Lepp v. Mallett, No. 25-10214 (Jan. 16, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Rev. Heidi Grossman Lepp v. Conrad Mallett, Jr., et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Jan. 16, 2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Rev. Heidi Grossman Lepp, Plaintiff, v. Conrad Mallett, Jr., et al...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 125968Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D.Michigan, Southern Division.Rev. Heidi Grossman Lepp, Plaintiff,v.Conrad Mallett, Jr., et al. Defendants.Case No. 25-10214|Filed 01/16/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsHeidi Grossman Lepp E-filer, Detroit, MI, Pro Se.Patrick M. Cunningham, City of Detroit Law Department,Detroit, MI, for Defendant Conrad Mallett, Jr.ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONFOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTPURUSANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) [35]JUDITH E. LEVY United States District Judge*1 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Heidi GrossmanLepp's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (ECF No. 35.)On June 9, 2025, Magistrate Judge Curtis Ivy, Jr., issued aReport and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending thatDefendant Mallet's motion to dismiss be granted and that JohnDoes 1-500 be dismissed as well. (ECF No. 31.) He alsoissued an order denying Plaintiff's motion for leave to file anamended complaint. (ECF No. 30.)The undersigned adopted Judge Ivy's R&R on July 21, 2025,and issued a judgment that same day. (ECF Nos. 33, 34.)Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment on August19, 2025. (ECF No. 35.) In her motion, she asks the Courtto vacate the judgment, reopen the case, permit her to file anamended complaint, and to consider her objections to JudgeIvy's R&R and order, which she claims were prepared but “notreceived, potentially due to connectivity issues with Pacer andthe internet.” (Id. at PageID.520, 530.)For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for relieffrom judgment is denied.I. Factual BackgroundThe Court adopts by reference the background set forth in theR&R, having reviewed it and finding it to be accurate andthorough. (ECF No. 31, PageID.467–470.)II. Standard of Review“Rule 60(b) ‘provides a mechanism for seeking post-judgment relief—reopening of a case—for a limited set ofcircumstances.’ ” Lunn v. City of Detroit, No. 19-13578, 2024WL 3160311, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2024) (quotingMarcelli v. Walker, 313 F. App'x 839, 841 (6th Cir. 2009)).Under Rule 60(b), the Courtmay relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, orproceeding for the following reasons:(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonablediligence, could not have been discovered in time to movefor a new trial under Rule 59(b);(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;(4) the judgment is void;(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged;it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed orvacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;or(6) any other reason that justifies relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “A motion under Rule 60(b) must bemade within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and(3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or orderor the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
Rev. Heidi Grossman Lepp, Plaintiff, v. Conrad Mallett, Jr., et al...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b) is in the Court'sdiscretion. See Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 250 F.3d 381, 385(6th Cir. 2001); Bank of Montreal v. Olafsson, 648 F.2d1078, 1079 (6th Cir. 1981) (“The grant of motions madeunder rule 60(b) is a matter of discretion for the districtcourt.”). “[T]he party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bearsthe burden of establishing the grounds for such relief by clearand convincing evidence.” Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch.,Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008). “[R]elief under Rule60(b) is ‘circumscribed by public policy favoring finality ofjudgments and termination of litigation.’ ” CGH Transp., Inc.v. Quebecor World, Inc., 261 F. App'x 817, 823 (6th Cir. 2008)(quoting Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of UMWA CombinedBen. Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001)). “Relief froma final judgment under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedythat is granted only in exceptional circumstances.” McAlpin v.Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., 229 F.3d 491, 502–03 (6thCir. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).III. Analysis*2 Plaintiff requests that the Court's order of dismissal bevacated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (2),and (6). (ECF No. 36, PageID.520–521.)A. Rule 60(b)(1)“Rule 60(b)(1) permits a district court to reopen a judgmentfor ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.’ ”Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 531 (2002). This rule“is intended to provide relief in only two situations: (1) whena party has made an excusable mistake or an attorney hasacted without authority, or (2) when the judge has made asubstantive mistake of law or fact in the final judgment ororder.” United States v. Reyes, 307 F.3d 451, 455 (6th Cir.2002).i. Judge's errors of lawRule 60(b)(1)'s definition of a “mistake” includes a “judge'serrors of law.” Kemp, 596 U.S. at 530. Plaintiff arguesbroadly that the Court made a mistake in its application ofstanding doctrine. (ECF No. 35, PageID.521.) Specifically,she takes issue with the Court's finding that she “lackedstanding due to insufficient allegations of injury-in-fact.” (Id.)Plaintiff lists as “concrete injuries” “[e]motional distress,PTSD exacerbation, reputational harm from DefendantMallett's defamatory statements in the Detroit Metro Times,economic loss from forced closure of Mothership Sanctuary,and interference with religious practice under the FirstAmendment and RLUIPA.” (Id.)As set forth in the R&R, constitutional standing requiresan injury-in-fact that is particularized, concrete, and actualor imminent. (ECF No. 31, PageID.480 (citing Lujanv. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992);Glennborough Homeowners Ass'n v. United States PostalServ., 21 F.4th 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2021)).) The R&R, which theCourt adopted, already considered Plaintiff's allegations thatshe suffered these injuries. (See ECF No. 31, PageID.484–500 (discussing reputation harms, severe emotional harm,financial losses, chilling of her constitutionally protectedrights, and disruption of the church's operation); see also ECFNo. 1, PageID.16.) Plaintiff's reiteration of her injuries is nota sufficient showing that the Court made a mistake of law.Plaintiff also states that the Court's “reliance” on Buchholzv. Meyer Njus Tanick, 946 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 2020),was “misplaced” because “Buchholz addressed speculativefuture harm, not actual harm from harassment and religioussuppression.” (ECF No. 35, PageID.522.) She claims thatGarland v. Orlans, PC, 999 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2021), andProws v. City of Oxford, No. 23-3920, 2024 WL 4786114(6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2024), “confirm that emotional distress andreligious interference, when factually supported, establishstanding” and that the Court's “failure” to consider Garlandand Prows “constitutes a mistake under Rule 60(b)(1).” (Id.at PageID.521–522.)However, the Court's order adopting the R&R consideredboth Garland and Prows, and discussed the R&R's relianceon Buchholz. (ECF No. 33, PageID.514–515.) As such, it isnot clear what mistake Plaintiff believes the Court committed.Additionally, Garland and Prows do not involve claimsrelated to religion; thus, those cases do not demonstrate that“religious interference, when factually supported, establishstanding.” (ECF No. 35, PageID.522.)*3 Plaintiff's motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) for errorsof law is denied.ii. Plaintiff's excusable mistakeThe Court construes Plaintiff's motion as also seeking reliefunder Rule 60(b)(1) for her excusable mistake of missing thedeadline to file objections to the R&R (ECF No. 31) andJudge Ivy's order denying her motion for leave to amend the
Rev. Heidi Grossman Lepp, Plaintiff, v. Conrad Mallett, Jr., et al...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3complaint. (ECF No. 30.) She claims that she attempted tofile “a timely Objection to the R&R, which the Court statedwas not received, potentially due to connectivity issues withPacer and the internet.” (ECF No. 35, PageID.520.) Plaintiffalso discloses that her father passed away in June of 2025,which affected her ability to keep up with the case.1 (Id. atPageID.525.)Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's failure to timely fileher objections is an “excusable mistake.” Plaintiff filed hermotion and her intended objections (ECF No. 35-1) less than30 days after the judgment was entered, and at least some ofthe reasons for her delay were not in her control. See Jacksonv. Chandler, 463 F. App'x 511, 513 (6th Cir. 2012) (describingthe factors to determine whether neglect is “excusable”).However, as set forth below, even if Plaintiff had timelyfiled her objections, it would not have resulted in a differentoutcome. For that reason, Plaintiff's motion for relief fromjudgment due to her excusable mistake is denied.a. Plaintiff's objections to the R&R (ECF No. 31)Plaintiff first objects to the R&R. (ECF No. 35-1,PageID.534.)A party may object to a magistrate judge's report andrecommendation on dispositive motions, and a district judgemust resolve proper objections under a de novo standard ofreview. