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Lacey v. State
(2025)
Case details
Full caption
Lacey v. State Farm General Insurance
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Wilner (Justice), joined by Copeland (Justice), Copeland (Justice), Keech (Justice), Vahedy (Justice)
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2
2.
I
also
conclude
that
additional
financial
or
disciplinary
sanctions
against
the
individual
attorneys
are
not
warranted.
This
was
a
collective
debacle,
and
is
properly
resolved
without
further
jeopardy.
RELEVANT
PROCEDURAL
AND
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
Discovery
Proceedings
Before
the
Special
Master
3.
In
January
2025,
the
Court
appointed
me
as
Special
Master
in
this
insurance-related
civil
action.
Central
to
the
reason
for
my
appointment
was
an
ongoing
dispute
between
the
parties
regarding
the
insurer’s
assertion
of
various
privileges
in
discovery.
(Docket
#
70,
73.)
4.
After
handling
intervening
legal
issues,
I
met
with
the
parties
in
early
April
to
discuss
the
insurer’s
privilege
invocations.
The
parties
provided
me
with
detailed
letter
briefs
regarding
the
discovery
issue
in
advance
of
the
meeting.
When
we
met,
the
parties
agreed
to
provide
supplemental
briefing
on
a
discrete
issue
regarding
the
propriety
of
in
camera
review
of
some
of
the
disputed
documents.
The
Briefs
with
AI
Research
5.
As
recounted
in
detail
in
orders
I
issued
on
April
15
and
20
(attached
to
the
Appendix
to
this
order),
Plaintiff’s
supplemental
brief
contained
numerous
false,
inaccurate,
and
misleading
legal
citations
and
quotations.
According
to
my
after-the-fact
review
–
and
supported
by
the
candid
declarations
of
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
–
approximately
nine
of
the
27
legal
citations
in
the
ten-page
brief
were
incorrect
in
some
way.
At
least
two
of
the
authorities
cited
do
not
exist
at
all.
Additionally,
several
quotations
attributed
to
the
cited
judicial
opinions
were
phony
and
did
not
accurately
represent
those
materials.
2
The
lawyers’
declarations
ultimately
made
clear
2
Some
“pincites”
were
not
correctly
reported.
While
this
could
certainly
impede
research
and
review,
I
consider
those
errors
to
be
at
the
mild
end
of
the
AI
hallucination
spectrum.
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3
that
the
source
of
this
problem
was
the
inappropriate
use
of,
and
reliance
on,
AI
tools.
6.
Here’s
an
abbreviated
summary
of
the
events.
Plaintiff
is
represented
by
a
large
team
of
attorneys
at
two
law
firms
(a
lawyer
moved
from
the
Ellis
George
firm
to
K&L
Gates
during
the
course
of
the
state
court
litigation
underlying
the
insurance
coverage
action;
the
representation
in
the
present
case
is
shared
between
the
two
firms).
3
The
lawyers
admit
that
Mr.
Copeland,
an
attorney
at
Ellis
George,
used
various
AI
tools
to
generate
an
“outline”
for
the
supplemental
brief.
That
document
contained
the
problematic
legal
research.
7.
Mr.
Copeland
sent
the
outline
to
lawyers
at
K&L
Gates.
They
incorporated
the
material
into
the
brief.
No
attorney
or
staff
member
at
either
firm
apparently
cite-checked
or
otherwise
reviewed
that
research
before
filing
the
brief
with
the
Special
Master.
Based
on
the
sworn
statements
of
all
involved
(which
I
have
no
reason
to
doubt),
the
attorneys
at
K&L
Gates
didn’t
know
that
Mr.
Copeland
used
AI
to
prepare
the
outline;
nor
did
they
ask
him.
8.
A
further
wrinkle.
During
my
initial
review
of
Plaintiff’s
brief,
I
was
unable
to
confirm
the
accuracy
of
two
of
the
authorities
that
the
lawyers
cited.
I
emailed
the
lawyers
shortly
after
receiving
the
brief
to
have
them
address
this
anomaly.
Later
that
day,
K&L
Gates
re-submitted
the
brief
without
the
two
incorrect
citations
–
but
with
the
remaining
AI-generated
problems
in
the
body
of
the
text.
4
An
associate
attorney
sent
me
an
innocuous
3
Although
it’s
necessary
to
identify
some
parties
involved
here,
I
decline
to
name-and-shame
all
of
the
lawyers
in
this
order.
They
know
who
they
are,
and
don’t
need
further
notoriety
here.
4
Copies
of
the
Original
Brief
and
the
Revised
Brief
(identified
as
Versions
1
and
3
in
my
initial
OSC)
are
attached
in
the
Appendix.
I’ve
marked
the
bogus
citations
in
both
briefs
in
red.
I
noted
that
there
was
an
intervening
iteration
of
the
brief
submitted
to
me
that
contained
the
bogus
AI
research
and
an
odd
(continued.
.
.)
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4
e-mail
thanking
me
for
catching
the
two
errors
that
were
“inadvertently
included”
in
the
brief,
and
confirming
that
the
citations
in
the
Revised
Brief
had
been
“addressed
and
updated.”
9.
I
didn’t
discover
that
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
used
AI
–
and
re-submitted
the
brief
with
considerably
more
made-up
citations
and
quotations
beyond
the
two
initial
errors
–
until
I
issued
a
later
OSC
soliciting
a
more
detailed
explanation.
The
lawyers’
sworn
statements
and
subsequent
submission
of
the
actual
AI-generated
“outline”
made
clear
the
series
of
events
that
led
to
the
false
filings.
The
declarations
also
included
profuse
apologies
and
honest
admissions
of
fault.
10.
I
subsequently
set
the
matter
for
a
hearing
on
the
OSC.
My
April
20
order
gave
the
parties
notice
of
the
specific
types
of
sanctions
and
fee-
shifting
awards
that
I
was
considering
based
on
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
11
and
37,
along
with
my
inherent
(and
Court-delegated)
authority.
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
responded
to
the
OSC
and
addressed
me
during
our
recent
hearing.
I
also
received
a
submission
from
the
defense
estimating
the
cost
of
the
preparation
of
their
brief
on
the
privilege
issue.
This
order
follows.
RELEVANT
LEGAL
AUTHORITY
11.
The
district
court’s
order
appointing
me
as
Special
Master
authorized
me
to
“take
all
appropriate
measures
to
perform
the
assigned
duties
fairly
and
efficiently.”
I
possess
the
Court’s
authority
to
“regulate
all
proceedings”
before
me
pursuant
to
the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure.
This
expressly
includes
the
ability
to
impose
“any
noncontempt
sanction
provided
by
Rule
37”
or
other
authority.
(Docket
#
70.)
typographical
error
in
one
of
the
challenged
citations.
I
don’t
understand
the
significance
of
that
additional
submission,
but
I
don’t
believe
that
it
adds
much
to
the
sanctions
analysis.
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12.
Rule
11(b)
states,
in
relevant
part,
that
when
an
attorney
presents
“a
pleading,
written
motion,
or
other
paper”
to
a
court,
the
attorney
“certifies
that
to
the
best
of
that
person’s
knowledge,
information,
and
belief,
formed
after
an
inquiry
reasonable
under
the
circumstances
[that
the]
legal
contentions
are
warranted
by
existing
law.”
Rule
11(c)(3-4)
states
that
a
court
may
impose
a
sanction
“limited
to
what
suffices
to
deter
repetition
of
the
conduct
or
comparable
conduct
by
others
similarly
situated.”
That
may
include
“nonmonetary
directives”
or
“an
order
directing
payment
[
]
of
part
or
all
of
the
reasonable
attorney’s
fees
and
other
expenses
directly
resulting
from
the
violation.”
13.
Rule
37(a)(5)(B)
states
that
a
court
“must,
after
giving
an
opportunity
to
be
heard,
require
[
]
the
attorney
filing
[an
unsuccessful
discovery]
motion
[
]
to
pay
the
party
or
deponent
who
opposed
the
motion
its
reasonable
expenses
incurred
in
opposing
the
motion,
including
attorney's
fees.”
Litigation-related
sanctions
(for
disobeying
a
court’s
discovery
order,
but
generally
applicable
to
other
circumstances)
may
include
prohibiting
a
party
from
“supporting
or
opposing
designated
claims
or
defenses”
or
“striking
pleadings
in
whole
or
in
part.”
Fed.
R.
Civ.
37(b)(2)(A)(ii-iii).
14.
Separate
and
apart
from
sanctions
based
on
these
rules,
a
court
has
the
inherent
authority
to
levy
sanctions
against
a
party
or
attorney
for,
inter
alia,
acting
in
“bad
faith”
or
for
otherwise
“willfully
abus[ing]
judicial
processes.”
Roadway
Express,
Inc.
v.
Piper,
447
U.S.
752,
766
(1980).
Sanctions
based
on
a
federal
court’s
inherent
authority
are
“both
broader
and
narrower
than
other
means
of
imposing
sanctions”
because
they
encompass
“a
full
range
of
litigation
abuses.”
Chambers
v.
NASCO,
Inc.,
501
U.S.
32,
46-
47
(1991).
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15.
The
Ninth
Circuit
has
concluded
that
such
sanctions
“are
available
if
the
court
specifically
finds
bad
faith
or
conduct
tantamount
to
bad
faith”
by
an
attorney.
Fink
v.
Gomez,
239
F.3d
989,
994
(9th
Cir.
2001);
Rocha
v.
Fiedler,
2025
WL
1219007
at
*1
(9th
Cir.
Apr.
28,
2025)
(same
standard
under
Fed.
R.
Bankr.
P.
9011);
Arrowhead
Capital
Finance,
Ltd.
v.
Picturepro,
LLC,
2023
WL
109722
at
*2
(9th
Cir.
Jan.
5,
2023)
(same;
affirming
discovery
sanction
award).
The
“tantamount
to
bad
faith”
standard
includes
“a
variety
of
types
of
willful
actions,
including
recklessness
when
combined
with
an
additional
factor
such
as
frivolousness,
harassment,
or
an
improper
purpose.”
Fink,
239
F.3d
at
994.
16.
With
greater
frequency,
courts
are
now
regularly
evaluating
the
conduct
of
lawyers
and
pro
se
litigants
who
improperly
use
AI
in
submissions
to
judges.
Whether
that
conduct
supports
the
imposition
of
various
types
of
sanctions
requires
a
fact-
and
circumstance-specific
analysis.
See,
e.g.,
United
States
v.
Hayes,
___
F.Supp.3d
___,
2025
WL
235531
at
*10-15
(E.D.
Cal.
Jan
17,
2025)
(sanctioning
criminal
defense
lawyer
for
using
AI;
when
questioned
by
the
court,
the
lawyer’s
response
about
the
source
of
inaccurate
legal
citations
“was
not
accurate
and
was
misleading”);
Saxena
v.
Martinez-
Hernandez,
2025
WL
1194003
at
*2
and
n.5
(D.
Nev.
April
23,
2025)
(“Saxena’s
use
of
AI
generated
cases
–
and
his
subsequent
refusal
to
accept
responsibility
for
doing
so
–
is
just
another
example
of
Saxena’s
abusive
litigation
tactics,
and
further
explains
why
the
court
issued
case-terminating
sanctions”)
(collecting
cases);
United
States
v.
Cohen,
724
F.Supp.3d
251,
254,
259
(S.D.N.Y
2024)
(declining
to
find
bad
faith
where
defense
lawyer
voluntarily
disclosed
that
she
“had
been
‘unable
to
verify’”
false
citations
in
colleague’s
brief
and
lawyer
acknowledged
that
he
“would
have
withdrawn
the
[fake]
citations
immediately
if
given
the
opportunity”).
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ANALYSIS
17.
I
conclude
that
the
lawyers
involved
in
filing
the
Original
and
Revised
Briefs
collectively
acted
in
a
manner
that
was
tantamount
to
bad
faith.
Fink,
239
F.3d
at
994.
The
initial,
undisclosed
use
of
AI
products
to
generate
the
first
draft
of
the
brief
was
flat-out
wrong.
Even
with
recent
advances,
no
reasonably
competent
attorney
should
out-source
research
and
writing
to
this
technology
–
particularly
without
any
attempt
to
verify
the
accuracy
of
that
material.
And
sending
that
material
to
other
lawyers
without
disclosing
its
sketchy
AI
origins
realistically
put
those
professionals
in
harm’s
way.
Mr.
Copeland
candidly
admitted
that
this
is
what
happened,
and
is
unreservedly
remorseful
about
it.
18.
Yet,
the
conduct
of
the
lawyers
at
K&L
Gates
is
also
deeply
troubling.
They
failed
to
check
the
validity
of
the
research
sent
to
them.
As
a
result,
the
fake
information
found
its
way
into
the
Original
Brief
that
I
read.
That’s
bad.
But,
when
I
contacted
them
and
let
them
know
about
my
concerns
regarding
a
portion
of
their
research,
the
lawyers’
solution
was
to
excise
the
phony
material
and
submit
the
Revised
Brief
–
still
containing
a
half-dozen
AI
errors.
Further,
even
though
the
lawyers
were
on
notice
of
a
significant
problem
with
the
legal
research
(as
flagged
by
the
brief’s
recipient:
the
Special
Master),
there
was
no
disclosure
to
me
about
the
use
of
AI.
Instead,
the
e-mail
transmitting
the
new
brief
merely
suggested
an
inadvertent
production
error,
not
improper
reliance
on
technology.
Translation:
they
had
the
information
and
the
chance
to
fix
this
problem,
but
didn’t
take
it.
Cohen,
724
F.Supp.3d
at
259.
19.
I
therefore
conclude
that
(a)
the
initial
undisclosed
use
of
AI,
(b)
the
failure
to
cite-check
the
Original
Brief,
and
(perhaps
most
egregiously),
(c)
the
re-submission
of
the
defective
Revised
Brief
without
adequate
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disclosure
of
the
use
of
AI,
taken
together,
demonstrate
reckless
conduct
with
the
improper
purpose
of
trying
to
influence
my
analysis
of
the
disputed
privilege
issues.
The
Ellis
George
and
K&L
Gates
firms
had
adequate
opportunities
–
before
and
after
their
error
had
been
brought
to
their
attention
–
to
stop
this
from
happening.
Their
failure
to
do
so
justifies
measured
sanctions
under
these
circumstances.
20.
Those
sanctions
are
as
follows.
I
have
struck,
and
decline
to
consider,
any
of
the
supplemental
briefs
that
Plaintiff
submitted
on
the
privilege
issue.
