peterson v. Gibson, 191 111. 365, 54 L. R. A. 836, 61 N. E. 127 ; Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, 3 L. R. A. 409, 20 N. E. 480; Daughtry v. Knights of Pythias, 48 La. Ann. 1203, 20 So. 712; Sargent v. Supreme Lodge, K. of H. 15S Mass. 557, 33 N. E. 650; Pain v. Societe St. Jean Baptiste, 172 Mass. 319, 52 N. E. 502; Messer v. Ancient Order, U. W. 180 Mass. 321, 62 N. E. 252; Borgards v. Farmers’ Mut. Ins. Co. 79 Mich. 440, 44 N. W.. 856; Domes v. Supreme Lodge K. of P. 75 Miss. 466, 23 So. 191; Ellerbe v. Faust, 119 Mo. 653, 25 L. R. A. 149, 25 S. W. 390; Chadwick v. Order of Triple A lliance, 56 Mo. App. 463; State cx rel. Schrempp v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. 70 Mo. App. 456; Brower v. Supreme Lodge Nat. Reserve Asso. 74 Mo. App. 490: Su¬ preme Council, A. L. of H. v. Adams, 68 N. l-I. 230, 44 Atl. 380; Chambers v. Supreme Tent, K. of M. 200 Pa. 244, 49 Atl. 784; Supreme Council C. K. of A. v. Morrison, 16 R. I. 408, 17 Atl. 57 ; Supreme Lodge,

K. of P. v. La Malta, 95 Tenn. 157, 30 L. R. A. 838, 31 S. W. 493; West v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. IF. 14 Tex. Civ. App. 471, 37 S. W. 966; Ducr v. Supreme Council 0. of C. F. 21 Tex. Civ. App. 493, 52 S. W. 109; Fugure v. Mutual Society of St. Joseph, 46 Vt. 369; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Taylor, 99 Va. 208, 37 S. E. 854; Schmidt v. Su¬ preme Tent, K. of M. 97 Wis. 528, 73 N. W. 22- Hughes v. Wisconsin Odd Fellows’ Mut.

L. Ins. Co. 98 Wis. 292, 73 N. W. 1015; Locfjier v. Modern Woodmen, 100 Wis. 79, 75 N. W. 1012; Smith v. Galloway [1898]

1 Q. B. 71.

Persons may contract with the state in such a way that the state may thereafter alter, modify, or repeal the contract, not¬ withstanding the provision of the Federal Constitution that no state may by legisla¬ tion impair the obligation of a contract; and the language of the reservation will be construed liberally to accomplish the pur¬ pose intended. Legislative enactments refer to existing contracts from their enactment, because of the agreement of the parties.

Re Oliver Lee & Go’s. Bank, 21 N. Y. 9; Re Reciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y. 9; Hamilton Gaslight cG Coke Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258, 36 L. ed. 903, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 27 S. C. 385, 4 S. E. 49.

Mr. Frederick H. Bacon argued the cause, and, with Messrs. E. M. Harbor and A. G. Knight, filed a brief for respondent:

The policy sued on was issued subject to the laws of the state of Missouri in force at the time of its issue, which entered into and formed a part of the contract; and hence the provision that the policy should be void in case of the suicide of the member was itself void.

141

Supreme Court of the United States.

State ex rel. Atty. Gen. y. Merchant’s Each. Mut. Benev. Asso. 72 Mo. 146; Na¬ tional Union v. Marlow, 21 C. C. A. 89, 4 U. S. App. 95, 74 Fed. 775; Toomey v. Su¬ preme Lodge K. of P. 147 Mo. 129, 48 S. W. 936; New York L. Ins. Go. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 44 L. ed. 1116, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Clements, 14U U. S. 226, sub nom. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Pettus, 35 L. ed. 497, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 822; White v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 4 Dill. 177, Fed. Cas. No. 17,545; Havens v. Germania F. Ins. Co. 123 Mo. 403, 26 L. R. A. 107, 27 S. W. 718 ; Christian v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 143 Mo. 460, 45 S. W. 268; Horton v. New York L. Ins. Co. 151 Mo. 604, 52 S. W. 356; Knights Templar d M. Life Indemnity Co. v. Berry, 1 C. C. A. 561, 4 U. S. App. 353, 50 Fed. 511 ; Toomey v. Supreme Lodge K. of P. 147 Mo. 129, 48 S. W. 936; Kern v. Supreme Council, A. L. of H. 167 Mo. 471, 67 S. W.

