McCormick v. Financial (June 11, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
McCormick v. Texakoma Financial
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
June 11, 2026
Majority
Amos L. Mazzant (J.) (unanimous Court)
MATT MCCORMICK, Plaintiff, v. TEXAKOMA FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant., --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1746259Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.MATT MCCORMICK, Plaintiff,v.TEXAKOMA FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant.Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-773|Filed 06/11/2026Editor's Note: This document contains discussion ofunverified citations, likely generated by AI tools used by aparty or counsel. These citations are not attributable to theCourt. The unverified citations have been preserved as part ofthe official record, but links are unavailable.Attorneys and Law FirmsAmy Lynn Bennecoff Ginsburg, Ginsburg Law Group, P.C.,Blue Bell, PA, for Plaintiff.Barry Frank Cannaday, Dentons US LLP, Dallas, TX, forDefendant.ORDER SANCTIONING AMY L.B. GINSBURGAMOS L. MAZZANT UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE*1 Courts have been flooded with cases involving fraudulentlegal citations caused by reliance on generative artificialintelligence (“AI”).1 Regrettably, this is one of them. Forthe reasons herein, the Court will issue sanctions againstPlaintiff's counsel, Amy L.B. Ginsburg.BACKGROUNDThis is a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) case.Plaintiff alleges that Defendant called Plaintiff's personalphone number three times even though he registered it onthe National Do Not Call Registry (Dkt. #1). On December16, 2025, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguingthat the TCPA does not cover the calls at issue, that Plaintiffshould be estopped from maintaining this lawsuit, and thatan affirmative defense under the TCPA is conclusivelyestablished (Dkt. #17).The Fraudulent Filing. On January 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed aresponse accompanied with a brief in support (Dkt. #21; Dkt.#21-1) (the “Motion for Summary Judgment Response”).Plaintiff's counsel, Amy L.B. Ginsburg (“Ginsburg”), signedit (Dkt. #21-1 at pp. 12, 13). Defendant filed a reply (Dkt.#22) (the “Reply”). In its “Introduction” section, the Replydrew attention to the fact that, among other issues, Ginsburg'sMotion for Summary Judgment Response “cites a case thatdoes not seem to exist” (Dkt. #22 at p. 4). The Reply alsoflagged fake quotes and unsupported propositions. Ginsburgdid not file a sur-reply or move to remedy this problem.The Order to Show Cause. After reviewing the veracityof Defendant's claim that Ginsburg submitted a brief withfraudulent citations, the Court issued an order to show causeon May 15, 2026 (Dkt. #23). The order identified the suspectcitations and ordered Ginsburg to appear in person on May28, 2026, at 10:00 a.m., to explain why she should notbe sanctioned. The Court also ordered Ginsburg to bringhighlighted copies of the cases she cited.The Response to the Order to Show Cause. On May 28, 2026,less than one hour before the show cause hearing, Ginsburgfiled a response to the order to show cause (Dkt. #24) (the“Order to Show Cause Response”). At the start of her Order toShow Cause Response, Ginsburg represented that she wanted“to explain how the filing occurred, correct the erroneous[fictitious] Noviello citation, and accept responsibility for thefailure to verify the final version had been filed” (Dkt. #24 atp. 1). Whether Ginsburg's response accomplishes these goalswill be the subject of further discussion below. See infra II.For now, the Court summarizes Ginsburg's explanation.*2 Ginsburg claims that a law clerk drafted the Motion forSummary Judgment Response. Allegedly, Ginsburg reviewedtheir draft. During her review, the Noviello case stoodout to Ginsburg because her husband previously workedon a case with Noviello as the plaintiff and Ginsburgpurportedly recognized the case name included the “incorrectDefendant” (Dkt. #24 at p. 3). Ginsburg assumed her “lawclerk had difficulty in locating the correct case or cite but ...corrected the citation in [Ginsburg's] final version” (Dkt. #24at p. 3). Ginsburg claims that, after the Court issued the orderto show cause, she learned a paralegal had “selected an earlierdraft from the file, added the date and certificate of service