From
this,
I
decline
to
award
any
of
the
discovery
relief
(augmenting
a
privilege
log,
ordering
production
of
materials,
or
requiring
in
camera
review
of
items)
that
Plaintiff
sought
in
the
proceedings
that
led
up
to
the
bogus
briefs.
I
conclude
that
these
non-monetary
sanctions
will
suffice
to
“deter
repetition
of
the
conduct
or
comparable
conduct
by
others
similarly
situated.”
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
11(c)(4).
If
the
undisclosed
use
of
AI
and
the
submission
of
fake
law
causes
a
client
to
lose
a
motion
or
case,
lawyers
will
undoubtedly
be
deterred
from
going
down
that
pointless
route.
5
21.
The
district
judge’s
order
appointing
me
initially
required
Defendant
to
pay
the
costs
of
the
Special
Master.
However,
that
order
expressly
authorized
me
to
shift
fees
when
I
deemed
appropriate.
(Docket
#
70
at
¶
7.)
It’s
certainly
appropriate
here.
I’ve
calculated
that
the
fees
for
dealing
with
this
issue
(reviewing
the
various
iterations
of
the
defective
briefs,
issuing
various
orders
and
reviewing
the
responses,
conducting
the
OSC
hearing,
and
issuing
this
sanctions
order)
were
approximately
$26,100
(including
service
fees
from
the
provider).
Because
5
At
our
recent
hearing,
Mr.
Copeland
movingly
asserted
that
neither
he
nor
his
colleagues
would
engage
in
similar
conduct
in
the
future;
exposure
of
these
events
was
therefore
sufficient
to
deter
them
from
doing
this
again.
I
completely
agree.
But
under
the
Rule,
I
also
have
to
consider
the
goal
of
deterring
other
members
of
the
legal
community.
In
my
estimation,
more
is
required.
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9
Defendant
advanced
those
fees
to
JAMS,
Ellis
George
and
K&L
Gates
are
jointly
and
severally
directed
to
pay
that
sum
to
the
defense
in
reimbursement
within
30
days.
22.
I
also
gave
serious
consideration
to
ordering
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
to
compensate
the
defense
for
time
that
Defendant’s
lawyers
spent
on
their
supplemental
brief.
A
shift
of
fees
to
the
winning
party
in
a
discovery
motion
is
authorized
and
commonplace
under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
37(a)(5),
and
falls
well
within
the
inherent
authority
of
the
court
to
deter
this
conduct
by
others
in
the
future.
I
also
easily
conclude
that
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
were
not
“substantially
justified”
in
using
false
information
in
advancing
their
legal
positions
on
th
e
privilege
issue.
(Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
37(a)(5)(B).)
23.
However,
the
amount
of
fees
that
the
defense
attested
to
(at
my
request,
not
theirs)
for
preparing
the
brief
and
attending
the
recent
hearing
approached
$25,000.
I
don’t
have
any
reason
to
dispute
that
sum,
but
I
don’t
believe
that
full
compensation
for
the
briefing
process
–
one
that
the
defense
somewhat
eagerly
agreed
to
–
isn’t
necessary
for
deterrence
purposes.
In
an
exercise
of
discretion,
I
direct
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
to
pay
the
defense
a
total
of
$5,000
for
fees
incurred
here.
6
24.
My
sanction
notice
informed
the
parties
that
I
planned
to
order
the
lawyers
to
inform
Plaintiff
personally
about
the
substance
and
outcome
of
6
I
note,
but
don’t
ascribe
any
weight
to,
Plaintiff’s
argument
that
Defendant
wasn’t
prejudiced
by
the
AI
debacle
because
the
parties
submitted
their
briefs
at
the
same
time.
Given
the
deterrence-based
motivation
of
this
sanction
order,
the
serendipity
of
simultaneous
v.
sequential
briefing
is
of
limited
relevance
to
my
consideration
of
this
point.
I’m
also
not
swayed
by
the
observation
(in
my
original
OSC,
and
echoed
in
Plaintiff’s
response
brief)
that,
as
it
turned
out,
the
AI
hallucinations
weren’t
too
far
off
the
mark
in
their
recitations
of
the
substantive
law.
That’s
a
pretty
weak
no-harm,
no-foul
defense
of
the
conduct
here.
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this
issue.
The
lawyers
told
me
at
the
hearing
that
they
already
disclosed
this
information
to
their
client;
that’s
sufficient
for
me.
I
recognize
that
Mrs.
Lacey
is
clearly
not
at
fault
for
the
AI
debacle,
but
will
bear
this
outcome
as
a
consequence
of
her
lawyers’
actions.
She
will
not,
however,
be
financially
responsible
for
the
monetary
awards
described
in
this
order.
Those
will
fall
solely
on
the
lawyers
and
their
firms.
25.
In
a
further
exercise
of
discretion,
I
decline
to
order
any
sanction
or
penalty
against
any
of
the
individual
lawyers
involved
here.
In
their
declarations
and
during
our
recent
hearing,
their
admissions
of
responsibility
have
been
full,
fair,
and
sincere.
I
also
accept
their
real
and
profuse
apologies.
Justice
would
not
be
served
by
piling
on
them
for
their
mistakes.
CONCLUSION
A
final
note.
Directly
put,
Plaintiff’s
use
of
AI
affirmatively
misled
me.
I
read
their
brief,
was
persuaded
(
or
at
least
intrigued)
by
the
authorities
that
they
cited,
and
looked
up
the
decisions
to
learn
more
about
them
–
only
to
find
that
they
didn’t
exist.
That’s
scary.
It
almost
led
to
the
scarier
outcome
(from
my
perspective)
of
including
those
bogus
materials
in
a
judicial
order.
Strong
deterrence
is
needed
to
make
sure
that
attorneys
don’t
succumb
to
this
easy
shortcut.
For
these
reasons,
Plaintiff’s
supplemental
briefs
are
struck,
and
no
further
discovery
relief
will
be
granted
on
the
disputed
privilege
issue.
Additionally,
Plaintiff’s
law
firms
are
ordered
(jointly
and
severally)
to
pay
compensation
to
the
defense
in
the
aggregate
amount
of
$31,100.
Dated:
May
5,
2025
/s/
Judge
Wilner
_______________________________________
HON.
MICHAEL
R.
WILNER
U.S.
MAGISTRATE
JUDGE
(RET.)
SPECIAL
MASTER
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11
APPENDIX
OF
MATERIALS
1.
Special
Master’s
Order
to
Show
Cause
re:
Sanctions
(April
15,
2025).
2.
Special
Master’s
Notice
of
Intended
Sanctions
and
Fee
Orders
(April
20,
2025).
3.
Plaintiff’s
Brief
in
Support
of
Obtaining
Relevant,
Non-Privileged
Documents
from
Defendant
(Original
Brief,
as
marked
by
Special
Master)
(filed
April
14,
2025).
4.
Plaintiff’s
Brief
in
Support
of
Obtaining
Relevant,
Non-Privileged
Documents
from
Defendant
(Revised
Brief,
as
marked
by
Special
Master)
(filed
April
14,
2025).
5.
E-mail
transmitting
Revised
Brief
to
Special
Master
(April
14,
2025).
6.
Declaration
of
Trent
Copeland
(filed
April
18,
2025)
plus
a
version
of
the
AI
outline
sent
to
K&L
Gates
(referenced
in
declaration,
received
separately).
7.
Declaration
of
Ryan
Keech
(filed
April
18,
2025).
8.
Declaration
of
Keian
Vahedy
(filed
April
18,
2025).
9.
Plaintiff’s
Response
to
Special
Master’s
Notice
of
Intended
Sanctions
and
Fee
Orders.
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J
J
AMS
CASE
REFERENCE
NO.
1210040394
USDC
CASE
NO.
CV
24-5205
FMO
(MAAx)
(C.D.
Cal.)
Jacqueline
“Jackie”
Lacey,
et
al.,
Plaintiff,
v.
State
Farm
General
Insurance
Co.,
Defendant.
______________________________________________
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
1.The
district
court
appointed
me
as
Special
Master
in
this
action
in
January
2025.
(Docket
#
70,
71.)
The
Court’s
appointment
order
specifically
authorized
me
to
“impose
on
a
party
any
noncontempt
sanction
provided
by
Rule
37
or
45,
and
may
recommend
[to
the
district
court]
a
contempt
sanction
against
a
party
and
sanctions
against
a
nonparty.”
(Docket
#
70
at
¶
3
(quoting
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.53(c)(2)).)
2.Plaintiff’s
lawyers
are
ordered
to
show
cause
why
the
Special
Master
should
not
impose
sanctions
based
on
the
following:
3.V
V
ersion
1
of
Plaintiff’s
supplemental
brief
.
I
conducted
a
hearing
on
a
discovery
issue
on
April
7,
2025.
During
that
hearing,
I
directed
the
parties
to
submit
supplemental
briefing
on
a
disputed
privilege
issue.
4.I
received
Plaintiff’s
supplemental
brief
(Version
1)
at
approximately
noon
on
Monday,
April
14.
1
During
my
review
of
Version
1
of
Plaintiff’s
brief,
I
went
onto
Westlaw
to
read
several
of
the
judicial
decisions
cited
or
quoted
in
the
pleading.
5.The
problem:
I
couldn’t
verify
aspects
of
what
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
put
into
the
brief.
Specifically,
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
included
what
they
presented
as
a
lengthy
quotation
from
a
decision
(National
Steel
Products)
that
appeared
to
1
I
also
received
a
supplemental
brief
from
Defendant.
That
submission
is
not
relevant
to
this
OSC.
$SSHQGL[
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strongly
support
their
position
on
the
privilege
issue.
The
passage
from
Version
1
is
reproduced
in
full:
Rather,
these
internal
notes
reference
the
adjusters’
recommendations,
pending
activities,
and
discussion
with
other
State
Farm
claims
representatives
regarding
the
Lacey’s
insurance
claim.
National
Steel
Products
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
164
Cal.App.3d
476,
489
(1985)
(“Internal
memoranda
or
claims
file
materials,
although
they
may
discuss
legal
theories,
litigation
tactics
or
potential
liability,
are
not
privileged
unless
they
are
written
by
or
at
the
direction
of
counsel
and
prepared
for
the
purpose
of
transmitting
information
to
counsel
for
legal
advice.”)
Version
1
at
7.
6.
I
reviewed
the
online
version
of
the
a
ppellate
decision
in
National
Steel
Products.
The
text
quoted
in
Plaintif
f’s
brief
does
not
exist
in
that
opinion.
7.
Additionally,
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
cited
to
another
judicial
decision
that,
again,
appeared
to
strongly
support
their
litigation
position:
California
courts
are
especially
skeptical
of
overbroad
privilege
assertions
in
bad
faith
insurance
litigation,
where
the
insurer’s
claims
conduct
is
directly
at
issue.
See
,
Booth
v.
Allstate
Ins.
Co.
,
198
Cal.App.3d
1357,
1366
(1989)
(“An
insurer
cannot
assert
privilege
to
shield
evidence
of
bad
faith.”)
Version
1
at
10.
8.
I
was
unable
to
locate
this
judicial
decision
online.
I
tried
inputting
the
citation
that
Plaintiff
provided.
I
also
searched
for
it
using
the
case
caption
in
the
brief.
2
The
decision
does
not
appear
to
exist.
9.
I
sent
an
e-mail
to
the
lawyers
via
JAMS
Access
later
that
day.
My
e-mail
(sent
at
around
4
pm
PT
on
April
14)
was
primarily
intended
to
set
up
another
hearing
on
the
discovery
issue.
Additionally,
I
asked
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
to
check
the
accuracy
of
the
National
Steel
Products
and
Booth
citations.
I
expressly
told
the
lawyers
that
I
was
unable
to
locate
the
items
as
stated
in
their
brief.
2
I
used
a
Boolean
search
(ti(booth
and
allstate))in
the
California
and
9th
Circuit
jurisdictional
databases
on
Westlaw.
No
result
found.
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10.
V
V
ersion
2
.
At
roughly
the
same
time,
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
filed
an
amended
version
of
their
supplemental
brief
(Version
2).
An
e-mail
from
an
administrative
assistant
at
the
Ellis
George
firm
informed
me
that
the
only
change
to
Version
2
of
the
brief
was
“cosmetic
to
correct
the
placement
of
the
screenshots”
of
certain
disputed
documents
that
were
copied
in
the
filing.
11.
Despite
that
statement,
there
was
a
curious
change
to
the
National
Steel
Products
parenthetical
quotation.
The
purported
text
from
the
decision
was
fundamentally
the
same.
However,
the
end
of
the
quotation
had
garbled
typing
added
to
it:
“[
]
prepared
for
the
purpose
of
transmitting
information
P
P
age
dfsadf
for
legal
advice.”
Version
2
at
7
(emphasis
added).
The
Booth
citation
was
unmodified.
12.
Version
3
.
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
filed
a
third
version
of
the
supplemental
brief
with
JAMS
at
approximately
6
pm
PT
that
same
day
(Version
3).
Version
3
did
not
contain
the
quoted
language
from
the
National
Steel
Products
decision
as
quoted
above.
Instead,
it
contained
a
parenthetical
summation
with
the
same
internal
pin
cite.
The
parenthetical
read:
“(Privilege
is
strictly
construed
because
it
suppresses
relevant
facts
which
may
be
necessary
for
a
just
decision.)”
Version
3
at
7.
13.
My
review
of
the
National
Steel
Products
opinion
showed
that
this
language
actually
was
a
direct
quotation
from
the
text
of
the
appellate
decision.
However,
it
appears
in
a
different
portion
of
the
decision
(Cal.
App.
edition
page
483,
not
page
489)
than
as
cited
in
the
brief.
14.
The
reference
to
the
Booth
decision
was
omitted
from
Version
3
of
the
brief.
Instead,
the
same
sentence
of
the
brief
(“California
courts
are
especially
skeptical.
.
.”)
is
supported
by
a
different
citation.
3
Version
3
at
10.
15.
I
also
received
an
e-mail
from
Mr.
Vahedy,
an
associate
at
the
K&L
Gates
firm.
That
e-mail
stated
that
the
Version
3
brief:
addresses
the
issues
raised
in
[my]
4:06
pm
e-mail.
Specifically,
references
to
National
and
Booth
were
inadvertently
included
prior
to
filing.
These
cites
have
since
been
addressed
and
updated
within
our
respective
papers.
16.
OSC
.
I’m
not
satisfied
by
that
explanation.
