Lin v. Shim (Mar. 6, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Nelson Lin v. The Honorable Jonathan H. Shim, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Mar. 6, 2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
John G. Koeltl (J.) (unanimous Court)
NELSON LIN, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE JONATHAN H...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 654650Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D. New York.NELSON LIN, Plaintiff,v.THE HONORABLE JONATHANH. SHIM, ET AL., Defendants.25-cv-1367 (JGK)|Filed 03/06/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsNelson Chia-Lin Lin, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.Adam Yefet, Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY,for Defendant The Honorable Jonathan H. Shim.Nafiz Cekirge, Brewer, Attorneys & Counselors, New York,NY, Eric Joseph Lanter, Offit Kurman, P.A., New York, NY,for Defendant June Hou.Ariel Purnell Cannon, Dewey, Pegno & Kramarsky, LLP,New York, NY, for Defendant Marx Rivera.Jonathan D. Rubin, Rebecca Rychik, Kaufman Borgeest &Ryan LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant Rodrigo Pizarro.Andrew Robert Jones, Furman Kornfeld & Brennan, LLP,New York, NY, for Defendant Nicole Riordan.Brian Linares-Ponce, Jonathan S. Erman, Marc John Falcone,I, Amabile & Erman, P.C., Staten Island, NY, for DefendantMargaret Areizaga.Allison Auer Waase, Lauren Zink, Wilson Elser MoskowitzEdelman & Dicker LLP, New York, NY, Mathew P. Ross,Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, WhitePlains, NY, for Defendant Manhattan Psychology Group, P.C.Saarah Dhinsa, NYC Law Department, New York, NY, forDefendants Sadina Henderson, Lafleur Thomas, New YorkCity Administration for Children's Services (ACS).Eric Joseph Lanter, Offit Kurman, P.A., New York, NY,for Defendants Offit Kurman P.A., Stephanie Lehman, FaraRodriguez.Michael Scott Fischman, Phillips Nizer LLP, New York, NY,for Defendant Phillips Nizer LLP.MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERJohn G. Koeltl United States District Judge*1 The pro se plaintiff, Nelson Lin — who is a lawyer— alleges that several individuals and entities conspired todeprive him of custody of his daughter. Lin brings federal andstate-law claims against the New York Family Court judgewho presided over Lin's custody dispute, Jonathan H. Shim;Lin's ex-wife, June Hou; Lin's ex-wife's former partner, MarxRivera; the forensic psychiatrist appointed by the FamilyCourt, Rodrigo Pizarro; Hou's former lawyers, StephanieLehman and Fara Rodriguez, as well as their current andformer law firms, Offit Kurman, P.A., and Phillips Nizer LLP;Lin's daughter's psychologist, Margaret Areizaga, as well asDr. Areizaga's employer, Manhattan Psychology Group, P.C.;Lin's daughter's lawyer, Nicole Riordan; and the New YorkCity Administration for Children's Services (“ACS”), alongwith two agency caseworkers, LaFleur Thomas and SadinaHenderson.Each defendant moves to dismiss the complaint for lack ofsubject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim pursuant toFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), For the followingreasons, the motions to dismiss are granted.I.Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken fromthe Second Amended Complaint and are accepted as true forpurposes of the current motions.A.