“ Self-destruction ” and suicide ” are synonymous terms.

Connecticut Mitt. L. Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U. S. 468, 37 L. ed. 1148, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155; Haynie v. Knights Templars d M. Life Indemnity Co. 139 Mo. 431, 41 S. W. 461.

There can be no suicide nor self-destruc¬ tion without an intent.

Breasted v. Farmers’ Loan d T. Co. 4 Hill, 73; Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121, 27 L. ed. 878, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99; Bigelow v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co. 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. ed. 918; Adkins v. Columbia L. Ins. Co. 70 Mo. 27, 35 Am. Rep. 410.

The intent of the statute was to prohibit the defense of suicide unless suicide was con¬ templated when the policy was taken out.

Keller v. Travelers’ Ins. Co. 58 Mo. App. 557 ; McDonald v. Bankers Life Asso. 154 Mo. 627, 55 S. W. 999 ; Logan v. Fidelity d C. Co. 146 Mo. 114, 47 S. W. 948; Chris¬ tian v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 143 Mo. 460, 45 S. W. 268 ; /Etna L. Ins. Co. v. Florida, 30 L. R. A. 87, 16 C. C. A. 618, 32 U. S. App. 753, 69 Fed. 932; John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 34 Mich. 42.

The suicide of a sane person avoids the policy, whether so stipulated therein or not.

Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 139, 42 L. ed. 693, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300.

The statute of 1887 had no retrospective operation, because the state Constitution forbade it.

Hope Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 38 Mo. 483, 90 Am. Dec. 438; Barton County v. Walser, 47 Mo. 189.

Statutes are construed to operate pros¬ pectively only, even in the absence of such a constitutional prohibition.

City R. Co. v. Citizens’ Street R. Co. 166 U. S. 557, 41 L. ed. 1114, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653; Voigt v. Kersten, 164 Ill. 314, 45 N. E.

Fund Life Soc. 178 III. 202, 52 N. E. 882.

The suicide statute of Missouri has never been repealed.

Knights Templar d M. Life Indemnity Co.

142

Oct. Term,

v. Berry, 1 C. C. A. 561, 4 U. S. App. 353, 50 Fed. 511.

If the suicide clause in the policy was void, and the effect of the statute of 1887 was to validate it, it would be injecting into the contract a. provision which did not be¬ fore exist, — -which could not be done.

Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380, 7 L. ed. 458.

As to policies subsequently issued by as¬ sessment companies after the law of 1837, there would be an exemption from the sui¬ cide law.

Haynie v. Knights Templars d M. Life In¬ demnity Co. 139 Mo. 416, 41 S. W. 461.

The title of the act of 1897 fully expresses its object.

State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; State ex rel. Wolfe v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271, 21 S. W. 1125; State ex rel. Kirkwood v. Heege, 135 Mo. 112, 36 S. W. 614; State ex rel. Dick- ason v. Marion County Ct. 128 Mo. 440, 31 S. W. 23.

Mere matters of detail need not be stated in the title.

State ex rel. Wolfe v. Bronson, 115 Mo.

271. 21 S. W. 1125.

The supreme court of Missouri has held the act in question valid.

Toomey v. Supreme Lodge K. of P. 147 Mo. 129, 48 S. W. 936; Logan v. Fidelity d C. Co. 146 Mo. 114, 47 S. W. 948.

Jarman had no intent to take his own life, nor did he know what he was doing. The gist of the defense of suicide or self- destruction is the intent, and if there was no intent Jarman did not, in a legal sense, take his own life.

Leman v. Manhattan L. Ins. Co. 46 La. Ann. 1189, 24 L. R. A. 589, 15 So. 388; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McWhirter, 19 C. C. A. 519, 44 U. S. App. 492, 73 Fed. 444; Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Nitterhouse, 11 Ind. App. 155, 38 N. E. 1110; Hale v. Life Indemnity d Invest. Co. 61 Minn. 516, 63 N. W. 1108; Edwards v. Travelers’ L. Ins. Co. 20 Fed. 661.

There pan be no such thing in law as in¬ sane or involuntary suicide.

Haynie v. Knights Templars d M. Life In¬ demnity Co. 139 Mo. 416, 41 S. W. 461; Adkins v. Columbia L. Ins. Co. 70 Mo. 27, 35 Am. Rep. 410.