Based
on
the
materials
I
reviewed
on
Monday,
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
may
have
presented
falsified
research
on
an
issue
of
such
significance
(the
dispute
over
privilege
assertions)
that
it
led
to
my
3
That
decision
–
State
Farm
Mutual
Auto
Ins.
Co.
v.
Lee,
13
P.3d
1169,
1183
(Ariz.
2000)
–
is
a
ruling
of
the
Arizona
Supreme
Court
that
may
(in
part)
have
relied
on
California
law.
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appointment
as
Special
Master.
I’m
also
concerned
that
a
brief
(Version
2)
that
allegedly
was
amended
for
“cosmetic”
reasons
contained
a
bizarre
modification
in
one
of
the
problematic
sections.
17.
Therefore,
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
are
ordered
to
show
cause
why
I
should
not
impose
sanctions
(or
recommend
that
the
district
judge
impose
sanctions)
on
them
for
this
conduct.
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
may
discharge
this
OSC
by
filing
a
sworn
declaration
attesting
in
adequate
detail
about
the
circumstances
by
which
the
erroneous
National
Steel
Products
and
Booth
materials
made
their
way
into
Versions
1
and
2
of
the
brief.
I
specifically
want
to
know
which
lawyers
/
staff
members
at
the
firms
representing
Plaintiff
were
responsible
for
this
conduct.
I
also
want
a
statement
from
a
competent
lawyer
explaining
whether
or
not
any
AI
product
was
utilized
in
the
preparation
of
the
brief.
18.
I
also
will
require
Mr.
Copeland
or
Mr.
Keech
to
personally
review
every
citation
and
quotation
in
Version
1
of
the
brief.
One
of
these
lawyers
will
attest
to
the
accuracy
of
those
materials
or
inform
me
of
any
other
problems
in
the
supplemental
brief
that
I
didn’t
catch.
19.
Plaintiff’s
lawyers
will
file
these
declarations
with
me
via
JAMS
Access
by
or
before
noon
on
Friday,
April
18.
Note
that,
until
I
resolve
this
issue,
neither
this
order
nor
the
declarations
of
counsel
should
be
filed
on
the
federal
court
docket.
Consistent
with
paragraph
7
of
the
appointm
ent
order,
the
parties
are
informed
that
I
may
consider
cost-shifting
of
my
fees
regarding
this
situation.
Dated:
April
15,
2025
/s/
Judge
Wilner
_____________________________
Hon.
Michael
R.
Wilner
(Ret.)
Special
Master
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
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Case
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119
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#:4282
508432015.1
CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF’S
BRIEF
IN
SUPPORT
OF
OBTAIN
ING
RELEVANT,
NON-PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ELLIS
GEORGE
LLP
Eric
M.
George
(SBN
166403)
egeorge@ellisgeorge.com
Trent
Copeland
(SBN
136890)
tcopeland@ellisgeorge.com
2121
Avenue
of
the
Stars,
30th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:
(310)
274-7100
Facsimile:
(310)
275-5697
K&L
GATES
LLP
Ryan
Q.
Keech
(SBN
280306)
Ryan.Keech@klgates.com
Kevin
S.
Asfour
(SBN
228993)
Kevin.Asfour@klgates.com
Keian
Vahedy
(SBN
316708)
Keian.Vahedy@klgates.com
10100
Santa
Monica
Blvd.,
8th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:
(310)
552-5000
Facsimile:
(310)
552-5001
Attorneys
for
Plaintiff
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
(in
her
individual
capacity
and
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lace
y
Famil
y
Trust
)
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
CENTRAL
DISTRICT
OF
CALIFORNIA
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY,
i
n
her
individual
capacity;
and
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
Family
Trust
dated
November
23,
2016,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY,
an
Illinois
corporation,
and
DOES
1-50,
inclusive,
Defendant.
Case
No.
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Judge:
Hon.
Fernando
M.
Olguin
PLAINTIFF
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY’S
BRIEF
IN
SUPPORT
OF
OBTAINING
RELEVANT,
NON-PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
"QQFOEJY
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
Filed
05/06/25
Page
20
of
77
Page
ID
#:4283
508432015.1
1
CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF’S
BRIEF
IN
SUPPORT
OF
OBTAIN
ING
RELEVANT,
NON-PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Pursuant
to
the
Special
Master’s
instructions
on
April
7,
2025,
Plaintiff
Jacquelyn
Lacey,
individually,
and
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J.
Lacey
Family
Trust
Dated
November
23,
2016
(“Plaintiff”)
submit
s
this
brief
to
further
address
defendant
State
Farm
General
Insurance
Company’s
(“
State
Farm”)
unjustified
withholding
of
relevant,
non-privileged
documents
and
communications
in
its
privilege
log.
I.PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT
This
motion
presents
a
focu
sed
and
practical
request:
that
the
Court
exercise
its
authority
under
California
Evidence
Code
§
915(a)
and
(b)
to
conduct
an
in
camera
review
of
a
discrete
set
of
documents
for
which
Defendant
State
Farm
asserts
attorney-client
privilege
or
work
product
protection,
despite
lacking
a
sufficient
factual
or
legal
basis
for
doing
so.
The
es
sential
issue
before
the
Court
is
whether
State
Farm
may
shield
from
discovery
inte
rnal
claims
handling
communications
–
many
involving
no
attorneys,
and
created
in
the
ordinary
course
of
business
–
based
solely
on
generalized
and
repetitive
assertions
of
privilege
that
fail
to
meet
the
threshold
burden
required
by
law.
At
the
center
of
this
case
is
a
fundam
ental
question:
Did
St
ate
Farm
act
in
bad
faith
when
it
denied
or
delayed
covera
ge
for
the
Laceys’
claim?
That
inquiry
necessarily
turns
on
the
conduct
and
state
of
mi
nd
of
the
decision-makers—
specifically,
State
Farm’s
claims
adjusters—whose
internal
communications
and
reasoning
during
the
claims
process
are
directly
at
issue.
Yet
State
Farm
now
seeks
to
withhold
precisely
those
communications
through
boilerplate
assertions
of
privilege,
despite
failing
to
demonstrate
that
any
recognized
legal
privilege
in
fact
applies.
Plaintiff
challenges
only
a
narrow
subset
of
the
documents
identified
in
State
Farm’s
privilege
log—specifically,
those
highlighted
in
red
and
green
in
Exhibit
B
to
Plaintiff’s
April
4,
2025
Letter
Brief
to
the
Special
Master.
The
red
entries
concern
communications
between
claims
representatives
made
during
the
ordinary
course
of
claims
handling,
while
the
green
entries
reflect
internal
discussions
about
purported
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
Filed
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Page
21
of
77
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#:4284
508432015.1
2
CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF’S
BRIEF
IN
SUPPORT
OF
OBTAIN
ING
RELEVANT,
NON-PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
"opinions"
of
outside
counsel,
though
it
is
unclear
whether
those
opinions
were
ever
formally
requested
or
provided
as
legal
ad
vice.
Crucially,
many
of
these
documents
were
created
at
or
near
key
decision
poin
ts—when
the
claim
was
first
tendered,
when
coverage
was
denied,
and
when
it
was
later
accepted
under
a
reservation
of
rights—
making
them
highly
relevant
to
the
bad
faith
analysis.
State
Farm’s
privilege
log
does
not
provide
individualized
or
substantive
justifications
for
withholding
these
documents.
Instead,
it
relies
on
uniform,
cut-and-
paste
assertions
that
offer
no
meaningful
detail
on
the
nature
or
context
of
the
communications.
This
lack
of
specificity
precludes
both
Plaintiff
and
the
Court
from
evaluating
the
legitimacy
of
the
privileg
e
claims.
Moreover,
State
Farm
has
already
selectively
disclosed
portions
of
the
same
communications
,
raising
serious
concerns
about
waiver
and
fairness.
Evidence
Code
§
915(b)
is
tailored
for
precisely
this
type
of
discovery
dispute.
Where,
as
here,
a
prima
facie
showing
has
been
made
that
the
claimed
privilege
may
not
apply,
and
the
proponent
has
failed
to
substantiate
its
claim,
the
Court
is
expressly
authorized
to
conduct
an
in
camera
review
to
resolve
the
issue.
This
mechanism
is
not
only
appropriate
but
necessary
to
safegu
ard
the
integrity
of
th
e
discovery
process,
particularly
where
withheld
docume
nts
go
to
the
heart
of
the
case.
Plaintiff’s
request
is
modest,
narrowly
tailored,
and
consistent
with
both
statutory
authority
and
principles
of
fairness.
A
limited
in
camera
review
of
these
selected
documents
(or
a
subset
of
these
ch
allenged
documents)
will
allow
the
Court
to
determine
whether
State
Farm’s
privilege
claims
are
valid
or
merely
an
attempt
to
shield
relevant,
discoverable
evidence.
Because
these
docu
ments
bear
directly
on
the
conduct
and
state
of
mind
of
the
claims
person
nel
whose
decisions
are
central
to
the
bad
faith
claim,
Plaintiff
respectfully
requests
that
the
Court
grant
the
request
for
in
camera
review
pursuant
to
Evidence
Code
§
915(a)
and
(b).
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
Filed
05/06/25
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22
of
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Page
ID
#:4285
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of
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2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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of
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2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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119
Filed
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25
of
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8
CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF’S
BRIEF
IN
SUPPORT
OF
OBTAIN
ING
RELEVANT,
NON-PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Costco,
supra,
47
Cal.4th
at
735.
Indeed,
“[b]ec
ause
an
in-house
lawyer
often
has
other
functions
in
addition
to
providing
legal
advice,
the
lawyer’s
role
on
a
particular
occasion
will
not
be
self-evident
as
it
usually
is
in
the
case
of
outside
counsel.”
Minebea
Co.,
Ltd.
v.
Papst,
228
F.R.D.
13,
21
(D.D.C.
2005).
Accordingly,
“courts
impose
a
higher
burden
on
in-house
counsel
to
‘clearly
demonstrate’
that
advice
was
given
in
a
legal
capacity.”
Neuberger
Berman
Real
Estate
Income
Fund,
Inc.
v.
Lola
Brown
Trust
No.
1B,
230
F.R.D.
398,
411
n.20
(D.
Md.
2005)
(citation
omitted).
And
the
principle
applies
equally
here
with
regard
to
State
farm’s
coverage
counsel.
To
justify
withholding
communications
with
coverage
counsel,
the
“lawyer’s
role
as
a
lawyer
must
be
primary
to
her
participation”
in
the
communication.
In
re
Vioxx
Prods.
Liability
Litig.,
501
F.
Supp.
2d
789,
798
(E.D.
La.
2007).
Communications
with
in-house
counsel
are
not
privileged
to
the
extent
they
“would
have
been
made
because
of
a
business
purpose,”
regardless
of
whether
there
may
have
been
a
“perceived
additional
interest
in
securing
legal
advice.”
McCaugherty
v.
Siffermann,
132
F.R.D.
234,
238
(N.D.
Cal.
1990).
See
also,
e.g
.,
UpjohnCo.
v.
U.S.
,
449
U.S.
383,
395-96
(1981)
(ACP
only
protects
communications
from
client
to
attorney,
an
d
not
disclosure
of
underlying
facts).
Based
on
the
foregoing,
Plaintiff
has
made
a
factual
showing
that
State
Farm’s
claims
file
notes
may
not
be
privileged.
B.
In
Camera
Review
Is
Warranted
Because
the
Claims
Adjusters’
Conduct
Is
the
Core
of
the
Bad
Faith
Claim
and
Cannot
Be
Shielded.
This
case
turns
on
what
State
Farm’s
cl
aims
personnel
did,
when
they
did
it,
and
why.
The
internal
commun
ications
reflect
the
evaluative
process
that
led
to
State
Farm’s
decisions
regarding
it
s
initial
denial
of
coverage
to
David
Lacey.
Indeed,
State
Farm
seeks
to
withhold
from
disclosure
even
the
very
first
entry
into
its
claims
file
titled
“
New
Suit
Notification
.”
This
communication
has
been
entirely
redacted
and
reflects
the
entry
as
having
been
made
into
the
file
by
a
cl
aims
representative
–
without
reference
to
an
attorney
(or
ev
en
a
communication
with
an
attorney)
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2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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11
CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF’S
BRIEF
IN
SUPPORT
OF
OBTAIN
ING
RELEVANT,
NON-PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Date
d
:Apr
il
14,
2025
Respect
f
u
ll
y
Su
b
m
i
tte
d
,
ELLIS
GEORGE
LLP
By:
/s/
Trent
Copeland
Eric
M.
George
Trent
Copeland
Attorneys
for
Plaintiffs
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
and
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J.
Lacey
Family
Trust
Dated
November
23,
2016
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
Filed
05/06/25
Page
31
of
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Page
ID
#:4294
508432015.1
CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF
’S
SECOND
AMENDEDBRIEF
IN
SUPPOR
T
OF
OBTAINING
RELEVANT,
NON-
PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ELLIS
GEORGE
LLP
Eric
M.
George
(SBN
166403)
egeorge@ellisgeorge.com
Trent
Copeland
(SBN
136890)
tcopeland@ellisgeorge.com
2121
Avenue
of
the
Stars,
30th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:
(310)
274-7100
Facsimile:
(310)
275-5697
K&L
GATES
LLP
Ryan
Q.
Keech
(SBN
280306)
Ryan.Keech@klgates.com
Kevin
S.
Asfour
(SBN
228993)
Kevin.Asfour@klgates.com
Keian
Vahedy
(SBN
316708)
Keian.Vahedy@klgates.com
10100
Santa
Monica
Blvd.,
8th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:
(310)
552-5000
Facsimile:
(310)
552-5001
Attorneys
for
Plaintiff
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
(in
her
individual
capacity
and
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
Family
Trust)
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
CENTRAL
DISTRICT
OF
CALIFORNIA
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY,
in
her
individual
capacity;
and
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
Family
Trust
dated
November
23,
2016,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY,
an
Illinois
corporation,
and
DOES
1
-
50,
inclusive,
Defendant.
Case
No.
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Judge:Hon.
Fernando
M.
Olguin
PLAINTIFFJACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY’S
SECOND
AMENDED
BRIEF
IN
SUPPORT
OF
OBTAINING
RELEVANT,
NON-PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
"QQFOEJY
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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of
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CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF
’S
SECOND
AMENDED
BRIEF
IN
SUPPOR
T
OF
OBTAINING
RELEVANT,
NON-
PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Pursuant
to
the
Special
Master’s
instructions
on
April
7,
2025,
Plaintiff
Jacquelyn
Lacey,
individually,
and
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J.