MATT MCCORMICK, Plaintiff, v. TEXAKOMA FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant., --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2to that earlier draft, and when saving that modified versionto our system and PDFing for filing, saved it as the finalversion” (Dkt. #24 at p. 3).The Order to Show Cause Response includes the “correct”case, written by United States Magistrate Judge David Horan,but the case does not include the quotes attributed to it.Ginsburg also attempted to explain the fact that the Replyidentified the fictitious case, quotations, and propositions.Allegedly, during a team meeting, the only issue that came upwas “that our case law was not on point, which is not unusualas attorneys typically differentiate [case law]” (Dkt. #24 atp. 4). Because Ginsburg held “the belief that [her] versionhad been filed,” the team meeting about the Reply did notput Ginsburg on notice about the fraudulent filing (Dkt. #24at p. 4). Ginsburg states that she “would agree that in the[Motion for Summary Judgment Response] erroneously filedit appears my law clerk did use AI to assist in drafting” (Dkt.#24 at p. 5). Ginsburg then requested leave to “locate orprepare a new version of the revised [Motion for SummaryJudgment Response]” (Dkt. #24 at p. 5).The Show Cause Hearing. At the hearing, Ginsburgrepresented that she could not know for certain whetherAI was used to draft the Motion for Summary JudgmentResponse, because the law clerk or intern that drafted it isno longer with her law firm. She reiterated that the Replydid not put her on notice about the fictitious case, quotes,and propositions because the only topic that arose at a teammeeting was that the cases in the Motion for SummaryJudgment Response were allegedly not on point. She alsoclaimed that she had recognized the fictitious case because herhusband represented one of the named parties in the correctversion of the case, and that she then corrected her versionof the brief. When the Court explained that the quote in theMotion for Summary Judgment Response does not appear inthe “correct” case, Ginsburg stated that she did not necessarilydisagree, but that she would not submit fake quotes.Furthermore, Ginsburg represented that her paralegal filed thewrong document. The Court asked Ginsburg if she was awareof the fact that other attorneys have tried to avoid sanctionswith similar explanations in the past, and Ginsburg stated thatshe had no idea because she has worked on over 2,000 casesand this has never happened to her.The Court then asked Ginsburg to explain the fake quotesattributed to real cases, observing that her Order to ShowCause Response focuses on the fake case. She agreed thequotes were fake but stated that the fake quotes did not appearon her revised draft of the Motion for Summary JudgmentResponse. The Court then asked Ginsburg if she reviewedthe cases with unsupported propositions. Ginsburg said yes,stating that she did not necessarily rely on them but that shebrought copies highlighting what the law clerk or intern mayhave been referring to.Ginsburg acknowledged that submitting fictitious cases,quotes, and propositions is sanctionable under Rule 11 andthe local rules. The Court asked Ginsburg what sanctionwould be appropriate under the circumstances, and Ginsburgstated that she did not know, because she has never beensanctioned before and has worked on thousands of caseswithout incident. The Court then asked Ginsburg whethershe had anything else to share, and she expressed that sheis extremely apologetic and that she would never knowinglysubmit fictitious citations.*3 The Court then asked defense counsel if he had a positionon sanctions. Defense counsel explained that he incurredaround $9,000 in attorney's fees preparing the Reply, whichwas more expensive than usual because defense counselwanted to ensure he was not missing anything before accusingGinsburg of relying on fictitious citations and unsupportedpropositions. Moreover, defense counsel explained that hespent around $2,000 to attend the show cause hearing. Basedon these expenses, defense counsel suggested that attorney'sfees would be an appropriate sanction.2The Court then took the matter under advisement.LEGAL STANDARDFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides in part that,in presenting to a court a written and signed pleading,motion, or other paper, an attorney “certifies that to the bestof the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formedafter an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ... theclaims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warrantedby existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing newlaw.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). Under Rule 11(b), an attorneywho signs a legal document certifies that they have “read thedocument, ... conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts andthe law and is satisfied that the document is well groundedin both, and is acting without any improper motive.” Bus.