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)–(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)–(3). “For an objection to be proper, Eastern District ofMichigan Local Rule 72.1(d)(1) requires parties to ‘specifythe part of the order, proposed findings, recommendations,or report to which [the party] objects’ and to ‘state the basisfor the objection.’ ” Pearce v. Chrysler Group LLC PensionPlan, 893 F.3d 339, 346 (6th Cir. 2018). Objections thatrestate arguments already presented to the magistrate judgeare improper, Coleman-Bey v. Bouchard, 287 F. App'x 420,422 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Brumley v. Wingard, 269 F.3d 629,647 (6th Cir. 2001)), as are those that are vague and disputethe general correctness of the report and recommendation.Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995).Moreover, objections must be clear so that the districtcourt can “discern those issues that are dispositive andcontentious.” Id. (citing Howard v. Sec'y of Health andHuman Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)); see alsoThomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985) (explaining thatobjections must go to “factual and legal” issues “at the heartof the parties' dispute”). In sum, the objections must be clearand specific enough to permit the Court to squarely addressthem on the merits. See Pearce, 893 F.3d at 346.Regarding Judge Ivy's constitutional standing analysis,Plaintiff claims that Judge Ivy ignored her factual allegationswhen he concluded that “her injuries were speculative orbelonged to others.” (ECF No. 35-1, PageID.534; see also id.at PageID.536.) She lists the following “substantial factualallegations” that she believes Judge Ivy ignored:*4 • Reputation Injury: Plaintiff was personally defamedby Defendant Mallet's Metro Times quote associatingher church with criminal activity. Her name and churchwere specifically targeted.• Severe Emotional Distress: Plaintiff has PTSD, whichwas exacerbated by the government's conduct (raids,threats, discriminatory enforcement).• Loss of Income and Donations: Plaintiff detailed loss ofsupport and disruption to her ministry caused by cityenforcement.• Deprivation of Religious Property Use: The Church'sparking and building access were obstructed by Cityinspectors under orders from Mallett and Green.(ECF No. 35-1, PageID.534–535.)Regarding Plaintiff's reputational injury, severe emotionaldistress, financial losses, and disruption of the church'soperation, the R&R, which the Court adopted, consideredPlaintiff's allegations that she suffered those injuries. (ECFNo. 31, PageID.484–500 (discussing reputation harms,severe emotional harm, financial losses, chilling of herconstitutionally protected rights, and disruption of thechurch's operation))); see also supra III.A.i. (holding thesame). Plaintiff's arguments do not identify flaws in theCourt's reasoning.Additionally, regarding Plaintiff's argument that she pled aninjury of “deprivation of religious property use” and that the“Church's parking and building access were obstructed byCity Inspectors under orders from Mallett and Green,” (ECFNo. 35-1, PageID.535), this allegation does not appear in thecomplaint. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7–17.) As such, Judge Ivy didnot have an obligation to consider those factual allegations.
Rev. Heidi Grossman Lepp, Plaintiff, v. Conrad Mallett, Jr., et al...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4For those reasons, Plaintiff's objection to Judge Ivy'sconstitutional standing analysis is overruled.Plaintiff also argues that Judge Ivy erred in his analysis ofprudential standing because she asserted both the rights ofthird parties and herself. (ECF No. 35-1, PageID.535.) ButJudge Ivy concluded that she could not assert the rightsof third parties, not that she only asserted the rights ofthird parties. (See, e.g., ECF No. 31, PageID.477 (“Plaintiff'slawsuit may proceed depending on whether she has alsoestablished constitutional standing to sue for her injuries andher injuries alone.”).)Plaintiff also appears to object to Judge Ivy's conclusion thatshe may not sue on behalf of her church. (ECF No. 35-1,PageID.535 (“Plaintiff ... [h]as the institutional capacity toassert religious rights of her church.”).) In support of thisstatement, Plaintiff cites Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); however, this case doesnot provide any support for Plaintiff's statement regarding herability to sue to assert her church's rights.Finally, Plaintiff asserts that she is “entitled to raise FirstAmendment claims chilled by government conduct underthe overbreadth doctrine,” and cites in support Secretaryof State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947(1984). (ECF No. 35-1, PageID.535.) This argument is notadequately explained. Additionally, the overbreadth doctrineas described in Munson does not have any applicability to thiscase. The overbreadth doctrine is generally used to “attack theconstitutionality of a statute or ordinance,” Prime Media, Inc.v. City of Brentwood, 485 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2007), andPlaintiff does not challenge a statute or ordinance.