Lacey
Family
Trust
Dated
November
23,
2016
(“Plaintiff”)
submits
this
brie
f
to
further
address
defendant
State
Farm
General
Insurance
Company’s
(“State
Farm”)
unjustified
withholding
of
relevant,
non-privileged
documents
and
communications
in
its
privilege
log.
I.
PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT
This
motion
presents
a
focused
and
practi
cal
request:
that
the
Court
exercise
its
authority
under
Ca
lifornia
Evidence
Code
§
915(a)
and
(b)
to
conduct
an
in
camera
review
of
a
discrete
set
of
documents
for
which
Defendant
State
Farm
asserts
attorney-client
privilege
or
work
product
protection,
despite
lacking
a
sufficient
factual
or
legal
basis
for
doing
so.
The
essential
issue
before
the
Court
is
whether
State
Farm
may
shield
from
discovery
in
ternal
claims
handling
communications
–
many
involving
no
attorneys,
and
created
in
the
ordinary
course
of
business
–
based
solely
on
generalized
and
repetitive
assertions
of
privilege
that
fail
to
meet
the
threshold
burden
required
by
law.
At
the
center
of
this
case
is
a
fundamental
question:
Did
State
Farm
act
in
bad
faith
when
it
denied
or
delayed
coverage
for
the
Laceys’
claim?
That
inquiry
necessarily
turns
on
the
conduct
and
st
ate
of
mind
of
the
decision-makers
—
specifically,
State
Farm’s
claims
adjusters—
whose
internal
communications
and
reasoning
during
the
claims
process
are
dir
ectly
at
issue.
Yet
State
Farm
now
seeks
to
withhold
precisely
those
communications
through
boilerplate
assertions
of
privilege,
despite
failing
to
demonstrate
that
any
recognized
legal
privilege
in
fact
applies.
Plaintiff
challenges
only
a
narrow
subset
of
the
documents
identified
in
State
Farm’s
privilege
log—
specifically,
those
highlighted
in
red
and
green
in
Exhibit
B
to
Plaintiff’s
April
4,
2025
Lett
er
Brief
to
the
Special
Master.
The
red
entries
concern
communications
between
claims
representa
tives
made
during
the
ordinary
course
of
claims
handling,
while
the
green
entries
reflect
internal
discussions
about
purported
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CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF
’S
SECOND
AMENDED
BRIEF
IN
SUPPOR
T
OF
OBTAINING
RELEVANT,
NON-
PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
"opinions"
of
outside
counsel,
though
it
is
unclear
whether
those
opinions
were
ever
formally
requested
or
provided
as
legal
advice.
Crucially,
many
of
these
documents
were
created
at
or
near
key
decision
points
—
when
the
claim
was
first
tendered,
when
coverage
was
denied,
and
wh
en
it
was
later
accepted
under
a
reservation
of
rights
—
making
them
highly
relevant
to
the
bad
faith
analysis.
State
Farm’s
privilege
log
does
not
provide
individualized
or
substantive
justifications
for
withholding
these
documents.
Instead,
it
relies
on
uniform,
cut-and-
paste
assertions
that
offer
no
meaningful
detail
on
the
nature
or
context
of
the
communications.
This
lack
of
specificity
precludes
both
Plaintiff
and
the
Court
from
evaluating
the
legitimacy
of
the
privilege
claims.
Moreover,
State
Farm
has
already
selectively
disclosed
portions
of
the
same
communications,
raising
serious
concerns
about
waiver
and
fairness.
Evidence
Code
§
915(b)
is
tailored
for
precisely
this
type
of
discovery
dispute.
Where,
as
here,
a
prima
facie
showing
has
been
made
that
the
claimed
privilege
may
not
apply,
and
the
proponent
has
failed
to
substantiate
its
claim,
the
Court
is
expressly
authorized
to
conduct
an
in
camera
review
to
resolve
the
issue.
This
mechanism
is
not
only
appropriate
but
necessa
ry
to
safeguard
the
integrity
of
the
discovery
process,
particularly
where
with
held
documents
go
to
the
heart
of
the
case.
Plaintiff’s
request
i
s
modest,
narrowly
tailored,
and
consistent
with
both
statutory
authority
and
principles
of
fairness.
A
limited
in
camera
review
of
these
selected
documents
(or
a
subset
of
these
ch
allenged
documents)
will
allow
the
Court
to
determine
whether
State
Farm’s
privilege
claims
are
valid
or
merely
an
attempt
to
shield
relevant,
discoverable
evidence.
Because
these
documents
bear
directly
on
the
conduct
and
state
of
mind
of
the
claims
personnel
whose
d
ecisions
are
ce
ntral
to
the
bad
faith
claim,
Plaintiff
respectfully
requests
that
the
Court
grant
the
request
for
in
camera
review
pursuant
to
Evidence
Code
§
915(a)
and
(b).
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2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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119
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of
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508432015.1
7
CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF
’S
SECOND
AMENDED
BRIEF
IN
SUPPOR
T
OF
OBTAINING
RELEVANT,
NON-
PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
See
also,
SF-CF
(PLUP)
000028:
Each
of
the
above
examples,
albeit
limited
given
the
page
limits
,
are
claims
file
notes
entered
by
claims
adjusters
assigned
to
handle
the
Lacey’s
claim
file
in
the
regular
course
of
their
business,
none
of
which
are
addressed
to
counsel
for
legal
opinions,
nor
are
they
attorney-work
product.
Rather,
these
internal
notes
reference
the
adjusters’
recommendations,
pending
activities,
and
discussion
with
other
State
Farm
claims
representatives
regarding
the
Lacey’s
insurance
claim
.
National
Steel
Products
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
164
Cal.App.3d
476,
489
(1985)
(Privilege
is
strictly
construed
because
it
suppresses
relevant
facts
which
may
be
necessary
for
a
just
decision.)
What
Costco
also
reaffirmed
is
the
l
ong-standing
principle
that
“a
client
cannot
protect
unprivileged
information
from
discovery
by
transmitting
it
to
an
attorney.”
Costco,
supra,
47
Cal.4th
at
735.
Indeed,
“[b]ecause
an
in
-house
lawyer
often
has
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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119
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39
of
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ID
#:4302
508432015.1
8
CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF
’S
SECOND
AMENDED
BRIEF
IN
SUPPOR
T
OF
OBTAINING
RELEVANT,
NON-
PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
other
functions
in
addition
to
providing
legal
advice,
the
lawyer
’
s
role
on
a
particular
occasion
will
not
be
self-
evident
as
it
usually
is
in
th
e
case
of
outside
counsel.”
Minebea
Co.,
Ltd.
v.
Papst,
228
F.R.D.
13,
21
(D.D.C.
2005).
Accordingly,
“courts
impose
a
higher
burden
on
in-
house
counsel
to
‘clearly
de
monstrate’
that
advice
was
given
in
a
legal
capacity.”
Neuberger
Berman
Real
Estate
Income
Fund,
Inc.
v.
Lola
Brown
Trust
No.
1B,
230
F.R.D.
398,
411
n.20
(D.
Md.
2005)
(citation
omitted).
And
the
principle
applies
equally
here
with
regard
to
State
farm’s
coverage
counsel.
To
justify
withholding
communications
with
coverage
counsel,
the
“lawyer’s
role
as
a
lawyer
must
be
primary
to
her
participation”
in
the
communication.
In
re
Vioxx
Prods.
Liability
Litig.,
501
F.
Supp.
2d
789,
798
(E.D.
La.
2007).
Communications
with
in-house
counsel
are
not
privileged
to
the
extent
they
“would
have
been
made
because
of
a
business
purpose,”
regardless
of
whether
there
may
have
been
a
“perceived
additional
interest
in
securing
legal
advice.”
McCaugherty
v.
Siffermann,
132
F.R.D.
234,
238
(N.D.
Cal.
1990).
See
also,
e.g
.,
Upjohn
Co.
v.
U.S.
,
449
U.S.
383,
395-96
(1981)
(ACP
only
protects
communications
from
client
to
attorney,
and
not
disclosure
of
underlying
facts)
.
Based
on
the
foregoing,
Plaintiff
has
made
a
factual
showing
that
State
Farm’s
claims
file
notes
may
not
be
privileged.
B.
In
Camera
Review
Is
Warranted
Because
the
Claims
Adjusters’
Conduct
Is
the
Core
of
the
Bad
Faith
Claim
and
Cannot
Be
Shielded.
This
case
turns
on
what
State
Farm’s
claims
personnel
did,
when
they
did
it,
and
why.
The
internal
commun
ications
reflect
the
evaluative
process
that
led
to
State
Farm’s
decisions
regarding
its
initial
denial
of
coverage
to
David
Lacey.
Indeed,
State
Farm
seeks
to
withhold
from
disclosure
even
the
very
first
entry
into
its
claims
file
titled
“
New
Suit
Notification
.”
This
communication
has
been
entirely
redacted
and
reflects
the
entry
as
having
been
made
into
the
file
by
a
claims
representative
–
without
reference
to
an
a
ttorney
(or
even
a
communication
with
an
attorney)
whatsoever.
The
wholesale
re
daction
reflected
in
SF-CF
(HO)
000110
is
a
further
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508432015.1
11
CASE
NO.
2:24-CV-05205-FMO-MAA
PLAINTIFF
’S
SECOND
AMENDED
BRIEF
IN
SUPPOR
T
OF
OBTAINING
RELEVANT,
NON-
PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
FROM
DEFENDANT
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY
1
2
3
4
5
6
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10
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12
13
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16
17
18
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20
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22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Dated:
April
14,
2025
Respectfully
Submitted,
ELLIS
GEORGE
LLP
By:
/s/
Trent
Copeland
Eric
M.
George
Trent
Copeland
Attorneys
for
Plaintiffs
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
and
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J.
Lacey
Family
Trust
Dated
November
23,
2016
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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119
Filed
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of
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2550949.1
DECLARATION
OF
TRENT
COPELAND
IN
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE
SANCTIONS
ELLIS
GEORGELLP
Trent
Copeland
(State
Bar
No.
136890)
tcopeland@ellisgeorge.com
2121
Avenue
of
the
Stars,
30th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:
(310)
274-7100
Facsimile:
(310)
275-5697
K&L
GATES
LLP
Ryan
Q.
Keech
(State
Bar
No.
280306)
Ryan.Keech@klgates.com
Kevin
S.
Asfour
(State
Bar
No.
228993)
Kevin.Asfour@klgates.com
Keian
Vahedy
(State
Bar
No.
316708)
Keian.Vahedy@klgates.com
10100
Santa
Monica
Blvd.,
8th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
CA
90067
Telephone:
(310)
552-5000
Facsimile:
(310)
552-5001
Attorneys
for
Plaintiff
JACQUELYN
“
JACKIE
”
LACEY,
inher
individual
capacity;
andJACQUELYN
“
JACKIE
”
LACEY
astrustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
FamilyTrust
dated
November
23,
2016
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
CENTRAL
DISTRICT
OF
CALIFORNIA
JACQUELYN
“
JACKIE
”
LACEY,
in
her
individual
capacity;
and
JAC
QUELYN
“
JACKIE
”
LACEY
astrustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
Family
Trust
dated
November
23,
2016
,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY,
an
Illinois
corporation,
and
DOES
1
-
50,
inclusive,
Defendants.
Case
No.
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
DECLARATION
OF
TRENT
COPELAND
IN
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE
SANCTIONS
[Assigned
to
the
Hon.
Fernando
M.
Olguin
,
Courtroom
6D]
Complaint
filed:
July
4,
2020
$SSHQGL[
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2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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2550949.1
-2-
DECLARATION
OF
TRENT
COPELAND
IN
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE
SANCTIONS
DECLARATION
OF
TRENT
COPELAND
I,
Trent
Copeland,
declare
and
state
as
follows:
1.
I
am
an
attorney
at
law,
duly
admitt
ed
to
practice
before
this
Court
and
all
courts
of
the
State
of
California.
I
am
a
partner
with
Ellis
George
LLP,
counsel
of
record
for
Plaintiffs
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
and
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J.
Lacey
Family
Trus
t
Dated
November
23,
2016
(collectively,
“Plaintiff
s
”)
in
this
matter.
2.
I
submit
this
Declaration
pursuant
to
the
Special
Master’s
April
15,
2025,
Order
to
Show
Cause
re:
Sanctions
(the
“OSC”).
I
have
personal
knowledge
of
all
the
matters
set
forth
herein,
and
could
and
would
testify
competently
thereto
if
called
upon
to
do
so.
3.
This
problem
began
with
me
—
full
stop
–
in
my
failure
to
advise
my
colleagues
that
a
preliminary
outline
I
forwarded
to
them
had
relied,
in
part,
on
the
use
of
generative
AI
capabilities
found
in
CoCounsel
and
Westlaw
Precision
and
Google
Gemini.
To
the
extent
my
co
lleagues
were
tasked
with
the
primary
responsibility
for
research
and
drafting
of
the
memorandum,
they
did
so
in
reliance
—
at
least
initially
—
on
my
preliminary
outline
and
notes
I
had
provided
several
days
earlier.
4.
Since
I
was
engaged
in
preparing
for
a
trial
scheduled
to
start
April
14,
2025,
I
was
unable
to
produce
a
more
comp
rehensive
work
product,
so
I
emailed
my
notes
and
high-level
thoughts
in
outline
for
mat.
I
did
so
because
I
wanted
to
assure
our
drafting
team
had
the
benefit
of
my
preliminary
thoughts
and
a
general
roadmap
before
beginning
their
research
and
writi
ng.
I
believe
I
initia
lly
used
CoCounsel,
which
I
had
recently
been
exposed
to
throug
h
a
firm
training,
as
well
as
Westlaw’s
AI
tool
to
undertake
research.
I
also
briefly
conducted
internet
research
using
Gemini,
Google’s
AI
product,
for
inform
ation
and
cases
related
to
insurance
companies
defending
against
bad
faith
clai
ms.
I
compiled
a
significant
number
of
notes
which
I
believed
(1)
accurately
reflected
current
law,
and
(2)
had
been
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2550949.1
-3-
DECLARATION
OF
TRENT
COPELAND
IN
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE
SANCTIONS
faithfully
transcribed
based
on
the
sources
I
reviewed.
It
is
unclear
to
me
whether
there
was
human
error
in
my
transcription
of
that
research,
or
whether
one
of
the
research
tools
I
utilized
returned
some
erroneous
information.
5.