It is conceded that Jarman did not know either the nature, moral or physical, or the consequences, moral or physical, of what he was doing. Therefore it follows that the condition of the policy in regard to self- destruction, voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, does not apply.

Bigelow v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co. 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. ed. 918; John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 34 Mich. 42; Blackstone v. Standard Life d Acci. Ins. Co. 74 Mich 592, 3 L. R. A. 486, 42 N. W. 156.

It is not suicide if the insured did not have the intent to do the act, or did not realize the physical consequences of his act.

Pierce v. Travelers’ L. Ins. Co. 34 Wis. 389; Grand Lodge I. 0. of M. A. v. Wietina 168 Ill. 408, 48 N. E. 59; Easta, brook v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. 54 Me. 224, 89 Am!

187 U. S.

Knights Templars’ & Masons’ Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman.

199, 200

Dec. 743; Streeter v. Western Union Mut. Life & Acci. Soc. 05 Mich. 199, 31 N. W. 779.

The contract is one of life insurance, and cannot be modified except by the consent of both parties.

Com. v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149; Na¬ tional Union v. Marlow, 21 C. C. A. 89, 40 U. S. App. 95, 74 Fed. 775.

What is here called the constitution is not the charter, but is simply a code of by-laws under an inappropriate name.

Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, 3 L. R. A. 409, 20 N. E. 483; Mul- roy v. Supreme Lodge, K. of H. 28 Mo. App.

The amendments to the by-laws did not affect this policy, because they do not pur¬ port to have any retrospective operation.

Carnes v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Asso. 100 Iowa, 281, 70 N. W. 683; Spencer v. Giand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. 22 Misc. 147, 48 N. Y. Supp. 590, Affirmed in 53 App. Div. 627, 65 N. Y. Supp. 1146; Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. IF. v. Stumpf, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 309, 58 S. W. 840; Robbs v. Iowa Mut. Ben. Asso. 82 Iowa, 107, 11 L. R. A. 299, 47 N. W. 983; Sieverts v. National Bcnev. Asso. 95 Iowa, 710, 04 N. W. 671; Benton v. Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen, 146 Ill. .570, 34 N. E. 939.

The company had no power to alter the contract by amendments to its constitution or by-laws.

Hobbs v. Iowa Mut. Ben. Asso. 82 Iowa, 107, 11 L. R. A. 299, 47 N. W. 983 -Pokrcfky v. Detroit Firemen’s Fund Asso. 121 Mich. 456, 80 N. W. -240 ; Voigt v. Kersten, 104 Ill. 314, 45 N. E. 543; Starling v. Supreme ■Council It. T. of T. 108 Mich. 440, 06 N. W. 340; Hale v. Equitable Aid Union, 168 Pa. 377, 31 Atl. 1006; Weiler v. Equitable Aid Union, 92 Hun, 277, 30 N. Y. Supp. 734; hysinger v. Supreme Lodge, K. <£ L. of H. 42 Mo. App. 635; Morrison v. Wisconsin Odd Fellows Mat. L. Ins. Co. 59 Wis. 162, 18 N. W. 13; Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. IF. v. Safer, 44 Mo. App. 452; Smith v. Supreme Lodge A. of P. 83 Mo. App. 512; Langan v. American Legion of Honor, 34 Misc. 629, 70 N. Y. Supp. 663; Newhall v. Supreme Coun¬ cil, A. L. of H. 181 Mass. ‘Ill, 63 N. E. 1; Supreme Council, A. L. of II. v. Getz, 50 C. C. A. 153, 112 Fed. 119; Gaut v. American Legion of Honor, 107 Tenn. 603, 55 L. R. A. 465, 64 S. W. 1070; Peterson v. Gibson, 191 Ill. 365, 54 L. R. A. 836, 61 N. E. 127; Brugaw v. Supreme Lodge, K. & L. of H. 123 N. C. 354, 54 L. R. A. 602, 38 S. E. 905; Strauss v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 128 N. C. 465, 54 L. R. A. 005, 39 S. E. 55; TFi.sf v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. IF. 22 Or. 271, 29 Pac. 610; Double v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. IF. 66 App. Div. 323, 72 N. Y. Supp. 755.

The question as to the reasonableness of the change is immaterial.