*5 For these reasons, Plaintiff's objections to Judge Ivy'sR&R are overruled.b. Plaintiff's objections to Judge Ivy's order denyingleave to file an amended complaint (ECF No. 30)Plaintiff also objects to Judge Ivy's order denying her leave tofile an amended complaint. (ECF No. 35-1, PageID.536.)Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) provides that, for non-dispositive pretrial matters where a magistrate judge issuesa written order, such as Judge Ivy's order denying her leaveto file an amended complaint (ECF No. 30), “[t]he districtjudge in the case must consider timely objections and modifyor set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous oris contrary to law.” The Eastern District of Michigan LocalRules state that objections under Rule 72 “must: (A) specifythe part of the order ... to which a person objects; and (B) statethe basis for the objections.” E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). “Thisstandard requires the District Court to review findings of factfor clear error and to review matters of law de novo.” Bisig v.Time Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 219 (6th Cir. 2019)(quoting EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99 (3d.Cir. 2017)).“A [factual] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when althoughthere is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on theentire evidence is left with the definite and firm convictionthat a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quoting UnitedStates v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “[A]norder is ‘contrary to the law’ when it ‘fails to apply ormisapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Winsper, No. 3:08-CV-631-H,2013 WL 5673617, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2013)).Plaintiff first argues that the order was incorrectbecause Judge Ivy “misapplied the ‘futility’ standard”and “improperly assumed facts and ignored keyallegations.” (ECF No. 35-1, PageID.536–537.) Plaintiffidentifies the following “ignored” allegations: (1) the additionof six additional Defendants “with specific dates, actions,and injuries not only to herself but to her members,” (2)the addition of “RLUIPA, ADA, Equal Protection, RFRA,and malicious prosecution claims with detailed factual anddocumentary support,” and (3) “Defendants' own writtenthreats” which “clearly show religious discrimination andretaliation.” (Id. at PageID.537.)Plaintiff is correct that Judge Ivy did not address a maliciousprosecution claim in his order, (see ECF No. 30), but thisis because Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint does notcontain a claim for malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 20-1.)Further, Plaintiff's objection is insufficient because JudgeIvy's order analyzes Plaintiff's claims in great detail andPlaintiff does not “specify the part[s] of the order ... towhich [she] objects” as is required by Local Rule 72.1(d).Instead, Plaintiff appears to generally object to the correctnessof the order and inappropriately relitigates matters alreadyconsidered by Judge Ivy.2*6 Plaintiff's objection that Judge Ivy's order “conflictswith the liberal standard of Rule 15” is also insufficient.(ECF No. 35-1, PageID.537.) As set forth by Judge Ivy,
Rev. Heidi Grossman Lepp, Plaintiff, v. Conrad Mallett, Jr., et al...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5while leave to amend the complaint “should be freely given‘when justice so requires,’ ” “this does not suggest that allmotions to amend are automatically granted.” (ECF No. 30,PageID.424–425 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)).) Plaintiffclaims that “[t]he Sixth Circuit strongly disfavors denial ofamendments on futility grounds before discovery,” (ECF No.35-1, PageID.537), but it is not clear how Plaintiff came to thisconclusion. In support of this statement, Plaintiff cites Fomanv. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), which is a Supreme Court, notSixth Circuit case. Further, Foman does not support Plaintiff'sargument regarding leave to amend the complaint. See id. at182 (listing “futility of amendment” as a legitimate reason fordenial of leave to file an amended complaint).For these reasons, Plaintiff's objections to Judge Ivy's orderdenying her motion for leave to file an amended complaintare overruled.iii. Plaintiff's exhibitThe Court notes that Plaintiff filed as part of her motion and/or proposed objections some documents. (ECF Nos. 35-2,35-3.)3 These documents are titled, “Declaration of Harm& Neutral Legal Analysis.” (ECF No. 35-2.) In the firsthalf of the documents, Plaintiff describes various harms thatshe has experienced. In the second half, Plaintiff claims thatshe used “OpenAI's ChatGPT-4o model” to “perform anobjective and dispassionate review of the Court's [R&R]” andJudge Ivy's order denying leave to file an amended complaint.