On
April
9,
2025,
I
circul
ated
to
my
colleagues
Ryan
Keech
and
Keian
Vahedy
some
of
my
notes
along
with
a
bullet-point
outline
of
the
legal
arguments
I
hoped
the
team
would
address
as
they
pr
epared
the
memorandum.
By
April
11,
2025,
it
was
my
understanding
the
K&L
Gate
s
team,
along
with
an
associate
from
Ellis
George,
had
commenced
drafting
the
memorandum.
I
understand
they
engaged
in
their
own
legal
research
and
writin
g
to
bring
the
brief
to
near-final
form.
It
is
clear
that
they
relied
on
the
accurac
y
of
some
of
the
case
citations
included
in
my
initial
outline,
while
also
adding
themselves
the
vast
majority
of
the
case
authority
to
the
brief.
In
hindsight,
there
is
no
question
I
should
have
taken
more
care
to
first
check
the
accuracy
of
these
ci
tations
before
sending
or
explicitly
request
my
colleagues
to
do
so
befo
re
including
any
material
from
my
preliminary
outline
in
the
final
version
of
the
brief.
6.
In
reviewing
versions
1
through
3
of
the
draft,
it
is
apparent
that
no
one
confirmed
the
accuracy
of
some
of
citations
pulled
from
my
preliminary
outline.
Compounding
matters,
prior
to
the
filing
of
version
2,
my
legal
assistant
noticed
that
we
were
working
off
of
multiple
drafts
—
none
of
which,
we
later
realized,
had
been
thoroughly
checked.
Further,
I
cannot
say
with
certainty
how
the
parenthetical
for
National
Steel
changed
between
versions
1
and
2,
but
I
suspect
the
switch
resulted
from
uploading
a
different
versi
on
that
included
the
correct
citation.
In
our
haste
to
meet
the
filing
deadline,
we
failed
to
(1)
ensure
that
the
correct
and
final
document
had
been
uploaded,
and
(2)
conduct
a
thorough
citation
check
of
the
cases
submitted
to
the
Court
—
both
of
which
should
have
occurred
and
which
I
assumed
had
been
completed.
7.
In
short,
our
process
broke
down
at
several
levels
across
both
firms.
And
as
the
most
senior
lawyer
on
our
collective
team
—
whether
cite-checking
was
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2550949.1
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DECLARATION
OF
TRENT
COPELAND
IN
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE
SANCTIONS
my
responsibility
or
not
—
I
accept
responsibility
for
(1
)
not
alerting
my
colleagues
with
respect
to
the
tools
I
utilized
in
conduc
ting
the
initial
research;
and
(2)
failing
to
conduct
cite-checking
myself
or
to
specifically
request
that
the
brief
be
properly
reviewed
for
citation
errors;
and
(3)
not
adequately
supervising
the
cite-checking
process.
I
am
both
deeply
apologetic
and
embarrassed
by
this
error.
As
for
the
“bizarre”
modification
the
Court
referenced
in
version
2,
I
am
in
formed
this
was
the
result
of
a
typographical
error
compounded
by
a
technical
glitch
during
the
upload
process
by
my
assistant.
Not
at
any
time
was
there
a
deliberate
effort
to
deceive
or
falsify
the
state
of
the
law,
nor
did
we.
8.
Importantly,
even
before
this
even
t,
I
had
reviewed
and
was
familiar
with
the
State
Bar’s
ethical
guidance
on
th
e
responsible
use
of
generative
AI
in
the
practice
of
law.
This
guid
ance
emphasized
that
while
lawyers
may
use
generative
AI,
our
ethical
obligations
apply
in
the
same
way
as
with
any
other
technology.
Specifically,
on
July
24,
2024,
the
State
Bar
stated
in
its
guidance
order
that
“The
State
Bar
recognizes
that
generative
AI
systems
are
not
without
risks.
COPRAC’s
Practical
Guidance,
the
State
Bar’s
interi
m
AI
Guidelines,
and
other
work
we
are
doing
to
responsibly
support
the
exploration
of
AI
internally
and
within
the
legal
profession
balance
opportunity
against
the
risks
of
bias,
inaccura
cy,
incompleteness,
and
falsehood
that
could
undermine
the
benefits
that
generative
AI
will
create.”
Additionally,
I
also
understood
that
while
the
use
of
AI
does
not
violate
Business
and
Professions
Code
6068(e)(
2),
my
ethical
duties
incl
uded
double-checking
the
source
accuracy.
Because
I
was
aware
of
th
is
guidance,
I
should
have
been
more
mindful
and
cautious
about
the
risks,
and
I
should
have
informed
my
team
of
my
use
of
AI
so
that
we
could
collectively
mitigat
e
any
errors
that
might
result,
even
from
its
good-faith
use.
I
fell
short
in
that
regard
and
that
will
never
happen
again.
9.
Following
the
Special
Master
’s
instructions,
I
have
personally
reviewed
each
and
every
citation
and
quotation
-
and
compared
these
findings
with
my
colleagues
-
to
be
certain
that
we
have
found
any
possible
issues
with
the
citations,
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2550949.1
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DECLARATION
OF
TRENT
COPELAND
IN
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE
SANCTIONS
including
even
the
misplacement
of
a
parent
hetical.
The
below
constitutes
a
list
of
items,
including
typographical
errors,
that
we
believe
should
be
brought
to
the
Special
Master’s
attention
–
irrespective
of
whether
these
errors
are
associated
with
the
use
of
AI,
or
not:
a.
Page
3
of
Dkt.
98
:
i.
People
v.
Superior
Court
,
25
Cal.4th
703,
725
(2001)
(“A
trial
court
has
broad
discretion
to
review
materials
in
camera
to
determine
whether
a
claimed
privilege
applies.”)
.
–
.there
should
be
no
quotes
in
the
parenthetical,
which
should
refer
to
n.
7.
b.
Page
4
of
Dkt.
98
:
i.
Wellpoint
Health
Networks,
Inc.
v.
Superior
Court
,
59
Cal.App.4th
110,
119
(1997)
–
the
pincite
should
be
page
123,
not
119.
ii.
Aetna
Cas.
&
Surety
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
153
Cal.App.3d
467,
476
(1984)
(“Where
th
e
evidence
sought
is
directly
at
issue…
a
party
should
not
be
allowed
to
use
privilege
as
both
a
sword
and
a
shield.”)
–
non-existent
quote;
however,
this
case
exists
and
the
quote
states
a
generally
correct
proposition
of
law.
iii.
Zurich
American
Ins.
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
155
Cal.App.4th
1485,
1503
(2007)
(“Communications
by
corporate
employees
that
are
not
made
at
the
direction
of
counsel
or
for
the
purpose
of
legal
advice
are
not
privileged.”)
–
the
pincite
should
be
1504
and
state:
“otherwise
routine,
non
-privileged
communications
between
corporate
officers
or
emp
loyees
transacting
the
general
business
of
the
company
do
not
attain
privileged
status
solely
because
in-
house
or
outside
counsel
is
‘copied
in’
on
correspondence
or
memoranda”
.
c.
Page
5
of
Dkt.
98
:
i.
Costco,
supra
,
47
Cal.4th
at
739
–
should
not
have
quotes
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2550949.1
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DECLARATION
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COPELAND
IN
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE
SANCTIONS
within
the
parentheticals.
d.
Page
6
of
Dkt.
98
:
i.
Davis
v.
City
of
Santa
Ana
,
51
Cal.App.5th
1094,
1115
(2020)
–
inaccurate
citation
to
a
case
that
appears
not
to
exist
and
should
be
removed
and
not
relied
upon.
ii.
National
Steel
Products
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
164
Cal.App.3d
476,
489
(1985)
(“Internal
memoranda
or
claims
file
materials,
although
they
may
discuss
le
gal
theories,
litigation
tactics
or
potential
liability,
are
not
privileged
unless
they
are
written
by
or
at
the
direction
of
counsel
and
prepared
for
the
purpose
of
transmitting
information
to
counsel
for
legal
advice.”)
–
the
pincite
should
be
477,
should
not
have
quotes,
and
the
parenthetical
should
be
revised
to
reflect
that
privilege
is
strictly
co
nstrued
because
it
suppresses
relevant
facts
which
may
be
necessary
for
a
just
decision.
e.
Page
9
of
Dkt.
98
:
i.
Lipton
v.
Superior
Court
,
48
Cal.App.4th
1599,
1619
(1996)
(“A
party
may
not
use
the
privilege
as
both
a
sword
and
a
shield.”)
–
inaccurate
quote;
quote
from
this
case
should
be
“
The
party
claiming
the
privilege
has
the
burd
en
to
show
that
the
communication
sought
to
be
suppressed
falls
within
the
terms
of
the
claimed
privilege.
”
See
D.
I.
Chadbourne,
Inc.
v.
Superior
Court
(1964)
60
Cal.2d
723,
729.
f.
Page
10
of
Dkt.
98
:
i.
Booth
v.
Allstate
Ins.
Co
.,
198
Cal.App.3d
1357,
1366
(1989)
(“An
insurer
cannot
assert
privilege
to
shield
evidence
of
bad
faith.”)
–
inaccurate
quote
to
a
case
that
appears
not
to
exist
but
is
a
correct
proposition
of
law.
See,
e.g.,
Zurich
Ins.
Co
.
v.
State
Farm
Mut.
Auto.
Ins.
Co.
,
137
A.2d
401,
402
(1
st
Dep’t
1988)
(“Where
it
is
alleged
Case
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2550949.1
-7-
DECLARATION
OF
TRENT
COPELAND
IN
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE
SANCTIONS
that
the
insurer
has
breached
that
du
ty
to
its
insured,
the
insurer
may
not
use
the
attorney-client
or
work
product
privilege
as
a
shield
to
prevent
disclosure
which
is
relevant
to
the
insured’s
bad
faith
action”);
Boone
v.
Vanlin
er
Ins.
Co.
,
9
Ohio
St.
3d
209,
213-
14
(2001)
(“in
an
action
alleging
bad
faith
denial
of
insurance
coverage,
the
insured
is
entitled
to
discover
claims
file
materials
containing
attorney
client
communications
related
to
the
issue
of
coverage
that
were
created
prior
to
the
denial
o
f
coverage.”).
ii.
Nei
v.
Travelers
Home
and
Marine
Ins.
Co.
,
326
F.R.D.
652
(2018)
(holding
that
attorney-client
privilege
does
not
apply
when
an
attorney
acts
as
a
claims
adju
ster,
supervisor,
or
investigation
monitor
rather
than
a
legal
advisor)
–
pincites
should
be
658.
Executed
this
18
th
day
of
April,
2025,
at
Los
Angeles,
California.
I
declare
under
penalty
of
perjury
under
the
laws
of
the
State
of
California
that
the
foregoing
is
true
and
correct.
Trent
Copeland
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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119
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05/06/25
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of
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DECLARATION
OF
RYAN
Q.
KEECH
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
ELLIS
GEORGE
LLP
Eric
M.
George
(SBN
166403)
egeorge@ellisgeorge.com
Trent
Copeland
(SBN
136890)
tcopeland@ellisgeorge.com
2121
Avenue
of
the
Stars,
30th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:(310)
274-7100
Facsimile:(310)
275-5697
K&L
GATES
LLP
Ryan
Q.
Keech
(SBN
280306)
Ryan.Keech@klgates.com
Kevin
S.
Asfour
(SBN
228993)
Kevin.Asfour@klgates.com
Keian
Vahedy
(SBN
316708)
Keian.Vahedy@klgates.com
10100
Santa
Monica
Blvd.,
8th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:(310)
552-5000
Facsimile:(310)
552-5001
Attorneys
for
Plaintiff
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY,
in
her
individual
capacity;
and
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
Family
Trust
dated
November
23,
2016
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
CENTRAL
DISTRICT
OF
CALIFORNIA,
WESTERN
DIVISION
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY,
in
her
individual
capacity;
and
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY
astrustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
Family
Trust
dated
November
23,
2016
,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY,
an
Illinois
corporation,
and
DOES
1
-
50,
inclusive,
Defendants.
Case
No.
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Judge
:Fernando
M.
Olguin
DECLARATION
OF
RYAN
Q.
KEECH
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
$SSHQGL[
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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-2-
DECLARATION
OF
RYAN
Q.
KEECH
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
DECLARATION
OF
RYAN
Q.
KEECH
I,
Ryan
Q.
Keech,
declare
as
follows:
1.
I
am
an
attorney
licensed
to
practice
law
in
this
court
and
all
courts
of
the
State
of
California.
I
am
a
partner
at
the
law
firm
of
K&L
Gates
LLP,
attorneys
of
record
for
Plaintiffs
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
and
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J.
Lacey
Family
Trust
Dated
November
23,
2016
(collectively,
“Plaintiff”),
in
this
action.
2.
I
submit
this
Declaration
pursuant
to
the
Special
Master’s
April
15,
2025
Order
to
Show
Cause
re:
Sanctions
(the
“OSC”).
I
have
personal
knowledge
of
each
of
the
matters
set
forth
herein,
and
would
testify
competently
thereto
if
called
upon
to
do
so.
3.
To
begin,
I
have
the
utmost
faith
in
and
respect
for
the
professional
conduct
and
integrity
of
Mr.
Copeland
and
his
firm
–
with
whom
I
have
had
the
great
privilege
of
working
and
from
whom
I
have
had
the
great
privilege
of
learning
as
a
partner
and
as
co-counsel
for
years.
His
and
their
professionalism
and
ethics
are
beyond
reproach.
4.
As
described
herein,
Mr.
Copeland
and
Mr.
Vahedy
have
been
primarily
responsible
for
the
briefing
associated
with
the
privilege
issue
addressed
by
the
Court
on
April
7,
2025.
I
had
limited
involvement
in
the
preparation
and
did
not
sign,
file
or
provide
final
approval
of
the
contents
of
any
of
the
three
versions
of
the
brief
addressed
in
the
OSC
prior
to
filing.
5.
However,
I
understand
and
take
seriously
the
critical
importance
of
accuracy
in
case
citations
in
order
for
th
e
process
to
function
and
know
that
my
colleagues
and
co-counsel
have
a
similar
view
.
I
apologize
that
these
versions
of
the
brief
contained
the
inaccuracies
initially
id
entified
by
the
Special
Master,
apologize
further
that
I
did
not
personally
catch
and
correct
those
inaccuracies,
and
respectfully
request,
because
–
as
discussed
herein
and
as
confirmed
by
the
declarations
of
my
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28
-3-
DECLARATION
OF
RYAN
Q.