MATT MCCORMICK, Plaintiff, v. TEXAKOMA FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant., --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S.533, 542 (1991).“If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, thecourt may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney,law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible forthe violation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). Rule 11(c) furtherprovides that “[a] sanction imposed under this rule must belimited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct orcomparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Id. 11(c)(4).In determining whether an attorney has complied with Rule11, the standard under which they are judged is “an objective,not subjective, standard of reasonableness.” Gauthier v.Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 1:23-CV-281, 2024 WL4882651, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2024) (internal quotationmarks omitted) (quoting Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard,Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 528 (5th Cir. 2016)).3ANALYSISThe Court begins by identifying the erroneous citationsincluded in the Motion for Summary Judgment Response.Then, the Court examines the veracity of Ginsburg'sexplanation and concludes that it is not credible. In the end,the Court imposes sanctions.I. The CitationsGinsburg's Motion for Summary Judgment Responsecontains three categories of serious errors: a fictitious case,fictitious quotes, and unsupported propositions.Fictitious Case. Instead of citing the fictitious case,4 theCourt includes a screenshot of the portion of the Motion forSummary Judgment Response that cites the case (Dkt. #21-1at p. 12):*4 standing. In Noviello v. Bayview Asset Management,LLC, the court held that a plaintiff's financial motive forpursuing TCPA claims is “irrelevant to the question ofliability,” explaining that Congress expressly authorizedstatutory damages to incentivize private enforcement. No.3:18-cv-02057, 2019 WL 13175252, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept.30, 2019). The court rejected arguments thatThe Court attempted to locate the case and discovered thatthe case number leads to a different case from the NorthernDistrict of Texas without any opinions issued in 2019 (andno relationship to the TCPA). The Westlaw reporter numberleads to a petition in a New Jersey personal injury case.Further detail regarding the case is unnecessary—Ginsburgconcedes the case is fictitious. Her explanation for this errorwill be addressed below. See infra II.Fictitious Quotes. Two fictitious quotes are attributed to areal case, Texas v. American Blastfax, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d892 (W.D. Tex. 2001). The Motion for Summary JudgmentResponse includes the following quotations that do not appearin the case (Dkt. #21-1 at p. 11):In Texas v. American Blastfax. Inc., the Western District ofTexas held that the TCPA “places the burden of compliancesquarely on the advertiser,” rejecting defenses that wouldshift responsibility to the recipient of the call. 164 F. Supp.2d 892, 899–900 (W.D. Tex. 2001). Thenon-delegable duties. In American Biastfax, the courtrejected defenses that would undermine the TCPA'sdeterrent purpose, emphasizing that allowing such defenseswould “eviscerate the statute.” 164 F. Supp. 2d at 900.Permitting estoppel based on a consumer's silence wouldeffectivelyUnsupported Propositions. The unsupported5 propositionsfrom real cases are as follows:Page Number 9 9 10 11 11 11 Case Cited (listed exactly asit appears in the Motion for Summary Judgment Response)Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 327(5th Cir. 2008) (affirmative defense fails where defendantcannot show procedures were effectively implemented).Texas v. Am. Blastfax, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 892, 899–900(W.D. Tex. 2001) Charvat v. GVN Mich., Inc., 561 F.3d623, 630 (6th Cir. 2009) Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPayLLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326–27 (5th Cir. 2008) Shields Ltd.P'ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 486 (Tex. 2017)Gene & Gene, 541 F.3d at 326. Court's ObservationsCase exists. Proposition is not supported. Ginsburg'sproposition is that “Courts uniformly hold that the § 227(c)(5) defense requires evidence of actual compliance, nottheoretical safeguards.” But the page cited discusses theburden to show that common issues predominate in thecontext of certifying a class under a TCPA claim.6 Caseexists. Proposition is not supported. Ginsburg assertsthat the “TCPA imposes strict liability,” but the cited page
