Our review in this regard is deferential, and we examine the district court’s balancing of the equities only for an abuse of discretion.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 363 U.S. 528, 535, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 1330, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1960). Moreover, the district court’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, although we examine conclusions of law
de novo. Wright and Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2962 at 633-36 (1973 and Supp.1993).
As to the district court’s original decision, the available evidence — indicating that Salvano and Coon took various documents and information pertaining to Merrill Lynch’s clients and used that information to solicit Merrill Lynch customers — sufficiently supports the court’s determinations regarding irreparable harm and the inadequacy of Merrill Lynch’s legal remedy. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1055 (4th Cir.1985) (“Merrill Lynch faced irreparable, noncom-pensable harm in the loss of its customers”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Patinkin, 1991 WL 83163 at *6, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6210 at *16 (N.D.Ill. May 3, 1991) (noting that Merrill Lynch “suffers irreparable harm from the solicitation and loss of its clients, and that this is a harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy”). Moreover, although the defendants would likely suffer some harm during the pendency of the TRO, the court was warranted in determining that the denial of the TRO would inflict greater injury upon Merrill Lynch than the granting of the TRO would inflict upon the defendants. See Patinkin, at *6, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6210 at *16 (stating that Merrill Lynch’s potential harm “on several levels, is enormous”). The TRO served to maintain the status quo without prejudice to the merits of any of the parties’ claims or defenses until an arbitration panel could consider the issues presented. Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1052-53 (noting that arbitration can become a “hollow formality” absent a court’s ability “to preserve the meaningfulness of the arbitration”); Teradyne, 797 F.2d at 51; Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053-54. We are unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting a TRO enjoining the defendants from soliciting any business from Merrill Lynch clients and from disclosing. Merrill Lynch records.
The case law does not clearly resolve, however, the extent to which the district court’s authority to grant injunctive relief extended beyond the initial November 4 TRO. Although we decline to follow the approach of the Eighth Circuit, which found a district court’s grant of any injunctive relief in an arbitrable dispute to be an abuse of discretion, see Hovey, 726 F.2d at 1291-92, we do not go so far as to determine that that authority extends ad infinitum. A reasonable limitation is set forth in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Patinkin, 1991 WL 83163 at *4, 6,1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6210 at *13, 20 (N.D.Ill. May 3, 1991), a district court case with facts similar to the case before us. Although the court granted the plaintiffs request to extend a TRO that had been imposed earlier, it explicitly did so only “until the arbitration panel is able to address whether the TRO should remain in effect.” Id. at *6, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6210 at *20. Once assembled, an arbitration panel can enter whatever temporary injunc-tive relief it deems necessary to maintain the status quo.
Language in some of the other circuit decisions lends support to the Patinkin approach. .For example, the Second Circuit’s Blumenthal decision, which refused to carve out an exception that would limit courts’ power to issue injunctions in NYSE cases where arbitrations are expeditious, nevertheless noted that “[wjhere an, injunction has been issued and it turns out that prompt arbitration is available, the enjoined party is that much more able to have the injunction promptly reconsidered.” 910 F.2d at 1054. The logical implication of this observation is that courts are ill-advised to extend the injunction once arbitration proceeds.
In light of this analysis, one of the bases that Salvano and Coon set forth for distinguishing Sauer-Getriebe from the present case — that is, that no arbitration proceeding had been commenced at the time the Sauer-Getriebe action was initiated in federal dis