(ECF No. 35-2, PageID.543.) She claims that this “review”is “free from advocacy, emotion, or bias” and “unequivocallysupports Plaintiff's formal objections to these legally unsoundrulings.” (Id. at PageID.543–546.)The Court declines to consider these documents. RegardingPlaintiff's declaration describing her harms, these statementscannot be considered part of the pleadings because Plaintiffmay only amend her complaint through Rule 15. See Kellyv. Valeo N. Am., Inc., No. 2:24-CV-11066-TGB-KGA, 2025WL 933943, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2025) (deciding thatan affidavit filed as part of a motion to dismiss may not beconsidered part of the complaint) (collecting cases).Regarding Plaintiff's “AI Legal Analysis Report,” (ECFNo. 35-2, PageID.547), this document is inappropriatelypresented and unhelpful. As an initial matter, the place forlegal arguments is in the brief, not the exhibits. See Redusv. Revenue Cycle Serv. Ctr., LLC, No. 3:22-CV-01029, 2025WL 2324078, at *6 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2025) (“Theinclusion of such statements, notes, or arguments on theexhibits themselves is neither a proper method of providingsupporting exhibits nor a proper method of presentingarguments to the Court.”), report and recommendationadopted, No. 3:22-CV-01029, 2025 WL 2535628 (M.D.Tenn. Sept. 2, 2025).More importantly, the Court is concerned about the “AI LegalAnalysis Report's” reliability. Courts across the country—and throughout the world—have seen a multitude of casesin which generative AI programs are relied upon by pro selitigants and attorneys in their filings, to the detriment ofthe user. Generative AI programs “are based on complexmathematical systems that learn their skills by analyzingenormous amounts of digital data. They do not — and cannot— decide what is true and what is false. Indeed, at times,they just make stuff up—a phenomenon some A.I. researcherscall hallucinations.” Hunt v. Morissette, No. 2-24-CV-12947-TGB-APP, 2025 WL 1660358, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 11,2025) (quoting Cade Metz & Karen Weise, A.I. Is GettingMore Powerful, but Its Hallucinations Are Getting Worse,N.Y. Times (May 6, 2025), [https://perma.cc/W39R-VZ4R]).*7 The Court recognizes that, “for a pro se litigantespecially, AI software offers a tempting tool to offsetthe disadvantage of appearing in an unfamiliar courtsetting.”Everett J. Prescott, Inc. v. Beall, No. 1:25-CV-00071-JAW, 2025 WL 2084353, at *2 (D. Me. July 24, 2025).Nevertheless, “a pro se litigant must not provide the Courtwith erroneous and factitious citations and has an obligationto review documents filed with the Court to make certainthey are scrupulously accurate.” Id. And when litigantsmisrepresent the law after relying on a generative AIprogram, they waste judicial resources and can be subjected tosanctions. See Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 163, 170(2025) (collecting cases); see also Evans v. Robertson, No.24-CV-13435, 2025 WL 2737446, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25,2025) (stating that a pro se litigant's reliance on generativeAI programs without reviewing the accuracy of citations toauthority “disrupts the Court's timely and efficient reviewof cases, as its efforts are wasted researching nonexistentcitations and legal principles”), objections overruled, No.24-13435, 2025 WL 3488280 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 4, 2025).These issues of accuracy and reliability are present here.While Plaintiff does not present the “Report” as the resultof her own legal research, she urges the Court to considerthe “Report's” findings. But the “Report's” findings are
Rev. Heidi Grossman Lepp, Plaintiff, v. Conrad Mallett, Jr., et al...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6not correct. For example, the “Report” states that Plaintiff“possesses inherent personal, associational and institutionalstanding to assert the ... rights of herself, her congregation andthe Church itself” and that this “is squarely supported by caseslike Church of the Lukumi Bablu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508U.S. 520 (1993).” (ECF No. 35-3, PageID.566.) But Lukumidoes not suggest that Plaintiff has standing to assert the rightsof her congregation and church; in fact, the Lukumi decisiondoes not discuss standing at all.For these reasons, the Court declines to consider thesedocuments filed with Plaintiff's motion and/or proposedobjections. (ECF Nos. 35-2, 35-3.)iv. Conclusion regarding Rule 60(b)(1)In conclusion, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitledto relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1). Plaintiff hasnot demonstrated an error of