KEECH
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
colleagues
–
these
inaccuracies
were
inadvertent
and
the
su
bject
of
an
honest
miscommunication,
the
OSC
be
discharged.
6.
After
the
Court’s
April
7,
2025
hearing,
I
discussed
the
Special
Master’s
request
for
briefing
regarding
the
in-camera
review
procedures
with
Mr.
Vahedy.
I
provided
initial
guidance
on
what
I
thought
the
brief
should
contain.
Mr.
Vahedy
offered
to
prepare
the
draft
of
the
brief,
and
I
agreed.
7.
Two
days
later,
on
April
9,
2025,
I
was
copied
on
an
email
from
Mr.
Copeland
to
me
and
to
Mr.
Vahedy,
providing
what
appeared
to
be
a
detailed
outline
of
the
brief.
I
recall
that
the
outline
contained
a
numbe
r
of
case
citations.
Mr.
Copeland
re-forwarded
that
outline
on
April
10,
2025.
Mr.
Copeland
did
not
indicate
where
those
citations
came
from
and
I
did
not
independently
verify
those
citations.
Given
our
long
experience
working
with
Mr.
Copeland
and
his
firm
and
our
utmost
respect
for
his
and
his
fir
m’s
professional
integrity
–
which
respect,
once
again,
continues
–
I
did
not
doubt
the
accuracy
of
any
of
those
citations.
8.
On
the
afternoon
of
Friday,
April
11,
2025,
Mr.
Vahedy
copied
me
on
his
transmission
to
Mr.
Copeland
and
his
associate,
Ms.
Carpenter,
of
what
I
understood
to
be
an
initial
draft
of
the
requested
brief.
I
had
not
received
a
draft
of
this
brief
prior
to
Friday.
9.
While
I
knew
that
Mr.
Copeland
was
taking
the
lead
on
this
issue,
I
reviewed
that
draft
on
the
morning
of
Saturday,
April
12,
2025
and
provided
high-
level
comments
aimed
at
ensuring
that
we
were
making
a
properly-tailored
request
and
citing
appropriately
illustrative
factual
ex
amples.
I
did
not
conduct
a
cite-by-cite
review
of
the
document.
Mr.
Copeland
prov
ided
additional
com
ments
and
instructed
Mr.
Vahedy
and
Ms.
Carpenter
to
provide
a
revised
draft.
I
understand
that
Mr.
Vahedy
worked
with
Mr.
Copeland
and
Ms
.
Carpenter
to
addr
ess
these
comments
throughout
the
day
on
April
12,
2025
and
circulated
a
revised
version
of
the
brief
late
in
the
morning
of
April
13,
2025.
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-4-
DECLARATION
OF
RYAN
Q.
KEECH
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
10.
Early
in
the
afternoon
of
April
13,
2025,
Mr.
Copeland
confirmed
that
the
revisions
were
appropriate
and
that
he
and
his
firm
would
take
responsibility
for
finalizing,
filing
and
submission
to
the
Court.
After
Mr.
Copeland
provided
that
confirmation,
later
that
same
afternoon,
I
made
a
high-level
suggestion
for
Mr.
Copeland
to
consider
incorporating
relating
to
the
brief’s
introduction.
I
presumed,
but
did
not
specifically
confirm,
that
the
finalization,
filing
and
submission
process
would
include
an
appropriately
robust
proof
and
cite-checking
procedure.
11.
I
did
not
participate
in
finalizing
or
filing
this
brief
and
did
not
sign
off
on
its
contents.
I
did
not
hear
anything
relating
to
the
brief
until
approximately
noon
on
April
14,
2025,
when
I
learned
that
Mr.
Copeland’s
firm
was
experiencing
formatting
and
submission
issu
es
with
the
JAMS
system
that
were
creating
difficulty
with
meeting
the
Court’s
noon
deadline
and
that
the
initial
filed
version
of
the
brief
was
not
able
to
correct
all
of
those
issues.
A
subsequent
version
of
the
brief
was
filed
that,
I
understand,
corrected
some
of
those
issues.
I
had
no
involvement
in
these
filings.
12.
After
the
Special
Master
sent
his
message
to
the
parties
on
April
14,
2025
identifying
apparent
issues
with
two
decisions
in
the
brief,
Mr.
Copeland
sent
two
messages
to
me
and
to
Mr.
Vahedy
iden
tifying
replacement
parentheticals
and
citations
for
the
Boone
and
National
Steel
decisions
identified
in
the
Special
Master’s
email.
Mr.
Copeland
promptly
filed
a
correct
ed
brief,
which
I
again
did
not
review
and
sign,
and
Mr.
Vahedy
sent
an
explanatory
email
to
the
Special
Master
explaining
the
inadvertent
inclusion
of
these
two
citations.
While
it
was
obvious
by
this
point
that
whatever
cite
check
had
been
performed
had
issues,
I
was
confident
that
the
issue
was
most
likely
limited
to
the
issues
identi
fied
by
the
Court,
cau
ght
by
my
colleagues
and,
even
then,
most
likely
had
been
caused
by
the
formatting
and
submission
difficulties
described
above
that
had
earlier
come
to
my
attention.
13.
I
can
confirm
that
none
of
our
firm
’s
work
on
this
brief
involved
our
use
of
AI.
In
providing
that
confirmation,
I
do
not
mean
to
suggest
that
there
is
anything
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-5-
DECLARATION
OF
RYAN
Q.
KEECH
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
wrong
with
the
appropriate
use
of
AI:
indeed,
I
understand
that
numerous
profession-
specific
AI
tools
are
becoming
available
–
including
Co-Counsel
and
Westlaw
AI
–
which
clients
are
increasingly
demanding
that
counsel
develop
familiarity
with
in
order
to
better
align
with
their
business
focus,
legal
needs
and
market
reality.
What
I
do
mean
to
say
is
that
our
firm
has
developed
policies
and
procedures
governing
access
to
profession-specific
AI
tools,
in
cluding
Co-Counsel,
and
has
decided
to
block
access
to
these
tools
absent,
inter
alia
,
tool-specific
training
developed
for
use
at
our
firm.
Neither
I
nor
Mr.
Vahedy
have
such
access.
We
did
not
have
such
access
at
the
time
of
the
preparation
and
filing
of
these
briefs.
14.
However,
in
light
of
the
OSC,
I
came
to
the
conclusion
that
the
citation
issue
was
broader
than
I
had
initially
beli
eved
was
the
case
when
I
reviewed
the
Court’s
April
14,
2025
correspondence.
Accordingly,
while
Mr.
Copeland
was
conducting
his
own
check,
I
personally
conducted
a
check
of
each
of
the
citations
in
the
brief
in
order
to
catch
whatever
issues
ma
y
have
escaped
the
Special
Master’s
review.
15.
After
having
conducted
this
check,
I
have
determined
that
while
most
citations
in
the
brief
stand
for
the
propositions
for
which
they
are
cited,
and
the
remainder
of
the
citations
la
rgely
involve
familiar
and
su
pportable
legal
propositions
present
in
other
cases,
the
fo
llowing
citations
should
be
changed.
I
apologize
once
again
that,
regardless
of
my
and
our
level
of
involvement,
I
did
not
catch
this
issue
prior
to
the
filing
of
the
brief:
a.
Page
3
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
People
v.
Superior
Court
,
25
Cal.4th
703,
725
(2001)
(“A
trial
court
has
broad
discretion
to
review
materials
in
camera
to
determine
whether
a
claimed
privilege
applies.”)
–
there
should
be
no
quotes
in
the
parenthetical,
which
should
refer
to
n.
7.
b.
Page
4
of
Dkt.
98:
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
Filed
05/06/25
Page
60
of
77
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ID
#:4323
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2
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4
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12
13
14
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16
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18
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-6-
DECLARATION
OF
RYAN
Q.
KEECH
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
i.
Wellpoint
Health
Networks
,
Inc.
v.
Superior
Court
,
59
Cal.App.4th
110,
119
(1997)
–
the
pincite
should
be
page
123,
not
119.
ii.
Aetna
Cas.
&
Surety
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
153
Cal.App.3d
467,
476
(198
4)
(“Where
the
evidence
sought
is
directly
at
issue…
a
party
should
not
be
allowed
to
use
privilege
as
both
a
sword
and
a
shield.”)
–
inaccurate
quote;
however,
this
case
exists
and
this
is
generally
a
correct
proposition
of
law.
iii.
Zurich
American
Ins.
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
155
Cal.App.4th
1485,
1503
(2007)
(“Communications
by
corporate
employees
that
are
not
made
at
the
direction
of
counsel
or
for
the
purpose
of
legal
advice
are
not
privileged.”)
–
the
pincite
should
be
1504
and
state:
“otherwise
routine,
non
-privileged
communications
between
corporate
officers
or
employees
transacting
the
general
business
of
the
company
do
not
attain
privileged
status
solely
because
in-house
or
outside
counsel
is
‘copied
in’
on
correspondence
or
me
moranda.
”
c.
Page
5
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
Costco,
supra
,
47
Cal.4th
at
739
–
should
not
have
quotes
within
the
parentheticals.
d.
Page
6
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
Davis
v.
City
of
Santa
Ana
,
51
Cal.App.5th
1094,
1115
(2020)
–
inaccurate
citation
to
a
case
that
I
have
not
been
able
to
find
and
should
thus
be
removed.
ii.
National
Steel
Products
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
164
Cal.App.3d
476,
489
(1985)
(“Internal
memoranda
or
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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119
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05/06/25
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61
of
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#:4324
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2
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12
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14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-7-
DECLARATION
OF
RYAN
Q.
KEECH
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
claims
file
materials,
although
they
may
discuss
legal
theories,
litigation
tactics
or
potential
liability,
are
not
privileged
unless
they
are
written
by
or
at
the
direction
of
counsel
and
prepared
for
the
purpose
of
transmitting
information
to
counsel
for
legal
advice.”)
–
the
pincite
should
be
477
and
the
parenthetical
should
be
revised
to
reflect
that
privilege
is
strictly
construed
because
it
suppresses
relevant
facts
wh
ich
may
be
necessary
for
a
just
decision.
e.
Page
9
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
Lipton
v.
Superior
Court
,
48
Cal.App.4th
1599,
1619
(1996)
(“A
party
may
not
use
the
privilege
as
both
a
sword
and
a
shield.”)
–
inaccurate
quote;
however,
this
case
exists
and
this
is
a
correct
proposition
of
law.
f.
Page
10
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
Booth
v.
Allstate
Ins.
Co
.,
198
Cal.App.3d
1357,
1366
(1989)
(“An
insurer
cannot
as
sert
privilege
to
shield
evidence
of
bad
faith.”)
–
inaccurate
quote
to
a
case
that
appears
not
to
exist,
but
is
a
holding
made
by
other
courts:
See,
e.g.,
Zurich
Ins.
Co.
v.
State
Farm
Mut.
Auto.
Ins.
Co.
,
137
A.2d
401,
402
(1st
Dep’t
1988)
(“Where
it
is
alleged
that
the
insurer
has
breached
that
duty
to
its
insured,
the
ins
urer
may
not
use
the
attorney-
client
or
work
product
privilege
as
a
shield
to
prevent
disclosure
which
is
relevant
to
the
insured’s
bad
faith
action”);
Boone
v.
Vanliner
Ins.
Co.
,
9
Ohio
St.
3d
209,
213-
14
(2001)
(“in
an
action
alleging
bad
faith
denial
of
insurance
coverage,
the
insure
d
is
entitled
to
discover
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
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119
Filed
05/06/25
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62
of
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26
27
28
-8-
DECLARATION
OF
RYAN
Q.
KEECH
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
claims
file
materials
cont
aining
attorney
client
communications
related
to
th
e
issue
of
coverage
that
were
created
prior
to
the
denial
of
coverage.”).
ii.
Nei
v.
Travelers
Home
and
Marine
Ins.
Co.
,
326
F.R.D.
652
(2018)
(holding
that
attorney-client
privilege
does
not
apply
when
an
attorney
acts
as
a
claims
adjuster,
supervisor,
or
investigation
monitor
rather
than
a
legal
advisor)
–
pincite
should
be
658.
I
declare
under
penalty
of
perjury,
under
the
laws
of
the
United
States
of
America,
that
the
foregoing
is
true
and
correct.
Executed
this
18
th
day
of
April
2025,
in
Los
Angeles,
California.
/s/
Ryan
Q.
Keech
Ryan
Q.
Keech
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
Filed
05/06/25
Page
63
of
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
DECLARATION
OF
KEIAN
VAHEDY
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
ELLIS
GEORGE
LLP
Eric
M.
George
(SBN
166403)
egeorge@ellisgeorge.com
Trent
Copeland
(SBN
136890)
tcopeland@ellisgeorge.com
2121
Avenue
of
the
Stars,
30th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:
(310)
274-7100
Facsimile:
(310)
275-5697
K&L
GATES
LLP
Ryan
Q.
Keech
(SBN
280306)
Ryan.Keech@klgates.com
Kevin
S.
Asfour
(SBN
228993)
Kevin.Asfour@klgates.com
Keian
Vahedy
(SBN
316708)
Keian.Vahedy@klgates.com
10100
Santa
Monica
Blvd.,
8th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:
(310)
552-5000
Facsimile:
(310)
552-5001
Attorneys
for
Plai
ntiff
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY,
in
her
individual
capacity;
and
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
Family
Trust
dated
November
23,
2016
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
CENTRAL
DISTRICT
OF
CALIFORNIA,
WESTERN
DIVISION
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY,
in
her
individual
capacity;
and
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
Family
Trust
dated
November
23,
2016,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY,
an
Illinois
corporation,
and
DOES
1-50,
inclusive,
Defendants.
Case
No.
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
J
udge:
Fernando
M.
Olguin
DECLARATION
OF
KEIAN
VAHEDY
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
$SSHQGL[
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
Filed
05/06/25
Page
64
of
77
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ID
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27
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-2-
DECLARATION
OF
KEIAN
VAHEDY
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
DECLARATION
OF
KEIAN
VAHEDY
I,
Keian
Vahedy,
declare
as
follows:
1.
I
am
an
attorney
licensed
to
practice
law
in
this
Court
and
Associate
at
the
law
firm
of
K&L
Gates
LLP,
attorneys
of
record
for
Plaintiffs
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
and
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
Lacey
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J.
Lacey
Family
Trust
Dated
November
23,
2016
(collectively,
“Plaintiff”),
in
this
action.
I
have
personal
knowledge
of
each
of
the
matters
set
forth
herein,
and
would
testify
competently
thereto
if
called
upon
to
do
so.