MATT MCCORMICK, Plaintiff, v. TEXAKOMA FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant., --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4numbers discuss whether defendants “willfully” violatedthe statute as the standard for liability, and the resultingdamages for their non-compliance. Nowhere does thecourt hold that the TCPA imposes strict liability.7 Caseexists. Proposition is not supported. Ginsburg claims that“[w]hether procedures were applied with due care is a fact-intensive inquiry that turns on what Defendant actuallydid ....” But the case cited deals with TCPA damagesthrough statutory interpretation and never discusses a fact-intensive inquiry or how to evaluate due care.8 Case exists.Proposition is not supported. Ginsburg's proposition isthat “the burden of proving consent or compliance lieswith the defendant and cannot be shifted to the calledparty through implication, silence, or conduct,” but the only“burden” the Gene court analyzes is the burden to prove theclass certification requirements.9 Case exists. Propositionis not supported. Ginsburg's proposition is that “[u]nderTexas law, silence can support estoppel only where thereis a duty to speak,” but the duty to speak is not mentionedin the case at all. The page cited discusses an estoppelargument in the context of a landlord-tenant issue.10 Caseexists. Proposition is not supported. The propositionis that a “party cannot claim detrimental reliance on aconsumer's silence where the law already imposes anindependent duty to verify compliance.” But the case doesnot discuss “reliance on a consumer's silence,” or “anindependent duty” to verify compliance.11* * **5 In sum, Ginsburg's Motion for Summary JudgmentResponse contains a fictitious case, fictitious quotesattributable to real cases, and unsupported propositions.II. The ExplanationFor the reasons below, the Court finds that Ginsburg'sexplanation for her errors is not credible. Therefore, eventhough Ginsburg claims she is taking ownership of hermistakes, the Court finds otherwise. In the Court's view,Ginsburg's story is a contrived attempt to shift the blame toothers. Appropriate sanctions will therefore follow. See infraIII.A. Ginsburg's alleged reaction to her intern or lawclerk's initial draft does not survive scrutiny.Under Ginsburg's version of events, she spotted the fictitiousNoviello v. Bayview case when reviewing an earlier draftof the Motion for Summary Judgment Response. She wasfamiliar with the matter because her husband representeda party in a prior case where Noviello was the plaintiff,and the “incorrect Defendant” name stood out to her (Dkt.#24 at p. 3). Ginsburg therefore “assumed [her] law clerkhad difficulty in locating the correct case or cite” and then“corrected the citation in [her] final version” (Dkt. #24 at p.3). As a reminder, to date, Ginsburg is unable to “locate” thisfinal version (Dkt. #24 at p. 5).At the show cause hearing, Ginsburg stated that she did notthink the fictitious Noviello v. Bayview case was fake whenshe reviewed the earlier draft, because it was a motion inlimine order that could be harder to cite and perhaps be moredifficult to find on Lexis or Westlaw.12 But if Ginsburg hadperformed a reasonable inquiry into the fictitious Noviellov. Bayview, she would have become aware of the fact that:(1) no case has this name; (2) the Westlaw reporter leadsto a different case by a different court; and (3) the casenumber leads to a different case from a different year. In otherwords, she would become aware that someone included afictitious case in a draft that was supposedly ready for herreview. And under her version of events, when “correct[ing]the citation,” she would presumably notice that the quote forwhich Noviello v. Bayview is cited does not appear in the“correct” Noviello case.13 Put differently, Ginsburg wouldbecome aware that her intern or law clerk included fake quotesin the brief. If someone—even an intern—gets the case name,number, year, and quotation wrong, they are not strugglingwith research or citation formatting. They are struggling withhonesty. Ginsburg's representations, at best, lack credibility.*6 Not only that, but if Ginsburg had verified every citationlike she claimed at the show cause hearing, she would havealso learned that her intern or law clerk attributed fake quotesto the real Blastfax case.14 Under these circumstances, noreasonable attorney, particularly after the advent of AI, wouldconclude that the intern or law clerk was merely having“difficulty in locating the correct case or cite” (Dkt. #24 atp. 3). The Court especially doubts that Ginsburg would reachthat conclusion, given her experience with “numerous CLEson the use of AI” (Dkt. #24 at p. 4).15The “correct case or cite” phrase is itself suspect. Theseare not interchangeable details. If Ginsburg discovered thatsomeone at her law firm tried to pass off a fictitious case as a
MATT MCCORMICK, Plaintiff, v. TEXAKOMA FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant., --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5real one, that would warrant a substantially different reactionthan discovering, say, a typo in the Westlaw reporter number(i.e., discovering an incorrect cite). Ginsburg's equivocallanguage is concerning.In sum, Ginsburg's explanation has problems from the start.The Court does not believe Ginsburg's representation that sheassumed her intern or law clerk was merely having difficultylocating the correct case or citation after she reviewed theirdraft.B. Ginsburg's “wrong version” explanation does notsurvive scrutiny.For Ginsburg's story to be true, two people other than herselfmust have committed critical mistakes: the intern or law clerkwho drafted a brief with serious errors, and the paralegalwho “selected an earlier draft from the file, added the dateand certificate of service to that