Loyer v. Michigan, No. 21-12589 (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Loyer v. Wayne County Michigan
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Loyer v. Wayne County Michigan, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 889770Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D.Michigan, Southern Division.Gary Lee LOYER, Sr., as Personal Representativefor the Estate of Gary Loyer, Deceased, Plaintiff,v.WAYNE COUNTY MICHIGAN et al., Defendants.Case No. 21-12589|Signed March 21, 2025Attorneys and Law FirmsRonnie E. Cromer, Jr., The Cromer Law Group, PLLC,Southfield, MI, for Plaintiff.Carlos A. Escurel, Foley Baron Metzger & Juip PLLC,Livonia, MI, John C. Boufford, Wayne County CorporationCounsel, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.OPINION AND ORDER GRANTINGDEFENDANTS’ MOTION FORSUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 47)SHALINA D. KUMAR, United States District JudgeI. Introduction*1 Plaintiff Gary Loyer, Sr., as Personal Representative forthe Estate of Gary Loyer (“plaintiff estate” or “plaintiff”),sued defendants Wayne County (“County”) and severalindividual county officials1 in their official capacity under 42U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of plaintiff decedent's Eighth andFourteenth Amendment rights in connection with his death bysuicide while in custody at the Wayne County Jail (“WCJ”).ECF No. 5. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgmenton all claims. ECF No. 47. The motion was fully briefed, andthe Court heard oral argument on March 12, 2025. ECF Nos.50, 51, 52. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grantsthe motion.II. Factual BackgroundGary Loyer was booked into WCJ on charges of armedrobbery on the evening of January 31, 2020. ECF No. 47-2.The following day he was screened by an employee ofWellpath, the medical service provider for WCJ. ECF No.47-3. During that screening, Loyer indicated that he didnot have a current or past mental health diagnosis, had notbeen prescribed medication for emotional or mental healthproblems, was not a current or past consumer of mentalhealth treatment, did not have concerns about his ability tocope emotionally or manage stress, did not have feelings ofhopelessness/helplessness, had not had thoughts of killinghimself, and he had not attempted suicide in the past.2 Id.;ECF No. 50-1, PageID.644-649. Loyer's only risk factoridentified on his mental health screen, his current chargeof armed robbery, prompted only a routine, not an urgentor STAT referral to Wellpath's mental health service anddid not warrant placement on suicide watch. ECF No. 47-3,PageID.503; ECF No. 50-1, PageID.649. Loyer's screeningindicates that he was recommended for placement in generalpopulation housing. ECF No. 47-3, PageID.505; ECF No.50-1, PageID.651.*2 Loyer was housed in Division 2 of WCJ, known as“the old jail,” and assigned a bunk in Ward 208, Cell6. ECF No. 47-2. On February 8, 2020, Loyer did notappear depressed or suicidal to other inmates and at leastone observing corrections officer (“CO”). ECF No. 47-10,PageID.525, 530, 535; ECF No. 50-1, PageID.660; ECFNo. 69, PageID.1286. In response to the Detroit PoliceDepartment (“DPD”) investigation of Loyer's suicide, oneinmate speculated that Loyer may have been depressed butnever said anything: “He was very fidgety and he kept talkingabout how he was going to beat his case.” ECF No. 47-10,PageID.525. Another inmate noted that he had played cardswith Loyer a couple times, and Loyer did not seem suicidal ordepressed. Id. at PageID.530. Another reported, “he soundednormal, like the day before.” Id. at 533. The DPD reportreflects two other inmates who stated that Loyer “didn't seemto have anything wrong with him” and that “Loyer's deathcame as a surprise because it didn't seem like anything wasbothering him.” ECF No. 50-1, PageID.660.According to WCJ records, CO Marcus Washingtoncompleted his rounds of Wards 208-209 at 11:09 p.m. Id. at689. CO James Olivero began his rounds at approximately11:37 p.m. Id. At approximately 11:40 p.m. Oliveroapproached Loyer's cell and noticed a sheet had been placedin the cell, partially obstructing the view inside, and called outto Loyer to remove it. Id. at PageID.670. When he receivedno response, he observed that Loyer was sitting on the flooragainst the bars with a knot in the sheet above him. Id.Olivero called for Washington and CO Joshua Nutter to pull