law in the Court's decisions.Additionally, while Plaintiff has demonstrated an excusablemistake in her failure to timely file objections to Judge Ivy'sR&R and order, her objections are futile and the outcome ofthe R&R and the order remain the same.For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) is denied.B. Rule 60(b)(2)Rule 60(b)(2) permits the Court to reopen the case if there is“newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trialunder Rule 59(b).”Plaintiff's showing is deficient. “To prevail on a Rule 60(b)(2) motion, ‘a movant must demonstrate (1) that it exerciseddue diligence in obtaining the information and (2) [that] theevidence is material and controlling and clearly would haveproduced a different result if presented before the originaljudgment.’ ” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. First Am. TitleIns. Co., 750 F.3d 573, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting HDC,LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2012)).Plaintiff presents as “newly discovered evidence” decisionsfrom the United States District Court for the District of Utahthat were issued on January 7, February 20, and August 4,2025. (ECF No. 35, PageID.522–523 (citing Jensen v. UtahCnty., 767 F. Supp. 3d 1153 (D. Utah 2025); Jensen v. UtahCnty., No. 2:24-CV-00887-JNP-CMR, 2025 WL 2208257(D. Utah Aug. 4, 2025); Jensen v. Utah Cnty., No. 2:24-CV-00887-JNP-CMR, 2025 WL 42150 (D. Utah Jan. 7,2025)).) These judicial decisions, which involve differentparties and unrelated facts, are not evidence. Additionally,the January 7 and February 20, 2025 decisions cannot beconstrued as “newly discovered evidence” because theyexisted when the R&R and the Court's order adopting theR&R were issued. Finally, these judicial decisions do not haveany relevance to this case because those rulings relied onUtah state law, which is inapplicable here. (See ECF No. 30,PageID.461 n.13; ECF No. 19, PageID.201.)*8 Plaintiff also describes “raids” that were conductedagainst “Black House Sanctuary” and “Salt City Sanctuary”on August 5, 2025. (ECF No. 35, PageID.523.) Plaintiffavers that these actions by other governmental actors“demonstrate[es] a coordinated pattern of suppression thatmirrors the City of Detroit's actions” and “confirm[ ] theongoing, concrete nature of the injuries pled here.” (Id.at PageID.523–524.) These events cannot be considered“evidence” in this case because they do not involve DefendantConrad Mallet, Jr. Again, and in order to have constitutionalstanding to sue, Plaintiff must allege an injury that is “fairlytraceable to the defendant's unlawful conduct.” (ECF No.31, PageID.477 (quoting Glennborough Homeowners Ass'n,21 F.4th at 414) (emphasis added).) Unlawful actions takenby people unrelated to the Defendant in this case that impactother individuals who are also not in this case cannot form thebasis of an injury and are thus not material or controlling inthis case.Plaintiff also states that, “landlord representatives ...unlawfully repossessed Plaintiff's leased building,Mothership Sanctuary, during a state court proceeding [onJuly 25, 2025], despite Plaintiff presenting a valid leaseagreement,” that the landlord was negligent in repairingissues with the building “[f]or over nine months prior” to therepossession of the building, and that on an unspecified datethat may be around July 2025, DPD officers “seized sacredchurch signs.” (ECF No. 35, PageID.524.) Plaintiff expressesthat she “relocate[d] to Missouri in July 2025” due to issueswith the building's air conditioning. (Id. at PageID.525.)Regarding Plaintiff's statements about her landlord'snegligence in repairing issues with the building, Plaintiff hasnot demonstrated that this is “newly discovered evidence.”Plaintiff claims that the landlord's negligence with regardto repairs began nine months prior to repossession of
Rev. Heidi Grossman Lepp, Plaintiff, v. Conrad Mallett, Jr., et al...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7the building (id. at PageID.524), suggesting that thoseissues began around October or November of 2024, beforethis case even began. As such, she has not demonstratedthat evidence of her landlord's negligence was “newlydiscovered.” Additionally, issues with her lease and landlord,and issues related to DPD officers allegedly taking churchsigns, do not appear to be material because they are not fairlytraceable to the actions of the Defendant in this case: ConradMallett, Jr.4For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) is denied.C. Rule 60(b)(6)Under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court may grant relief from afinal judgment or order for “any other reason that justifiesrelief.” “Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) require extraordinarycircumstances,” and this standard “does not become lessdemanding when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant also hopes to amendhis