NELSON LIN, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE JONATHAN H...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Lin and Hou have a child together. Second Am. Compl.(“SAC”) 34, ECF No. 60. In 2017, Lin and Hou divorced,and each received joint legal and physical custody of theirdaughter. Id. In the fall of 2019, Lin, allegedly concerned forhis daughter's safety, reported to ACS that Hou's then-partner,Marx Rivera, was abusing the child. See id. ¶¶ 34-35. ACSinvestigated Lin's allegations against Rivera between Octoberand November of 2019 but ultimately concluded that Lin'sallegations were “unsubstantiated.” Id. 42.In late 2019, Hou initiated custody proceedings in New YorkFamily Court, seeking to limit Lin's custody of the child (the“Family Court Proceedings”). Id. 36. In December 2019,the judge presiding over the Family Court Proceedings, JudgeShim, appointed Nicole Riordan as the “Attorney for theChild.” Id.To manage the effect of the custody dispute on their daughter,Lin and Hou hired Margaret Areizaga to provide therapy.Id. 38. In April 2020, Dr. Areizaga determined that Linwas “emotionally harming” his daughter.1 Id. 44. Linconsequently terminated Dr. Areizaga on June 23, 2020. Id.That same day, Dr. Areizaga reported Lin to ACS, whichopened an investigation into Lin. Id.Sadina Henderson was the ACS caseworker who investigatedDr. Areizaga's allegations against Lin. Id. 45. Afterinterviewing Hou, Lin, and their daughter, Hendersonconcluded that there was “some credible evidence” that Linwas emotionally abusing his daughter. Id. On August 25,2020, ACS issued an “indicated” finding against Lin. Id.According to Lin, he was not afforded a hearing and hisrequest for administrative review remains pending. Id.*2 In June 2020, Judge Shim also appointed RodrigoPizarro, an independent forensic evaluator, to assess Lin,Hou, and their daughter, and to make ultimate custodyrecommendations. Id. 38. Pizarro began his investigation inthe fall of 2020. See id. ¶¶ 38, 46. In January 2021, Pizarroissued a report recommending that Hou receive full custodyof her daughter. Id. 46. According to Lin, Pizarro conducteda biased investigation, relied on inaccurate information fromHou and Dr. Areizaga, and ignored “substantial evidence ofHou's wrongdoing.” Id.Lin claims that in November 2022, his daughter renewedher allegations that Rivera was abusing her, and Lin soughtemergency relief to protect his daughter. Id. 48. Linreported Rivera to Lin's attorney, the New York PoliceDepartment, and ACS. Id. ACS assigned a new case worker,LaFleur Thomas, to investigate. Id. Thomas concluded herinvestigation in January 2023 and determined not only thatLin's allegations against Rivera were unsubstantiated, but thatLin had abused his daughter. Id. 50.On December 6, 2022, the parties appeared before JudgeShim for a fact-finding hearing in the underlying custodydispute. Id. 51. According to Lin, at the conclusion ofthat proceeding, Judge Shim indefinitely suspended Lin'sparenting time “without holding any evidentiary hearing,[ ]taking witness testimony,” or giving Lin an opportunity topresent his own evidence. Id. Lin appealed Judge Shim's orderto the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division,First Department, which affirmed Judge Shim's order. Id. Ex.C at 5 n.4; see also id. 79.Judge Shim proceeded to issue four additional allegedlyunlawful orders. First, on December 17, 2024, Judge Shimdenied Lin's “motion to fairly apportion” Riordan's fees. Id. 82. Second, also on December 17, 2024, Judge Shim deniedLin's motion to discharge Riordan. Id. Third, on December18, 2024, Judge Shim denied Lin's motion to terminate theorder awarding Hou control over the child's therapy. See id ¶¶82, 98. And fourth, on January 16, 2025, Judge Shim deniedLin's motion seeking various forms of relief, including thatJudge Shim recuse himself. See id. 54. Hou cross-movedfor, among other things, “a moratorium on motions submittedby [Lin] without th[e] [Family] Court's prior consent in anattempt to curtail [Lin's] bad faith litigation tactics.” Id. Ex.C. at 2. Judge Shim granted that part of Hou's cross-motionand prohibited Lin from filing additional motions without firstseeking leave from the Family Court. Id. Ex. C. at 9.According to Lin, on February 28, 2025, during a FamilyCourt hearing, “Riordan and Shim (with tacit supportfrom Hou's attorneys) threatened” Lin “with contempt,incarceration, and damage to [his] law license, unless heimmediately paid Riordan $12,500.00 in alleged outstandingfees.” Id. 5; see also id. 55.B.Lin brought this action on February 17, 2025. ECF No. 1; seealso ECF No. 11. In his initial complaint, Lin asserted claimsunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and New Yorkstate law against Judge Shim, Hou, Rivera, Pizarro, Riordan,Dr. Areizaga, Manhattan Psychology Group, and various John
NELSON LIN, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE JONATHAN H...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3and Jane Doe defendants. ECF No. 11. Lin then filed aproposed order to show cause for a preliminary injunctionand temporary restraining order. ECF No. 23. Chief JudgeSwain denied Lin's application, holding that his claims wereunlikely to succeed on the merits for various jurisdictional andprudential reasons.Lin amended his complaint on March 13, 2025, ECF No.28, and then again on April 9, 2025, ECF No. 60. Thecurrent Second Amended Complaint names Judge Shim,Hou, Rivera, Pizarro, Riordan, Dr. Areizaga, ManhattanPsychology Group, ACS, Henderson, Thomas, Hou's lawyers(Lehman and Rodriguez), their past and present law firms(Offit Kurman, P.A. and Phillips Nizer LLP), and various Johnand Jane Doe defendants. Each defendant moves to dismissthe complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See ECF Nos. 93, 96, 101, 107, 127, 136,149, 163. At the present time, the Family Court Proceedingsremain pending.II.