Loyer v. Wayne County Michigan, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2the duress alarm, which did not sound, and to call a Code 2.Id. Nutter responded to the scene and assisted with cuttingthe sheet from Loyer's neck. Id. The COs performed CPRuntil Wellpath nurses, and eventually Detroit EMS, arrived totake over lifesaving measures. Loyer was pronounced dead at12:27 a.m. on February 9, 2020. Id.The investigation revealed that Loyer left a suicide note,which was found in his cell, and the Wayne County MedicalExaminer classified his death as a suicide. ECF No. 47-5; ECFNo. 47-6.Plaintiff estate claims defendants violated Loyer's FourteenthAmendment rights by failing to thwart his suicide. ECFNo. 5 (Count III). Plaintiff also asserts several state lawclaims against defendants, including wrongful death, grossnegligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.Id. (Counts I, II, IV, V). Plaintiff asserts that the Countyand the individually named county officials were deliberatelyindifferent to Loyer's known risk of suicide. Specifically,plaintiff argues that the County's failure to repair videocameras in WCJ areas housing suicidal inmates amountedto deliberate indifference. See ECF No. 50. Plaintiff alsocontends that the COs on duty the night of Loyer's suicidefailed to conduct the WCJ-mandated 30-minute checks. Id.at PageID.556. Defendants contend that they are entitled tosummary judgment because there is no evidence that Loyerdemonstrated a risk of suicide while in WCJ custody, noris there evidence that the County had a custom, policy,or practice of indifference to known risks of suicide. ECFNo. 47, PageID.480. Furthermore, the individual defendantscontend that plaintiff sued them in their official capacitiesonly (as spelled out in the FAC), and thus only asserted clamsagainst the municipality. ECF No. 47.III. AnalysisA. Standard of ReviewSummary judgment is appropriate where the evidence in therecord, viewed in its entirety, shows that there is no genuineissue as to any material fact and that the moving party isentitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a). When a party files a motion for summary judgment,it must be granted “if the movant shows that there is nogenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant isentitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinelydisputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particularparts of materials in the record ...; or (B) showing that thematerials cited do not establish the absence or presence ofa genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produceadmissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The standard for determining whether summary judgmentis appropriate is whether the evidence presents a sufficientdisagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it isso one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).Additionally, the evidence and all reasonable inferences mustbe construed in the light most favorable to the non-movingparty. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).*3 Where the movant establishes the lack of a genuine issueof material fact, the burden of demonstrating the existence ofsuch an issue shifts to the non-moving party, who must comeforward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuineissue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23(1986). That is, the party opposing a motion for summaryjudgment must make an affirmative showing with properevidence and must designate specific facts in affidavits,depositions, or other factual material showing “evidence onwhich the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].”Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. However, mere allegations ordenials in the non-movant's pleadings will not satisfy thisburden, nor will a mere scintilla of evidence supporting thenon-moving party. Id. at 248, 251.If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showingon an essential element of its case with respect to which ithas the burden of proof, the movant is entitled to summaryjudgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The court must construeRule 56 with due regard not only for the rights of those“asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based infact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury,” but alsofor the rights of those “opposing such claims and defenses todemonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial,that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.” Id. at 327.B. Deliberate IndifferencePlaintiff asserts that the County and the individual defendantswere deliberately indifferent to Loyer's known risk of suicide.ECF No. 50. As defendants point out, plaintiff estate suedthe individual defendants in their official capacities only.See ECF No. 5. Official capacity claims are different from
Loyer v. Wayne County Michigan, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3claims against defendants in their individual capacity. SeeEssex v. Livingston Cnty., 518 F. App'x 351, 354 (6th Cir.2013) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67(1985)). Government officials face personal liability whensued in their individual capacity whereas officials sued intheir official capacity expose only the government entity toliability. Id. “In other words, an official-capacity claim ismerely another name for a claim against the municipality.”Id. (citing Cady v. Arenac Cnty., 574 F.3d 334, 342 (6th Cir.2009)).A municipal entity cannot be liable under § 1983 if there isno underlying constitutional violation. City of Los Angelesv. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); A court's finding thatan individual defendant is not liable for a constitutionalviolation, however, does not necessarily foreclose municipalliability. North v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 754 F. App'x 380, 389(6th Cir. 2018). Under certain “circumstances a municipalitycan be liable when the plaintiff suffered a constitutionalviolation but cannot attribute it to any individual defendant'sunconstitutional conduct.” See id. (collecting cases). Amunicipality may be liable based on the actions of individualgovernment actors other than those who are named as parties.Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 900 (6th Cir. 2018)(quoting Epps v. Lauderdale, 45 F. App'x 332, 334–35 (6thCir. 2002) (Cole, J., concurring)).Here, plaintiff has not alleged, nor provided evidence thatany named defendant or WCJ officers violated Loyer'sconstitutional rights. None of the named defendants had anyinteraction or involvement with Loyer during his time inWCJ. See ECF No. 5; see Doe v. Jackson Loc. Sch. Dist.Bd. of Ed., 954 F.3d 925, 934 (6th Cir. 2020) (under § 1983,defendants may only be liable for their own conduct, notfor the conduct of others under a vicarious-liability theory).Nor has plaintiff offered evidence to support that any ofthe unnamed officers who did interact with Loyer weredeliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm he faced.See Lawler v. Hardeman Cnty., 93 F.4th 919, 926 (6th Cir.2024) (internal quotation omitted).*4 Jail staff may violate the Due Process Clause byfailing to protect pretrial detainees from harm, includingfailing to thwart a detainee's suicide. Id. at 926 (citingDownard v. Martin, 968 F.3d 594, 598-99 (6th Cir. 2020)).Failure-to-protect claims carry both objective and subjectiveelements: “Objectively, [pretrial detainees] must have faceda ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ ” and “[s]ubjectively,officers must have acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to thisrisk.” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834(1994)). Prior to 2023, a pretrial detainee had to prove thatan officer both subjectively knew of the facts that createda substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee and thatthe officer subjectively concluded that the risk existed. Id. at926-27.Most cases addressing inmate suicides hinge on the subjectiveelement. Id. at 929. This element requires a detainee “to provethat an officer knew of the facts creating the substantial risk ofserious harm[,] ... that the officer believed that this substantialrisk existed, [a]nd ... that the officer ‘responded’ to the risk inan unreasonable way.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844and citing Beck v. Hamblen Cnty. 969 F.3d 592, 601–02 (6thCir. 2020)). Because detainees “often take their lives ‘withoutwarning,’ [such that] jail staff will find it ‘difficult’ to identifythe inmates who pose substantial suicide risks[,] ... an estatemust prove more than that an officer knew of a ‘possibility’or ‘even a likelihood’ of the suicide.” Id. (quoting Andrews v.Wayne Cnty, 957 F.3d 714, 717 (6th Cir. 2020) and Downard,968 F.3d at 601). “Rather, the officer must have believed thata ‘strong likelihood’ existed that the inmate would commitsuicide.” Id. (quoting Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232,240 (6th Cir. 1992)).Rarely will correction officers admit they knew of a stronglikelihood that an inmate would try to kill themselves,so estates must often rely upon circumstantial evidence toestablish the officer's knowledge. Id. “[C]aselaw sets a ‘highbar’ for plaintiffs who try to prove an officer's knowledgein this circumstantial way.” Id. (citing Downard, 968 F.3d at601). Required evidence includes that an officer knew of aninmate's “suicide watch” classification. Id.The Sixth Circuit found that this high evidentiary bar was“met when an inmate told officers that he was suicidal andneeded to go to the hospital and when the officers knew thathe had recently been released from a mental-health facility.”Id. at 929-30 (citing Bonner-Turner v. City of Ecorse, 627F. App'x 400, 408–10 (6th Cir. 2015)). The Sixth Circuitlikewise “found the bar met when an officer knew of theinmate's past suicide attempts, knew that the inmate hadrecently been placed on suicide watch, and knew that theinmate was complaining of pain and crying out to go tothe hospital.” Id. at 930 (citing Schultz v. Sillman, 148 F.App'x 396, 401–03 (6th Cir. 2005)). To the contrary, thecourt “granted summary judgment to an officer even thoughshe knew that the deceased inmate seemed despondent.”Id. (citing Downard, 968 F.3d at 601–02). It also “granted
