Mills v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:25-cv-1219-MTS (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Theoda E. Mills, Jr. v. City of St. Louis, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Matthew T. Schelp (J.) (unanimous Court)
THEODA E. MILLS, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 251781Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court,E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.THEODA E. MILLS, JR., Plaintiff,v.CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al., Defendants.Case No. 4:25-cv-1219-MTS|01/30/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsDr. Theoda E. Mills, St. Louis, MO, Pro Se.Curtis D. Wilson, St. Louis City Counselor's Office, St. Louis,MO, for Defendants.MATTHEW T. SCHELP, UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGEMEMORANDUM AND ORDER*1 Before the Court are Plaintiff's response to the CourtsOrders to Show Cause, Doc. [35]; see also Fed. R. Civ.P. 11(c)(3), and Defendants’ unopposed Motion to Dismiss,Doc. [23]. After due consideration, the Court finds that thisaction should be dismissed for two independent reasons.Therefore, as explained in more detail below, the Court willdismiss Plaintiff's action with prejudice.*Theoda E. Mills, Jr. filed this pro se employmentdiscrimination case against the City of St. Louis, SylviaJackson-Bell, and Victoria Anwuri alleging that theydiscriminated against him based on his age and sex andalso subjected him to retaliation. Doc. [1]. From the startof this action, Plaintiff's filings contained misquotations ormisrepresentations about case law he cited and discussed.See, e.g., id. 8. The egregiousness of these misstatementsincreased over time and progressed to Plaintiff citing casesthat do not even exist and including wholly fabricatedquotations from cases that do. See Mills v. City of St. Louis,4:25-cv-1219-MTS, 2025 WL 3470293, at *1 (E.D. Mo.Dec. 3, 2025) (providing multiple examples of Plaintiff'smisstatements). For this misconduct, the Court required himto show cause why it should not sanction him under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(3). Id. Plaintiff filed hisresponse, Doc. [35], which the Court has reviewed andconsidered.As the Court explained in its show cause order,Plaintiff's errors “bear the hallmarks of artificial intelligencehallucinations.” Mills, 2025 WL 3470293 at *1. WhilePlaintiff does not specifically own up to using artificialintelligence to write his filings, he acknowledges that he used“electronic drafting tools that paraphrase legal principles.”Doc. [35] at 2. He “mistakenly believed,” he adds, that “thosesummaries accurately reflected the holdings of the citedcases.” Id. But “all litigants—represented and unrepresented—must read their filings and take reasonable care to avoidmisrepresentations, factual and legal.” Jones v. KankakeeCnty. Sheriff's Dep't, --- F.4th ----, No. 25-1251, 2026 WL157661, at *3 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026).Whether Plaintiff used artificial intelligence is largelybeside the point in a determination of whether he violatedRule 11 because the fact remains that he provided theCourt with multiple filings that contained fictitious andmisleading information. Whatever the reason, this kind ofmisinformation is “fundamentally incompatible with ourjustice system,” a system that “is constructed in a way thatdepends on integrity and honesty from the parties.” SeeJessica R. Gunder, Why Can't I Have a Robot Lawyer? Limitson the Right to Appear Pro Se, 98 Tul. L. Rev. 363, 406(2024). Thus, regardless of the origins of the fake case law andquotations, Plaintiff's “attempt to persuade a court or opposean adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of theadversary system.” See Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).As other courts have recognized, “[e]very filing in a federalcourt that contains citations to phony case law amountsto a violation of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure.” Turnage v. Associated Bank, N.A., 0:25-cv-3004-ECT, 2025 WL 3052638, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 12, 2025),aff'd summarily, 25-3092 (8th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025); accord