earlier draft, and whensaving that modified version ... for filing, saved it as the finalversion” (Dkt. #24 at p. 3). Ginsburg says that the “paralegalsuggested it may have been written over when she saved thefiled version as the final version” (Dkt. #24 at p. 5). The Courtdoes not believe this either.At the show cause hearing, Ginsburg stated that it was not herpractice to save files under different version names, such asversion one and version two. Yet her Order to Show CauseResponse indicates that there were multiple drafts from whichthe paralegal could “select[ ]” (Dkt. #24 at p. 3). If there weremultiple drafts to select from, it is unclear why saving oneof the files would “writ[e] over” a different file (Dkt. #24 atp. 5).16 Maybe it is Ginsburg's practice to have her paralegaldelete older drafts once a final version is filed, but that isnot what Ginsburg claims. If Ginsburg's practice is to have asingle draft without multiple versions, it is not clear why theproblematic citations would remain in the draft after Ginsburgsupposedly revised it (and if only one draft existed, it wouldbe misleading and sanctionable to claim that the paralegal“selected an earlier draft”).*7 Furthermore, to date, Ginsburg has not presented any“[revised] draft, metadata, or any other evidence to support[her] excuse.” R-Mart Trailers, No. 5:24-cv-87-RWS, DocketNo. 59 at 6. Under these circumstances, the Court does notbelieve Ginsburg's explanation that the wrong version of acorrected brief was filed.C. Ginsburg's generic assertions and equivocalstatements cast further doubt on her explanation.Ginsburg's explanation has other problems that lead the Courtto doubt that she is truly taking ownership of her mistakes.In the opening paragraph of Ginsburg's Order to Show CauseResponse, filed under an hour before the show cause hearing,Ginsburg stated that she submits “this response to explain howthe filing occurred, correct the erroneous [fictitious] Noviellocitation, and accept responsibility for the failure to verify thefinal version had been filed” (Dkt. #24 at p. 1).The fictitious Noviello citation is the most egregious error inGinsburg's filing, but it is hardly the only error warranting“correct[ion].” For example, Ginsburg's signature is on a briefthat attributes fictitious quotes to the Blastfax case. Ginsburg'sOrder to Show Cause Response does not mention this. Whenthe Court raised this issue during the hearing, Ginsburg statedthat she did not rely on any fictitious quotes in her reviseddraft. If Ginsburg's story is that she spotted the fake Blastfaxquotes during her review of the “earlier draft,” then, again, itstrains credulity for Ginsburg to claim that she merely thoughther intern or law clerk was struggling to locate or cite cases.Ginsburg's Order to Show Cause Response only specificallyidentifies a single citation that she fixed (Dkt. #24 at p. 3(“[W]hen reviewing and revising the brief, I had taken noteof this incorrect cite and assumed my law clerk had difficultyin locating the correct case or cite but regardless corrected thecitation in my final version” (emphasis added))).When Ginsburg does refer to multiple citations, shedoes so generically, while using terms that minimize herpredicament. In the introduction to her Order to Show CauseResponse, for example, Ginsburg states that she “respectfullyacknowledge[s] that the [Motion for Summary JudgmentResponse] ... included citations and parentheticals that shouldhave been drafted with greater precision” (Dkt. #24 at p. 1).But Ginsburg's signature is on a court filing containing, atthe very least, a fictitious case and fictitious quotes. Ginsburghad almost two weeks to draft her Order to Show CauseResponse (and submitted it less than an hour before the showcause hearing), so the Court assumes Ginsburg had ampletime to choose her words carefully. Characterizing this as acase needing “greater precision” was the wrong choice.Furthermore, when confronted with the simple andundeniable fact that the “correct” Noviello case does notinclude the quote attributed to it, Ginsburg stated she didnot necessarily disagree. Whether the quote exists or not is a
MATT MCCORMICK, Plaintiff, v. TEXAKOMA FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant., --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6straightforward issue. Because the existence of the “correct”Noviello case is the only piece of evidence Ginsburg puts forthto corroborate her story, she should have been prepared todirectly answer questions about its contents.Also, when asked if she brought copies of the cases withhighlights on the text supporting the propositions in herMotion for Summary Judgment Response, Ginsburg statedthat she did not necessarily rely on the cases but that shehighlighted the provisions she believes the law clerk or internmay have been referring to. Again, whether she relied on thecases or not is a straightforward issue. If Ginsburg believes thepropositions are supported, she should have stood by them. Ifshe determined the propositions were unsupported, she shouldhave left the cases blank, because the Court ordered her to“highlight[ ] the text that supports the propositions,” not tohighlight what she thinks someone else might think supportsthem (Dkt. #23 at p. 2).