2.
I
submit
this
Declaration
pursuant
to
the
Special
Master’s
Order
to
Show
Cause
re:
Sanctions,
explaining
my
role
in
assisting
with
preparing
Plaintiff’s
supplemental
brief
regarding
defendant
State
Farm
General
Insurance
Company’s
(“State
Farm”)
privilege
log.
3.
While
I
did
not
finalize
the
brief
for
filing,
I
sincerely
apologize
for
the
evident
errors
in
the
citations
provided
within
Plaintiff’s
brief
submitted
on
April
14,
2025
(“Brief”).
The
inaccuracies
contained
therein
were
inadvertent
and
a
result
of
honest
miscommunication.
I
should
have
caught
these
errors
beforehand
and
apologize
for
not
more
actively
checking
all
sources
contained
within
Plaintiff’s
Brief.
I
take
seriously
the
critical
importan
ce
of
accuracy
in
case
citations
in
order
for
the
Special
Master
and
the
Court
to
meaningfully
do
their
jobs,
and
I
know
that
my
colleagues
share
the
same
view.
I
believed
that
the
research
submitted
to
me
when
I
worked
on
drafting
the
brief
was
accurate
and
that
the
cases
were
properly
cited.
I
had
no
information
suggesting
that
any
of
the
citations
may
have
come
from
artificial
intelligence
and
had
no
involvement
in
finalizing
or
submitting
the
document
for
filing.
But
it
is
still
no
excuse.
As
the
associate
tasked
with
drafting
Plaintiff’s
Brief,
I
should
have
made
sure
to
cite-check
not
only
the
cases
I
provided,
but
also
the
cases
that
originated
from
Mr.
Copeland’s
outline.
4.
To
begin:
I
and
Mr.
Copeland
have
been
primarily
responsible
for
the
briefing
associated
with
the
privilege
issue
addressed
by
the
Court
on
April
7,
2025.
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
Filed
05/06/25
Page
65
of
77
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-
3
-
DECLARATION
OF
KEIAN
VAHEDY
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
After
the
Court’s
April
7,
2025
hearing,
I
spoke
with
Mr.
Keech,
who
provided
me
with
an
update
regarding
the
hearing
and
initial
guidance
as
to
what
the
brief
should
contain.
I
offered
to
prepare
the
draft
of
the
brief,
and
he
agreed.
5.
On
April
9,
2025,
I
and
Mr.
Keech
received
an
email
from
Mr.
Copeland,
providing
what
appeared
to
be
a
detailed
outline
of
the
brief.
This
brief
contained
a
number
of
case
citations.
Mr.
Copeland
re-forwarded
that
outline
on
April
10,
2025.
While
Mr.
Copeland
did
not
indicate
where
those
citations
came
from,
having
previously
worked
at
Ellis
George
LLP
and
understanding
the
high
quality
and
standards
that
the
firm
and
Mr.
Copeland
uphold
in
their
practice,
I
relied
on
this
outline
when
drafting
the
brief
believing
th
at
its
sources
were
true,
accurate,
and
already
cite
checked.
I
separately
conducted
legal
research
exclusively
on
Westlaw:
reviewing
additional
cases,
secondary
sour
ces,
and
published
trial
documents,
each
of
which
I
relied
upon
to
lay
foundation
and
draft
Plaintiff’s
Brief.
With
respect
to
the
cases
I
found
on
Westlaw,
I
made
sure
to
verify
that
these
cases
were
valid
and
stood
for
the
proposition
for
which
they
were
cited.
6.
I
submitted
a
draft
of
the
brief
on
Friday,
April
11,
2025
to
Mr.
Copeland
and
his
associate
Ms.
Carpenter,
copying
Mr.
Keech.
Mr.
Keech
provided
high-level
comments
on
Saturday,
April
12,
2025,
which
was
followed
by
Mr.
Copeland
providing
additional
comments
to
me
and
to
Ms.
Carpenter.
Throughout
the
day
on
April
12,
2025
I
worked
with
Mr.
Copeland
and
Ms.
Carpenter
to
address
these
comments.
I
circulated
a
revised
version
of
the
brief
on
the
morning
of
April
13,
2025.
7.
On
April
13,
2025,
Mr.
Copeland
informed
me
that
the
revisions
were
appropriate
and
that
he
and
his
firm
would
take
responsibility
for
finalizing,
filing
and
submission
to
the
Court.
I
offered
to
provide
assistance
in
this
regard,
though
did
not
hear
anything
relating
to
the
brief
until
approximately
noon
on
April
14,
2025,
when
I
learned
that
Mr.
Copeland’s
firm
was
experiencing
formatting
and
submission
issues
with
the
JAMS
system
that
were
creating
di
fficulty
with
meeting
the
Court’s
deadline.
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
Filed
05/06/25
Page
66
of
77
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ID
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26
27
28
-4-
DECLARATION
OF
KEIAN
VAHEDY
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
I
assumed,
again,
that
the
citations
provided
to
me
on
April
9
and
10
were
accurate
for
the
propositions
they
represented.
8.
After
the
Court
sent
its
message
to
the
parties
on
April
14,
2025
identifying
apparent
issues
with
two
decisions
in
the
brief,
Mr.
Copeland
sent
two
messages
to
me
and
to
Mr.
Keech
identifyi
ng
replacement
parentheticals
and
citations
for
the
Boone
and
National
Steel
decisions
identified
in
the
Special
Master’s
email
to
the
parties.
I
confirmed
the
accuracy
of
those
parentheticals
and
prepared
an
email
for
submission
to
the
Special
Master,
which
I
then
sent
in
close
proximity
to
the
filing
of
the
further
revised
brief.
9.
After
the
Court
issued
its
OSC,
I
personally
conducted
a
full
cite
check
of
the
brief
that
was
filed
with
the
Court
in
order
to
catch
whatever
issues
may
have
escaped
review.
10.
At
no
point
did
I
use
or
knowingly
rely
on
any
artificial
intelligence
tool
or
program
to
assist
in
drafting
any
version
of
this
Brief.
I
do
not
have
access
to
Co-
Counsel
at
our
firm.
I
have
never
used
artificial
intelligence,
or
any
artificial
intelligence
program,
with
respect
to
my
le
gal
research
or
any
law
and
motion
practice
in
my
career,
nor
is
or
would
it
be
my
practice
to
do
so.
11.
I
confirm
personally
conducting
a
citation-by-citation
check
of
the
citations
in
the
brief
in
order
to
catch
whatever
issues
may
have
escaped
the
Special
Master’s
review.
I
confirm
that
most
citations
in
the
brief
stand
for
the
propositions
for
which
they
are
cited.
However,
I
also
confirm
finding
that
the
following
citations
should
be
noted
as
follows
and
apologize
again
for
not
catching
these
issues
sooner:
a.
Page
3
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
People
v.
Superior
Court
,
25
Cal.4th
703,
725
(2001)
(“A
trial
court
has
broad
discretion
to
review
materials
in
camera
to
determine
whether
a
claimed
privilege
applies.”)
–
there
should
be
no
quotes
in
the
parenthetical,
which
should
refer
to
n.
7.
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5
-
DECLARATION
OF
KEIAN
VAHEDY
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
b.
Page
4
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
Wellpoint
Health
Networks,
Inc.
v.
Superior
Court
,
59
Cal.App.4th
110,
119
(1997)
–
the
pincite
should
be
page
123,
not
119.
ii.
Aetna
Cas.
&
Surety
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
153
Cal.App.3d
467,
476
(1984)
(“Where
the
evidence
sought
is
directly
at
issue…
a
party
should
not
be
allowed
to
use
privilege
as
both
a
sword
and
a
shield.”)
–
inaccurate
quote;
however,
this
case
exists
and
this
is
a
correct
proposition
of
law.
iii.
Zurich
American
Ins.
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
155
Cal.App.4th
1485,
1503
(2007)
(“Communications
by
corporate
employees
that
are
not
made
at
the
direction
of
counsel
or
for
the
purpose
of
legal
advice
are
not
privileged.”)
–
the
pincite
should
be
1504
and
state:
“otherwise
routine,
non-privileged
communications
between
corporate
officers
or
employees
transacting
the
general
business
of
the
company
do
not
attain
privileged
status
solely
because
in-house
or
outside
counsel
is
‘copied
in’
on
correspondence
or
memoranda”
c.
Page
5
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
Costco,
supra
,
47
Cal.4th
at
739
–
should
not
have
quotes
within
the
parentheticals.
d.
Page
6
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
Davis
v.
City
of
Santa
Ana
,
51
Cal.App.5th
1094,
1115
(2020)
–
inaccurate
citation
to
a
case
that
appears
not
to
exist
and
should
be
removed.
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6
-
DECLARATION
OF
KEIAN
VAHEDY
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
ii.
National
Steel
Products
Co.
v.
Superior
Court
,
164
Cal.App.3d
476,
489
(1985)
(“Internal
memoranda
or
claims
file
materials,
although
they
may
discuss
legal
theories,
litigation
tactics
or
potential
liability,
are
not
privileged
unless
they
are
written
by
or
at
the
direction
of
counsel
and
prepared
for
the
purpose
of
transmitting
information
to
counsel
for
legal
advice.”)
–
the
pincite
should
be
477,
should
not
have
quotes,
and
the
parenthetical
should
be
revised
to
reflect
that
privilege
is
strictly
construed
because
it
suppresses
relevant
facts
which
may
be
necessary
for
a
just
decision.
e.
Page
9
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
Lipton
v.
Superior
Court
,
48
Cal.App.4th
1599,
1619
(1996)
(“A
party
may
not
use
the
privilege
as
both
a
sword
and
a
shield.”)
–
inaccurate
express
quote;
however,
this
case
exists
and
this
is
a
correct
proposition
of
law.
f.
Page
10
of
Dkt.
98:
i.
Booth
v.
Allstate
Ins.
Co
.,
198
Cal.App.3d
1357,
1366
(1989)
(“An
insurer
cannot
assert
privilege
to
shield
evidence
of
bad
faith.”)
–
inaccurate
quote
to
a
case
that
appears
not
to
exist,
but
is
a
correct
proposition
of
law.
See,
e.g.,
Zurich
Ins.
Co.
v.
State
Farm
Mut.
Auto.
Ins.
Co.
,
137
A.2d
401,
402
(1st
Dep’t
1988)
(“Where
it
is
alleged
that
the
insurer
has
breached
that
duty
to
its
insured,
the
insurer
may
not
use
the
attorney-client
or
work
product
privilege
as
a
shield
to
prevent
disclosure
which
is
relevant
to
the
insured’s
bad
faith
action”);
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7
-
DECLARATION
OF
KEIAN
VAHEDY
IN
RESPONSE
TO
THE
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
ORDER
TO
SHOW
CAUSE
RE:
SANCTIONS
Boone
v.
Vanliner
Ins.
Co.
,
9
Ohio
St.
3d
209,
213-14
(2001)
(“in
an
action
alleging
bad
faith
denial
of
insurance
coverage,
the
insured
is
entitled
to
discover
claims
file
materials
containing
attorney
client
communications
related
to
the
issue
of
coverage
that
were
created
prior
to
the
denial
of
coverage.”).
ii.
Nei
v.
Travelers
Home
and
Marine
Ins.
Co.
,
326
F.R.D.
652
(2018)
(holding
that
attorney-client
privilege
does
not
apply
when
an
attorney
acts
as
a
claims
adjuster,
supervisor,
or
investigation
monitor
rather
than
a
legal
advisor)
–
pincite
should
be
658.
I
declare
under
penalty
of
perjury,
under
the
laws
of
the
United
States
of
America,
that
the
foregoing
is
true
and
correct.
Executed
this
18
th
day
of
April
2025,
in
Irvine,
California.
/s/
Keian
Vahedy
Keian
Vahedy
Case
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119
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PLAINTIFF’S
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
NOTICE
ELLIS
GEORGE
LLP
Eric
M.
George
(SBN
166403)
egeorge@ellisgeorge.com
Trent
Copeland
(SBN
136890)
tcopeland@ellisgeorge.com
2121
Avenue
of
the
Stars,
30th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:
(310)
274-7100
Facsimile:
(310)
275-5697
K&L
GATES
LLP
Ryan
Q.
Keech
(SBN
280306)
Ryan.Keech@klgates.com
Kevin
S.
Asfour
(SBN
228993)
Kevin.Asfour@klgates.com
Keian
Vahedy
(SBN
316708)
Keian.Vahedy@klgates.com
10100
Santa
Monica
Blvd.,
8th
Floor
Los
Angeles,
California
90067
Telephone:
(310)
552-5000
Facsimile:
(310)
552-5001
Attorneys
for
Plaintiff
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY,
in
her
individual
capacity;
and
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
Family
Trust
dated
November
23,
2016
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
CENTRAL
DISTRICT
OF
CALIFORNIA,
WESTERN
DIVISION
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY,
in
her
individual
capacity;
and
JACQUELYN
“JACKIE”
LACEY
as
trustee
of
the
D
and
J
Lacey
Family
Trust
dated
November
23,
2016,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE
FARM
GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY,
an
Illinois
corporation,
and
DOES
1-50,
inclusive,
Defendants.
Case
No.
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Judge
Fernando
M.
Olguin
JAMS
Case
No.
1210040394
Proceeding
before
Special
Master
Hon.
Michael
R.
Wilner
(Ret.)
PLAINTIFF’S
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
NOTICE
OF
INTENDED
SANCTIONS
AND
FEE
ORDERS
Date:
April
29,
2025
Time:
10:00
a.m.
Place:
Remote
via
Zoom
$SSHQGL[
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-1-
PLAINTIFF’S
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
NOTICE
Plaintiff
and
her
counsel,
Ellis
George
LLP
and
K&L
Gates
LLP,
hereby
respond
to
the
Special
Master’s
April
20,
2025
Notice
pursuant
to
Paragraph
8
thereof
and
its
five-page
limitation.
This
submission
consists
of
three
discrete
components:
Section
I
,
submitted
jointly
by
Plaintiff,
Ellis
George,
and
K&L
Gates;
Section
II
,
by
K&L
Gates
alone;
and
Section
III
,
by
Ellis
George
alone.
I.
JOINT
SUBMISSION
(BY
PLAINTIFF
AND
BOTH
FIRMS)
A.
Introduction
As
reflected
in
the
declarations
already
submitted,
1
Plaintiff
humbly
acknowledges,
apologizes
for,
and
takes
full
responsibility
for
the
erroneous
AI-
generated
citations
that
were
inadvertently
included
in
its
briefing
filed
with
the
Special
Master
on
April
14,
2025.