Gaut v. American Legion of Honor, 107 Tenn. 603, 55 L. R. A. 405, 04 S. W. 1070.

Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:

This case turns principally upon the ap-

187 U. S.

plicability to the policy in question of §

5982 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879, afterwards Rev. Stat. 1889, § 5855 (hereinafter termed the suicide statute), which was in force in 1885, when tnis pol¬ icy was written. The section is as follows:

“In all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any company do¬ ing business in this state, it shall be no de¬ fense that the insured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void.”

that Jarman did not commit suicide within the meaning of this act, since the stipulated fact was that he shot liimself while insane to such an extent as to be incapable of un¬ derstanding the nature or consequences *of

his act. The position of the company in this connection is that the enactment above quoted, that “it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide,” relates only to cases where the insured takes his own life voluntarily, while sane, and in full posses¬ sion of his mental faculties; and hence, the provision of the policy, that “in case of the self-destruction of the holder of this policy, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, . . . this policy shall become

null and void,” applies, and exonerates the company from all liability beyond that pro¬ vided in the policy, “that in the case of the suicide of the holder of this policy, then this company will pay to his widow and heirs or devisees* such an amount of his policy as the member shall have paid to this company on the policy in assessments on the same with¬ out interest.”

This contention is founded upon the rul¬ ing of this court in Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 21 L. ed. 236, and cog¬ nate' cases, to the effect that a similar pro¬ vision avoiding a policy in ca.se the insured should “die by his own hand” applied only where the insured intentionally takes his own life, while in possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, and does not apply when he is unable to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences and effects of the act he is about to com¬ mit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he has not the power to resist.

But ive are of opinion that the word “suicide” is not used in this statute in its technical and legal sense of self-destruction by a sane person, but according to its pop¬ ular meaning of death by one's own hand, irrespective of the mental condition of the person committing the act. The result of the construction urged by the defendant would be that, if a perfectly sane man vol¬ untarily and from anger, pride, or jealousy, or a mere desire to escape from the ills of life, puts an end to his life, and thereby be¬ comes guilty of the crime of self-murder, and of a fraud upon the insurance company, the company would still be responsible, un¬ less it could be shown that the insured con-

143

200-208

Supreme Court of the United States.

Oct. Term,

templated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy; while, if he com¬ mitted the same act while insane, and therefore irresponsible, the statute would

not apply, and the company would not *be liable under the terms of the policy, which provided that it should become void “in case of the self-destruction of the holder . . . whether voluntary or involuntary,

sane or insane.” In the one case, as we held in Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 139, 42 L. ed. 693, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300, that is, of self-destruction by a sane man, not only would the policy be void, whether there were a provision to that effect or not, but even a contract that it should be valid under such circumstances was thought to be against public policy and subversive of sound morality (p. 154, L. ed. p. 698, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 505 ) , while in the other case of a suicide by an insane person, the insured is guilty of no wrong to the company if he be incapable of understanding the moral consequences of his own act, and there is no reason in law or morals why the com¬ pany should not pay. It is impossible to suppose that the legislature could have con¬ templated such a contingency, and a con¬ struction that would lead to this result should be deemed inadmissible, unless the language of the statute were too plain to be misunderstood.

The statute was manifestly intended to apply to all cases of self-destruction or sui¬ cide, unless the same were contemplated at the time application was made for the pol¬ icy, and the fact that we may have given a different construction to the same words when used in a policy of insurance does not militate against this theory. The same words may require a different construction when used in different documents, as, for instance, in a contract, and a statute; and identity of words is not decisive of identity of meaning where they are used in different connections and for different purposes. In a contract, the technical rights of the par¬ ties only are involved; in a statute, an im¬ portant question of public policy. If this statute were read alone and disembarrassed by the construction given to these words in policies of insurance, not a doubt would arise as to its application to all cases of self-destruction ; and when we examine the theory of the defendant, and find that it leads to the conclusion that the company would be liable if the insured had commit¬ ted a fraud upon it, and would not be liable if he had taken his life, though guilty of no fraud, the theory must be rejected without hesitation. The construction we have given to the words “committed suicide” in this

act is fortified by ’reference to § 6570, Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, referring to the construc¬ tion of statutes, which provides that “words and phrases shall be taken in then- plain, or ordinary and usual, sense; but technical words and phrases, having a pe¬ culiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be understood according to their tech¬ nical import.” Undoubtedly the word “suicide” in its usual sense includes all cases of self-destruction.

