Martin v. Action (Northern District of Ala. (N.D. ALA) 2025)

Case details
Full caption
ALLEN-ANTHONY MARTIN v. Civil Action
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Northern District of Alabama (N.D. ALA)
Decided
2025
Majority
Senior United States (J.) (unanimous Court)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTNORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMANORTHEASTERN DIVISIONALLEN-ANTHONY MARTIN,))Plaintiff,))vs.)Civil Action No. 5:25-cv-00548-CLS)REDSTONE FEDERAL CREDIT)UNION,))Defendant.)MEMORANDUM OPINIONThe plaintiff, Allen-Anthony Martin, is proceeding pro se, without the aid ofcounsel. He commenced this action on April 10, 2025. The complaint filed on thatdate alleged six claims against the defendant, Redstone Federal Credit Union(“Redstone”): i.e., breach of fiduciary duty (Count I); “Trust Fraud and Malfeasanceof Office” (Count II); “Default by Non-Response and Power of Attorney for LienFiling” (Count III); “Violation of UCC § 9-201 — Enforcement of SecurityAgreement” (Count IV); “Trespass and Unreasonable Conduct” (Count V); and,“Violation of Constitutional Rights (Due Process) (Count VI). Doc. no. 1(Complaint). The last two Counts, V and VI, alleged violations of plaintiff’sconstitutional rights. Accordingly, the court possesses federal question jurisdictionpursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ofall civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).FILED 2025 Sep-19 AM 10:59U.S. DISTRICT COURTN.D. OF ALABAMACase 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 1 of 19
Redstone filed a motion to dismiss all of plaintiff’s claims on May 21, 2025. Doc. no. 6. Plaintiff responded to the motion on May 23, 2025 (doc. no. 12), but thenfiled an amended complaint on May 28, 2025 (doc. no. 14), thereby rendering theinitial motion to dismiss moot. Redstone filed a motion to dismiss the amendedcomplaint on May 29, 2025, and also asked the court to enter an injunction prohibitingplaintiff from making any substantive filings (other than a response to the motion todismiss) without leave of court. Doc. no. 15.1 This opinion addresses defendant’smotion to dismiss.2I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONSAs an initial matter, the court observes that plaintiff’s “amended complaint”(doc. no. 14) appears to be merely a revision of the claims alleged in Count III(“Default by Non-Response and Power of Attorney for Lien Filing”) and Count IV(“Violation of UCC § 9-201 — Enforcement of Security Agreement”). Ordinarily,an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, which becomes a legalnullity. See Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (citingDresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006)). However, the court will assume, as Redstone does, that plaintiff intended the1 Redstone re-asserted the arguments advanced in its initial motion to dismiss and supportingbrief (doc. nos. 6 & 7).2 The court ordered plaintiff to respond to the motion, and denied as moot Redstone’s initialmotion to dismiss. On May 30, 2025, plaintiff filed an objection to the aspect of Redstone’s motionseeking a filing injunction. Doc. no. 17.2Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 2 of 19
allegations contained in his original complaint (doc. no. 1) to be read together with therevisions to Counts III and IV contained in the “amended complaint” (doc. no. 14).The two pleadings thereby constitute plaintiff’s statement of his six claims.3 SeeTannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Pro sepleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys andwill, therefore, be liberally construed.”). As best as the court can discern, plaintiff’s lawsuit centers around a documentattached to his complaint, and entitled “UCC [Uniform Commercial Code] FinancingStatement.”4 Plaintiff apparently filed the document in the State of Florida’s “SecuredTransaction Registry” on September 11, 2023. The document lists the Debtor’s Names as: “ALLEN ANTHONY MARTIN TRUST©”; and “ALLEN ANTHONYMARTIN, NON-ADVERSE, NON-BELLIGERENT, NON-COMBATANTPRIVATE FOUNDATION.” The same document lists the “Secured Party’s Name”as “Allen-Anthony Martin.” The section of the form entitled “Collateral” contains thefollowing statement:This is the entry of collateral by Trustee/Secured Party on behalf of theTrust/Estate; ALLEN ANTHONY MARTIN TRUST© in the Commercial Chamber under necessity to secure the rights, title(s),3 The substance of the revisions is addressed in Part III of this opinion.4 Doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 1. “ECF” is an acronym formed from the initial letters of the nameof a case filing system that allows parties to file and serve documents electronically (i.e., “ElectronicCase Filing”). When this court cites to pagination generated by the ECF header, it will, as here,precede the page number(s) with the letters ECF. 3Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 3 of 19