*3 When presented with a motion to dismiss under bothFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state aclaim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must firstanalyze the motion under Rule 12(b)(1) to determine whetherthe Court has the subject-matter jurisdiction necessary toconsider the merits of the action. See Rhulen Agency, Inc.v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir.1990); see also S.E.C. v. Rorech, 673 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220-21(S.D.N.Y. 2009).In defending against a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of provingthe Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). In considering such a motion, the Court generally mustaccept the material factual allegations in the complaint as true.See J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2dCir. 2004). The Court does not, however, draw all reasonableinferences in the plaintiff's favor. See id.; see also Graubartv. Jazz Images, Inc., No. 02-cv-4645, 2006 WL 1140724,at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). Indeed, when jurisdictionalfacts are disputed, the Court has the power and the obligationto consider matters outside the pleadings, such as affidavits,documents, and testimony, to determine whether jurisdictionexists. See APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003);Kamen v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2dCir. 1986). In so doing, the Court is guided by that body ofdecisional law that has developed under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 56. See Kamen, 791 F.2d at 1011.To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiffmust allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that isplausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when theplaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to drawthe reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for themisconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009). This Court accepts the allegations in the complaintas true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff'sfavor. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191(2d Cir. 2007). Although the Court must construe the factualallegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “thetenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegationscontained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6)motion, “the complaint is deemed to include any writteninstrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements ordocuments incorporated in it by reference.” Chambers v. TimeWarner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002).Finally, the Court ordinarily must construe pro se pleadingsliberally. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).However, “the degree of solicitude may be lessened wherethe particular pro se litigant is experienced in litigation andfamiliar with the procedural setting presented.” Tracy v.Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, “a lawyerrepresenting himself ordinarily receives no such solicitude atall.” Id. at 102.III.Lin brings eighteen causes of actions under federal andstate law. The Court first addresses certain abstention andjurisdictional bars followed by the specific defects in hisfederal claims and the lack of supplemental jurisdiction.A.*4 The defendants move to dismiss each of Lin's federal-law claims based on several abstention doctrines andjurisdictional bars — specifically, Younger abstention, theRooker-Feldman doctrine, and domestic-affairs abstention.
NELSON LIN, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE JONATHAN H...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Judge Shim also argues that he is entitled to state sovereignimmunity for actions he took in his official capacity as aFamily Court Judge.1.Under the abstention doctrine established in Younger v.Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), “a federal court may notenjoin a pending state criminal proceeding in the absenceof special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment orirreparable injury that is both serious and immediate.” Gibsonv. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1973). The Supreme Courthas since explained that “[t]he policies underlying Youngerare fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings whenimportant state interests are involved.” Middlesex Cnty.Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432(1982). Thus, when a federal litigant invokes the jurisdictionof the federal courts to interfere with a state proceedingimplicating important state interests, the federal court shouldabstain “unless state law clearly bars the interposition of theconstitutional [or federal] claims,” and “so long as there is noshowing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinarycircumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” Id.at 432, 435.Younger abstention bars Lin's claims for injunctive anddeclaratory relief because his “federal lawsuit implicates theway that New York courts manage their own ... custodyproceedings — a subject in which the states have an especiallystrong interest.” Falco v. Justices of the Matrimonial Partsof Supreme Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 805 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir.2015). Lin's claims under § 1983, for example, are repletewith requests for relief modifying the Family Court's orders.Lin seeks, among other things, declaratory and injunctiverelief ordering the Family Court to “restor[e] [Lin's] custodyrights pending lawful adjudication,” SAC 84, to “vacat[e]the fraudulent supervised visitation order,” id. 91, and to“prohibit[ ] enforcement of th[e] [gag] order and prevent[ ]future pre-filing bans or contempt threats,” id. 98. Theserequests for relief plainly implicate New York's interest inmanaging its own custody proceedings.To avoid Younger abstention, Lin invokes two“tightly defined” exceptions: bad faith and extraordinarycircumstances. Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282F.3d 191, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2002). The bad-faith exceptiondepends on the “subjective motivation of the state authorityin bringing the proceeding.” Id. at 199. Thus, “[t]o invokethis exception, the federal plaintiff must show that thestate proceeding was initiated with and is animated byretaliatory, harassing, or other illegitimate motives.” Id. Theextraordinary-circumstances exception, on the other hand,applies only when circumstances “render the state courtincapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issuesbefore it ... creating an extraordinarily pressing need forimmediate federal equitable relief.” Id. at 201. Allegationsof bias fall within the extraordinary-circumstances exception.Id.Lin's allegations of bad faith and bias are inadequate to invokeeither exception because they are wholly conclusory. Thecases Lin cites to the contrary are unpersuasive. For example,Lin relies on Cullen v. Fliegner, but the Court of Appealsfor the Second Circuit in that case determined that the bad-faith exception applied based on the appellant's “past historyof personal conflict” with the appellee. 18 F.3d 96, 104 (2dCir. 1994). In this case, by contrast, Lin alleges no pastinteractions with Judge Shim, let alone a history of conflict.Similarly, in Gibson v. Berryhill, the Supreme Court foundbias triggering the extraordinary-circumstances exceptionwhen the state administrative agency had a pecuniary interestin the outcome of the state-court proceedings. 411 U.S. at 579.But again, Lin does not allege that to be the case here.*5 To the extent Lin seeks injunctive or declaratoryrelief that would interfere with the ongoing Family CourtProceedings, those claims are dismissed.2.When “a federal court is asked to grant a divorce orannulment, determine support payments, or award custodyof a child,” the Supreme Court has held that such disputes,even though they otherwise might satisfy the requirementsfor diversity jurisdiction, fall within “an implied exceptionto Congress's grant of diversity jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.§ 1332.” Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 622 (2dCir. 2019). “Nevertheless, even if subject matter jurisdictionlies over a particular matrimonial dispute” — for example,because the action arises under Congress's grant of federal-question jurisdiction — “federal courts may properly abstainfrom adjudicating such actions in view of the greater interestand expertise of state courts in this field.” American Airlines,Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990). “A federal courtpresented with matrimonial issues or issues ‘on the verge’of being matrimonial in nature should” therefore “abstain
NELSON LIN, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE JONATHAN H...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5from exercising jurisdiction so long as there is no obstacleto their full and fair determination in state courts.” Id. Thisso-called domestic-relations abstention is appropriate evenwhen a litigant “seeks only damages and does not challengethe validity of the state court's orders in his ... custodyproceedings.” Zappin v. Comfort, No. 23-cv-7363, 2024 WL5001624, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2024).Even though Lin invokes federal-question jurisdiction, thedefendants argue that the Court should nonetheless abstainfrom exercising jurisdiction because Lin's claims implicatean ongoing child-custody dispute and because there are noobstacles to a full and fair determination of that dispute instate court.Lin's federal claims alleging, among other things, that thedefendants conspired to deprive him of custody of his childare, at a minimum, “on the verge of being[ ] about childcustody.” Deem, 941 F.3d at 620. Indeed, Deem itself,which affirmed a district court's decision to invoke domestic-relations abstention, involved “claims under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985, and New York state law[ ] alleging ... thatDefendants conspired to maliciously prosecute [the plaintiff]and to violate his right to intimate association with hischildren.” Id.Lin argues in response that “[f]ederal courts routinely hearconstitutional tort claims arising out of custody contexts.”Pl.’s Mem. Opp'n Mot. Dismiss (“Opp'n Mem.”) 22, ECF No.131. In support of this proposition, Lin cites Hernandez v.Spitzer, No. 09-cv-3914, 2010 WL 11586928, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.Mar. 29, 2010). But that case does not exist. On the contrary,“[d]istrict courts regularly abstain on this basis in cases thatrelate to custody disputes, even when the federal case isbroader than the state court custody proceedings.” Robinsonv. Admin. Child. Servs., No. 23-cv-2058, 2025 WL 917198, at*4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2025); see also Hamilton v. Hamilton-Grinols, 363 F. App'x 767, 768-69 (2d Cir. 2010) (abstainingwhere federal employee requested that his name be removedfrom a loan held with his ex-wife so he could maintain federalemployment); Reeves v. Reeves, No. 22-cv-2544, 2022 WL1125267, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2022) (declining to exercisejurisdiction over child-custody proceeding).*6 Because all of Lin's federal claims are, at a minimum, “onthe verge of being[ ] about child custody,” Deem, 941 F.3dat 620, the Court abstains from reaching the merits of any ofthose claims.3.“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courtslack jurisdiction over cases that essentially amount to appealsof state court judgments.” Vossbrinck v. Accredited HomeLenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014). The doctrineapplies if “(1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court;(2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state courtjudgment; (3) the plaintiff invites review and rejection of thatjudgment; and (4) the state judgment was rendered before thedistrict court proceedings commenced.” Id. This doctrine isexceedingly narrow. Only when a losing state court litigantcalls on a district court to modify or “overturn an injuriousstate-court judgment” should a claim be dismissed underRooker-Feldman. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292-93 (2005). Courts in the SecondCircuit, however, routinely hold that this doctrine bars themfrom reviewing a state court's custody determination. See,e.g., Black v. Ranley, No. 17-cv-9026, 2018 WL 2766138, at*12 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018); J.R. ex rel. Blanchard v. Cityof New York, No. 11-cv-841, 2012 WL 5932816, at *4-8(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2012).The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Lin's claims to the extenthe requests injunctive relief vacating or modifying the FamilyCourt's orders. The proper course would be for Lin to appealthose orders to the First Department (as he has done) and theNew York Court of Appeals thereafter, and then, potentially,to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writof certiorari. That is because the only federal court with whichCongress has vested appellate jurisdiction over state-courtorders is the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28U.S.C. § 1257.Lin argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because“[t]here is no final judgment in the custody proceeding,” andin any event, he does not challenge “the outcome of any statecourt decision, but the conduct of state actors.” Opp'n Mem.20. But both arguments are unpersuasive. First, “Rooker-Feldman applies where the state proceeding has ended withrespect to the issues that the federal plaintiff seeks to havereviewed in a federal court, even if other matters remain to belitigated.” Melintzky v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 06-cv-13526,2007 WL 1159639, at *8 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2007). Andsecond, Lin expressly seeks injunctive relief ordering JudgeShim to vacate or modify his orders. It is no answer tothe defendants’ Rooker-Feldman argument to say that Lin ischallenging Judge Shim's conduct in reaching his decisions
NELSON LIN, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE JONATHAN H...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6rather than the decisions themselves. “[S]uch reasoning issheer sophistry because if the Court were to declare that”Judge Shim's conduct in reaching his decision violated Lin'sconstitutional rights, “it would effectively be reversing ajudgment of the state court.” Id. at *8 n.5.Lin's federal claims are therefore dismissed to the extent theyseek to enjoin, modify, or vacate any of Judge Shim's orders.4.“[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be suedin federal court unless they have waived their EleventhAmendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogatedthe states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when actingpursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment.” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir.2009), State sovereign immunity “extends beyond the statesthemselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are,effectively, arms of a state.” Id. This includes the New YorkState Unified Court System. Id.; see also Martinez v. QueensCnty. Dist. Att'y, No. 12-CV-6262, 2014 WL 1011054, at*8 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014) (“[P]laintiff's claims againstthe state courts and the individual judges, to the extentthat plaintiff is suing the judges in their official capacities,are barred under the Eleventh Amendment.”), aff'd, 596 F.App'x 10 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order). Judge Shim is astate-court judge and thus ordinarily enjoys state sovereignimmunity when he acts in his official capacity.*7 Lin insists that he can still seek equitable relief againstJudge Shim in his official capacity under Ex parte Young,209 U.S. 123 (1908), “to halt the ongoing constitutionalviolations for which Shim bears responsibility.” SAC 16.Under the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Young, a“plaintiff may avoid the Eleventh Amendment bar to suit andproceed against individual state officers, as opposed to thestate, in their official capacities, provided that his complaint(a) alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and (b) seeksrelief properly characterized as prospective.” In re DepositIns. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 2007).Many of Lin's requests for injunctive and declaratory relief,however, are retrospective and target past conduct. See, e.g.,SAC at 98 (seeking injunction “[v]acating” Judge Shim'sDecember 6, 2022, December 17, 2024, and December18, 2024 orders); id. (seeking judgment declaring that thedefendants’ “conduct as alleged violated [Lin's] rights underthe U.S. Constitution” and that the “State court ordersobtained by fraud and without due process ... are null and voidand of no effect”). The injunctive relief that Lin seeks, thoughoccasionally “phrased as a bar on ‘continuing’ conduct,is ... not prospective.” Gribbin v. N.Y. State Unified CourtSys., No. 18-cv-6100, 2020 WL 1536324, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.Mar. 31, 2020). Identifying “the consequences of [a] pastalleged violation ... is not the same as alleging an ongoingconstitutional violation.” Id.; see also Nat'l R.R. PassengerCorp. v. McDonald, 978 F. Supp. 2d 215, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (rejecting this argument because it “would obliteratethe bar on retrospective relief created by the Ex parte Youngdoctrine and render a state liable for past violations of federallaw, which is constitutionally impossible”), aff'd, 779 F.3d 97(2d Cir. 2015).To the extent Lin seeks retrospective relief from Judge Shimin his official capacity, Lin's claims are barred by the EleventhAmendment.B.All of Lin's claims must be dismissed for the jurisdictionaland prudential reasons outlined above. Yet Lin's claims wouldstill fail in any event because he has failed adequately toplead facts showing a plausible entitlement to relief. First, Linfails to state any claims against Judge Shim in his personalcapacity because Judge Shim is entitled to absolute judicialimmunity. Second, Lin's civil RICO, RICO-conspiracy, and§ 1985(3) claims against all the defendants fail because Lin'sallegations in support of those claims are wholly conclusory.Finally, Lin's § 1983 claims against Hou, Rivera, Lehman,Rodriguez, Offit Kurman, P.A., Phillips Nizer LLP, Riordan,Pizarro, Dr. Areizaga, and Manhattan Psychology Group,P.C. fail because Lin has not alleged adequately that any ofthese defendants are state actors. Lin's § 1983 claims againstACS, Thomas, and Henderson fail because the allegationssupporting those claims are wholly conclusory.1.