144

tion of the applicability of the suicide stat¬ ute (§ 5982) to policies of this company is¬ sued at this time. This. act, upon its face, applies to all insurance companies “doing business in this state,” and to all policies issued by such companies after the date of the act. It undoubtedly governs the rights of the parties in this case, except so far as the same may have been modified by an act passed in 1887, authorizing the incorpora¬ tion of insurance companies on the assess¬ ment plan. Section 10 of this act (Laws 1887, pp. 199, 204) is now known as § 5869 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, and provides that corporations “doing busi¬ ness under this article” shall make certain annual statements, which, as well as other requirements, are also made applicable to foreign companies, with the following pro¬ viso: “Provided, always, That nothing

herein contained shall subject any corpora¬ tion doing business under this article to any other provisions or requirements of the gen¬ eral insurance laws of thissstate, except aa distinctly herein set forth.” It appears that the defendant in this case, which is a citizen of Illinois, elected to take advantage of this law, and on June 18, 1888, received from the insurance department of the state authority to do business thereunder up¬ on the assessment plan. As to policies is¬ sued upon the assessment plan subsequent to this date and prior to 1897, the supreme court of Missouri held that the suicide stat¬ ute, above quoted, does not apply. Haynie v. Knights Templars & Masonic Life Indem¬ nity Go. 139 Mo. 416, 41 S. W. 461. To the same effect are Hanford v. Massachusetts Hen. Asso. 122 Mo. 50, 26 S. W. 680; Jacobs v. Omaha Life Asso. 142 Mo. 49, 43 S. W.

375, and Aloe v. Mutual Reserve Life Asso.

147 Mo. 561, 49 S. W. 553. It is true the authority of these cases was somewhat shaken by the recent case of Aloe v. Fidel¬ ity Mut. Life Asso. 164 Mo. 675, 55 S. W.

993, which *did not involve the repeal of the

suicide statute, but of another statute, pro¬ viding that no misrepresentation should be deemed material, unless the matter misrep¬ resented should have contributed to the death of the insured. The case, however, turned, as did the cases above cited, upon the scope of the proviso of § 5869, and a persuasive opinion was delivered by Judge Valliant in favor of the theory that the pro¬ viso was intended to relate only to the or¬ ganization of the corporations, and the ex¬ tent to which they should be subject to the supervision of the department of insurance, and under the superintendent’s control.

This opinion was delivered in the first de¬ partment of the supreme court, and, there being a dissent, the cause was transferred to the court in banc, wherein a majority of the court apparently differed from the views expressed by Judge Valliant, and reaffirmed the cases above cited. These cases, includ¬ ing the Haynie Case, must therefore be re¬ garded as representing the views of the su¬ preme court that the suicide statute was actually repealed by the act of 1887 as to

187 TJ. S.

Knights Templars’ & Masons’ Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman.

203-205

policies thereafter issued, and that view is, of course, binding upon this court.

But we are of the opinion that this stat¬ ute was intended to be prospective in its operation, and that the rights of the defend¬ ant as an assessment company under the act of 1887 began in June, 1888, with its certificate of authority to do business under that act, and with respect to policies ante¬ rior to that date the rights of the parties are to be determined by the suicide statute, § 5855, Rev. Stat. 1889. It must be borne in mind that the repealing act of 1887, now known as Rev. Stat. 1889, § 5869, was not passed as an independent statute, but as § 10 of a new statute of fourteen sections, entitled “An Act to Provide for the Incorpo¬ ration and Regulation of Associations, Soci¬ eties, or Companies, Doing a Life or Casu¬ alty Insurance Business on the Assessment Plan.” The prior sections define what shall be deemed a contract of insurance up¬ on the assessment plan, how the corpora¬ tions are formed, what the policies should specify, giving general details with regard to the management of the business, and then providing, in § 10, for annual statements made by “every corporation doing business under this act,” with the provision that

“nothing herein contained *shall subject any corporation doing business under this act to any provisions or requirements of the general insurance laws of this state, except as distinctly herein set forth.” This whole act, slightly amended in language, was car¬ ried into the Revised Statutes of 1889 as chapter 89, article 3. It seems to us quite clear that the declaration of the proviso that corporations “doing business under this act” shall not be subject to the general insurance laws of the state, applies only to corporations which took out a certificate of authority from the insurance department to do business on the assessment plan, and to policies thereafter issued by such compa¬ nies, notwithstanding the fact that such companies may have issued policies under the general insurance laws of the state prior to the act of 1887. The words “doing business” evidently refer to issuing policies, and not to paying them. A man does busi¬ ness when he contracts obligations; he ceases to do business when he discharges them.