* * **8 Ginsburg claims that she is taking ownership of hermistakes, but her actions say otherwise. Rather than owningup to her ethical violations, Ginsburg came forward with ahalf-baked, last-minute story that shifts the blame to everyonebut herself and raises more questions than answers. TheCourt does not believe it. Instead, the Court finds Ginsburg'snarrative was a failed attempt to avoid responsibility.III. The Court's SanctionsGinsburg's signature appears on a document stainedby a fictitious case, fictitious quotes, and unsupportedpropositions, so she will be sanctioned. See, e.g., Mata v.Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Afake opinion is not ‘existing law’ and citation to a fake opiniondoes not provide a non-frivolous ground for extending,modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing newlaw.”); Safe Choice, LLC v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:24-CV-02033-PAB, 2025 WL 2958211, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct.17, 2025) (“[A]s it always has, misrepresenting the holdingsof case law violates Rule 11.”). The remaining question iswhat the sanctions should be.Because Ginsburg has not accepted responsibility despiteclaiming to do so, see supra II, the Court finds that areprimand alone would be an insufficient sanction. SeeFletcher, 168 F.4th at 240 (acknowledging that a reprimandmay be an appropriate sanction if, among other things, theattorney recognizes their misconduct).17Nor are financial sanctions sufficient to deter similarmisconduct. In a February 18, 2026 opinion, the FifthCircuit cited a database identifying “239 cases ofhallucinations by lawyers in the United States.” Id. at234 (citing AI Hallucination Cases, Damien Charlotin,https://www.damiencharlotin.com/hallucinations [hereinafterAI Hallucinations]). As of June 11, 2026, that figure hasincreased to 434. AI Hallucinations. Despite the frequency ofthese incidents, “attorneys have not been sufficiently deterredby financial sanctions imposed to date.” Parker v. CostcoWholesale Corp., No. C25-0519-SKV, 2025 WL 4228413, at*9 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2025). “As a practical matter, time istelling us—quickly and loudly—that [reprimands and modestfines] are insufficient deterrents.” Johnson v. Dunn, 792 F.Supp. 3d 1241, 1246 (N.D. Ala. 2025).Because a sanction under Rule 11 “must be limited to whatsuffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparableconduct by others similarly situated,” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4), the Court concludes that the consequences for Ginsburgmust be more than financial. The “seriousness of filingfictitious case citations—and the corresponding waste ofjudicial and party resources—warrants a penalty sufficient todeter future violations.” Elizondo v. City of Laredo, No. 5:25-CV-50, 2025 WL 2071072, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 23, 2025).*9 The Court takes no joy in issuing sanctions, but deterringmisconduct from those similarly situated “will, necessarilyand unfortunately, involve moving beyond admonitions andreprimands into more punitive sanctions. Until attorneysreliably verify the accuracy of AI-generated materials, courtsmust take the steps necessary to safeguard the integrity ofthe judicial process.” Fivehouse v. U.S. Dep't of Def., No.2:25-CV-00041-M, 2026 WL 1278575, at *10 (E.D.N.C.May 7, 2026). The Court will sanction Amy L.B. Ginsburgaccordingly.18CONCLUSIONAfter considering the record, the veracity of Ginsburg'sexplanation, and the arguments presented, the Court finds thatthe following combination of monetary and non-monetarysanctions are the least severe sanctions sufficient to detersimilar misconduct:
MATT MCCORMICK, Plaintiff, v. TEXAKOMA FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant., --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7The Court PUBLICLY REPRIMANDS Amy L.B. Ginsburgfor the misconduct described in this Order.It is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall servea copy of this Order on all the district judges and magistratejudges in this district.Ginsburg is ORDERED to conduct a reasonable reviewof every filing bearing Ginsburg's signature filed betweenJanuary 1, 2026, and the date of this Order in any federalor state court. As part of that review, Ginsburg shallverify the existence and accuracy of every legal authoritycited in those filings, including case citations, quotations,parentheticals, statutory citations, regulatory citations, andcitations to secondary authorities. If her review reveals anycitation to a non-existent authority or any other materialmisrepresentation concerning a cited authority, Ginsburgshall notify the affected court and parties in the relevantmatter and take appropriate steps to correct the recordwithin three days of discovering such misrepresentation.No later than ninety days from the date of this Order,Ginsburg shall file with this Court a sworn certificationstating that she completed the required review, identifyingany misrepresentations discovered and the corrective actionstaken. The sworn certification shall include a list of all filingsthat Ginsburg reviews.It is further ORDERED that any motion for sanctions byDefendant requesting an award of attorney's fees must befiled