interest and value therefrom in and of the Root of Title from inception,as well as all property held in trust including but not limited to DNA,cDNA, cell lines, retina scans, fingerprints and all Debentures,Indentures, Accounts, and all the pledges represented by same includedbut not limited to the pignus, hypotheca, hereditments, res, the energyand all products derived therefrom nunc pro tunc, contracts, agreements,and signatures and/or endorsements, facsimiles, printed, typed orphotocopied of owner’s name predicated on the “Straw-man” Erislegis/Trust/Estate described as the debtor and all property is accepted forvalue and is Exempt from levy. Lien places on debtor entities is for alloutstanding property still owed but not yet returned to trust from entitiessuch as municipalities, governments and the like, not on trust entityitself. Trustee is not surety to any account by explicitreservation/indemnification. The following property is hereby registeredand liened in the same: all Certificates of Birth Document [redacted inoriginal], SSN/UCC Contract Trust Account-prepaid account Number[redacted in original] Exemption Identification Number [redacted inoriginal], is herein liened and claimed at a sum certain $100,000,000.00,also registered: Security Agreement No. 03131982-AAM-SA, HoldHarmless and Indemnity Agreement No. 03131982-AAM-HHIA,Copyright under item no.: 03131982-AAM-CLC Adjustment of thisfiling is in accord with both public policy and the national UniformCommercial Code. Trustee/Secured Party Allen-Anthony: Martin, isliving flesh and blood human being sojourning upon the land/ground/soilof the land known as Alabama, and not within fictional boundaries,territories nor jurisdiction of any fictional entity including fictionalFederal geometric plane(s).Doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 1. Plaintiff signed his name as “Secured Party.” He alleges thatthe UCC form is evidence that he is a beneficiary of a “Cestui Que Vie Trust,”5 withan enforceable security interest.6 5 That reference is characteristic of so-called “sovereign citizen” complaints. See, e.g.,Potter v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 24, 28-29 (Fed. Cl. 2022) (“Sovereign citizens also sometimesreference the ‘Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666' or a ‘cestui que vie” trust, as support for their argumentsin court.”) (footnote omitted). 6 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 1.4Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 4 of 19
Plaintiff alleges that he applied for a $10,000 loan from Redstone “under theCestui Que Vie Trust, a legally binding instrument that designated [Redstone] as theTrustee responsible for administering funds on behalf of the Plaintiff.”7 Redstonedenied plaintiff’s loan application on May 6, 2024.8 Plaintiff contends that Redstone’sdenial of the loan application was a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.9 Plaintiff alsoalleges that Redstone failed to adequately respond to the requests for information andother “notices” that he sent to defendant.10 Plaintiff further states that:On November 1, 2024,[11] Plaintiff attempted to resolve the dispute inperson by visiting Defendant’s physical location and speaking with arepresentative regarding the denial of the loan and failure to respond tohis requests.Despite Plaintiff’s legitimate attempt to address the matter, Defendant’semployees issued a trespass notice against Plaintiff and called lawenforcement. Plaintiff was stalled in the office for 20 minutes. Lawenforcement officers (5 of them) proceeded to aggressively handlePlaintiff and pat him down before attempting to physically remove himfrom the bank with no explanation. This action [was] done by OfficerEmani Richardson Badge #20027. Once outside, Defendant’srepresentative handed Plaintiff the notice and told him it was enforceablefor all locations until legal counsel contacted him. Plaintiff did notreceive any explanation for this action.Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 9-10 (alteration supplied). Plaintiff contends that7 Id. at 2.8 Id. at 3.9 Id. at 4; see also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 3-5, 7-8, 9-14. 10 Id. at 7.11 A Redstone Federal Credit Union “Notice of Trespass Warning,” dated October 1, 2024,is attached to the Complaint. Doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 2.5Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 5 of 19
Redstone’s conduct was unlawful.II. STANDARD OF REVIEWThe relevant portion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 permits a party tomove to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can begranted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That rule must be read together with Rule 8(a),which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasissupplied). While that pleading standard does not require “detailed factualallegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it doesdemand “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Courtstated in the Iqbal opinion:A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitationof the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly, 550 U.S. at555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.To survive a motion to dismiss [founded upon Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which reliefcan be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleadsfactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference thatthe defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. Theplausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but itasks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted6Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 6 of 19
unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merelyconsistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line betweenpossibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557 (bracketsomitted).Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations containedin a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitalsof the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusorystatements, do not suffice. Id. at 555 (Although for the purposes of amotion to dismiss we must take all factual allegations in the complaintas true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couchedas a factual allegation”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors ofdiscovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survivesa motion to dismiss. Id. at 556. Determining whether a complaint statesa plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be acontext-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense. 409 F.3d at 157-58. But wherethe well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the merepossibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not“show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.8(a)(2).In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion todismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because theyare no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, theymust be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleadedfactual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and thendetermine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis supplied, second and fourth alterations inoriginal, other alteration supplied).7Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 7 of 19
III. DISCUSSIONRedstone first contends that plaintiff’s complaint is an impermissible “shotgunpleading,” because it “is a lengthy, largely repetitive collection of irrelevant facts andcitations to legal authorities that offer no apparent support for any colorable claimsagainst Redstone.”12 The court agrees. Even so, there are other, substantive reasonsthat plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive defendant’s motion to dismiss.A.“Sovereign Citizen” TheoriesRedstone argues that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed in its entiretybecause it relies on “sovereign citizen” theories that have been widely rejected bycourts as frivolous.13 The basis for theories espoused by adherents of the sovereign citizen movementhas been described by another district court as follows:The foundation of [a sovereign citizen] claim is equal partsrevisionist legal history and conspiracy theory. Supposedly, prior to thepassage of the Fourteenth Amendment, there were no U.S. citizens;instead, people were citizens only of their individual states. Even afterthe passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. citizenship remainsoptional. The federal government, however, has tricked the populaceinto becoming U.S. citizens by entering into “contracts” embodied insuch documents as birth certificates and social security cards. With thesecontracts, an individual unwittingly creates a fictitious entity (i.e., theU.S. citizen) that represents, but is separate from, the real person. 12 Doc. no. 7 (Defendant Redstone Federal Credit Union’s Brief in Support of its Motion toDismiss), at 5.13 Id. at 5-8 (collecting cases).8Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 8 of 19
Through these contracts, individuals also unknowingly pledgethemselves and their property, through their newly created fictitiousentities, as security for the national debt in exchange for the benefits ofcitizenship. However, the government cannot hold the profits it makesfrom this use of its citizens and their property in the general fund of theUnited States because doing so would constitute fraud, given that theprofits technically belong to the actual owners of the property beingpledged (i.e., the real people represented by the fictitious entities). Therefore, the government holds the profits in secret, individual trustaccounts, one for each citizen. Bryant v. Washington Mutual Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758-59 (W.D. Va. 2007)(alteration supplied). Those beliefs manifest as “names written in all capital lettersand the same names written with just the initial letters capitalized.” Wood v. UnitedStates, 161 Fed. Cl. 30, 34 (Fed. Cl. 2022). A sovereign citizen plaintiff mayreference a “cestui que vie” trust, ostensibly based upon the Cestui Que Vie Act of1666, see id., and seek to validate the so-called trust through the filing of UCCfinancing statements, in which he lists himself as both the secured party and thedebtor. See Bryant, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 759. Although plaintiff disavows the characterization of his claims as based upon“sovereign citizen” ideology,14 his complaint contains hallmarks of those discreditedtheories, as illustrated by the contents of the UCC Financing Statement set out above.Upon review of plaintiff’s complaint, the court concludes that Counts II (“TrustFraud and Malfeasance of Office), III (“Default by Non-Response and Power of14 Doc. no. 12 (Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Dismiss), at 1, 1.9Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 9 of 19