“It is well settled that judges generally have absoluteimmunity from suits for money damages for their judicialactions.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009).Judicial immunity is intended to ensure “that a judicial officer,in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to actupon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
NELSON LIN, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE JONATHAN H...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7consequences to himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13Wall.) 335, 347 (1871). “A judge will not be deprived ofimmunity because the action he took was in error, was donemaliciously, or was in excess of his authority ....” Stumpv. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Separately, § 1983provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officerfor an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratorydecree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42U.S.C. § 1983.*8 Judges are not absolutely immune, however, “fromliability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in thejudge's judicial capacity.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11(1991). “[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judgeis a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e.,whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, andto the expectations of the parties.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.Lin argues that the Judge Shim was not acting in his judicialcapacity when he engaged in the conduct Lin challenges— for example, by allegedly issuing orders without notice,“facilitating threats of contempt and license revocation,” andengaging in ex parte communications with other parties.SAC 16. As an initial matter, the fact that a proceedingis “informal and ex parte ... has not been thought to implythat an act otherwise within a judge's lawful jurisdictionwas deprived of its judicial character.” Forrester v. White,484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). Judge Shim would be entitled toabsolute immunity even assuming he exceeded his authorityin issuing any of the orders Lin challenges. The ultimatequestion is whether Judge Shim's issuing of those orderswas a “function normally performed by a judge.” Stump,435 U.S. at 362. Plainly, issuing orders in a custody disputeis a function normally performed by a family-court judge.See, e.g., Leathersich v. Cohen, No. 18-cv-6363, 2018 WL3537073, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 23, 2018) (“[The judge's]actions in conducting hearings and deciding custody issuesare all quintessential judicial functions that, even whereperformed incompetently or for improper purposes, cannotform the basis of a suit against the judicial officer.”). Lin's“conclusory assertion that” Judge Shim was “part of anextrajudicial conspiracy in [his] family court proceedingsdoes not change the judicial nature of” Judge Shim's actions.Hunter v. McMahon, 751 F. Supp. 3d 246, 253 (W.D.N.Y.2024).To the extent Lin seeks money damages from Judge Shim,those claims are barred by judicial immunity. To the extentLin seeks injunctive or declaratory relief against Judge Shimin his personal capacity, “such relief is not available under §1983 absent an allegation of a violation of a prior declaratorydecree.” Jacobs v. Mostow, 271 F. App'x 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2008).All of Lin's claims against Judge Shim in his personal capacityare therefore dismissed.2.To state a substantive civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must show,among other things, a violation of § 1962. See 18 U.S.C. §1964(c); see also Kim v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir.2018). A § 1962 violation requires “(1) conduct (2) of anenterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”Kim, 884 F.3d at 103. To establish a RICO conspiracy under §1962(d), a plaintiff must “allege the existence of an agreementto violate RICO's substantive provisions.” Butcher v. Wendt,975 F.3d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 2020).Lin fails adequately to plead a substantive civil RICO claimat the threshold because he has not sufficiently allegedthe existence of an enterprise. An “enterprise” is “a groupof persons associated together for a common purpose ofengaging in a course of conduct,” and with “associates[that] function as a continuing unit.” DeFalco v. Bernas, 244F.3d 286, 307 (2d Cir. 2001). In this case, Lin makes onlyconclusory allegations that any of the defendants were actingin concert with each other. See Oliphant-Macher v. Macher,No. 23-cv-1450, 2024 WL 4335728, at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 27,2024) (dismissing RICO claims because “there is no factualbasis in the SAC upon which to infer that plaintiff's estrangedhusband, a state court judge, and a municipal agency wereacting in concert to plaintiff's detriment”).*9 Similarly, Lin's RICO conspiracy claim fails because hedoes not allege any agreement between any of the defendantsto violate RICO. “Conclusory allegations of agreements toviolate RICO are insufficient to state a RICO conspiracyclaim.” Espire Ads LLC v. TAPP Influencers Corp., 655F. Supp. 3d 223, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Lin makes onlyconclusory allegations that any of the defendants agreed toanything. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 67, 68. These allegations areinsufficient to state a RICO conspiracy claim.Lin's conspiracy claims under § 1985(3) fare no better.To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege“(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, eitherdirectly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