THEODA E. MILLS, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489, 495 (D. Wyo.2025); Elizondo v. City of Laredo, 5:25-cv-0050-MGM, 2025WL 2071072, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 23, 2025). Plaintiff'sactions, regardless of the nature of their origin, violatedRule 11, and the Court concludes these violations warrantsanctions.1 The question now is what sanction is appropriatehere.*2 Choosing a Rule 11 sanction is a context-sensitive matterand should be based on a case-by-case inquiry. See ProtectiveLife Ins. Co. v. Dignity Viatical Settlement Partners, L.P., 171F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1999); Orlett v. Cincinnati Microwave,Inc., 954 F.2d 414, 419 n.5 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Vallejo v.Amgen, Inc., 903 F.3d 733, 747 (8th Cir. 2018) (recognizingthat district courts have “broad discretion in the choiceof sanctions”). After careful consideration of the facts andcircumstances here, the Court finds that dismissal of thisaction is the appropriate sanction. See Carman v. Treat, 7 F.3d1379, 1382 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding district court did not abuseits discretion by dismissing action with prejudice as a Rule 11sanction); Hernandez v. Acosta Tractors Inc., 898 F.3d 1301,1305 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Certainly, the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure give courts authority to enter default judgments ordismissals as sanctions.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11)).Although the Court has considered the full range of facts andcircumstances at play here, three key circumstances underpinthe Court's chosen sanction. See Clark, 460 F.3d at 1008(noting district courts should “explain the basis” for theirchosen Rule 11 sanction). First, Plaintiff made numerousmisstatements in multiple filings. His misconduct, in otherwords, was “part of a pattern of activity,” not an “isolatedevent.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to1993 amendment. It is intuitive that a pattern of wrongdoingwill, at least at times, “require stiffer sanctions than an isolatedincident.” See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Pracs.Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 615 (D.N.J. 1997).Second, even after the Court brought this matter to Plaintiff'sattention, he continued this pattern of activity. Plaintiff madean objectively false representation regarding yet another casein a filing he made to the Court days after the Court's showcause order. See Doc. [32] at 3, 4 (claiming, multiple times,that this Court appointed counsel to the pro se plaintiff inZekert v. FieldWorks, LLC, 4:20-cv-0471-RWS (E.D. Mo.),which the Court did not do). The Court views this additionalmisrepresentation as especially egregious given that the Courthad put Plaintiff on notice of the falsification issue and itsseriousness.2 So, while even “a pure heart and empty head”is not enough to “avoid the sting of Rule 11 sanctions,”Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1488 (9th Cir. 1994), andregardless of Plaintiff's state of mind when he made his earliermisrepresentations, he made this latest misrepresentation withmore than mere negligence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisorycommittee's note to 1993 amendment (noting courts mayconsider “[w]hether the improper conduct was willful, ornegligent” when fashioning a sanction).Third, Plaintiff simply should have known better. He is awell-educated individual who has earned a doctorate degreein his field. Cf. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7thCir. 2007) (en banc) (noting courts consider a plaintiff'sliteracy, communication skills, and educational level whendetermining his competence to litigate his own case). Tobe sure, Plaintiff heavily leans into his self-representedstatus to excuse his misdeeds. But “[t]here is no pro seexception to Rule 11(b).” Turnage, 2025 WL 3052638, at*3; accord Ferguson v. Comm'r of Tax & Fin., 739 F. App'x19, 22 (2d Cir. 2018). Not only has the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Eighth Circuit explained time and againthat pro se representation “does not excuse a party fromcomplying...with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,”Ackra Direct Mktg. Corp. v. Fingerhut Corp., 86 F.3d 852,856 (8th Cir. 1996), Rule 11’s plain terms apply to an“unrepresented party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Declining toissue sanctions because a litigant is pro se “would effectivelyplace all unrepresented parties beyond the reach of Rule 11.”Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994) (percuriam).*3 With these considerations in mind, along with thebroader facts and circumstances at play here, the Court hasthoughtfully considered possible sanctions to arrive at onethat is not more severe than reasonably necessary to deterrepetition of the conduct by Plaintiff or comparable conductby other litigants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). The Court doesnot find that an admonition, reprimand, or censure would beadequate here. The Court already put Plaintiff on notice of hismisstatements, and he persisted in them. Likewise, requiringparticipation in seminars or other educational programs forthis pro se Plaintiff would be neither adequate nor appropriate.And Plaintiff specifically has requested that any sanctionbe “non-monetary.” See Doc. [35] at 4; cf. White v. Gen.Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 685 (10th Cir. 1990) (findingdistrict courts must consider an “offender's ability to pay”Rule 11 monetary sanctions); Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d516, 529 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding same). After measuredconsideration, the Court finds that dismissal of Plaintiff's