Attorney for Lien Filing”), and IV (“Violation of UCC § 9-201 — Enforcement ofSecurity Agreement”) of plaintiff’s complaint are due to be dismissed because eachis based upon frivolous, sovereign citizen theories, as opposed to cognizable legalclaims. 1.��Trust Fraud and Malfeasance of Office” (Count II)Plaintiff alleges in Count II that Redstone “has committed trust fraud andmalfeasance of office by intentionally denying Plaintiff access to the trust funds andrefusing to respond adequately to Plaintiff’s legitimate inquiries.”15 He further statesthat:[Redstone’s] failure to provide a written agreement or documentationrelated to Plaintiff’s trust interest is a violation of the Statute of Frauds(1666 Act), which requires contracts involving interests in land orproperty rights, including trust agreements, to be evidenced in writing.Doc. no. 1 (complaint), at 5 (alteration supplied, boldface type in original). Plaintiffalso invokes the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §1961 et seq., contending that Redstone’s conduct in denying his loan application andfailing to adequately respond to his notices constitutes “a pattern of racketeeringactivity,” as defined by that statute.16 Plaintiff’s claim of “Trust Fraud and Malfeasance of Office” is not based on15 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 5 (boldface type in original).16 Id. at 6.10Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 10 of 19
any recognized cause of action under Alabama or federal law. Instead, it is“incomprehensible and replete with the legal-sounding but meaningless verbiagecommonly used by adherents to the so-called sovereign citizen movement.” Sealeyv. Branch Banking and Trust Company, No. 2:17cv785-MHT-SMD, 2019 WL1434065, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2019). See also Sovereign Citizens: A CultMovement that Demands Legislative Resistance, 17 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 153, 157(2015) (“[Court] filings [by ‘sovereign citizens’] are written in a code-like languagethat judges, lawyers, and other court staff usually cannot understand. This is becausesovereigns believe that if they find the right combination of words, punctuation, inkcolor, and timing, they can obtain anything they want.”) (alterations supplied andfootnotes omitted). Additionally, plaintiff has not alleged facts that would support a civil RICOclaim. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff “must prove three essential elements: (1) a violation of [18 U.S.C. §] 1962; (2) injury to business or property; and (3) thatthe violation caused the injury.” Avirgan v. Hall, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir.1991) (alteration supplied). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that support any of therequisite elements.2.“Default by Non-Response and Power of Attorney for Lien Filing”(Count III)Count III of plaintiff’s complaint suffers from the same affliction. Plaintiff11Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 11 of 19
states, in part:By failing to respond within five business days to Plaintiff’ssecond formal notice, Defendant’s non-response has implicitly grantedPlaintiff a Power of Attorney (POA), as allowed by law incircumstances where a fiduciary or trustee fails to perform its duties andobligations. This implied POA allows Plaintiff to act on Defendant’sbehalf, including the right to file a Claim of Lien against Defendant andany third parties involved, for the amount of $1,000,000 per recipient, asstipulated in Plaintiff’s UCC-1 filing and the fee schedule attachedhereto as Exhibit A. This claim of lien is fully enforceable by Plaintiffas a secured party and creditor of the trust.By failing to respond within five business days to Plaintiff’s secondformal notice, Defendant’s non-response has implicitly granted Plaintiffa Power of Attorney (POA), as allowed by law in circumstances wherea fiduciary or trustee fails to preform its duties and obligations. Thisimplied POA allows Plaintiff to act on Defendant’s behalf, including theright to file a Claim of Lien against Defendant and any third partiesinvolved, for the amount of $1,000,000 per recipient, as stipulated inPlaintiff’s UCC-1 filing and the fee schedule attached hereto as ExhibitA. This claim of lien is fully enforceable by Plaintiff as a secured partyand creditor of the trust.Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 7. The “amended complaint” states, with respect to thatCount:Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations inparagraphs 1 through 11.[17]Defendant’s failure to respond within five business days to Plaintiff’ssecond notice constitutes default by non-response, which would invokethe POA [Power of Attorney] entitling Plaintiff to take legal action. Byfailing to respond to Plaintiff’s second formal notice within the17 Plaintiff’s reference to “paragraphs 1 through 11” is confusing. The only numberedparagraphs in the original complaint appear in the “Prayer for Relief.” See doc. no. 1 (Complaint),at 11-13.12Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 12 of 19