This is not only the natural construction of the act, but to hold that the proviso ap¬ plies to policies antecedently issued might open it to the imputation of impairing the obligation of contracts previously entered into between these companies and their in¬ sured, since these policies amounted to a special agreement on the part of the com¬ panies that they would be liable in case of suicide, — an agreement upon which the in¬ sured and his beneficiary were entitled to rely. The provision of the suicide statute, that it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide, and that any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void, must be considered as imposing a condition upon every policy thereafter issued, not- ' withstanding any stipulation in the policy to the contrary. It must be treated as an 187 U. S. U. S., Book 47.

independent and binding obligation, and as overriding and nullifying any stipulation of the parties. As Mr. Justice Gray ob¬ served in Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Cle¬ ments, 140 U. S. 226, sub nom. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Pettus, 35 L. ed. 497, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 822: “The statute . . .

is mandatory, and controls the nature and terms of the contract into which the com¬ pany may induce the assured to enter.”

But we do not find it necessary to express an opinion whether, if the act of 1887 were plainly applicable upon its face to antece¬ dent policies, it would be objectionable as impairing the obligation *of contracts en-

t.ered into between the insurance company and insured, inasmuch as we are clearly of opinion that it should not be held to apply to such unless its language imperatively de¬ mand it. City R. Co. v. Citizens’ Street R.

Co. 166 U. S. 557, 565, 41 L. ed. 1114, 1117,

17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653.

Were the act of 1887 more ambiguous than it is as to its application to past transactions, we should still be disposed to apply the cardinal rule of construction, that where the language of an act will bear two interpretations, equally obvious, that one which is clearly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution is to be pre¬ ferred. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes,

§ 178. This rule was applied by this court in Granada County v. Brogden, 112 U. S.

261, sub nom. Granada County v. Brown, 28 L. ed. 704, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 125; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 269, 29 L. ed. 615,

620, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580, and Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657, 39 L. ed. 297,

301. 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610, 15 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 207.

We do not wish to be understood, how¬ ever, as expressing an opinion upon the con¬ stitutionality of the act of 1887, if it were applied to prior policies, but simply as holding that, in view of the language of the act, and the doubtfulness of its constitu¬ tionality as applied to prior policies, it should only be given effect in cases of poli¬ cies thereafter issued.

But there is another argument in this connection which ought not to be over¬ looked, and which is, in our opinion, deci¬ sive that the suicide statute is applicable to this policy. In 1897 a law was passed by the legislature of Missouri, specially apply¬ ing the suicide statute to insurance compa¬ nies doing business upon the assessment plan. This was done by an amendment to § 5869, which will hereafter be considered.

Two objections to the applicability of this statute are deserving of consideration.

First, that it is in conflict with art. 4, § 28, of the Constitution of Missouri, declaring “that no bill . . . shall contain more

than one subject, which shall be clearly ex¬ pressed in its title;” and also art. 4, § 25, that “no law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so amended in its pas¬ sage through either house as to change its original purpose.”

The act was entitled “An Act to Repeal Section 5869 of Art. 3, Chap. 89, of the Re¬ vised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, entitled

10 145

205-208

Supreme Court of the United States.

Oct. Term,

‘Insurance Companies on the Assessment Plan,’ and to Enact a New Section in Lieu

Tliereof, and Designated *as Section 5809” of the same chapter, “Relating to State¬ ment of Affairs of Assessment Insurance Companies and Misrepresentations Made in Securing a Policy of Insurance and Defense Thereon, for Such Misrepresentations,” and as first introduced contained the section as herein printed in the margin.t Subse¬ quently the bill was amended by inserting between the word “sections” and the figures “5912” the figures “5855” (the suicide stat¬ ute). This was not strictly germane to the other sections cited, which related to the purposes set forth in the title to the act, and it is argued that the legislature exceed¬ ed its constitutional powers in inserting these figures.