THEODA E. MILLS, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3instant action with prejudice is appropriate and necessary—but not more severe than necessary—to deter repetition ofPlaintiff's conduct by him or other litigants.It is true that, at least in other contexts, the Eighth Circuithas described the dismissal of a claim with prejudice as an“extremely harsh sanction.” See, e.g., Norman v. Ark. Dep'tof Educ., 79 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 1996). This Court doesnot impose the sanction lightly or indiscriminately. But it doesnote that, here, dismissal with prejudice may, if anything, bean inadequate sanction given that dismissal of this action isappropriate for another independent reason. See Thomas v.Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir.2002) (Posner, J.) (“Even dismissal with prejudice wouldn'tbe much of a sanction unless the plaintiff's suit was a winner,or at least had some settlement value, which it may not havehad.”).Though the Court has decided that this action should bedismissed with prejudice as a sanction for Plaintiff's Rule11 violations, this other matter is worth addressing if for noother reason than that it independently warrants dismissalof this action with prejudice. See United States v. Files, 63F.4th 920, 935 n.4 (10th Cir. 2023) (Newson, J., joined byTjoflat, J., concurring) (explaining that when district courtsprovide “redundant decisional grounds,” it can “meaningfullyincrease judicial efficiency”); see also, e.g., Thomas v.Pangburn, 4:23-cv-0046-RSB, 2023 WL 9425765, at *7(S.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2023) (recommending case be dismissed onthe merits or, in the alternative, as a sanction for violatingRule 11). Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss this action onNovember 28, 2025. Doc. [23]. The Court ordered Plaintiff to“file any opposition” to that Motion no later than December16, 2025. Doc. [25]; see also Doc. [33] (reminding Plaintiffthat his opposition was due on December 16, 2025). Forty-five days have passed since that Court-ordered deadline, butPlaintiff still has not opposed the Motion to Dismiss.“The Court construes such failure as an abandonment ofPlaintiff's claims.” Thomas v. Walmart Stores, LLP, 4:13-cv-0565-HEA, 2014 WL 117645, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 13,2014) (collecting cases and dismissing the action as to therelevant defendants). See also Farraj v. Cunningham, 659 F.App'x 925, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (mem.) (affirming the districtcourt's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint “based on his failureto oppose the motions to dismiss”). For this reason, the Courtwill grant Defendants’ unopposed Motion to Dismiss thisaction.Accordingly,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Theoda E. Mills,Jr., is SANCTIONED pursuant to Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 11(c), and for such sanction, this action will bedismissed with prejudice.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ unopposedMotion to Dismiss, Doc. [23], is GRANTED.A separate Order of Dismissal will beentered herewith. See Fed. R. Civ. P.58(a). Dated this 30th day of January2026.MATTHEW T. SCHELPUNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGEAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 251781Footnotes1Previous versions of Rule 11(c) made sanctions mandatory upon the finding of a violation. O'Connell v.Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987). After Rule 11’s amendment in 1993, district courtshave discretion to determine whether sanctions are appropriate in response to a violation. Fed. R. Civ. P.11(c) (providing “the court may impose an appropriate sanction” (emphasis added)); Franklin v. Pinnacle Ent.,Inc., 289 F.R.D. 278, 288 n.11 (E.D. Mo. 2012); see also 5A Wright & Miller's Federal Practice & Procedure §
THEODA E. MILLS, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.41336.1 (4th ed.). Exercising this discretion often will involve fact-intensive close calls. Clark v. United ParcelServ., Inc., 460 F.3d 1004, 1010 (8th Cir. 2006).2There is no doubt that Plaintiff saw the Court's show cause order before he wrote and submitted thisfiling because he referenced the Court's “Rule 11(b) concerns” in the filing, right alongside his Zekertmisrepresentations. Doc. [32] at 4.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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