Loyer v. Wayne County Michigan, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4summary judgment to medical staff even though they knewthat the deceased inmate had been suffering from drugwithdrawals and refusing medication and meals.” Id. (citingBroughton v. Premier Health Care Servs., 656 F. App'x54, 57–58 (6th Cir. 2016)). And finally, the court “grantedsummary judgment to a jail doctor who knew of an inmate'sprior attempt to harm himself and recent suicidal thoughtsbecause the inmate had said that he no longer felt suicidal.”Id. (citing Nallani v. Wayne Cnty., 665 F. App'x 498, 507–08(6th Cir. 2016)).*5 Guided by this precedent, plaintiff estate here clearlylacks evidence from which a reasonable jury could findthe COs responsible for Loyer believed there was a stronglikelihood that he would commit suicide. Loyer denied anypast suicide attempts and any current suicidal thoughts duringhis intake screening eight days before his suicide. ECF No.50-1, PageID.649. He also denied ever or currently sufferingfrom withdrawal and denied a current or past psychiatricdiagnosis. Id. at 647-48. Nor does plaintiff estate supplyevidence that Loyer said or did anything to suggest thathe would take his own life. The guards and other inmateson his ward indicated that he played cards with otherdetainees earlier the day he committed suicide. ECF No.47-10, PageID.530; ECF No. 69, PageID.1286. One inmatedescribed Loyer as fidgety and maybe depressed, ECF No.47-10, PageID.525, but even if the officers interacting withLoyer knew of those observations, they fall far short ofthose required to meet the high bar for proving a stronglikelihood for committing suicide. See Lawler, 93 F.4th at931 (caselaw forecloses any reliance on generic risk factorssuch as substance abuse problems or even historical suicideattempts); see also Downard, 968 F.3d at 601–02) (knowledgethat inmate was despondent was not knowledge of stronglikelihood of suicide); Broughton, 656 F. App'x at 57–58(medical staff's knowledge that deceased inmate had beensuffering from drug withdrawals and refusing medicationand meals did not equate to knowledge of strong likelihoodof suicide). Without evidence that any officer knew of astrong likelihood that Loyer would commit suicide, plaintiffcould not satisfy the subjective element for a deliberateindifference claim under the Due Process Clause of theFourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, a municipal liabilityclaim against the County cannot arise from an individual CO'sviolation of Loyer's constitutional rights.A finding that no individual defendant violated the plaintiff'sconstitutional rights often means that the plaintiff has sufferedno constitutional violation. North, 754 F. App'x at 390. Anda constitutional violation is required for municipal liabilityto lie. Est. of Andrews v. City of Cleveland, 112 F.4th 436,450 (6th Cir. 2024); see also Epps, 45 F. App'x at 334 (Cole,J., concurring) (Heller prohibits municipal liability when thevictim suffers no constitutional injury at all). Nevertheless,“it is proper to consider possible constitutional violationscommitted by a municipality qua municipality, even in theabsence of a showing of a constitutional violation by any oneindividual officer.” Grote v. Kenton Cnty., 85 F.4th 397, 414(6th Cir. 2023).Plaintiff's efforts to demonstrate that the County itself violatedLoyer's constitutional rights also fail. To establish municipalliability, “a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of anillegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that anofficial with final decision-making authority ratified illegalactions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate trainingor supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of toleranceof or acquiescence to federal rights violations.” Stewartv. City of Memphis, 788 F. App'x 341, 344 (6th Cir.2019) (internal quotation and marks omitted). “[T]o holda municipality liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must provethat the municipality's policy or custom caused the allegedinjury.” Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, 969 F.3d 265,286 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citationsomitted) (emphasis added). A plaintiff “must identify thepolicy, connect the policy to the [county] itself and show thatthe particular injury was incurred because of the execution ofthat policy.” Andrews, 957 F.3d at 721-22.Plaintiff, emphasizing media reports of WCJ's historicallyhigh rate of suicides, argues that WCJ's “long-standingfailure to repair known camera blind spots in areas housingsuicidal inmates ... typifies the kind of custom of toleranceor acquiescence giving rise to Monell liability.” ECF No.50, PageID.563. To succeed on a custom of tolerance oracquiescence claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff mustprove the following: (1) the existence of a clear and persistentpattern of illegal activity; (2) notice or constructive noticeon the part of the municipality; (3) the municipality's tacitapproval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that theirdeliberate indifference in their failure to act can be said toamount to an official policy of inaction; and (4) that themunicipality's custom was the moving force or direct causallink in the constitutional deprivation. Stewart, 788 F. App'xat 347-48 (quoting Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)) (quotation marks omitted).