within fourteen days of the date of this Order. Counselfor both parties is further ORDERED to meet and conferregarding: (1) whether opposition to any motion for sanctionsis warranted in light of the Court's findings herein; and (2)the reasonable necessity of the attorney's fees incurred indiscovering and exposing the fictitious citations, quotations,and unsupported propositions in Ginsburg's Motion forSummary Judgment Response. Defendant shall not seek torecover expenses incurred in filing those aspects of its motionpapers that did not relate to discovering and exposing thefictitious citations, quotations, and unsupported propositionsin Ginsburg's Motion for Summary Judgment Response.Ginsburg is further ORDERED to pay a $5,000 penalty intothe registry of this Court within fourteen days of the date ofthis Order. Ginsburg and her law firm are jointly responsible.It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff's Response inOpposition to Defendant Texakoma Financial, Inc.'s Motionfor Summary Judgment (Dkt. #21) is hereby STRICKEN.*10 It is further ORDERED that any corrected responseto Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be filedwithin five days of the date of this Order.It is further ORDERED that, to effectuate the Court'sreprimand, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to submitthis Order for publication in the Federal Supplement.Ginsburg is further ORDERED to serve a copy of this Orderon Plaintiff and file a Notice of Proof of Compliance with theCourt within three days of the date of this Order.Ginsburg is further ORDERED to attend Continuing LegalEducation course(s) of at least two hours regarding the ethicaluse of artificial intelligence in the practice of law, the topic ofcandor to the court, and/or similar topics, and Ginsburg shallfile a Notice of Proof of Compliance within thirty days ofthe date of this Order.It is further ORDERED that, for one year after the date ofthis Order, Ginsburg must include a signed Certification ofVerification at the end of any future filings that cite any legalauthorities in all cases before this Court, which must state thefollowing:I, Amy L.B. Ginsburg, certify that I personally reviewedeach citation and authority referenced in this filing and that,to the best of my knowledge and belief, all citations aregenuine and accurately reflect the law as of the date offiling. I also certify that I personally verified that the fileI reviewed is the same one that is being submitted to thisCourt.IT IS SO ORDERED.SIGNED this 11th day of June, 2026.All Citations--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2026 WL 1746259Footnotes
MATT MCCORMICK, Plaintiff, v. TEXAKOMA FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant., --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.81See, e.g., Fletcher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 168 F.4th 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2026) (“[D]espite numerous news stories,CLE presentations, scholarly articles, and judicial entreaties, AI-hallucinated case citations have increasingly become aneven greater problem in our courts, and the problem shows no sign of abating.”); Kettering Adventist Healthcare v. Collier,No. 3:25-CV-273, 2026 WL 523117, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2026) (“[T]he problem of attorneys submitting hallucinatedcitations is rapidly worsening, and is one of the biggest threats currently facing federal civil litigation.”); Sanders v. UnitedStates, 176 Fed. Cl. 163, 169 (2025) (“It is no secret that generative AI programs are known to ‘hallucinate’ nonexistentcases, and with the advent of AI, courts have seen a rash of cases in which both counsel and pro se litigants have citedsuch fake, hallucinated cases in their briefs.”).2“Attorneys' fees paid to another party are not a valid sua sponte sanction under ... Rule [11].” Brunig v. Clark, 560 F.3d292, 298 (5th Cir. 2009); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). At this stage, the Court will not award them.3Moreover, the local rules for the Eastern District of Texas specifically address a lawyer's obligations when using AI,and caution that “[i]f a lawyer chooses to employ generative artificial intelligence technology in representing a client, thelawyer continues to be bound by the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Local Rule AT-3, and all otherapplicable standards of practice and must review and verify all content.” LOCAL RULE AT-3(m).4Because the Westlaw reporter number and the case number both connect to real cases, the Court will avoid perpetuatingthe error of attributing those numbers to the fictitious case Ginsburg cited.5The Court excludes citations with imprecise pincites as well as any propositions that the Court found arguably supported.During the show cause hearing, Ginsburg stated she did not necessarily rely on these cases. In the event that she did,the Court explains why it found the propositions listed herein to be unsupported.6Ginsburg's highlights in the Gene case, which she claims represent what her law clerk or intern may have been referringto, do not alleviate the Court's concerns about reliance on AI. Gene in no way analyzes when the safe harbor “affirmativedefense fails,” but instead discusses the role