In the absence of an express adjudication of the supreme court of the state upon this question, we are forced to rely upon other decisions concerning the construction given to this provision of the state Constitution. In State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495, it was held that the object of this provision was to pre¬ vent logrolling, and surprise and fraud on members; and in State ex rel. Wolfe v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271, 276, 21 S. W. 1125, 1126, it is said that “these and other cases show that this section of the Constitution is to be reasonably and liberally construed and applied, due regard being had to its ob¬ ject and purpose. It was designed to pre¬ vent the insertion of disconnected matters in the same bill. The section asserts only two propositions. The first is that no bill shall contain more than one subject, and the second is that this single subject must be

clearly expressed in the title. If all *the provisions of the bill have a natural rela¬ tion and connection, then the subject is sin¬ gle, and this, too, though the bill contains many provisions. As to the second propo¬ sition, namely, that the single subject must be clearly expressed in the title, it is suffi¬ cient to say that the legislature may select its own language, and may use few or many words. It is sufficient that the title fairly embraces the subject-matter covered by the act ; mere matters of detail need not be stated in the title.” And in State ex rel. Kirkwood, v. Heege, 135 Mo. 112, 118, 36 S. W. 614, it is said: “A mere reference to the section to be amended, without other description of the subject-matter of the amendatory law, is un der the rulings of this court a sufficient title to an act which deals exclusively with the subject of the section amended.” It was also said in State ex rel. Dickason v. Marion County Ct. 128 Mo. 440, 30 S. W. 105: “The practice of legislation

fSec. 58(19. Ifvery corporation doing busi¬ ness under this article shall annually, on or before the first day of February, return to the superintendent of the insurance department, in such manner and form as he shall prescribe, a statement of its affairs, for the .year ending on the preceding 31st day of December, and the said superintendent, in person or by dep¬ uty, shall have the power of visitation of and examination into the affairs of such corpora¬ tion, which are conferred upon him in the case of life insurance companies by the laws of this 146

by reference to sections of the authorized version of the statutes (without other de¬ scription of the subject of the amending act) has been followed quite generally in this state on the faith of early rulings of the supreme court approving such methods of lawmaking. So much has been done, and so many rights have been acquired, on the basis of those rulings, that we hold that the question of their correctness ought not to be reopened at this day. We adhere to them and follow them as an expression of the set¬ tled law of Missouri.”

As the new act was simply an amendment of § 5869, these two last cases would seem to be decisive of the opinion of the supreme court upon the statute in question, upon which its decision is, of course, obligatory upon this court.

Section 5869 of the Revised Statutes of 1889 deals with four questions relating to the law of insurance by companies doing business on the assessment plan. First, providing for an annual statement; second, a visitation and examination into the af¬ fairs of the corporation; third, a general statement that foreign companies are sub¬ ject to certain provisions; and, fourth, a recital as to what, among the general insur¬ ance laws of the state, shall be applicable to these companies.

While, as already stated, the supreme court has not decided as to the constitu¬ tional power of the legislature to incorpo¬ rate the suicide statute into this amended § 5869, the decisions *above cited, that a[208| mere reference to the section amended is sufficient to sustain the validity of the law, would seem to cover the case, and for this reason the suicide statute, though not strictly germane to the other sections men¬ tioned, is germane to the business of insur¬ ance on the assessment plan. Bearing in mind that the suicide statute was original¬ ly repealed, as to these policies, by § 5869, as enacted in 1887, it would seem that an amendment introduced into the same sec¬ tion restoring its application to these same policies would not be unconstitutional.

A second objection to the application of this statute is that if the petitioner be right in his contention that, by the repeal of the suicide statute, the contract between the as¬ sured and the company relieving the latter from liability in case of suicide, became ef¬ fective, the legislature could not thereafter, by re-enacting the statute or attempting to subject assessment companies to its provi¬ sions , impair the contract subsisting be¬ tween the assured and this petitioner.

The answer to this argument is not diffi¬ cult. No new contract was made, and no

state ; and all such foreign companies are here¬ by declared to be subject to, and required to conform to, the provisions of sections 5912, aud 5849, and 5850 of the Revised Statutes of Mis¬ souri of 18S9, and governed and controlled by all the provisions in said section contained : Provided, always, That nothing herein con¬ tained shall subject any corporation doing busi¬ ness under this article to any other provisions or requirements of the general insurance laws, of this state, except as distinctly herein set forth and provided.