NELSON LIN, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE JONATHAN H...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8equal protection of the laws, or of the equal privileges andimmunities under the law; (3) an act in furtherance of theconspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in hisperson or property or deprived of any right of privilege ofa citizen of the United States.” Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town ofHenrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 791 (2d Cir. 2007). There mustbe “some factual basis supporting a meeting of the minds,such that defendants entered into an agreement, express ortacit, to achieve the unlawful end.” Webb v. Goord, 340F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2003). The conspiracy must alsobe “motivated by some racial or perhaps other class-based,invidious discriminatory animus.” Cine SK8, 507 F.3d at 791.As with his RICO conspiracy claim, Lin fails to pleadfacts showing any meeting of the minds between anyof the defendants to engage in the allegedly unlawfulconduct. Moreover, Lin does not plead facts tending toshow that the alleged conspiracy was motivated by someimpermissible class-based animus. He claims that thedefendants “intentionally discriminated against [him] on thebasis of his gender,” SAC 100, but he makes no factualallegations to support that contention. Lin also claims inhis opposition brief that the defendants’ conspiracy was“driven by class-based animus against [him] as both afather and a whistle-blower — two groups recognized assystemically disfavored under § 1985(3).” Opp'n Mem. 32.The cases he cites in support of that proposition, however,either do not involve claims under § 1985(3) or do notinvolve fathers and whistleblowers. See LeBlanc-Sternbergv. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995) (plaintiffs established§ 1985(3) claim based on religious discrimination); Phillipsv. Cnty. of Orange, 894 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)(discussing § 1983 claims that did not involve allegations ofdiscrimination).Because Lin has failed to plead facts showing he is entitledto relief on his RICO and § 1985(3) claims, those claimed aredismissed.3.Lin also alleges that the defendants violated his rights underthe First and Fourteenth Amendments, and he seeks redressunder § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff mustallege both that (1) a right secured by the Constitution orlaws of the United States was violated, and (2) that right wasviolated by a person acting under color of state law. West v.Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Private actors are liable under§ 1983 only if there is a “sufficiently close nexus” between thestate and the private action, and thus the action may be “fairlytreated” as state action. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399,406 (2d Cir. 2013).Hou, Rivera, Lehman and Rodriguez (Hou's lawyers), OffitKurman, P.A. and Phillips Nizer LLP (those lawyers’ currentand prior firms), Dr. Areizaga (the child's therapist), andManhattan Psychology Group (Dr. Areizaga's employer) arenot state actors, and Lin makes no effort to argue otherwise.Riordan, the child's court-appointed lawyer, is also not a stateactor, because “it is well-established that court-appointedattorneys performing a lawyer's traditional functions ascounsel ... do not act ‘under color of state law’ and thereforeare not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Rodriguez v.Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1997). Likewise, Pizarro,the court-appointed forensic investigator, is not a state actorbecause “[s]imply providing the Family Court with allegedlydefective reports does not support allegations that [a clinician]should be treated as [a] state actor[ ].” Davis v. Whillheim,No. 17-cv-5793, 2019 WL 935214, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,2019); see also Cherner v. Westchester Jewish Comm. Servs.,Inc., No. 20-cv-8331, 2022 WL 596074, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.Feb. 28, 2022) (“[A] court-appointed psychologist taskedwith performing [a] forensic evaluation of Plaintiff and hisfamily ... is not a state actor ....”).*10 Lin also brings § 1983 claims against ACS, Thomas,and Henderson. As an initial matter, ACS is not a suableentity. See N.Y. City Charter, Ch. 17 § 396 (“All actions andproceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violationof any law shall be brought in the name of the city of NewYork and not in that of any agency, except where otherwiseprovided by law.”); Graham v. City of New York, 869 F. Supp.2d 337, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“ACS is an agency of the Cityof New York and cannot be sued independently.”). The claimagainst ACS must be dismissed for that reason alone.2Lin's § 1983 claims against Henderson and Thomasfail as well. Lin repeatedly alleges that Henderson andThomas issued “baseless” findings and “perform[ed] theirinvestigations in a manner that furthered” the allegedconspiracy's objective of removing Lin's daughter from hiscustody. SAC ¶¶ 61, 63, 77, 107. But these allegationsare conclusory — besides expressing disagreement with theconclusion of the caseworkers’ investigations and insistingthat they were acting in concert with Hou, Lin never explainshow exactly their investigations were biased or their findingsbaseless.