of affirmative defenses in the predominance inquiry for class certification.The Court therefore agrees with Defendant that the proposition is unsupported.7Ginsburg's highlights, again, do little to alleviate the Court's concerns about improper reliance on AI. One of her highlightsis the portion of Blastfax that explains that TCPA liability does not require “bad faith, but only that the person havereason to know, or should have known, that his conduct would violate the statute.” The distinction between a strict liabilitystandard and a willfulness standard that requires that a person “know” or “should have known” something is self-evident.The Court agrees with Defendant that the proposition is not supported.8Ginsburg highlights the portion of this case that quotes the safe harbor statute, which does not itself discuss whether thesafe harbor defense is fact intensive. The Court agrees with Defendant that the proposition is unsupported.9Ginsburg's highlights do not support the proposition. The parties in Gene debated whether consent is an affirmativedefense or part of a plaintiff's claim, but the Gene court deemed that issue “irrelevant to [its] analysis” because bothaffirmative defenses and elements of a claim can bear on the predominance inquiry for class certification. The Courtagrees with Defendant that the proposition is unsupported.10Ginsburg highlights the portion of Shields setting forth the elements of equitable estoppel. The list of elements makes nomention of a duty to speak. The Court agrees with Defendant that the proposition is not supported.11Ginsburg highlights portions of page 324 and 327, but the Court cannot discern a connection between the highlightedportions and the proposition. Thus, the Court agrees with Defendant that the proposition is unsupported.12Judge Horan's motion in limine order is on Westlaw and Lexis, and it can be cited like any other case. See Noviello v.Holloway Funding Grp., No. 3:22-CV-52-BN, 2023 WL 2195768, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2023), and Noviello v. HollowayFunding Grp., No. 3:22-cv-52-BN, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30591, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2023). The Court does not see,nor did Ginsburg explain, why Judge Horan's order would be cited differently just because it resolved a motion in limine.
MATT MCCORMICK, Plaintiff, v. TEXAKOMA FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant., --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.913It goes without saying that if Ginsburg corrected only the “case or cite” without verifying the quote exists, that would nothelp her avoid sanctions. Especially because, if this is what happened, Ginsburg was not forthcoming about it. Instead,she denied including any fake quotes in her revised version.14Ginsburg does not specifically address the fake quotes attributed to Blastfax in her Order to Show Cause Response.Instead, Ginsburg makes generic assertions that undermine her credibility, as explained further below. See infra II.C.15Ginsburg's experience with AI-related courses also leads the Court to be skeptical of her other positions at the hearing.When asked if she is aware that other lawyers have tried to avoid sanctions by arguing they filed the wrong brief, see,e.g., R-Mart Trailers LLC v. MP Custom Trailers LLC, No. 5:24-CV-87-RWS, Docket No. 59 at 2 (E.D. Tex. July 17,2025); Coomer v. Lindell, No. 22-CV-01129-NYW-SBP, 2026 WL 1256553, at *1 (D. Colo. May 7, 2026), Ginsburg statedthat she has no idea because she has been practicing over 20 years and handled over 2,000 cases in federal courtwithout experiencing anything like this. When asked what she believes would be an appropriate sanction, Ginsburg statedthat this question is completely out of her wheelhouse because she has never been sanctioned. The Court doubts thatGinsburg is totally uninformed about the types of sanctions courts have deemed appropriate in cases containing fakecases, quotes, or propositions.16To be clear, Ginsburg's Order to Show Cause Response does not assert that the file was written over, but that theparalegal suggested it was. At the hearing, Ginsburg used similar language, claiming that her paralegal believes therevised draft was overwritten.17Because Rule 11 sanctions serve to deter future misconduct by others, federal courts have issued creative non-monetarysanctions even when an attorney earnestly accepts responsibility. See, e.g., Lifetime Well LLC v. IBSpot.com Inc., 819F. Supp. 3d 373, 389 (E.D. Pa. 2026) (ordering attorney that “accepted responsibility” to “send a cover letter to thePresident of the Philadelphia Intellectual Property Lawyers Association enclosing today's Order, this Memorandum ...and respectfully advise the President of our request these attachments be shared with the Association's membershipduring its next Association membership meeting as a lesson on the risks of artificial intelligence”).18There is no evidence suggesting that Plaintiff was aware of Ginsburg's conduct, so he will not be sanctioned. To avoidprejudicing Ginsburg's client for her misconduct, the Court will also allow a corrected response to be filed.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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