Loyer v. Wayne County Michigan, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff could satisfythe first three prongs of this requirement—that the County'srefusal to repair cameras in the WCJ areas housing suicidalinmates equated to an official policy of inaction, it cannotsatisfy the fourth prong. In other words, plaintiff cannotestablish that the absence of cameras in areas housing suicidalinmates was the direct causal link to the County's failureto thwart Loyer's suicide. Plaintiff has not offered plausibleevidence that Loyer was housed in an area designated forsuicidal detainees.3 To the contrary, the record evidencesupports defendants’ assertion that Loyer was housed in ageneral population ward. See ECF No. 50-1, PageID.651,755; ECF No. 69, PageID.1282. Nor, as discussed above, canplaintiff point to any evidence to support that Loyer identifiedor demonstrated any suicidal tendencies prior to taking hislife, such that he belonged anywhere other than the generalpopulation ward. See ECF No. 47-10, PageID.525, 530, 535;ECF No. 50-1, PageID.644, 647-48, 660. Finally, plaintiffdoes not allege or argue that camera disrepair in the generalpopulation areas of the jail amounts to deliberate indifferenceto a known risk of suicide. Accordingly, notwithstandingknown and longstanding nonfunctioning cameras withinWCJ, plaintiff cannot establish municipal liability against theCounty under a custom or tolerance or acquiescence theorybecause Loyer's suicide would not have been prevented bythe presence of working cameras in the areas housing suicidalinmates.*6 Plaintiff's brief in response to defendants’ motion hintsat the assertion of a failure to train argument. ECF No. 50,PageID.564. “Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,are deemed waived—it is not sufficient for a party to mentiona possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving thecourt to put flesh on its bones.” Alston v. City of DetroitPolice Officers, 717 F. Supp. 3d 618, 628–29 (E.D. Mich.2024) (quoting McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96(6th Cir. 1997)) (cleaned up). Even if the Court does notdeem the superficial nature of that allusion as a waiver ofsuch an argument, plaintiff cannot demonstrate deliberateindifference based on inadequate training.“To succeed on a failure to train or supervise claim, theplaintiff must prove the following: (1) the training orsupervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) theinadequacy was the result of the municipality's deliberateindifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related toor actually caused the injury.” Ouza, 969 F.3d at 286-87.A plaintiff may establish that inadequate training resultsfrom municipal “deliberate indifference by showing thatthe municipality has failed to act in response to repeatedcomplaints of constitutional violations by its officers.” Id. at287 (internal quotations omitted). Alternatively, “a plaintiffcan show that a municipality was deliberately indifferent byfailing to equip law enforcement officers with specific toolsto handle recurring situations.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Comm'rsv. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)) (cleaned up).Plaintiff has not offered evidence that the County failedto act in response to repeated complaints of constitutionalviolations by its officers. See id. Moreover, even if plaintiffhad evidence (which it does not)4 that the County failedto provide its officers with any suicide prevention trainingand that the need to train officers to recognize and respondto inmates demonstrating suicidal tendencies was so obviousthat the failure to do so could be characterized as deliberateindifference to constitutional rights, it would still have toprove that the failure to train caused the defendants’ failureto prevent Loyer's suicide. See Jackson v. City of Cleveland,925 F.3d 793, 837 n.26 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ciminillov. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2006)) (cleanedup) (“A failure-to-train claim ... requires showing that thefailure to train “was closely related to or actually causedplaintiff's injury.”). Once again, the absence of evidence thatLoyer voiced or exhibited any suicidal propensities to anyoneprior to taking his life would be fatal to such an argument.Officers trained in recognizing and responding to signs ofsuicidal intent can only do so if such signs are displayed.Here, as discussed, plaintiff has not identified any remark orconduct from Loyer that would have alerted a properly trainedofficer to the risk of his suicide. In other words, plaintiff lacksevidence that further training would have prevented Loyer'ssuicide.In sum, notwithstanding the much-publicized spate ofsuicides at WCJ several years ago, plaintiff has not suppliedevidence that working cameras in the areas housing suicidalinmates, or correction officers more fully trained for suicideprevention could have thwarted Loyer's suicide. Accordingly,plaintiff cannot prove, as it must, that any municipal policywas the moving force in defendants’ failure to prevent Loyer'ssuicide. The County is thus entitled to summary judgment onplaintiff's municipal liability claim.C. State Law Claims
Loyer v. Wayne County Michigan, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6*7 Defendants argue that they are entitled to absolutegovernmental immunity from all potential state law tortliability to plaintiffs. Because plaintiff does not address thisargument or its state law claims in its response to defendants’motion for summary judgment, these claims are deemedabandoned. See Briggs v. University of Detroit-Mercy, 611 F.App'x 865, 870 (6th Cir. 2015).IV. ConclusionFor these reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motionfor summary judgment (ECF No. 47) and DISMISSESWITH PREJUDICE plaintiff's FAC (ECF No. 5). Thismatter is now closed.IT IS SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 889770Footnotes1As set forth in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), plaintiff estate sues Daniel Pfannes, Undersheriff for theWayne County Sheriff's Office, Robert Dunlap, Chief of Jails and Court Operations, James E. David, DeputyChief of Jail Operations, and Raphael Washington, Wayne County Sheriff. See ECF No. 5.2Plaintiff states in its response brief that “[d]uring Loyer's February 1, 2020 medical screening, he reporteda history of psychiatric illness, daily methamphetamine abuse, and severe withdrawal symptoms, includinghallucinations. (Ex. 7 Loyer Medical Records). Staff noted he was ‘uncooperative,’ ‘very anxious,’ and‘angry.’ Id.” But, as set forth here, the records cited reveal the opposite: A history of psychiatric illness wasspecifically denied, as was current or prior withdrawal. ECF No. 50-1, PageID.647-48. For behavior, the boxfor “uncooperative” was not checked; the box checked noted Loyer's behavior as “appropriate.” “Anxious”and “Angry” were options to describe mood, but neither were checked for Loyer. Id. at PageID.644. Instead,“Unremarkable” was selected. Id. At the hearing on this matter, the Court admonished plaintiff's counsel forincluding Artificial Intelligence(AI)-generated bogus legal citations in plaintiff's response brief and orderedhim to attend an ethics seminar. See ECF No. 68. This brazen factual fabrication, perhaps also the result ofcounsel's inappropriate dependence on AI, cannot be tolerated; the Court strongly urges counsel to exercisegreater vigilance in preparing court-filings that are factually and legally accurate. Further transgressions ofthis sort will result in disciplinary action.3As pointed out at the hearing on this motion, plaintiff relies solely on a screenshot of a list of detainees inWard 208, which contains this notation at the bottom: “SUICIDE WARD 208 TIME: 0004 HOURS CASE #1988-20 OIC OFFICER JAMES OLIVERO” to support its claim that Loyer was housed on a suicide ward.ECF No. 50-1, PageID.657. At the hearing, counsel for defendants indicated that the word “Suicide” in thatfooter refers to the event, followed by the location where the event occurred, “Ward 208.” In other words,“suicide” does not modify “Ward 208.” Even if the Court accepted plaintiff's interpretation that this footer refersto Ward 208 as Suicide Ward 208, this footer is not “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for theplaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party” does notcreate a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 248, 251.4Plaintiff's response brief, citing generally to defendants’ discovery responses, states that defendants couldidentify only two officers who had received suicide prevention training in the three years before Loyer's death.ECF No. 50, PageID.557. In its review of the discovery responses attached to plaintiff's response brief, theCourt found no information related to suicide prevention training. See ECF No. 50-1, PageID.713-32.
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