complaint.” BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204,210 (2025).Plaintiff first argues that “[t]he recent decision in Jensenv. Utah County, 2025 WL 582812 (D. Utah Feb. 20,2025), reaffirmed that RFRA and RLUIPA provide robustprotections against government interference with religiouspractice in factually analogous circumstances” and that theissuance of this opinion “constitutes precisely the type ofextraordinary circumstance warranting relief.” (ECF No. 35,PageID.526.) But the R&R and the Court already consideredthe February 20, 2025 decision in Jensen v. Utah County anddetermined it is not relevant. (See ECF No. 30, PageID.461n.13.) Even if Jensen was relevant to this case, changes in lawdo not constitute extraordinary circumstances. See Gonzalezv. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536–37 (2005); Henness v. Bagley,766 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2014) (“However, it ‘is wellestablished that a change in decisional law is usually not, byitself, an extraordinary circumstance meriting Rule 60(b)(6)relief.’ ” (quoting McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst.,738 F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 2013))).*9 Plaintiff also discusses another lawsuit that she filed,Lepp v. City of South Salt Lake, Case No. 25-cv-00675 (D.Utah), (ECF No. 35, PageID.527), but it is not clear tothe Court how her filing of a new case could constituteextraordinary circumstances.Plaintiff urges the Court to reopen the case to allow her toamend the complaint. (See id.; see also id. at PageID.528.)Her argument appears to merge Rule 60(b)(6) and Rule 15(a)'sstandards. But, as recently set forth by the Supreme Court,a plaintiff must first satisfy Rule 60(b)(6)'s “extraordinarycircumstances” standard before the Court may apply Rule15(a)'s “liberal amendment policy.” BLOM Bank SAL, 605U.S. at 213. BLOM Bank explicitly forbids courts fromconsidering Rule 60(b)(6) and Rule 15(a) “in tandem.” Id. at214.Finally, Plaintiff claims that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is warrantedbecause “Defendant Conrad Mallett, Jr., as CorporationCounsel for the City of Detroit, serves as the direct superior toMagistrate Judge Curtis Ivy, Jr.” (ECF No. 35, PageID.527.)This is not true. Judge Ivy—like all other United StatesMagistrate Judges—is appointed by the United States DistrictCourt Judges of his Judicial District and does not work for amunicipality or state. 28 U.S.C. § 631(a).For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion for reliefunder Rule 60(b)(6) is denied.IV. ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion for relieffrom judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure60(b) is DENIED. (ECF No. 35.) This case remains closed.IT IS SO ORDERED.Ann Arbor, MichiganCERTIFICATE OF SERVICEThe undersigned certifies that the foregoing document wasserved upon counsel of record and any unrepresented partiesvia the Court's ECF System to their respective email orfirst-class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice ofElectronic Filing on January 16, 2026.WILLIAM BARKHOLZ Case ManagerAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 125968
Rev. Heidi Grossman Lepp, Plaintiff, v. Conrad Mallett, Jr., et al...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Footnotes1The Court expresses sympathy for Plaintiff's loss.2Judge Ivy's order clearly addresses the proposed addition of six Defendants. (See ECF No. 30, PageID.417(“Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint adds six new Defendants ....”).)The order also addresses Plaintiff's RLUIPA, ADA, Equal Protection, and RFRA claims. (See id. atPageID.447–450 (RLUIPA); id. at PageID.450–451 (ADA); id. at PageID.442–445 (Equal Protection); id. atPageID.461 (stating that Plaintiff “did not include a RFRA claim as a cause of action in the proposed amendedcomplaint” and that such an addition would fail anyway).)Finally, the order addressed Plaintiff's allegations related to “written threats.” (Id. at PageID.419 (discussing“Madden's reference to civil and criminal liability), 447, 455, 456 n.12 (addressing “Black['s] ‘threats’ ” in hisCivil RICO analysis).)3The documents are entirely identical except for the very last sentence in ECF No. 35-2, which does not appearin ECF No. 35-3. The sentence is “Exhibit A – Donald Trump May 4th, Executive Order Religious Libertyand Memorandum.” (ECF No. 35-2, PageID.555.) This “Exhibit A” does not appear in Plaintiff's August 19,2025 filings.For ease of reference, the Court will only refer to the filing at ECF No. 35-2.4As set forth in the R&R, although Plaintiff also brings suit against John Does 1-500, “Plaintiff lodged no claimsagainst these Defendants in her original complaint” and, thus, “has not alleged that the John Does causedany redressable injury-in-fact.” (ECF No. 31, PageID.466.)End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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