This
has
never
happened
before
in
this
case
(nor
in
any
other
matter
handled
by
these
attorneys)
and
it
will
never
happen
again.
Respectfully,
however,
most
of
the
contemplated
sanctions
referenced
in
the
Notice
are
unsupported
by
the
facts
and
controlling
legal
principles,
disproportionate
to
the
circumstances
at
hand,
and
run
counter
to
the
ends
of
justice,
as
detailed
below.
B.
Plaintiff’s
Use
of
Erroneous
AI-Generated
Material
Was
Inadvertent,
Promptly
Disclosed,
and
Cured
Without
Causing
Any
Prejudice
Given
limited
space,
and
the
Special
Master’s
familiarity
with
the
facts
from
the
submitted
declarations,
Plaintiff
will
not
provide
a
comprehensive
discussion
of
the
facts
here,
but
summarizes
the
following
points
germane
to
the
arguments:
•
Following
the
OSC,
Plaintiff’s
counsel
candidly
disclosed
that
limited
portions
of
the
Supplemental
Brief
were
initially
drafted
with
the
aid
of
generative
artificial
intelligence
(“AI”),
in
an
effort
to
explore
time-saving
methods
during
a
period
of
constrained
resources.
Upon
internal
review,
counsel
acknowledged
all
of
the
case
authority
that
had
been
AI-generated,
and
additionally
identified
and
disclosed
other
inconsistencies,
including
pin
cite
errors
and
misplacement
of
parentheticals.
Plaintiff’s
counsel
specifically
requested
the
Court
not
to
rely
upon
the
two
nonexistent
cases.
1
See
Declarations
of
Trent
Copeland
(“Copeland
Decl.”),
Ryan
Keech
(“Keech
Decl.”)
and
Keian
Vahedy
(“Vahedy
Decl.”),
all
submitted
April
18,
2025.
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-2-
PLAINTIFF’S
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
NOTICE
There
is
no
indication
whatsoever
that
any
of
Plaintiff’s
counsel
ever
acted
with
malice,
an
intent
to
deceive,
or
bad
faith
of
any
kind.
•
Despite
the
above
citation
issues,
Plaintiff’s
Supplemental
Brief
did
not
present
any
incorrect
or
non-existent
proposition
of
law.
Rather,
Plaintiff’s
arguments
stem
from
established
legal
principles
supported
by
valid
precedent.
Thus,
the
brief
did
not
advance
a
frivolous
legal
position.
•
Defendant
did
not
rely
upon,
suffer
any
prejudice,
or
incur
any
expense
due
to
the
incorrect
citations.
Indeed,
such
would
be
impossible,
logically
and
temporally,
since
per
the
Special
Master’s
orders,
each
side
concurrently
submitted
their
Supplemental
Brief
on
April
14,
2025.
In
other
words,
Defendant’s
submission
was
not
filed
in
response
to
Plaintiff’s
submission,
nor
did
the
Special
Master’s
orders
permit
either
side
to
file
a
“reply”
brief
in
response
to
the
Supplemental
Briefs.
C.
The
Contemplated
Sanctions
Are
Not
Appropriate
Under
the
Law
The
Ninth
Circuit
has
long
held
that
“[i]n
determining
the
validity
of
any
judicial
sanction,
we
must
first
consider
the
underlying
authority
for
the
court’s
action.”
Zambrano
v.
City
of
Tustin
,
885
F.2d
1473,
1476
(9th
Cir.
1989).
“For
a
sanction
to
be
validly
imposed,
the
conduct
in
question
must
be
sanctionable
under
the
authority
relied
on.”
Id.
at
1476-77
(citations
omitted).
Here,
the
Notice
identifies
three
sources
of
authority
for
imposing
sanctions:
(i)
the
Court’s
inherent
authority
to
“regulate
all
proceedings”
before
it;
(ii)
FRCP
11;
and
(iii)
FRCP
37.
To
impose
sanctions
under
the
Court’s
inherent
authority
,
the
target
“must
have
‘engaged
in
bad
faith
or
willful
disobedience
of
a
court’s
order.’”
Fink
v.
Gomez
,
239
F.3d
989,
992
(9th
Cir.
2001);
see
also
U.S.
v.
Stoneberger
,
805
F.2d
1391,
1393
(9th
Cir.
1986)
(“A
specific
finding
of
bad
faith...must
‘precede
any
sanction
under
the
court’s
inherent
powers.’”)
(citations
omitted).
As
detailed
above,
there
is
no
bad
faith
here,
and
thus
sanctions
under
the
Court’s
inherent
powers
are
not
appropriate.
See,
e.g.,
United
States
v.
Cohen
,
724
F.
Supp.
3d
251,
258
(S.D.N.Y.
2024)
(declining
to
impose
sanctions
upon
attorney
for
mistaken
inclusion
of
erroneous
AI
material
in
brief,
holding
that
“the
Court
cannot
find
that
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3
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PLAINTIFF’S
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
NOTICE
it
was
done
in
bad
faith”);
compare
Unites
States
v.
Hayes
,
---
F.
Supp.
3d.
---,
2025
WL
235531,
at
*9
(E.D.
Cal.
2025)
(issuing
sanctions
against
attorney
who
declined
to
admit
use
of
AI
and
persisted
in
asserting
the
validity
of
non-existent
cases
despite
opposition
that
expressly
raised
fictitious
case
concerns);
Mata
v.
Avianca
,
678
F.
Supp.
3d
443,
466
(S.D.N.Y.
2023).
Likewise,
for
Rule
11
:
where,
as
here,
the
proposed
sanction
is
imposed
sua
sponte
,
a
finding
of
bad
faith
is
a
prerequisite.
See,
e.g.,
United
National
Ins.
Co.
v.
R&D
Latex
Corp.
,
242
F.3d
1102,
1116
(9th
Cir.
2001)
(“
sua
sponte
sanctions
‘will
ordinarily
be
imposed
only
in
situations
that
are
akin
to
a
contempt
of
court
’”);
see
also
Cohen
,
724
F.
Supp.
3d
at
258
(“
sua
sponte
[Rule
11]
sanctions
should
only
issue
upon
a
finding
of
subjective
bad
faith”).
Again,
there
is
no
bad
faith
here.
2
Turning
to
Rule
37
:
The
specific
prongs
of
the
Rule
cited
in
the
Notice
are
Rule
37(a)(5)(B)
(award
of
attorney’s
fees)
and
Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(ii-iii)
(prohibiting
a
party
from
“supporting
or
opposing
designated
claims
or
defenses”
and
“striking
pleadings
in
whole
or
in
part”).
Starting
with
the
latter
(Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(ii-iii)):
by
their
own
terms,
those
provisions
have
no
applicability
here.
To
impose
any
sanction
under
Rule
37(b)(2)(A),
the
Court
must
find
that
a
party
has
“fail[ed]
to
obey
an
order
to
provide
or
permit
discovery.”
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
37(b)(2)(A).
Here,
nothing
of
the
sort
is
even
alleged
to
have
occurred,
and
thus
there
is
no
basis
for
the
contemplated
sanction
of
striking
Plaintiff’s
Supplemental
Brief
wholesale.
By
extension,
then,
the
automatic
denial
of
the
underlying
motion
due
to
the
contemplated
striking
of
Plaintiff’s
brief
is
likewise
inappropriate.
Further,
the
Notice’s
contemplated
sanction
of
ordering
Plaintiff’s
counsel
“to
pay
reasonable
attorney’s
fees
that
Defendant
incurred
in
the
preparation
of
its
supplemental
brief
2
Moreover,
a
Rule
11
sanction
imposed
sua
sponte
can
never
include
a
payment
of
attorney’s
fees
to
the
opposing
party,
given
the
provision
in
Rule
11(c)(4)
that
fee
awards
are
only
available
“if
imposed
on
motion
.”
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
11(c)(4)
(emphasis
added);
see
also
Barber
v.
Miller
,
146
F.3d
707,
711
(9th
Cir.
1998);
Nuwesra
v.
Merrill
Lynch,
Fenner
&
Smith,
Inc.
,
174
F.3d
87,
94
(2nd
Cir.
1999).
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-4-
PLAINTIFF’S
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
NOTICE
(filed
April
14)”
is,
respectfully,
not
appropriate:
First,
Defendant’s
Supplemental
Brief
was
filed
concurrently
with
Plaintiff’s
Supplemental
Brief.
Thus,
any
fees
expended
in
its
preparation
could
not
have
resulted
from
any
mistaken
citations
in
Plaintiff’s
Supplemental
Brief.
Second,
any
attorney’s
fee
award
under
Rule
37(a)(5)(B)
requires
that
the
movant
have
lost
the
motion;
as
noted
above,
the
striking
of
Plaintiff’s
brief
is
not
permitted
under
these
circumstances,
and
thus
the
motion
should
not
automatically
be
denied.
Third,
even
if
the
Court
denies
the
motion
on
its
merits,
Rule
37(a)(5)(B)
provides
that
“the
court
must
not
order
this
payment
if
the
motion
was
substantially
justified.”
And
here,
Plaintiff
respectfully
submits
that,
if
nothing
else,
the
motion
was
substantially
justified.
Finally,
even
when
considering
AI
hallucination
matters
in
isolation
(separate
and
apart
from
the
foregoing
legal
impediments),
Plaintiff
respectfully
notes
that
the
proposed
sanctions
discussed
above
do
not
comport
with
the
principle
that
“any
sanction
imposed
must
be
proportionate
to
the
offense
and
commensurate
with
principles
of
restraint.”
Zambrano
,
885
F.2d
at
1480.
Here,
given
the
candor
of
Plaintiff’s
counsel,
the
fundamental
correctness
of
the
legal
arguments
advanced,
the
lack
of
any
bad
faith,
and
the
lack
of
prejudice,
Plaintiff
respectfully
submits
that
imposing
sanctions
that
substantively
impact
the
case—including
the
striking
of
briefing
and
denial
of
the
motion—would
unfairly
penalize
Plaintiff
and
her
case.
See,
e.g.,
id.
at
1476
(cautioning
against
penalizing
litigants
for
inadvertent
transgressions
by
counsel).
D.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff
respectfully
submits
that
the
contemplated
sanctions
set
forth
in
Paragraph
6(a),
6(b),
and
6(c)
of
the
Notice
are
not
appropriate.
That
said,
Plaintiff’s
counsel
reiterates
their
acknowledgement
of
the
errors
that
occurred
here
and
their
sincere
apologies,
and
stipulate
to
the
contemplated
sanctions
set
forth
in
Paragraph
6(d)
(apportionment
to
Plaintiffs’
counsel
of
Special
Master
fees
relating
to
correction
of
the
foregoing
errors
and
these
OSC
proceedings)
and
Paragraph
6(e)
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-
5
-
PLAINTIFF’S
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
NOTICE
(written
disclosures
to
Plaintiff).
II.
SUBMISSION
BY
K&L
GATES,
ONLY
K&L
Gates
briefly
notes
the
following
additional
facts
and
mitigating
factors
specific
to
it
and
its
lawyers.
K&L
Gates
has
strict
policies
and
prohibitions
on
the
use
of
generative
AI
tools,
and
indeed
blocks
its
attorneys
from
accessing
such
tools
absent,
inter
alia
,
tool-specific
training.
(
See
Keech
Decl.,
¶
13;
Vahedy
Decl.,
¶
10.)
None
of
the
K&L
Gates
attorneys
who
worked
on
the
subject
brief
used
any
AI
tools;
had
access
to
any
AI
tools;
or
had
any
awareness
that
an
Ellis
George
attorney
had
used
such
tools
in
connection
with
the
subject
brief,
until
after
the
Special
Master’s
inquiries.
(
See
Keech
Decl.,
¶
13;
Vahedy
Decl.,
¶
10;
see
also
Copeland
Decl.,
¶
3.)
K&L
Gates
further
notes
that
it
had
no
reason
to
doubt
the
accuracy
of
the
citations
provided
by
its
trusted
co-counsel,
and
that
it
did
not
sign
or
file
the
subject
brief.
(
See
Keech
Decl.,
¶¶
3-7;
Vahedy
Decl.,
¶¶
3-5.)
see
also
Braun
ex
rel
Advanced
Battery
Techs.,
Inc.
v.
Zhiguo
Fu
,
2015
WL
4389893,
at
*19
(S.D.N.Y.
Jul.
10,
2015)
(declining
to
impose
sanctions
where
no
evidence
that
anybody
at
firm
had
actual
knowledge
that
pleading
contained
false
allegation).
No
sanctions
against
K&L
Gates
are
appropriate
in
this
situation.
III.
SUBMISSION
BY
ELLIS
GEORGE,
ONLY
Ellis
George
notes
the
following
mitigating
factors
specific
to
its
lawyer,
Trent
Copeland:
Mr.
Copeland
used
generative
AI
tools
specifically
designed
for
legal
professionals
when
providing
his
colleagues
with
his
initial
thoughts
in
outline.
When
doing
so,
he
specifically
indicated
that
they
were
“not
intended
to
be
a
guide”
but
rather
an
overview
of
the
potential
arguments.
(
See
Copeland
Decl.,
¶¶
4-8.)
Because
Mr.
Copeland
was
not
tasked
with
primary
responsibility
for
drafting
the
brief,
he
assumed
that
case
authority
would
be
cite-checked
by
those
who
were
responsible
for
its
drafting.
Mr.
Copeland
acknowledges
that,
in
hindsight,
he
should
have
alerted
the
primary
draftsman
of
his
initial
use
of
AI
to
assure
proper
cite
checking
prior
to
submission.
Case
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-
6
-
PLAINTIFF’S
RESPONSE
TO
SPECIAL
MASTER’S
NOTICE
Respectfully
submitted,
ELLIS
GEORGE
LLP
Eric
M.
George
Trent
Copeland
Date:
April
25,
2025
By:
s/
Trent
Copelan
d
Trent
Copeland
A
ttorneys
for
Plaintiff
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
L
ace
y
in
all
capacitie
s
Respectfully
submitted,
K&L
GATES
LLP
Ryan
Q.
Keech
Kevin
S.
Asfour
Keian
Vahed
y
Date:
April
25,
2025
By:
s/
Kevin
S.
Asfou
r
Kevin
S.
Asfour
A
ttorneys
for
Plaintiff
Jacquelyn
“Jackie”
L
acey
in
all
capacities
Case
2:24-cv-05205-FMO-MAA
Document
119
Filed
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Page
77
of
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ID
#:4340
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