NELSON LIN, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE JONATHAN H...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9The closest Lin comes in his § 1983 claim against thecaseworkers is his procedural due-process argument. Lincontends that, at a minimum, the caseworkers violated hisdue-process rights by issuing an “indicated” finding withoutfirst conducting a hearing. SAC 77.As an initial matter, Lin alleges elsewhere in his complaintthat he had an opportunity to be heard by the caseworkers— specifically, he alleged that Henderson interviewed himand that he sent Henderson “substantial evidence of Hou'swrongful conduct.” SAC 45. But in any event, Lin nevershows that he is entitled to a hearing before a caseworkercan make a finding. Lin cites Southerland v. City of NewYork, 680 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012), for the proposition thatdue process entitles a parent to a hearing before the statecan restrict that parent's custody over the parent's child. Butin Southerland, the caseworker obtained an ex parte orderfrom the Family Court authorizing entry into the parents’apartment to remove the plaintiffs’ children. In this case, andunlike in Southerland, Henderson and Thomas made findingsthat they then reported during an ongoing custodial disputebefore the Family Court. Henderson and Thomas did notuse their findings to engage in an ex parte removal of Lin'schild. Southerland, 680 F.3d at 140. Moreover, Lin had anopportunity to be heard before the Family Court on thosefindings before Judge Shim issued the January 2022 orderlimiting Lin's custody.For the reasons explained above, Lin's § 1983 claims aredismissed.C.The defendants also argue that if the Court dismisses Lin'sfederal-law claims, it should decline to exercise supplementaljurisdiction over Lin's residual state-law claims. The Courtneed not reach this argument because, as explained in sectionIII.A, the Court either lacks jurisdiction or abstains fromexercising jurisdiction over any of Lin's claims. But, for thesake of completeness, the Court also declines to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over Lin's state-law claims.*11 Because Lin's federal claims have been dismissed,the Court can hear his state-law claims only if it exercisessupplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see alsoUnited Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,726 (1966). In deciding whether to exercise supplementaljurisdiction, a federal district court balances the traditional“values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, andcomity.” Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006). “[I]n the usual case in which allfederal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance offactors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdictionover the remaining state-law claims.” Id. Because districtcourts ordinarily will not maintain jurisdiction over state-law claims once the anchoring federal claims are dismissed,the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction overLin's remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).IV.The Court has considered all the arguments raised by theparties. If any argument was not specifically addressed, it iseither moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons, thedefendants’ motions to dismiss are granted.The Clerk is directed to close all open docket entries. TheClerk is also directed to enter judgment dismissing this actionwithout prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 654650Footnotes1Unless otherwise noted, this Memorandum Opinion and Order omits all internal alterations, citations,footnotes, and quotation marks in quoted text.
NELSON LIN, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE JONATHAN H...., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.102The City of New York would be a suable defendant, but Lin would be required to prove that there was amunicipal policy or custom that directly subjected him to a constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc.Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Amnesty Am. V. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113,125 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[C]onstitutional torts committed by city employees without official sanction or authority donot typically implicate the municipality in the deprivation of constitutional rights, and therefore the employer-employee relationship is in itself insufficient to establish the necessary causation.”).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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