stipulated 5-business-day period, Defendant’s non-response constitutesan implied Power of Attorney allowing Plaintiff to act on their behalfand file a Claim of Lien, as provided in the UCC and related agreements.This POA is invoked due to Defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty andfailure to fulfill obligations as set forth in the trust agreement and UCCfilings. Plaintiff seeks to enforce the Claim of Lien for the amount of$1,000,000 per recipient.Doc. no. 14 (Amended Complaint), at 1 (alterations supplied). Plaintiff’s allegations,taken as a whole, are: incomprehensible and nonsensical; based on rejected sovereigncitizen theory; and relate to a fictional trust. For those reasons, they do not supporta cognizable claim under Alabama or federal law.3.“Violation of UCC § 9-201 — Enforcement of Security Agreement”(Count IV ) Plaintiff essentially recasts the claim a third time in Count IV, adding references to the UCC, ostensibly in an attempt to bolster his “legalese.” He states:Plaintiff is a secured party in relation to the trust and has duly fileda UCC-1 Financing Statement (#202302477403) with the FloridaSecretary of State, which perfects Plaintiff’s security interest as theprincipal creditor of the trust. Under UCC § 9-201, Defendant is legallyobligated to recognize and act upon Plaintiff’s secured interest asevidenced by the UCC-1 filing. By denying Plaintiff access to the trustfunds and failing to respond to formal notices, Defendant has wrongfullyimpaired Plaintiff’s security interest and violated Plaintiff’s rights underthe Uniform Commercial Code, including the failure to comply withUCC § 9-609 (relating to enforcement of a security agreement. . . . TheDefendant’s actions, including the wrongful denial of access to the trustand failure to respond to formal notices, undermine Plaintiff’s legalrights as a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code, thusimpairing Plaintiff’s ability to enforce the security agreement.13Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 13 of 19
Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 8 (ellipsis supplied). Plaintiff’s amended complaint addsthe following:Plaintiff is a secured party in relation to the trust and has duly filed aUCC-1 Financing Statement (#202302477403) with the FloridaSecretary of State, which perfects Plaintiff’s security interest as theprincipal creditor of the trust. Under UCC § 9-201, Defendant is legallyobligated to recognize and act upon Plaintiff’s secured interest asevidenced by the UCC-1 filing.By denying Plaintiff access to the trust and failing to respond to formalnotices, Defendant has wrongfully impaired Plaintiff’s security interestand violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Uniform Commercial Code. Furthermore, Defendant’s failure to provide a written contract constitutesa violation of the Statute of Frauds.Doc. no. 14 (Amended Complaint), at 2.As defendant aptly states, “regardless of plaintiff’s legal theory, claims basedon Redstone’s failure to provide the plaintiff access to illusory trust funds or torespond to legally meaningless notices have no merit and should be dismissed.”18 Thecourt agrees.In short, Counts II, III, and IV of plaintiff’s complaint are due to be dismissedas frivolous.B.Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count I)Plaintiff alleges that Redstone breached its fiduciary duty “by denying accessto the trust funds and failing to act in Plaintiff’s best interest, resulting in financial and18 Doc. no. 7 (Redstone’s Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss), at 12.14Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 14 of 19
emotional harm” — presumably by denying plaintiff’s loan application.19 To prevailon a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the existence of afiduciary duty between the parties; (2) the breach of that duty; and (3) damagessuffered as a result of the breach.” Regions Bank v. Lowery, 101 So. 3d 210, 219 (Ala.2012). It is well settled under Alabama law that, absent circumstances not presenthere, “the relationship between a bank and its customer [is] a creditor-debtorrelationship that does not impose a fiduciary duty on the bank.” Power EquipmentCompany, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So. 2d 1291, 1297 (Ala. 1991). Accordingly, Redstone’s denial of plaintiff’s loan application does not support a claimof breach of fiduciary duty, and this claim fails.C.Claims Based Upon Constitutional Violations (Counts V and VI)Counts V and VI of plaintiff’s complaint allege that Redstone violated hisconstitutional rights. In Count V, plaintiff alleges that Redstone’s actions insummoning law enforcement officers to remove plaintiff from Redstone’s premisesviolated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as protected by 42 U.S.C. §1983. Count VI alleges that Redstone deprived plaintiff of his property — i.e., the so-called trust funds — without due process of law.Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that:19 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 4.15Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 15 of 19