187 U. S.

new rights were vested, between the act of 1887, repealing the suicide statute, and the act of 1897 restoring it. All that the lat¬ ter act purported to do was to reinstate the parties in their original rights prior to the act of 1887, which rights had not been af¬ fected by anything done during the ten years between the two acts. Upon defendant’s theory, if the act of 1887 had been in exist¬ ence but a single day the same result would have followed.

Our conclusion, then, is that the court be¬ low was correct in holding that the suicide statute, as originally applied to this policy, had not been repealed at the death of Jar¬ man in 1898, when the cause of action arose.

that the court permitted a recovery, not only of the amount of the policy, but of all the money paid by assured in assessments upon such policy.

The promise of the company was to pay the plaintiff “the sum of $5,000, and all the money paid on the policy in assessments, subject to the limitation as to the amount

of such payment *as is provided in § 1 of art. 7 of the constitution on the back of this policy, which section reads as follows:

“Sec. 1. Upon due notice and satisfactory proof of the death of a member of this com¬ pany, the board of directors shall within sixty (GO) days pay the widow, children, or heirs of the deceased member (and in the order named unless otherwise ordered by the member during his lifetime or in his will), the amount set forth in the deceased mem¬ ber’s policy of membership : Provided, that a policy of membership for $5,000 shall be good for all the money in the death fund arising from one assessment; provided, it shall not exceed $5,000 and all the money paid on the policy in assessments : and a certificate for $4,000 shall be good for four fifths of all the money in the death fund arising from one assessment, provided it shall not exceed $4,000 and all the money paid on the policy in assessments; and so on in the same proportion as to all certificates.”

The assessments paid upon the policy amounted to $S11.83, and the right of the plaintiff to recover this amount in addition to the principal sum of $5,000 would be be¬ yond question, were it not for certain changes thereafter made in the constitu¬ tion, which it is insisted were binding upon the plaintiff under the following clause, found in the application of Jarman for membership: “I further agree, if accepted, to abide by the constitution, rules, and reg¬ ulations of the company, as they now are, or may be constitutionally changed hereafter.”

ITie application further stated that the application was made a part of the policy by reference thereto.

“ In virtue of the privilege thus given to amend its constitution, the company, on January 8, 1889, amended art. 4, § 3, of the constitution so as to read as follows:

“Sec. 3. Policies of membership may be issued upon a basis of benefits ranging in amounts to $5,000, and all the money paid in assessments upon the policy for the first five years.”

187 TJ. S.

The proviso of art. 7, § 1, was also amend¬ ed at the same time to correspond with the above amendment and to read as follows:

“Provided, That a policy of membership for $5,000 shall be good for all the money in the death fund arising from one * assess-

ment; provided, that it shall not exceed $5,000 and all the money paid on the policy in assessments for the first five years.”

On February 20, 1894, this section was again amended by striking out the proviso altogether.

It seems that these sections thus changed from an agreement to repay all assessments upon policies to an agreement to pay all as¬ sessments for the first five years, was found, or deemed to be, too liberal; and in Janu¬ ary, 1898, the. company made an important additional amendment by striking out en¬ tirely the proviso for the repayment of as¬ sessments, under which it now claims to be relieved altogether from paying more than the principal sum of the policy. The arti¬ cle as finally amended reads as follows:

“Sec. 3. Policies of membership may bo issued upon a basis of benefits ranging in amounts to $5,000, but no member shall hold more than one policy at the same time, except one additional policy on the term plan,” etc.

In view of the fact that both of these amendments imply a prospective operation upon policies which may he issued, it would seem to be unnecessary to consider the ques¬ tion discussed with much detail in briefs of counsel, whether the amendments were in¬ tended to operate upon policies already is¬ sued. In our opinion it is clear that they were not, and conceding the proposition that Jarman had agreed to abide by the con¬ stitution, rules, and regulations of the com¬ pany, as they then were, or might be con¬ stitutionally changed thereafter, this agree¬ ment could have no operation upon changes which, upon their face, indicated that they applied only to policies thereafter to be is¬ sued. To cover this case he should have promised to abide by amendments there¬ after made, though they were intended to apply only to future policies.

The judgment of the court below award¬ ing the plaintiff the full amount agreed upon in the policy, without damages, is ac¬ cordingly affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the

decision of this case.