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District ofColumbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the UnitedStates or other person with in the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivationof any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution andlaws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equityor other proper proceeding for redress . . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis supplied). Plaintiff’s claims must fail for the simplereason that Redstone is a private entity and cannot be sued for constitutional violationsunder § 1983 or otherwise. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment “does not erect a shield against merelyprivate conduct, however discriminatory or wrong”). With respect to Count V, the fact that “law enforcement” officers wereallegedly involved in plaintiff’s removal from Redstone’s premises does not makeRedstone liable under § 1983 for any unconstitutional acts that may have occurred. With respect to Count VI, in addition to the fact that Redstone is a private actor, therewere no “trust funds” or other property of which plaintiff could be deprived. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted inCounts V and VI. D.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11Finally, the court must address plaintiff’s use of non-existent case citations inhis complaint and amended complaint. Of the twelve citations to legal authority16Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 16 of 19
contained in the complaint, eight are “fake.”20 Further, all five cases cited inplaintiff’s amended complaint do not exist.21 As just one example, in Count I of thecomplaint, plaintiff cites “Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Bank of America, 121 Cal. Rptr.3d 517 (2011),” and states “”[t]his case discusses the elements of a fiduciary duty andthe breach thereof, particularly in the context of corporate and financial institutions.”22 A Westlaw search of that citation leads to People v. Xinos, a case that involves amotion to suppress information obtained from a criminal defendant’s “event datarecorder” in a vehicular manslaughter case. As stated previously, complaints drafted by pro se plaintiffs are treated withmore leniency than those prepared by attorneys. Even so, that leniency does notextend to the duty of candor to the court required of all parties — including pro selitigants — imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rule 11(b)states that [b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion or other paper —whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it — anattorney or unrepresented party certifies that, to the best of the person’s20 The citations to non-existent cases that appear in plaintiff’s complaint are: Wells FargoBank, N.A. v. Bank of America, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517 (2011); In re Estate of Brodie, 661 P.2d 145(1983); In re Connelly, 21 F.3d 1423 (1994); Allied Steel & Conveyor Co. v. U.S., 256 U.S. 148(1921); Calif. State Board of Equalization v. Tarrant, 117 Cal. App. 3d 611 (1981); Citibank (SouthDakota, N.A. v. Jackson, 460 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2006); In re J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 614 F.3d 290(2d Cir. 2010); In re Safeway Stores, Inc., 99 B.R. 525 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989). Doc. no. 1(Complaint), at 4-9.21 See doc. no. 14 (Amended Complaint), at 1-2.22 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 4.17Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 17 of 19
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonableunder the circumstances:* * * *(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted byexisting law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying,or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[ ].Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (alteration, emphasis, and ellipsis supplied). As one judicialofficer succinctly stated: “Non-existent law is indeed the opposite of existing law”and, accordingly, violates Rule 11. Rollins v. Premier Motorcar Gallery, Inc., No.4:24-cv-413-MW-MAF, 2025 WL 2166019, at *5 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2025).Although such conduct may be sanctionable under Rule 11, the court will nottake further action at this time in light of the disposition of defendant’s motion. However, plaintiff is strongly cautioned that any future pleadings, motions, or otherpapers submitted to this court or any other must comply with Rule 11.IV. CONCLUSIONFor all of the foregoing reasons, Redstone’s motion to dismiss is due to begranted. Further, upon review of the pleadings, Redstone’s motions to dismiss, andplaintiff’s responses, the court concludes that plaintiff’s complaint could not be curedby amendment. See Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir.1999) (“[D]enial of leave to amend is justified by futility when the ‘complaint as18Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 18 of 19
amended is still subject to dismissal.’”) (alteration supplied and citation omitted). Aseparate order consistent with this memorandum opinion will be enteredcontemporaneously herewith.DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of September, 2025.______________________________Senior United States District Judge19Case 5:25-cv-00548-CLS Document 19 Filed 09/19/25 Page 19 of 19
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